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Rediscovering the Market
Economics, as scholarly discipline, dates back to 1776, when Adam Smith of 
Glasgow University published his pathbreaking book, the Wealth of Nations. 
Adam Smith's contribution was to analyze the way markets organized economic 
life and produced rapid economic growth. He showed that a system of price and 
markets Is able to co-ordinate people and businesses without any central 
direction.
Almost a century later, there appeared the massive critique of capitalism: Karl 
Marx’s Capital (1876-1894). Marx proclaimed that capitalism was doomed and 
would soon be follow by business depression, revolutionary upheavals, and 
socialism. In the decade that followed, events seemed to confirm Marx’s 
predictions. Economic panics and deep depressions between the 1890s and 
1930s led Intellectuals of the twentieth century to question the viability of prlvate- 
enterprlse capitalism. Economists began to apply their model in the Soviet 
Union in 1917, and by the 1980s, almost one-third of the world was ruled by 
Marxian doctrines.
In the 1980s, the wheel turned full circle. The capitalist countries of the West and 
socialist countries of the East rediscovered the power of markets to produce 
rapid technological changes and high living standards. The most dramatic 
development occurred In Eastern Europe, where the peaceful revolution of 1989 
forced the socialist countries to cast off their central planning apparatus and 
allow market forces to develop. The fundamental Insight of Adam Smith were 
rediscovered more than two centuries after he wrote the Wealth of Nations! 
{Samuelson, P , and Nordhause, WD, 1992:3).
Ill
To my Mother and Father, Hadil, Majd, Rawan, Razan, Rula, Faris, and Maram.
CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
ABBREVIATIONS 
LIST OF FIGURES 
LIST OF TABLES 
LIST OF BOXES
V
xiii
xiv
XV::
XV::
xix
INTRODUCTION
1. The importance of the study
2. Scope of the study
a. Period of slu(fy
3. Objective of the study
4. Methodological and empirical difficulties
5. Sequence of presentation
PART ONE: THE FEATURES OF THE CLASSICAL SOCIALIST SYSTEM 
AND WHY IT FAILED, AND THE ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE SOCIALIST 
SYSTEM IN POLAND (1945-89) 14
ii
SECTION (1) THE ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE CLASSICAL
SOCIALIST SYSTEM AND WHY IT FAILED 16
1. The economic features of the Classical Socialist System
a. Social ownership and concentration of power
b. Co-ordination Mechanism
1. Planning
2. Production and growth, investment (accmnulation), and consumption
a. Production and growth
b. Investment (accumulation)
c. Consmnption
3. Money and banking
a. Money
b. The banking system
4. Pricing
5. State Budget
6. External economic relations
7. Labour and wages
a. Labour
b. Wages
2, Why did the Classical Socialist System fail?
Endnotes
15
15
16
17
19
X923
25
25
25
27
29
30
31
31
32
33
38
SECTION (2) THE ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE POLISH SOCIALIST 
SYSTEM (1945-88) 40
1. Stages of Economic Development in Poland (1945-1988) 40
a. The GomuUca and Bierut Era (1945-1956): (The Imposition of CSS and Reconstruction) 41
b. Gomulka’s Regime Second Era (1956 - 1970): (Decollectivisation of agriculture and a move
from
agrarian to industrialisation economy)
0 . Gierek’s Regime Era (The 1970s): (New Development Strategy)
45
d. Kania’s & Jamzelski’s Regimes Era (1980s): (The rise of Solidarity, New Management System 
for SOEs, and Martial Law) 57
2. The Legacy of the Socialist System in Poland in the late 1980s
a. Share of the private and the public sector in GDP and Employment
b. Sources of output and employment
c. The effectiveness of the Industrial Sector in Socialist Poland
62
62
65
a
VI
d. Other macroeconomic indicators 68
e. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 70
f. Capital markets and banking 71
3. Conclusion: (An urgent need for a radical transformation programme) 72
Endnotes 74
PART TWO: THEORETICAL BACKROUND ON ECONOMIC 
TRANSFORMATION AND THE POLISH EXPERIENCE IN 1989/90, AND THE 
NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN POLAND (1990-95) 81
SECTION (3) THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AND 
THE POLISH EXPERIENCE IN 1989/90 82
1. Theoretical background on economic transformation 82
a. Theoretical transformation models 85
b. Sequencing of economic reform 92
c. Alternative stabilisation strategies 93
1. The Orthodox Approach pg
2 . The Heterodox Approach 95
2. The Polish economic transformation programme of 1989/90 96
a. Political developments 98
b. Economic issues 100
c. External influences 102
d. A two-stage programme 102.
e. Comparisons with economic theories 105
f. Major policy changes 107
1. Price Liberalisation 10?
2. Trade Liberalisation 109
3. Exchange rate regime 110
4. Tax System l U
g. Major political changes with virtually tlie same economic policy 112
Endnotes: 115
Vll
SECTION (4) THE NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN POLAND (1990-1995) 121
1. Output (GDP)
2. The growth of the Private Sector
a. Share of the private sector in the GDP and employment
b. Number of registered firms in the Private Sector
c. Financial performance of corporate sector
122
124
125
127
129
3. External trade 130
4. The State Budget
a. Revenues
b. Expenditures
1. Producer subsidies
2. Consumers’ subsidies and Social Security Benefits
5. The capital market, the banking system, and the money markets
a. Capital market and the development oftlie Stock Exchange
b. The banking system
1. Specialised banks
2. The Commercial Banks
3. Co-operative Banks
c. The money markets
1. Inflation
2. Credit
133
134
135
135
136
137 
137
139
140
141 
141
141
142
143
f
6. External debt
7. Foreign direct investment
8. The labour market
a. Employment
1. The enactment of 16 December, 1994
2. The establishment of the Employment Fund in 1992
2. Wages
144
145
147
147
149
149
150
vm
9. Conclusion
Endnotes
151
152
PART THREE: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON PRIVATISATION, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF POLAND'S PHILOSOPHY ON PRIVATISATION, 
STATISTICAL AND ECONOMIC RESULTS OF PRIVATISATION IN POLAND 
(1990-95), AND THE IMPACT OF PRIVATISATION ON ENTERPRISES 156
SECTION (5) THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON PRIVATISATION 167
1. The meaning of privatisation 157
2. The main issues of privatisation
a. The role of privatisation
1. Economic Goals
a. Fiscal impact
2. Impact on FDI
2. Social and Political Goals
3. Systematic Goals
b. Compartmentalising privatisation policies
c. Corporate governance and property rights
1. Take-overs
2. Mass or voucher privatisation
d  The problem of privatising large enterprises
158
158
162
163
164
165
165
166
168
172
172
177
3. Various Privatisation Models: Advantages and Disadvantages
a. Sale of SOEs
1. Sale to Enterprise Employees
2. Sale to Other Domestic Investors
3. Sale to Foreign Investore
b. Free transfer: personal entitlements and endowments to institutions
1. Personal entitlements
178
180
180
181
181
183
183
IX
:V
a. Free transfers to employees
b. Free transfer to citizens
2. Institutional endowments
a. Holding companies
c. Combinations of teclmiques
4. The main challenges to Privatisation in Eastern Europe
a. Political Constraints
b. Identification of enterprises chosen for privatisation:
c. Valuation
d. Low levels of demand for shares of the privatised companies
e. Lack of capital markets
f. Low levels of credit to the private sector
g. Protection of new owners 
Endnotes
183
183
186
186
186
186
187
187
188 
188 
189 
189 
189 
19l
SECTION (6) THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLAND'S PHILOSOPHY ON 
PRIVATISATION 195
1. Polish privatisation policy before 1989: (Communist era)
a. ‘Nomenclature’ privatisation phenomenon
b. Political and social background on Poland
196
197 
199
2. Polish privatisation policy after the collapse of Communism (September, 1989-December, 
1995) 201
A. Privatisation policy during the ex-communists era (September, 1989-September, 1993) 201
1. Mazowiecki’s Government Era (September, 1989-December, 1990) 202
a. Control over tlie privatisation process, and the decay of ‘nomenclature’ ’ privatisation 203
b. ‘British model’, ‘employee’ vs. citizen’ ownership and ‘insiders’ pressure
c. New form of ownership: ( ‘corporatisation’ or ‘commercialisation’)
d. Legally controlled process and privatisation methods
1. Capital’ privatisation
2. Privatisation Through Liquidation
3. Bankruptcy Liquidation
e. Involvement of foreign investors in the privatisation process
f. Reprivatisation
g. The declared goals of privatisation
203
205
206 
209 
214
217
218 
219 
219
2. Bielecki’s Government Era (January, 1991-December, 1991) 221
a. A shift towards citizens’ ownership 222
b. Adoption of Foreign Investment Law 223
c. Sectoral privatisation programme 224
d. Restructuring privatisation programme 225
e. Regional offices 225
f. Local government involvement 225
3. Olszewski’s Government Era (December, 1991-June, 1992) 226
4. Suchocka’s Government Era: (July, 1992 - September, 1993) 227
a. State Enterprise Pact 227
b. Tlie Mass Privatisation Prograimne (MPP) 228
1. Basis of implementation 229
2. Aims of the MPP 229
3. The structure of the NIFs programme: 229
4. MPP Timetable 230
5. Implications for companies, citizens, and the whole Polish economy 233
6 . Critique over the MPP 236
B. Privatisation policy during the ex-Communist Era (September, 1993-December, 1995) 240
1. Pawlak’s Government Era (September, 1993 - March, 1995) 237
a. The Stabilisation, Restructuring and Privatisation Programme (SRP) 238
2. Oleksy’s Government Era (March, 1995- December, 1995) 239
4. Conclusions 240
Endnotes 242
i
SECTION (7) STATISTICAL & ECONOMIC RESULTS OF PRIVATISATION IN 
POLAND (1990-95) 249
1. Small Privatisation 251
2. Medium and large-scale privatisation
a. The pace of ownership transformation
1. ‘Capital’ Privatisation
a. Techniques of privatisation via the capital’ path
b. Privatised STCs via the capital’ path by the economic sector
d. Assessment of the effects of ‘capital’ privatisation path
2. Privatisation through Liquidation based on Article (37)
XI
255
255
259
259
262
262
263 i
i
■i: ■:
i : : :
3. Bankruptcy liquidation based on Article (19) 264
3, The involvement of foreign investors in the privatisation process
a. The extent of participation of foreign parties in privatisation
b. The scope of foreign investment in Poland
c. Involvement of foreign investors in the privatisation processes
265
265
266 
269
4. Revenues from Privatisation 271
5. Conclusions
Endnotes
272
275
SECTION (8) THE IMPACT OF PRIVATISATION ON ENTERPRISES 278
Who are the new owners? 278
Corporate control and privatisation in Poland 281
a. Corporate control in ‘capital’ privatisation 281
b. Corporate control in ‘privatisation via liquidation’ 283
c. Corporate control in Mass Privatisation Programme 284
Privatisation impact on the performance of enterprises 285
a Study number one 285
b. Study number two 288
c. Study nmnber three 289
d Study number four 296
e. Study number five 299
Study number six 301
1. Revenues and costs 301
2. Profitability 301
3. Capitalisation 302
4. Liquidity indicators 303
5. Financial Liabilities 304
6. Assets tmrnover ratio 304
7. Adaptation of products to the market 304
xn
8. Employment 306
9. Wages 307
10. Ownership 307
11. Companies’ control 308
Endnotes 310
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 313
XIll
I
■E
1. Summary 313 |
2. Conclusions 318
BIBLIOGRAPHY 322
i'S:î
ISt
Acknowledgment
I would like first to thank my Supervisors Professor Tauno Tiusanen, and Mr. Richard 
Berry, of the Institute of Russian and East European Studies at the University of Glasgow, 
for their advice and clarifying suggestions.
I would also like to thank my colleagues in the Central Bank of Jordan for their invaluable 
encouragement and support. Special thanks go to the Central Bank o f Jordan for its 
financial assistance. Without its scholarship, this degree would not be achieved.
I wish also to thank the Ministry of Privatisation, Ministry of Finance, the Central 
Statistical Office of Poland for their help in providing data and information necessary for 
this study.
I would like also to thank my friends in Scotland for their encouragement and support. 
Special thanks go to Miss Lesley Hardie for reading my thesis and helping with English 
language usage.
Special thanks also go to Prof. Margaret Reid, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville 
(USA), a fi-iend whom I have never met, for her suggestions and encouragement through 
the ‘email’.
Finally, I am extremely grateful to my parents, brothers and sisters for their 
encouragement and patience at every stage of my studies.
Glasgow, August, 1996 
Adli Shehadeh Ayed Kandah
XÏV
ABBREVIATIONS
FER Fixing Exchange Rate
CPR Central Parity Rate
EIT Enterprise Income Tax
PIT Personal Income Tax
SOAs State Owned Assets
SBA Stand-by-Arrangements
GUS Central Statistical Office (CSO)
POCs Private-Owned Companies
FJVs Foreign Joint Ventures
EFTA European Foreign Trade Agreement
EU European Union
LDCs Less Developed Countries
DC Developed Countries
WSE Warsaw Stock Exchange
BOP Balance of Payments
wwn Second World War
LC London Club
PC Paris Club
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
PAIZ Polish Agency for Foreign Investment
SPA State Property Agency
IPO Initial Public Offering
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
SOEs State Owned Enterprises
IMF International Monetary Fund
WB The World Bank
IBRD The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
XV
c s s  Classical Socialist System
VAT Value Added Tax
Comecon Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
STCs State Treasury Companies
GDP Gross Domestic Product
SPC State Planning Commission
CPA Central Planning Authority
COMs Council of Ministers
FTO Foreign Trade Organisation
EEC European Economic Community
CPEs Centrally Planned Economies
PZPR Polish Workers Communist Party
WOG Wielka Organizacja Gospodarcza (Large Economic Organisations)
TFP Total Factor productivity
DRC Domestic Resources Costs
PPI Producer Price Index
CPI Consumer Price Index
JVs Joint Ventures
NBP National Bank of Poland
MoP Ministry of Privatisation
MoF Ministry of Finance
ME Market Economy
IFC International Finance Corporation
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
NEM New Economic Mechanism
STEs Soviet Type Economy
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
CEM Country Economic Memorandum
PPRG Polish Policy Research Group
US$ United States Dollar
XVI
Î
I
‘: i■S*
S
È' 'A ' -I:'-.:....• . 'v J--'
ZI Zloty (Polish National Currency)
Sejm Polish Parliament ■1
PSL United Peasant Party 1
SD Democratic Party
JIT Investment TrustHC Holding Company
JSCs Joint Stock Companies
SLD Democratic Left Alliance
MEBO Management Employee Buy-out ÎZCHN Christian National Union . i
NIFs National Investment Funds I
SCs Share Certificates 1use Universal Share Certificates ’
MPP Mass Privatisation Programme
SRP Stabilisation Restructuring Programme
IDA Agency for Industrial Development 1
IVs Investment Vehicles
MoIT Ministry of Industry and Trade 1
KPN Confederation of Independent Poland
GIfME Gdansk Institute for Market Economics 1
SME Small and Medium Sized Department 1j
X V ll
FIGURES
Figure (1.1) Levels of Administration in a Typical Classical Socialist System 
Figure (1.2) The Typical Structure of Industrial Administration (1955)
Figure (4.1) Growth Rate of GDP (%) (1990-95)
Figure (4.2) Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance 
Figure (4.3) Inflation Rates in Poland (%) (1989-90)
Figure (7.1) The Number of SOEs Privatised and Liquidated by Different Paths of 
Privatisation (1990-95)
Figure (7.2) The Number of STCs Privatised in Poland (1990-95)
TABLES
Table (2.1 
Table (2.2 
Table (2.3 
Table (2.4 
Table (2.5 
Table (2.6 
Table (2.7 
Table (2.8 
Table (3.1 
Table (4.1 
Table (4.2 
Table (4.3 
Table (4.4 
Table (4.5 
Table (4.6 
Table (4.7
Basic Indices of the Polish Six Year Plan (1950-55)
Selected Economic Indicators in Poland (1955-70)
Macroeconomic Indicators for Poland (1975-80)
The Economic Collapse of 1980-81
Macroeconomic and External Trends, 1983-1989
Share of Private Sector in Output and Employment, 1989 (%)
Sources of GDP and Employment by Economic Sector (%)
Polish Macroeconomic Indicators in 1988 and 1989 
Strategy for Poland: Major Economic Indicators (%)
Sectoral Origin of GDP and Employment (Current Prices) (%)
Share of Private Sector in Output and Employment (1989-1995) 
Economic Units in The Polish Private Sector (1989-94)
Financial Performance of Corporate Sector 1992-94 
Trade Balance in Poland in US$ Billion (1989-95)
Geographical Distribution of Exports and Imports in Poland (1989-95) 
Composition of Exports (1985-95)
X V lll
I
-J
I
,î
I
__
Table (4.8) 
Table (4.9) 
Table (4.10) 
Table (4.11) 
Table (4.12) 
Table (4.13) 
Table (4,14) 
Table (4.15) 
Table (4.16) 
Table (4.17) 
Table (7.1) 
Table (7.2)
Table (7.3) 
Table (7.4)
Table (7.5)
Table (7.6) 
Table (7.7)
Table (7.8)
Table (7.9)
Table (7.10)
Table (7.11) 
Table (8.1) 
Table (8.2)
Composition of Imports (1989-95)
Fiscal Budget: Revenues and Expenditures (%) in GDP 
Credit to Non-government (% change in real terms)
External Debt and Debt Service Burden 1989-95
FDI in Poland 1989-95 in US$ Million
FDI in Poland, as of December 1995
GDP, Employment and Disguised Unemployment
Unemployment in Poland 1990-95
Employment Fund Expenditures (in Billion Old Zloties)
Growth Rates of Nominal and Real Wages in Poland 1989-95 
Properties Sold and Leased Under Small-scale Privatisation 
The Number of SOEs in the Process of Ownership Transformation by Path 
of Privatisation 1990-95
The Number of SOEs Privatised by Method of Privatisation 1990-95 
The Number of SOEs in the Process of Ownership Changes by Economic 
Activity and Privatisation Method 1990-95
The Number of SOEs in the Process of Ov/nership Changes by Viovodship 
and Method of Privatisation, as of December 1994 
The Number of STCs Privatised by Technique of Privatisation 1990-94 
The Number of STCs Privatised Via ‘Capital’ Path by Economic Sector 
1990-September 1995
The Number of Privatised Enterprises Under Article 37 by Method of 
Disposal of Assets
The Number of Companies With Foreign Participation by Establishment 
1990-95
The Number of Companies with Foreign Participation by Establishment 
and Investor Country
Revenues From Privatisation 1990-94 (in Million Zloties)
The Distribution of Shares by Type of Control 
Profitability Indicators by Industry
XIX
: |
Î
i
' :
Table (8.3) Liquidity Indicators by Industry
Table (8.4) Quick Ratio Indicators By Industry
Table (8.5) The Relation of Financial Liabilities by Industry
Table (8,6) Modernising Products by Industry
I
BOXES
Box (1) Alternative Approaches to Assess the Impact of Privatisation 
Box (2) An Approach to Assess The Performance of The Polish Privatisation Process 
Box (3.1) Elements of Economic Reform Model Proposed by Fischer and Gleb (1991) 
Box (3,2) Elements of Economic Reform Model Proposed by Lipton and Sachs (1990) 
Box (3.3) Elements of Economic Reform Model Proposed by Komai ( 1990)
Box (3,4) Elements of Economic Reform Model Proposed by Summers (1990)
Box (3.5) Elements of Economic Reform Model Proposed by Hanson (1992)
Box (3.6) Elements of Economic Reform Model Proposed by Clague (1992)
Box (3.7) Elements of Economic Reform Model Proposed by The World Bank (1991) 
Box (3.8) Elements of Economic Reform Model Proposed by The 
WB/ IMF/ EBRD/ OECD (1992)
Box (3.9) The Polish Economic Reform Programme of 1989-1990 
Box (5.1) The Main Declared Privatisation Goals 
Box (5.2) Main Tools of Privatisation World Wide 
Box (5.3) Methods of Privatisation
Box (6.1) The Party Affiliation of Sejm Deputies in June, 1989 
Box (6.2) The Composition of The October 1991 Parliamentary Elections 
Box (6.3) The Composition of The September, 1993 Parliament in Poland 
Box (6.4) The Development of The Polish Privatisation Philosophy 1990-1995 
Box (7.1) Methods and Techniques of Privatisation Used in Poland 1988-95 
Box (7.2) The Different Procedures That Could be Applied to Privatise SOEs in Poland, 
by Size, and Financial Standing of the Enterprises
XX
Box (8.1) The Performance of Commercialised and Liquidated Enterprises
Box (8.2) A Summary of the Impact of Different Paths of Privatisation on Enterprises
XXI
Eg
"E:|
INTRODUCTION
In the mid to late 1980s, the governments of the Central and Eastern European countries 
started searching for a more efficient economic system. This was due to the fact that, 
during the 1970s and 1980s, Socialism had lost most of its allure. Compaied to what 
had been achieved in Western Europe, the USA, Japan, and the Pacific Rim after the 
Second World War, the Socialist countries had fallen fai’ behind*.
In the late 1980s and veiy eai'ly 1990s, it was reluctantly decided by many of the 
governmental planners to take the road to a market economy, or what was understood 
by these governments to be a market economy. This meant that many, but not all, of 
the barriers that hinder the growth of the market were to be removed. Governmental 
planners in these countries were initially confronted with two major questions: which 
approach (‘big-bang’ or gradual) should be adopted for the transition?, and once a 
decision about the approach had been made, what should be appropriate strategies for 
transition?.
Each country adopted a strategy and an approach that has suited its society and 
economy^. Poland, the case chosen here for analysis, adopted a ‘big bang’, or ‘shock 
therapy’ approach^ . The outcome of that decision, arrived at jointly with the IMF staff 
and Western experts (especially Sachs), produced a radical transformation programme, 
later called the ‘Balcerowicz Plan’ by the media .The Plan had two main components: 
a stabilisation and liberalisation package, and an institutional reform package.^ In fact, 
privatisation was one of the main elements of the institutional reform package. The 
main concern in this thesis is the element of privatisation, as an economic policy.
1. The importance of the study
The appeai'ance of privatisation on the World’s economic policy agenda can be 
attributed to different reasons. In the developed countries in the early 1980s,
ilprivatisation was inspired mainly by a revival of ‘New Right’ thinking, that is to say, it f
was an ideological decision, with issues of economic efficiency assuming a 
significantly important role later.^
In the developing countries, privatisation was linked with the macroeconomic burden of 
the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). SOEs were seen by the World Bank (WB) and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as an important contributory factor to 
surmounting fiscal imbalances. Financial support directed to SOEs reduced the 
amounts of funds available for social services, crowded out private sector borrowing, 
and undermined the development of the private sector.^
In the 1990s, following the democratic ‘revolutions’ and collapse of the Socialist 
regimes, Eastern European countries adopted privatisation as a central element in their 
economic reform programmes to transform their economies from socialist, centrally 
planned to capitalist, market orientated ones.^
The popularity of privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe can be explained in a 
variety of ways. Politically, it was a way for established political leaders to retain their 
influence in the face of growing disenchantment with socialist economies. Younger 
generations of economists were enamoured with the allures of economic efficiency, 
both productive and allocative, promised by traditional market models. Good Socialist 
enterprise managers and employees may have seen privatisation as a way to secure their 
continued employment, by advocating increased output, improving product quality and 
variety, reducing costs of production, improving innovative behaviour, and fostering 
investment based on - prospective profitability. The IMF and the World Bank staff 
might have hoped that privatisation could curb the growth of public spending and raise 
cash to reduce government debts. They argued that this objective can be achieved if 
the assets of SOEs are sold in the market at more than give-away prices, and if the 
resulting revenue is not entirely absorbed by the administrative and other costs 
(transaction costs) associated with carrying out the privatisation. Others, who believe 
in the Schumpeterian innovative theory, favour privatisation as an economic policy 
because of its general emphasis on private initiative and private markets as the most
___
successful route to economic growth and human development. Finally, a large group of 
Central and Eastern European countries, views privatisation as a way to broaden the 
base of ownership and participation in a society- encouraging larger numbers to feel 
that they have a stake in the system. One aspect of this is the attempt to create a new 
“middle class’’.^
In Poland, small-scale privatisation as an ''unojficial” economic policy was known 
since 1988, when the last Communist government of Rakowski opened the door to the 
development of the private sector. However, that kind of privatisation which was 
termed as 'nomenclature’ was rejected by the public, the first non-Communist 
government, and some of the interest groups, because it was ‘biased’ towards the 
managers of state enterprises, and was held to be ‘improper’ (See Section Six). But 
after the collapse of the Communist system, the first non-communist government of 
Mazowiecki adopted privatisation as an integral element in its economic reform 
programme, the “Balcerowicz Plan” of 1989/90, which then became “official” 
economic policy. At the time, privatisation had been gradually accepted by the Polish 
people in general, and by various interest groups in particular, for different reasons.^^ 
Therefore, privatisation as an economic policy has become very important in Poland, 
and this forms the basis of this study.
Poland is chosen as a case study because it is a front-runner in the process of economic 
transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Poland was the first of the ex- 
Communist countries to embark on a radical economic transformation programme, in 
which privatisation was a central element of that programme. I believe that the Polish 
privatisation methods may be taken as models to follow by many economies in other 
Central and Eastern European countries.
2. Scope of the study
a. Period of study
The study covers the period 1990-95. 1990 is the beginning of the Polish economic 
reforai programme. During the period of analysis, two major sub-periods can be 
distinguished: first, Januaiy, 1990-September, 1993; and second, September 1993- 
December, 1995. The first period covers the era when the non-Communists were in 
power, while the second covers the era when the ex-Communists returned to power. 
This gives us the chance to investigate whether there were changes in the attitudes of 
the different "interest groups” towards privatisation during the two distinct periods.
3. Objective of the study
Since privatisation is such a vast topic, and cannot be treated comprehensively in a 
single thesis, it is important to spell out what I will not discuss here. I will not discuss 
the process of privatising the banking system. I will not analyse the process of 
agriculture privatisation. I will not discuss the involvement of the international 
organisations in the privatisation process. I will not touch on the socially and politically 
complex question of restitution of property (or reprivatisation as it is called in Poland) 
that was nationalised from the 1940s through the 1950s. The concern of this study is 
Polish privatisation policy concerning only the 8,441 SOEs, excluding the (1,659) 
agriculture state farms (ASPs). That is to say the main concern of the study is the 
industrial sector. In addition, I will say little on small-scale privatisation. This study 
also can serve as a test of privatisation theories/approaches/models in settings for which 
we have no historical precedents.
The main general aim of the study is to analyse the Polish privatisation process and 
examine its contribution in creating a market economy in Poland during the period 
1990-95.
4. Methodological and empirical difficulties
The objective of examining the contribution of privatisation in shifting the economy 
from a Centrally planned system, to a modern market orientated system, involves an 
attempt to develop some indicators or measurements of the impact privatisation has had 
on the performance of Polish economy. Researchers in this field face many difficulties. 
For example, it is a difficult task not only to obtain data on a consistent and comparable 
basis pre and post-privatisation, but also to define the variables that can be taken as 
proxies when it comes to measuring the success or failure of the privatisation process; 
secondly, it is not easy to specify precisely a period that might be considered as 
“transition”; thirdly, it is difficult to remove the financial effects of balance sheet 
restructuring, and to measure ehanges in quality of inputs and outputsfourth,  there is 
also the difficulty of separating out the effect of ownership changes from the changes in 
the other elements of the economic reform programme (i.e. liberalisation and 
stabilisation factors). For instance, it is difficult to separate the impact of privatisation 
on the growth of the private sector and foreign direct investment, from that of other 
factors that have some effect on the growth of those variables '^ .^
In the case of Poland, the privatisation process is still ongoing, and only a short period 
of time has elapsed following the privatisation and corporatisation of the first 1000 
enterprises between December, 1993 and December, 1995. Consequently, only an 
preliminary assessment is feasible at this time.
To deal with these problems, I shall utilise main approaches that have been used to 
assess the privatisation process around the world, but also point to areas of uncertainty 
in these models to answer some of the questions posed. This remains the area where 
systematic case studies can assist the researchers to broaden the scope of existing 
research designs. A review of the existing work shows that five main approaches can 
be used to assess the impact of any privatisation process. Box (1) summarises these 
approaches:
Box (1) 
Alternative Approaches to Assess the Impact of Privatisation
The Approaches
1) The World Bank*s Approaches (1992)
Type of Assessment
2) The IMF Approach (1988)
3) Vickers* & Yarrow's (1988): 
Weiss's (1995); Karatas's (1995): 
Pott's (1995) Approach:
a) The macroeconomic impact of privatisation. Indicators taken are; 
Investment, output, productivity, economic welfare, diversification, b) The social impact o f privatisation. Indicators taken are: employment, wage levels, employment benefits.
a) The fiscal impact o f privatisation. Indicators taken are: revenues, expenditures, external debt.
a) The microeconomic impact o f privatisation, or the so-called the impact of privatisation on the 
enterprise level. Indicators taken 
are: labour productivity, profitability, sales, exports, profit-asset ratios, etc..
4) Cook's & Kirkpatrick's Approach (1995) a) The impact of privatisation on
economic welfare, using  _____ ___________________________________ Cost-Benefit Approach.
Source.' See Bibliography fo r complete citation.
In the specific Polish situation no single approach will be used^ .^ Therefore, in this 
study, I propose an alternative way utilising the first three approaches. The rationale is 
be both comprehensive and systematic, and capable of assessing some of the questions 
posed for this research. This approach assesses the impact of privatisation on the 
macroeconomic, social, fiscal and enterprise levels. Box (B) is primarily an 
elaboration on methodology used:
Box (B)
An Approach to Assess The Performance of The Polish Privatisation Process
A. Macroeconomic LevelIndicators taken are: GDP, Investment, productivity, employment, wages, prices,revenues, expenditures,
B. Enterprise levelIndicators taken are: labour productivity, profitability, sales, exports, profit-asset ratio, the new form of corporate governance
.................................................
5. Sequence of presentation
The study is divided into three major parts. Part One is on the features of the 
Classical Socialist System and why it failed (Section One), and (Section Two) the 
economic features of the Socialist system in Poland (1945-89). Part Two is concerned 
with the theoretical background on economic transformation and the Polish experience 
in 1989/90 (Section Three), and (Section Four) the new economic system in Poland 
(1990-95). Part Three is on the theoretical background on privatisation (Section Five), 
the development of the Poland’s philosophy on privatisation (Section Six), the 
statistical and economic results of privatisation in Poland during the 1990-95 period 
(Section Seven), the impact of privatisation on enterprises (Section Eight), and finally 
(Section Nine) conclusions and general lessons. The sequence of presentation is as 
follows:
a. To understand the logic behind the urgent need for a radical economic reform, in 
general, and for privatisation in particular, in Section One, I analyse the main economic 
features of the Classical Socialist System (CSS) in general, in order to shed some light 
on the main weaknesses and strengths of that system. Then, I try to answer the old 
question; “Why did that system fail?”. This serves as a general background to my 
analysis to the main features of Socialist system in Poland during the period 1945-89, in 
Section Two. The main purpose of Section two is to discuss the different economic 
development stages that Poland has passed through during the period 1945-89, and to 
highlight the main economic elements of the heritage of the Socialist system in Poland 
in the late 1980s. More specifically, I focus mainly on the characteristics of the private 
sector, the sources of output and employment, the effectiveness of the industrial sector 
in Socialist Poland, foreign direct investment, etc.. The aim is to point out the main 
factors responsible for the urgent need for a radical economic transformation 
programme in the late 1980s, in which privatisation was one main element.
b. Since it was decided by the Polish governmental planners to take the road to a 
market economy, and to adopt privatisation as a central element in the transition 
process, I investigate in the first part of Section Three how economic theories, and the
experiences of other countries, can help in formulating a reasonable economic 
transformation programme to transfer an economy from a Centrally planned, to a 
modem market orientated one. In this part, I sketch the most important economic 
transformation approaches that had been proposed by different economists at the start 
of the transformation process. And analyse the main stabilisation approaches, as well 
as the experiences of some countries that have gone through similar stabilisation 
process. In the second part of this section, I investigate how Poland managed to adopt 
its economic transformation programme of 1989/90, and analyse the main assumptions 
and components of the programme. In addition, the major economic policy changes are 
discussed. Here I ai'gue that Poland did not have the guidance that could be gleaned 
from theoretical economic models. The transformation in Poland happened before 
other economic reform programmes appeared in 1990. However, the aim is to find out 
how much the Polish economic transformation programme of 1989/90 resembles other 
theoretical models and the experiences of other countries that have gone through similar 
stabilisation process. It is important to discern the role of privatisation as an element in 
the whole transformation process.
c. In Section Four, the main general features of the structure of the new economic 
system that has emerged in Poland during the first six years of the transition period 
(1990-95) are discussed. Originally, the aim of this section is to investigate the impact 
of privatisation on the performance of the Polish economy. However, since it is very 
difficult to separate out the impact of the three elements of the economic transformation 
programme of 1989/90, therefore, one might argue that the impact of privatisation is 
implicitly included with the other impacts. Whenever possible, I try to divorce the 
impact of privatisation from other effects. In this section, I try to assess some of the 
official goals of privatisation that were set by the Polish government. These are: ''Did 
privatisation process help in creating an efficient market economy?'*. More 
specifically, "What is its impact on the output?"; "What is its impact on the private 
sector?"; "What is its impact on the fiscal budgetff'What is its impact on foreign 
trade?"; "What is its impact on the capital market?"; and "What is its impact on the 
labour market?".
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d. In Section Five, a theoretical background on privatisation is created. I discuss the 
meaning of privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe in general, the main issues of 
privatisation in Eastern Europe, focusing on the overall role of privatisation, the 
corapartmentalisation of privatisation policies, corporate governance and property 
rights, and finally, privatising large enterprises. In addition, I outline the various 
privatisation objectives focusing on the declared privatisation goals in Eastern Europe. 
Then, I outline the main methods and procedures of privatisation from the more radical 
to the more moderate, and outline their possible advantages and disadvantages in 
greater detail. Finally, the main constraints to privatisation are analysed. This Section 
serves as a general framework for my empirical work on the Polish privatisation 
process in the following sections of the thesis.
e. In Section Six, the development of Poland’s philosophy on privatisation, from the 
late 1980s to the end of December, 1995, is analysed. The main proposals that were 
initiated in Poland during that period are discussed and related to the Polish economic, 
political, and social set up. Our attention is directed to discern whether there is a 
change in the attitude of the Polish governments in respect of privatisation policy, and 
to ascertain the main reasons behind that change. The main questions that are tackled 
in this section are: (1) “Did Polish privatisation philosophy change in the latest part of 
the period of the study (September, 1993- December, 1995), in comparison to that at the 
start of the period of the study- when the non-communists were in power (September, 
1989- September, 1993)?. (2) “Why certain privatisation methods were chosen, above 
others?”. (3) “How much the political, social, and economic pressure groups 
(managers of large state enterprises, workers’ councils, and trade unions) were able to 
shape (or reshape) Polish privatisation philosophy during the period under analysis?”.
f. Section Seven analyses, statistically and economically, the main results of the 
different paths to privatisation, focusing at the end, on the involvement o f foreign 
investors in the privatisation process. More specifically, the following will be analysed: 
(1) the number of SOEs under processes of ownership transformation. (2) the number 
of SOEs which are subjected to ownership transformation by legal path as of 
September, 1995. (3) the number of State Treasury Companies (STCs) privatised
j ;
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during the period 1990-95. (4) the number of SOEs privatised through liquidation 
procedures under Article 37 of the July 1990 law on privatisation. (5) the number of 
SOEs privatised through bankruptcy liquidation procedures under Article 19 of the law 
on SOEs of 1981. (6) the extent and scope of foreign investment that entered to Poland 
thi-Qugh the process of privatisation, by the number of companies, size of investment, 
origin of investor, type of privatisation, and economic sector. (7) and finally, revenues 
from privatisation are analysed. The aim of this section is to try to answer the 
following questions; “Did Polish privatisation policy meet the goals as stated by the 
successive Polish governments: “speed of adaptation and implementation”; “promoting 
wider share ownership among the public at large, including employees of enterprises”; 
and “generating funds for the budget” ?”.
g. Section Eight discusses the impact of privatisation on enterprise. The main points 
that I focused on are; “Who are the new owners of the enterprises?”; “Corporate 
governance and privatisation in Poland”; and finally, on the impact of privatisation on 
the performance of enterprises, relying mainly on some survey studies done by some 
Polish institutions, and individual experts. I focus on the issue of whether the Polish 
privatisation experience does (or does not) support the idea that ownership matters. 
This is done by comparing the performance of commercialised enterprises {i.e. those 
which were transformed into companies solely owned by the State Treasury), as well as 
those enterprises that were completely privatised through other paths to 
privatisation {like capital privatisation - which is the second step after 
commercialisation) before and after privatisation. The rationale is to try to find some 
evidence to assess the magnitude of the potential gain or loss from both privatisation 
and marketisation. In this case, I argue that marketisation has two faces: the first where 
enteiprises are still owned by the state (SOEs) and have access to the government's 
financial resources, but are operating in a new market environment; the second, when 
SOEs are transferred into limited liability companies solely owned by the State 
Treasury (i.e. commercialised), with new administrative and market conditions: new 
boards of directors, and in most cases new managers, and no workers’ councils, and 
finally ‘hai'd budget constraints’.
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The final goal is to try to derive some suggestions for Polish policy makers. The main 
ai’gument I shall advance here is to proceed, or not, with the second step of ‘capital’ 
privatisation, that is ‘commercialisation’. The policy recommendation would be to 
proceed with second step of ‘capital’ privatisation, if the gains from 
‘commercialisation’ are comparatively small. Or to stop and save time, effort, and 
money, if the gains from marketisation are big. The importance of the exercise is the 
fact that capital privatisation in Poland, is the most significant path to privatisation, 
because it involves numerous large enterprises that have high percentage shares in the 
Polish economy, measured by their shares in total output, employment, as well as 
exports. However, the problem is to define the meaning of the gains from 
‘commercialisation’.
To make the analysis more reliable, a comparison between the performance of 
privatised enterprises of one specific sector (e.g. construction sector), with the 
performance of the whole sector (i.e. construction), is done in study number six. This 
might be the closest available study to what is called “like-for-like” comparison studies.
h. Finally, the study ends by summarising and discussing the main conclusions and 
general lessons that can be learned from the Polish experience and the theoretical 
background.
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Endnotes:
1 This can be seen if one contrasts East and West Germany, which had roughly equal
5»;::|-
levels of productivity and similar industrial structure at the end of the Second World :|
War. After 4 decades of Communism in the Soviet Bloc, and Capitalism in the West, |
productivity in East Geimany had fallen to a level estimated between 1/4 to 1/2 of that 
in West Germany.
 ^ For example, Russia adopted a step-by-step approach, the Czech Republic chose to 
adopt shock therapy.
 ^ The Polish Approach was much more radical than the approaches adopted in the 
Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Hungaiy, because of the fact that in Hungary, 
some economic reforms were taken in the 1980s, while in the cases of the Czech and 
the Slovak Republics, it was partly because of the lower rates of inflation and less 
public support for the ‘big bang’ {Bryant, 1994:61).
Balcerowicz, 1990; Sachs, 1990; Rosati, 1991b:21.
 ^ Blaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1993; Bryant, 1994:60-61.
 ^ Bryant, 1993; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988 
 ^ Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1995 
 ^ Duke & Grime, 1994
 ^ Frydman & Rapaczynski, 1994; Poznanski, 1992; The World Bank, 1991; The IMF,
1994; Clague, 1992; Balcerowicz, 1990 & 1994; Balcerowicz & Dabrowski, 1993.
Poznanski, 1992.
One should differentiate between the official and public attitude towards 
privatisation. In the case of Poland, the shift in the official attitude towards 
privatisation began in the late 1980s, during the Communist government’s discussion of 
economic reform. The government’s initial strategy was not to privatise the overall 
economy; rather, it was to inject competition into the state-run sector. Eventually, 
however, it proved difficult for state leaders to praise market mechanisms while 
suppressing the private sector. The government’s change in strategy coincided with 
shifting popular attitudes towards privatisation. A 1984 survey reflected the public’s 
ambivalent attitude toward privatisation: 82% of those responding favoured the 
introduction of a competitive market economy, but only 50% wanted to expand the
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private sector. Social acceptance of privatisation came late in the 1980s, as the 
government increasingly consented to private sector growth. By 1988, the vast majority 
of those surveyed supported expansion of the private sector. At the time the public was 
prepared for some form of economic change. There were mainly two schools of 
thought: the first believed the change should occur through the introduction of market 
mechanisms into the state economy; while the second believed that the change should 
be through the privatisation of SOEs. The fall of Communist from power in 1989 made 
the second approach the only available option. (Kolarska-Bobinska, 1994:120-121). 
For more details on the attitudes towards privatisation in Poland since the reforms were 
launched, see Kolarska-Bobinska, 1994, “Privatisation in Poland: The Evolution of 
Opinions and Interests, 1988-1992”, In “A Fourth Way?: Privatisation, Property, and 
the Emergence of new market Economies'’, edited by, G S Alexander, and G Skapska, 
(Routledge:London).
Kramer, 1995:72.
"  Bollard & Mayes, 1991:23.
In the case of Poland, the growth of the private sector has been affected by a number 
of factors such as privatisation, reprivatisation, reclassification of some economic units 
by the Central Statistical Office, and the removal of the barriers to entry and exit on 
domestic and foreign private investors. Therefore, it was difficult to divorce the effect 
of privatisation on the growth of the private sector from the impact of the other factors.
Because this depends not only on the approach used, but also on who is reading the 
results: Politicians, Sociologists, Economists, or even the Public. When they assess the 
performance of privatisation. Politicians concentrate on the change in the structure of 
the economy and the role of the State after privatisation. Some economists read the 
impact in the short run: high rates of inflation, and reduction in the growth rates of the 
GDP, the appearance of the unemployment phenomenon. Others wait and assess the 
whole privatisation process on the medium and long terms: high growth rates of 
investment and the GDP and the attraction of foreign investment. Sociologists read the 
results starting with unemployment, social security benefits, and deterioration of real 
wages.
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SY STEM  AND WHY IT FAILED, AND THE ECONOM IC 
FEA TU RES O F  THE SO CIA LIST SYSTEM  IN POLAND (1945-89)
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SECTIO N  (1) THE ECONOM IC FEATURES O F THE CLA SSICA L 
SO CIA LIST SYSTEM  AND WHY IT FAILED
The main purpose of this section is to examine the general features of the economic 
structure of the Classical Socialist System^ (CSS), and to try to answer the question; 
“Why did the CSS fail?.” This enables us to have a better understanding of the main 
weaknesses and strengths of that system, and, at the same time, serves as a general 
framework for our discussion on the Polish Socialist System during the period 1945-89, 
in the next section.
1. The economic features of the Classical Socialist System
The general economic structure of the CSS can be reduced to four fundamental 
elements; (1) social ownership of the means of production; (2) concentration of power 
in the Communist party; (3) central economic planning; (4) and finally, socially- 
equitable distribution of national income.^
a. Social ownership and concentration of power
In the CSS, the nominal owner of the means of production is the state, represented by 
the national government. However, other forms of property exist when the enterprise is 
owned by a regional organisation of the state in federal countries, a national or 
provincial government, or a county, city, or village council.^
One of the most important property forms is the bureaucratic State Owned Enterprise 
(SOE). Another form of state property is the co-operative, especially in the agricultural 
sector. In most countries, the classical agricultural co-operative is exclusively a 
production and sales co-operative" .^
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Under the pure form of CSS, private firms employing hired labour either do not exist, 
or ai*e restricted to a small segment of the economy.^ The almost total elimination of 
private capitalism is precisely what the official ideology considers a major, or even the 
criterion of socialism. Only state and co-operative ownership are recognised 
ideologically as socialist. However, there were a variety of private forms (and partly 
related to them; production activities of a private nature), although they are dwarfed by 
the state and co-operative sector. Among these private forms, the most notable are 
small-scale private industry and commerce, household farming, and the informal 
private economy (such as production or service activity performed by one individual for 
another for compensation in money or kind; production and marketing of foodstuffs by 
those where full time job is not agriculture; subletting a privately owned or rented 
dwelling; trading activity outside the framework of state-owned; and co-operative and 
officially permitted private commerce )^ .
The unique feature of the CSS was that the central power, represented by the 
Communist Party, used to intervene from above artificially, by means of legal 
regulations, in the development of society, to decide that a market co-ordination should 
vanish, or at least be confined to insignificant positions, and replaced by centralised 
bureaucratic co-ordination. This was carried by the central decisions of power, and by 
fire and sword. It was then followed by numerous on effects (concomitants) that arose 
spontaneously without any central decision expressly being taken: the atrophy of self- 
governing forms, the dwindling of enthusiasm for family and community life to a 
subordinate role^.
b. Co-ordination Mechanism
Under the heading of co-ordination mechanism, I discuss the main features of the CSS 
in association with planning, production and growth, consumption, investment, money 
and banking, pricing, profit, state budget and fiscal policy , domestic and foreign trade, 
and finally, labour and wages.
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1. Planning
The term ‘planning’ had a very broad meaning in the former Socialist countries. It is 
defined as “the system of managing economic processes involving production, 
investment and consumption. Its essence consists of determining economic targets and 
the methods of their implementation, in particular the allocation of the means of 
production and of labour to different uses. As such, planning is an instrument of 
economic strategy to achieve the optimum growth of national income or the maximum 
satisfaction of social needs’’^ .
The system presupposed the existence of a central planning authority, usually known as 
the State Planning Commission (SPC), whose chairman was a member of the Cabinet. 
The main responsibilities of the SPC were; (1) determination of the criteria of economic 
calculation underlying planning decisions; (2) determination and quantification of the 
targets to be reached in the planned period; (3) co-ordination of the targets to ensure the 
internal consistency of the plan; (4) determination of appropriate methods to ensure 
plan fulfilment; (5) and finally, current revision of targets according to changing 
conditions^®.
The intellectual forerunners of the CSS saw planning as one of socialism’s great 
advantages. The details of the plan were naturally worked out in close collaboration 
with the different ministries. The role played by the operational level (enterprises and 
branch associations) differs according to the degree of centralisation. In the extreme 
case of ‘hierarchical’ planning, the plan was simply imposed from above by the SPC, 
and the different administrative organs and individual economic units had no influence 
on the plan (beyond supplying basic information to higher authorities)
The national economic plan was used to cover every aspect of activity in the economy. 
Under the CSS, implementation of the plan was compulsory. The most difficult 
problems facing planning were motivation of leaders in the economic bureaucracy, 
inner conflict and the problem in information flow* .^
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Therefore, one can understand that under Socialism, the market mechanism was 
superseded to varying degrees by planning. Markets for the means of production in the 
socialised sector were virtually eliminated. But elsewhere, markets never completely 
disappeared, and even under Stalinist ‘command’ planning and administration they had 
to be tolerated. They had always existed for certain consumer goods and services, such 
as privately grown produce, fish and wild animals caught privately, services and articles 
made by tradesmen in their spai'e time and placed in local markets at (relatively) free
prices according to local supply and demand 13
In fact, the extension of the role of the market in a planned economy was justified on 
three major grounds; the first, being based on Marxian ideas. Socialised economies 
had traditionally concentrated on macroeconomic issues, but they have failed at the 
microeconomic level. A substantially free operation of the maiket mechanism was a 
device to overcome the undesirable consequences of central planning in the micro 
sphere of production and consumption not lending itself to remote central control in 
order to produce the best results. The delegation to the market of the working out of 
microeconomic details also relieves central planners of unnecessary routine work, so 
that they can concentrate on long-term macro problems. Secondly, the market 
mechanism was necessary for the continuous verification and correction of planned 
decisions. Thirdly, the market provided a salutary discipline in the form of 
competition, so that production and distribution were constantly being adapted to 
buyers’ preferences, and carried out in the most efficient manner. Lack of competition 
contributed to the persistence of sellers’ markets, noted for shortages and inflationary 
pressure, a low quality of products and services, a weakening of incentives, speculation 
and various other abuses. In brief, the Socialist economic system which was almost 
completely governed by the market mechanism is known as market socialism- an idea 
put forward by Oskar Lange (of Poland) in the Thirties- and developed and improved 
by such economists as Brus (of Poland), Erdos (of Hungary), Kaganov (of the former 
USSR), Sik (of the former Czechoslovakia), and Sirotkovich (of the former 
Yugoslavia). During the Communist era, market socialism was adopted only in 
Yugoslavia and Hungary'" .^
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To sum up: in the advanced stages of the Socialist economic development, the majority 
of economists agreed that whilst economic planning must be retained, an extension of 
the role of the market was possible, indeed imperative, as it can^ :^ (i) ensure adaptation 
of production to buyers’ needs and thus lead to the development of buyers’ markets; (ii) 
evolve and maintain rational price structures conducive to the optimisation of 
production and distribution; (iii) create conditions for rapid technological progress; (iv) 
and finally, accelerate growth in labour productivity^^.
2, Production and growth, investment (accumulation), and consumption
a. Production and growth
According to the official classification of the CSS, material production fell into six 
major divisions: industry, construction, agriculture, transport, trade, and other material 
production. Of course, this list indicates the descending order of importance attached to 
the different branches of the economy. The classification of industry was broadly 
understood. It includes mining, quarrying, and manufacturing. Forestry, fishing, 
hunting and gathering were also ‘productive’. They might be included under ‘industry’ 
or ‘agriculture’, or sometimes treated as separate divisions, or included in the last 
(residual) division*^.
The remaining forms of activities constituted the ‘unproductive sphere’. These are 
usually classified under eight groupings: (i) public administration and justice; (ii) 
education, science and culture; (iii) health, social welfare and culture; (iv) finance and 
insurance; (v) local government and housing administration; (vi) defence; (vii) 
political, social and religious activities; (viii) and other services
In former Socialist economies, national income was calculated to comprise material 
production only, and was based on: (i) net value of production, i.e. excluding 
depreciation; (ii) domestic production, i.e. as attained within the country, irrespective of 
who ultimately received it; (iii) realised prices (not factor cost), i.e. including indirect 
taxes (called ‘turnover taxes’) but disregarding subsidies
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The economic administration in the former Socialist countries was centralised, in spite 
of considerable decentralisation attempts associated with the reforms during the history 
of the Socialist system. Typically, five levels of administration can be distinguished: 
the Council of Ministers; the State Planning Commission; economic ministries; 
‘intermediate’ administrative bodies (branch, or economic associations, regional 
authorities); enterprises (including workshops, farms, etc.). The Council of Ministers 
(the Government) was responsible for carrying out the general goals laid down by the 
Communist Party. The State Planning Commission, in addition to working out the 
national plan, was also responsible for determining the channels of its implementation, 
and the rest was then left to the respective economic ministries. Hence, the role of the 
government in any former Socialist country was much greater than in a market 
economy. Intermediate administrative agencies assumed different forms- ‘industrial 
branch association’ (in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the 
former USSR), ‘industrial associations’ (in Romania) or ‘economic associations’ (in 
Bulgaria). In Poland, ‘agricultural circles’ played an important role in the countryside. 
Productive enterprises can be conveniently divided into six categories: state industrial 
and trading enterprises; co-operative enterprises; state farms; collective farms; agro­
industrial undertakings; and the private sector^ ®.
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Figure (1.1)
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Source: Montias, 1962:28.
The most characteristic features of the Socialist rates of growth were likely to embody 
an upward bias. That is very clear because, first, the success of the enterprises was 
largely judged by the targets attained and overfulfilled. The management, in providing 
statistical returns, had a vested interest in overstating production achievements. 
Secondly, targets were usually defined in quantitative terms. The poor quality or even 
sheer uselessness of some production was not reflected in the rates. Moreover, there is 
a general agreement amongst a large number of Western economists (such as Bergson, 
Campbell, Cohn, Kaplan, Nove, and Nutter) that the official socialist growth rates were 
exaggerated^*.
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b. Investment (accumulation)
Under the CSS, the investment process was far more strictly centralised than day-to-day 
production. The national economic plan of any country distributed investment funds 
among the various ministries in the course of the planning and decision-making 
process. The investment rate was not a product of micro decisions dependent on 
anticipated demand and profitability, but was determined by the central authority in 
advance. The rate of economic growth in a given period of time depended on the 
investment made in the preceding period, and its efficiency. In former Socialist 
countries, the role of investment in economic growth was very high and direct.
Some priorities in the allocation of investments were applied. These are the following:
(1) priority of investment good: the sectors developed are primarily those that directly 
cause an increase in fixed capital, that is, the production of investment goods. (2) 
priority of domestic production over imports: the development of the sectoral structure 
is stamped by the pursuit of autarky. (3) priority of the production sphere: a distinction 
was made in Marxian political economy between “productive” and “non-productive” 
activity, as explained above. The productive sphere must have an investment advantage 
over the non-productive, in other words, the production of material goods over services. 
(4) priority of class-one production: Marxian political economy made a further
important distinction, between class-one and class-two production. The former created 
the means of production and the latter consumer goods. The priority: class one must 
enjoy an investment advantage over class two. (5) priority of industry: industry was 
considered to be the engine of growth. The strategy of forced growth primarily meant 
fast industrialisation. The priority: industry must have an investment preference over 
all other branches of the economy. (6) priority of heavy industry: the industrialisation 
preference must be given primarily to heavy industry, and within it to machinery and 
steelmaking. (7) priority of the arms industry: the investment demands of the armed 
forces, including both the army and the police, receive unconditional priority over 
civilian development tasks. The establishment of factories for purely military purposes 
received particularly close attention when investment funds were allocated. (8) priority 
of new installations. Moreover, there were other types of priorities concerning the
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development of the microstructure. These are priority of new installations; priority of 
big installations; and products and investment projects.^^
0 . Consumption
Under Socialism, consumption was centrally planned in advance, because it constituted 
an integral part of the national economic plan. In working out the consumption model, 
the Central Planning Authority (CPA) made a distinction between the preferences of 
consumers in their capacity as private individuals and as members of society. The CPA 
endeavoured to meet consumers’ private preferences up to the point where they did not 
interfere with the interests of society. When that conflict arose, the CPA would make 
value judgements, usually in favour of the long-term interests of society as a whole, in 
accordance with the principle known as the primacy of macrosocial preferences.
23
:,:A.
When it came to the realisation of the plan, the CPA might find either that it had gauged 
consumers’ preferences incorrectly, or that some unexpected developments had 
occurred on the production side. In such cases, three options were open to the 
authorities; (1) no attempt was made to restore equilibrium in the consumer goods 
market by changing either demand or supply, which could lead to either shortages or 
rationing. (2) steps were taken to adjust demand to the existing supply by the process 
called consumption steering. (3) supply was adjusted to demand, by the CPA ; ;
providing for larger stocks of finished goods and raw materials, creating excess capacity 
through additional investments and perhaps allowing more imports of consumer 
goods^ "*.
'ÀH.
I
IUnder Socialism a good deal of importance was attached to the distinction between ‘private’ (or individual), and ‘social’ (or collective) consumption. Private consumption consisted of those goods and services which were purchased out of the consumer’s own 
earnings on the basis of free choice. Social consumption included public child care, 
education at all levels, health benefits, pensions, housing, communal feeding, special 
holidays, transport, entertainment and cultural services. What is interesting to note is 
the fact that these benefits were provided completely free, or at charges well below
 : : : -  . . -
actual costs, on a far wider scale than even in the most affluent Western countries. 
Social consumption was financed from the state budget, and social insurance funds, 
communal resources and enterprises’ and farms’ profits were earmarked for the 
purpose.
The role of the consumer in the economy could be judged by the extent to which he 
used to influence production. In an extreme case of centralised planning, consumption 
patterns were simply imposed on the consumer from above by means of specific, non- 
transferable, fixed-period validity rationing. Under such conditions, there was no 
consumer’s choice and it was the planners who were sovereign. Absence of consumer 
choice was usually associated with tight, centralised command planning . This situation 
existed in the former Socialist countries up to the early 1950s. After that a liberal form 
of consumer’s free choice existed. Under the new form, the CPA had to exercise a dual 
system of control. This assumed the foim of a two-tier price system, whereby 
producers’ and retail prices of consumer goods could move independently. Thus the 
price received by producing enterprises could be manipulated to regulate profitability, 
and consequently production, whilst retail prices were regulated to influence 
consumption. By this insulation, production did not necessarily have to respond to 
consumers’ preferences, unless the CPA decided otherwise. Hence, planners could 
ensure equilibrium on the market. The deviations of retail from producers’ prices (apart 
from trade margins to cover distribution costs) was an indication of the extent to which 
the CPA controlled consumption, by manipulating retail prices rather than allowing 
them to respond to consumers’ changing preferences. It must be mentioned, however, 
that there were some prices of consumer goods which were ‘free’ prices, determined in 
the market according to supply and demand^^.
'
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S. Money and banking
a. Money
The formal feature of the CSS is that it was a monetised economy, but in fact it was a 
semi-monetised system, since the role of money in the economy was weak or 
secondary. Traditionally, the Marxists have always been negative about money, largely 
a reaction against Capitalism, where money reaches its peak of development and 
influence. Two distinct spheres of monetary flows can be distinguished: a ‘passive’ one 
and an ‘active’ one. In all of the transactions between enterprises and all government 
units cash was not used. All government units must hold accounts at an allocated 
branch of the state banking system, so their accounts were automatically debited and 
credited, as was decided by the plan. This type of transaction was called ‘passive’ 
money. Whereas, all cash payments from the state sector to the population in the form 
of, for example, wages, salaries, payments for agricultural procurements and taxes, 
were termed ‘passive’ money spheres^^.
The overall objective of the monetary policy was to provide a financial basis conducive 
to plan fulfilment and monetary equilibrium in the economy. Before reforms, the scope 
for monetary policy was pretty limited, as money performed a passive function. Under 
the new system, basic proportions in the economy were still centrally determined, but 
otherwise, enterprises had a good deal of freedom in deciding on the details and 
methods of fulfilling the plan. Directives and prohibitions were largely replaced by 
financial incentives and disincentives administered flexibly by monetary authorities. 
The most important financial instruments consisted of differentiated credit terms, which 
affected enterprises’ profits and consequently incentive payments to their personnef^.
b. The banking system
The banking system was entirely owned by the state. It consisted of several 
organisations: the central bank, and various specialised banks (such as investment bank, 
a foreign trade bank, a savings bank for the public). Although the specialised banks
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were nominally independent, they received instructions from the central bank; in effect 
operating as its agents. The overall banking policy in the former Socialist country was 
laid down by the Ministry of Finance in close co-operation with the State Planning
Commission and the State Bank^ .^
The banking system in formerly Socialist economies could not pursue its activities 
independently, and the banking operations were subordinated to the needs of the 
economic plan, in which the overall and major structural developments were 
predetermined. In fact, the banking policy was in a sense a powerful weapon, because 
there was no short-term money market, no stock exchange and no ‘fringe’ banking 
institutions (hire purchase companies, personal loan establishments, development 
financiers, building societies, etc.). All these functions were performed by the banking 
system, and regulation provided an air-tight control over the flow and distribution of 
finance^®.
Under Socialism, economic development was never allowed to be hampered by a lack 
of finance. If there were physical resources available and if the production was socially 
desirable, it went without saying that the means of financing would be provided. The 
economic plan had a counterpart in the credit plan, which was worked out by the central 
bank in co-operation with other banks. The total amount of credit and the proportions 
allowed to different branches were centrally fixed according to the planned needs of the 
economy. But the microeconomic distribution was left to the judgement of the banks 
and enterprises concerned. Loans were extended on the conditions of good 
management, and the soundness of the purpose for which credit was sought^ ®.
A distinction was made between short-term (‘turnover’ or ‘production’) and long-term 
(‘investment’) credits. Short-term credits, particularly on commodity turnover, were 
not as important as in capitalist countries. Trade credits on commodity turnover were 
extended only by banks, not by the selling enterprises. Consumer credit, which was 
extended only by savings banks and consumer co-operative shops, was as yet of smaller 
importance than in the Capitalist countries. To ensure financial discipline, banks had 
considerable powers of control over the users of banks funds. In cases where credits
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were not applied for the approved purpose or the project was not completed on time, or 
if credits were not repaid on maturity, banks could apply some kind of sanctions. They 
could charge penalty interest for the period originally approved; require the repayment 
of the credits before maturity; withhold the funds for wage and salary payments, 
especially for material incentives; and refuse credits in the future^\
4. Pricing
The philosophy of Socialist prices was based on the Marxian concept of value, i.e. the 
cost of live and materialised labour plus a micro-social mark-up proportional to prime 
costs. Therefore, rent, interest (to some extent), utility and scarcity, as well as 
fluctuations in supply and demand, were not considered as contributions to value. The 
actual price fixing was highly centralised in each country in the hands of the State Price 
Planning Commission, with the most crucial matters of pricing reserved for the Council 
of Ministers^^.
Prices were set by the authorities according to certain specified principles. These 
principles are the following: prices must reflect the socially necessary costs; they should 
be the means by which the economic management encourages producers to perform 
specific tasks; they ought to be stable to maintain the purchasing power of the incomes 
of the individuals; they must be set so as to influence the demand of the population in 
the way those mnning the country consider desirable; the determination of consumer 
prices should be used for the purpose of income redistribution^^ (i.e., there should be 
special taxes to raise the prices of luxury goods, while prices of basic goods should be 
lowered through subsidies)^t
In each former Socialist country there was a two-tier price system; producers’ (or 
wholesale) prices and retail (consumers’) prices. Producers’ prices were, as a rule, 
based on the ‘average cost of production’ of the branch of industry. But these costs did 
not include rent and capital charges. Moreover, these prices were fixed in advance 
before the desired combination of resources and the structure of production were 
worked out in the plan, and they remained fixed for long periods. The prices for
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agricultural products payable by the State differed according to ‘compulsory’ and 
‘above-compulsory’ deliveries, and were further differentiated according to regions. In 
the construction of the central plan, the allocation of resources was not guided by 
prices, but by material balances expressed in physical terms.
Retail prices usually bore little relation to producers’ prices, as the ovemding objective 
in fixing the former was to ensure an equilibrium in the market for consumer goods by 
adjusting demand to the planned supply. Even the same product was often assigned 
different prices according to the type of article, its purpose and the class of user. In 
effect, the prices of retail consumer goods were insulated from producers’ prices by 
substantial and highly differentiated turnover taxes or subsidies. Consequently, 
consumers’ preferences had hardly any influence on the size and structure of production 
until they were acknowledged by central planners prepared to make appropriate 
adjustments to producers’ prices and the allocation of resources.
Under Socialism, the stability of prices was considered favourable. Up to about the 
mid-1960s, Socialist price systems were rigid. The prices of producer goods remained 
unchanged for long periods, usually five to ten years, and even the retail prices of the 
most important items entering the cost of living were not changed frequently. 
However, to meet the challenge of intensive growth, the former socialist countries have 
introduced some elements of price flexibility.^^
In their trade with the Capitalist countries, former Socialist countries normally used the 
prices prevailing in world Capitalist markets, and transactions were carried out in 
Western currencies. In individual cases, however, prices were often negotiated, and 
they might depart considerably from current world market prices. In intra-Socialist 
foreign trade up to 1958, there was no systematic basis for determining prices. They 
were negotiated between trading paitners, but apparently used only for reference. In 
1958, the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance adopted 
what has come to be known as the ‘Bucharest Agreement’
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The State budget in Socialist countries differed from that of the capitalist system in the 
formal features of the items, rather than in their relative size. The main items of 
expenditure were: administration, the armed forces, state investment, subsidisation of 
firms, subsidisation of consumer prices, and financing of free public services. Whereas, 
the main items of the revenue side were : the revenue generated by SOEs; tax payment 
by co-operatives; taxes paid by individuals, and loans by the budget.
Under the CSS, ‘soft budget constraints’^  ^ were applied. In this case, if a SOE’s 
spending exceeded its budget constraint, the constraints would be adjusted to a repeated 
overspending. This enterprise received regular external assistance, like soft taxation, 
soft credit, and soft administrative pricing^^.
The Socialist budget performed three basic functions: (1) the control and co-ordination 
of physical economic processes through financial discipline, (2) the promotion of 
economic activities through fiscal incentives and disincentives to achieve the targets 
postulated in the economic plan, and (3) the redistribution of national income in 
conformity with the ‘law of planned proportionate (or balanced) development’ of the 
entire economy.
The importance of budgetary planning under Socialism derives from the size of the 
budget and its focal position in relation to different facets of the economy, and from 
several peculiarities of the economic and social conditions: (1) because of the direct 
participation of the State in the economic and social life of the country, the scope of the 
public finance was naturally great. (2) the State budget is a financial expression of the 
economic and social tasks laid down in the overall economic plan. The budget was the 
key element in economic planning and growth, and it linked the requirements of the 
plan with the production and financial plans of the enterprises. The plan and the budget 
would be worked out simultaneously (by the State Planning Commission and the 
Ministry of Finance respectively) and would be presented to Parliament annually at the 
same session. (3) the importance of the budget was further enhanced by the fact that it 
was integrated with other financial plans, viz. the cash plan, credit plan, personal wage
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fund, and the financial plans of the enterprises. (4) the role of the budget had been 
increased after the introduction of the reforms, where directives had been largely 
replaced by sophisticated forms of fiscal and financial instruments. On the other hand, 
the new emphasis attached to self-financing and bank credits as sources of enterprises’ 
ways and means had tended to reduce the proportion of funds passing directly through 
the State budget."^^
6. External economic relations
Under the CSS, all kinds of foreign trading activity were a state monopoly, and firms 
were strictly forbidden to have direct relations with their partners abroad. The 
exclusive right to conduct import and export transactions and maintain relations with 
foreign partners belonged to specialised organisations, in most countries the so-called 
Foreign Trade Organisations (FTC). Each corporation usually had the exclusive right
to export and/or import a defined class of goods'  ^\
Regarding exchange rates, all the Socialist countries administered multiple exchange 
rates-up to seven different rates. In addition to the official basic rate(s), there was 
usually a tourist rate(which might be further differentiated according to the currency 
area and the amount of the foreign currency exchanged) and a remittance rate (hard 
currency transmitted to private persons in the Socialist country in non-commercial 
transfers). All these rates were unilaterally fixed by the government, and they still 
differed from an equilibrium rate (i.e. the black market rate)"^ .^
The only tangible step towards integration between the classical Socialist countries was 
the establishment, in 1949, of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(COMECON). Through this agreement each member of the COMECON countries had 
bilateral clearing accounts with the other members of the COMECON. These accounts, 
together with the policy of state monopoly of foreign trade, guaranteed the relative 
equilibrium of the BOP on current accounts in each individual country
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■S7. Labour and wages
a. Labour
Labour was less subject to directive planning than other facets of the Socialist economy. 
Generally speaking, economic planning was compatible with the individual freedom of 
the choice o f carrier and of the place of work. Moreover, Socialist countries have 
traditionally been committed to continuous full employment. The concept of full 
employment under Socialism lacked precise definition. In the 1950s and the early 
1960s, it was generally assumed that the only unemployment that can be tolerated was 
of the frictional type, which owing to economic planning should not exceed 1% of the 
total work force- compared to 2-3% in the Capitalist countries. In the late 1960s, many 
Socialist economists (such as Pick, 1969; and Laski, 1966), especially in Poland and the 
former Yugoslavia, have argued that optimal employment was in fact below maximum 
employment, as the latter might in fact lead to lower national income.' '^^
Trade unions in Socialist countries were a curious survival from the past and modern 
adaptations to the needs of the State. Trade unions had been described by Lenin as 
“schools for Communism" and “transmission belts’ for the Party economic programme 
to the working masses. The trade unions were organised on a vertical, industrial basis,
i.e. according to the branches of industry, although there was also regional co­
ordination. The membership of unions was voluntary, and it included both workers and 
persons of managerial status. The unions’ funds were derived from members’ 
contributions and from State grants. The State control of trade unions was assured.'^^
The work of the local trade union typically included various responsibilities, among 
which were; (1) to devise rules for work discipline, and to teach the workers how to 
protect socialised property; (2) to participate with the management in working out the 
details of output norms, work incentives and the distribution of various enterprise 
funds; (3) to take up individual members’ grievances against the management 
concerning such matters as qualifications allowances, bonus payments, dismissals, 
etc.."^ ^
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The degree of workers’ participation in the management of enterprises differed from 
one Socialist country to another. For example, in the former Yugoslavia, the system of 
workers’ participation was described as ‘workers’ self-management’, and had been in 
the hands of workers’ Councils since 1950. A similar system was introduced in Poland 
in 1956, as we shall see in the next section."^^
b. Wages
Under Socialism, the determination of wages was highly controlled and centralised. 
The total amount of wages to be paid, and the production counterpai't to support the 
wage fund, depended on the division of the national income between accumulation and 
consumption and, further, of consumption between the ‘social consumption fund’ and 
the ‘wage fund’. The wage structure embodied considerable differentiation according 
to occupations, industries and regions. The main aims were; to encourage greater 
performance, and to promote vertical (from less to more skilled jobs) and horizontal 
(betv/een enterprises, industries and regions) mobility of labour, according to planned
a • ■ 48priorities.
In the absence of private ownership of the means of production, little private enterprise, 
and with virtually no unemployment, and a granted social security, incentives under 
Socialism were differently ordered; moral incentives, which were based on a workers’ 
social consciousness in contributing to society’s welfare, on his interest in his 
occupation, his sense of satisfaction from the work performed and pride status were 
important; in addition there were material incentives, which consisted of rewards in 
money or kind. Of course the final aim of both types of incentives was to increase 
enterprise labour productivity, on which the workers’ total pay was dependent on."^ ^
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2. Why did the Classical Socialist System fail?
Considering the above listed facts one can conclude that the Central and Eastern 
European countries were not poor by international standards. It appears that the former 
planned economies of Eastern Europe and the USSR, excluding Albania and Romania,
I
1Before highlighting the main factors responsible for the collapse of the CSS in Central 
and Eastern Europe, it is of interest to mention that the CSS was successful in terms of 
growth rates, although relatively inefficient and not competitive according to Western 
standards. The state of the Soviet and Eastern European economies on the eve of the
1989 revolutions and their accomplishments should not be underrated, and could be
1:1summarised as follows:
(1) ''They achieved impressive, although declining growth rates after WWIL During 
the 1970s growth rates declined from 3 to 5% a year to about 2%, approaching zero in 
the late 1980s.
(2) They are middle-income countries, and several of them are in fact on a par with the -1 
least well-off EEC member countries.^^
(3j “They are heavy resource consumers, but inefficiencies in the use of resources are 
well documented. Energy consumption per unit of output is two or three times Western 
European levels, and the amounts of pollution are higher than current Western levels, J
although they are comparable to the Western level o f a few decades ago”.
(4) “Macroeconomic imbalances increased, and so did the excess o f consumer 
purchasing power over supply of consumer goods at prevailing prices; incentives for 
management and workers were distorted by unrealistic prices, political infiltration and 
employment guarantees regardless o f productivity; but unemployment was negligible, 1
1g
and public services like health care and education were provided in high quality and
quantity compared to other countries’ development, even if both declined in recent
53 1years together with these services ’ share in GNP. ” |  :
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belonged to the top 27% of the world population with regard to GDP per capita, and to 
the top 24% with regard to the human development indexl"^
The question that should be answered at this stage (of analysis); “What aie the main 
factors responsible for the collapse of the CSS in the late 1980s?.”
The literature^^ summarises the main factors that led to a failure of the CSS in the late 
Eighties as follows;
1) The debilitating domination of the state over economic activities, alongside the 
relative absence of private property rights in almost all aspects of production. It is 
commonly argued that under large-scale state ownership, little interest was shown, 
either by management or workers, in improving the efficiency of production. The state, 
via its central planning mechanism, required obedience from enterprises to ensure the 
fulfilment of the overall economic plan for the economy. Enterprise losses were 
therefore almost automatically underwritten by the state, and the presence of the 
bankruptcy sanction, which has provided such a spur for enterprises in western market 
economies to improve economic efficiency, was all but absent. Equally, there was no 
threat of take-over to displace inefficient management, either. Enterprises in the foimer 
Socialist countries thus faced what Kornai terms the ‘soft budget constraint’. There 
was no incentive to pay any attention to such goals as economic efficiency or
profitability in their day-to-day activities 56
2) The adoption of what Komai (1980) termed ‘soft budget constraint’. This meant 
that (1) the majority of firms were not price-takers but price makers, i.e. price was not 
exogenous for most firms; (2) the tax system was soft, that is the formulation of tax 
rules influenced by the firms; the firm might be granted exemption or postponement as 
an individual favour; and taxes were not collected strictly; (3) free state grants, which 
meant that fiims could get various favours: contributions to investment expenditures, 
without repayment obligations; permanent subsidies paid continuously in compensation 
for a lasting loss or to encourage some activity over a long period; and ad hoc non
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recurrent subsidies to counterbalance an occasional loss or to encourage a special 
activity. (4) the credit system 'was soft, i.e., it did not follow “orthodox” and 
‘conservative’ principles. The firm was granted credit even if there was no full 
guaiantee of its ability to repay it on schedule from its proceeds from sales. Credit was 
not strictly an “advance payment”; its granting was not closely related to expected 
production and sales. The firm was permitted to fail to fulfil its repayment obligations 
undertaken in the credit agreement. Moreover, the firm was allowed arbitrarily to 
postpone payment, without previous agreement with the seller. (5) external financial 
investment at soft conditions, which is the same as condition number 3 above, in the 
case of SOEs. Regarding privately owned enterprises (POEs), owners invested money 
from their own resources in the firm - not in order to develop and enlarge it, but to help 
it out of its financial difficulties.^^
The consequences of these conditions were the growth and survival of unhealthy firms, 
living in a high degree of uncertainty, under conditions of imperfect competition, and 
absence of market signals. Therefore, any kind of reform, obviously, led to failure, 
because no significant improvement on economic efficiency had occurred in 
comparison with what was happening in the industrialised economies.
3) Market refoim in socialism could not succeed, because the main frame of economic 
planning was not changed, and certain (limited) price reforms could not provide 
allocative efficiency. Besides, state-owned monopolistic firms usually did not make 
investment decisions on the basis of market (price) signals. Distorted signals came 
from foreign trade (mainly distorted prices in COMECON).
4) The totalitarian political system adopted in Soviet type economies in the late 1940s, 
under pressure from what used to be called the Soviet Union, which was based on 
highly centralised decision-making and overwhelming state control of the economy. 
The main aim of that system was to accumulate capital and create social control, in 
order to change the structure of the economy from one based on agriculture to another 
based on industry, ignoring the criteria of optimal allocative efficiency.
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5) The reform programmes displayed numerous conceptual and operational flaws, 
among which was the belief that the market mechanism can be consistently introduced 
without actually removing the so-called fundamentals of the socialist system, i.e. single­
party rule, conamand planning and state ownership of the means of production.
6) The adverse effect of the international environment (or the so-called “soviet factor” 
which had less influence (since 1985-6) on the willingness and ability of consecutive 
governments to implement genuine reforms.®’
7) The fact that the state still owned the huge majority of the means of production, and 
would give priority to politics over economics in its decision-making process.®^
8) The fact that during those reforms, the party and state authorities kept a watchful 
eye on all changes, so as to prevent them from crossing structural boundaries and to 
keep the economy socialist.®^
9) The inefficiency of the state owned sector, which failed to invest or produce 
rationally; squandered material inputs, labour, and energy; and did not innovate.®'’
10) The disorder of investment and foreign imbalances.®®
11) Finally, since all the reform attempts were unable to create a market economy with 
real competition, they ended in failure.®®
The CSS was reform-resistant, or at least its structural framework was too rigid, 
therefore it needed a radical transformation. In the next section, I analyse the main 
economic characteristics of the Polish Socialist System during the period 1945-1989. 
The final aim is to highlight the main economic features of the legacy of that system in 
Poland in the late 1980s. This enables us to have a clear picture of the Polish economic 
situation at the starting point of the transformation process, and to understand why there 
was a need to transform the Polish economy from a Socialist, centrally planned, to a 
Capitalist, market orientated economy.
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SECTION (2) THE ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE POLISH
SOCIALIST SYSTEM (1945-88)
The main purpose of this section is to discuss the different economic development 
stages that Poland has passed through during the period 1945-88, and to highlight the 
legacy of the Polish Socialist economy in the late Eighties. The aim is to point out the 
main factors behind the urgent need for a radical economic transformation programme 
in the late 1980s, in which privatisation was one main element.
1. Stages of Economic Development in Poland (1945-1988)
The history of Poland goes back more than one thousand years. The Polish Kingdom 
was powerful and prosperous, but declined in the 17* and 18* centuries. Between 1795 
and 1918 it was ruled by foreign powers. Poland came into being as an independent 
state in November 1918.’
Polish independence ended at the outbreak of WWH on September 1, 1939. The 
country was invaded by Germany from the West on September 1, and by Soviet troops 
on September 17.^
During the period between the two world wars, Poland was mainly agrarian, and one of 
the poorest countries in Europe. According to the 1931 census, nearly two thirds of the 
population worked in agriculture and forestry The national income per head in 1938 
did not surpass $250 of the 1960 purchasing power. Poland was one of the less 
industrialised European countries, distinctly lagging behind its neighbour, 
Czechoslovakia. Its main natural wealth consisted of abundant bituminous coal 
deposits, from which an output of 36 million tons was extracted in 1937, or 2.8% of the 
world output of coal at the time.
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Following WWn, the map of Poland changed, and the character of the Polish economy 
changed fundamentally. During the following four decades after WWn, Poland 
adopted Socialism as its economic, political and social system, and has passed through 
different stages of economic development, and adopted many economic reform 
programmes, hi 1989, the whole CSS collapsed and all Central and Eastern European 
countries (including Poland) decided to abandon that system.
To analyse the main different stages o f economic development of Socialist Poland 
during the period 1945-88, it is of interest to divide the period under discussion into 
four sub-periods, relating them to the Polish political and social set up during the time. 
These sub-periods are: (1) the Gomulka and Bierut Era (1945 - 56), during which the 
CSS was imposed, and Poland adopted a strategy for reconstructing its economy after 
WWn; (2) The Gomulka Second Era (1956-70), during which the Polish economy 
moved from an agrarian to an industrialised one; (3) The Gierek Era (1970-80), during 
which Poland adopted a ‘new development strategy’, based on heavy borrowing from 
the West; (4) The Kama’s and Jaruzelski’s Era: (1980-1989), during which Poland lost 
its creditworthiness, and a new system of management for state owned enterprises 
(SOEs)- the so-called the 3-Ss, was introduced.
a. The Gomulka and Bierut Era (1945-1956): (The Imposition of CSS and 
Reconstruction)
This period corresponds historically to the years of reconstruction (The Three Year Plan 
of Economic Reconstruction, 1947-49), and the imposition of the CSS on the Polish 
economy. During the first two years after WWn (1945-46), the role of the legal person 
was sustained by independent firms {Zaklady). In the years 1947-49, this legal status 
was forced upward to the level of associations and chief administrations. Between 
1949 and 1952, the next shift in the legal status appeared when branch ministries began 
to function as independent basic economic units. Then, during the highly centralised 
period 1953-55,. the economy became a single huge enterprise with ministries as 
organisation divisions.
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During the yeai'S from 1945 until the beginning of 1947, the Polish economy was 
multisectoral, with co-operative and private (largely non-industrial) firms functioning 
alongside state enterprises.® Following the 19 Januaiy, 1947 Parliamentary elections, 
when the Communist-led bloc managed to secure more than 80% of the votes,® 
questions about the role of the private and co-operative sectors were quickly settled 
with Stalinist resolve^. From the start, the new regime was split between the Stalinists, 
led by Bierut, who returned to Poland in the baggage of the Red Army, and the 
partisans, led by Gomulka, who had remained inside the country throughout the horrible 
years of occupation. Gomulka became secretary-general of the Polish Workers’ Party 
and presided over a great expansion of that organisation: by 1948, it had over one 
million members and had eliminated its rivals. In that year, it merged with the Socialist 
Party to form the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR). By then, Stalin had decided to 
impose his own brand of Communism on Poland. Gomulka was against the idea, and 
so was replaced by Bierut, who was the Head of the State^. The new leadership of the 
Polish Communist Party, assisted by the Soviet Stalinist regime, imposed upon the 
country a totalitarian (Stalinist) system of extreme mono-centerism and repression in 
socio-political life, and bureaucratic centralism within the economy.^ In other words, 
the government shifted all the legal rights of private enterprises upward to the level of 
ministries. Hence the macro-management decisions started to be taken by the 
government, and the economy was run on the basis of commands. The economic 
system established in Poland at the end of the 1940s was basically a CSS- as analysed 
in the previous section.
The PZPR leaders saw in planning and socialisation of large-scale industry, steps 
towards socialist economy, while some of the non-communist parties saw
nationalisation as transitional. 10
The reconstruction period officially ended in the early 1950s, when national income 
reached its pre-war level.”  The process of centralisation took ten years after WWn to 
take root’^ . In 1946, the state sector accounted for nearly 85% of the total employment 
in the manufacturing sector for units with over five workers. Industry was almost fully
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nationalised by the early 1950s.Every  priority was given to iron and steel production: 
the ancient capital of Poland, Krakow, was overwhelmed by the enormous steel plan at 
Nowy-Huta, one of the largest and most polluting in Europe. The mines and industries 
of Silesia, inherited from the Germans, were developed without any regard to the 
environmental consequences, and a large shipbuilding industry was built up along the 
Baltic, at Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin.’'’ In agriculture, family farms were subjected 
to the pressure of collectivisation after WWn. The banking and financial systems were 
nationalised in the late 1940s. Foreign trade was controlled by the State, and prices of 
most consumers and producers goods were fixed by the State. Although statistics from 
this period are of notoriously poor quality, estimates show that the number of legal 
private farms declined by 41% between 1947-1953; the share of private shops in the 
retail trade fell from 78% in 1946 to 18% in 1950; the wholesale private trade was 
practically eliminated; and output from private enterprises was reduced from 21% in 
1946 to 6% in 1950. ’® By the first half of the 1950s, the economy had become a single 
huge enterprise, with ministries as organisation divisions.’®
Figure (2.1) shows the typical organisational structure of ‘industrial ministries’, 
responsible for the operation of large-and medium-scale nationalised enterprises in their 
sector.
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Figure (2.1)
The Structure of Industrial Administration
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In fact, planning was centralised in the hands of the State Commission for Economic 
Planning and became compulsory and comprehensive. The number of industrial 
ministries swelled from one in 1948 to six in 1949 and ten in 1954, reflecting the 
increasing bureaucratisation of economic decision making. Political control over the 
economy was exercised by the party 'nomenclature', through its appointments of 
managers, planning officials, and trade union leaders. Trade flows were reoriented 
away from the Western trading partners toward the former USSR and the COMECON
countries. 17
In 1956, thi’ee years after Stalin’s death^ ,^ Khrushchev made his anti-Stalin speech to 
the 20th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. After a month, the 
Polish Communist Party leader Bierut died. These events spread chaos through the 
Polish Party; the haid-liners were purged, the last Polish prisoners were released from 
Siberia and returned home, and for a few months, Poles hoped for better things, 
including economic reform. Gomulka returned to power in October 1956 without
consultation with Moscow 19
b. The Gomulka Second Era (1956 -1970): (Decollectivisation of agriculture and 
a move from agrarian to industrialisation economy)
In October, 1956, Khrushchev arrived in Warsaw, together with leading members of 
the Soviet government. In a very short period of time, Gomulka managed to convince 
the Soviets to allow the Polish government and the Party more autonomy in domestic 
policy. Collective farms spontaneously dissolved, but there was no money to 
modernise the farms; workers’ councils were established and took key state enterprises; 
a special Economic Council of blue-ribbon economists, including Oskar Lange, 
Kalecki, Brus, and others, was established to advise the Council of Ministers on 
possible changes in the economic ‘model’. T h i s  was a great victory for Poland- it 
became know as ‘The October’- and the Poles believed for a while that they had at last 
recovered their independence.^*
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At the time, intellectuals opting for cultural independence and political change attacked 
the doctrinaire Party leadership. Industrial workers in Poznan protested against revised 
production norms that reduced their take-home pay.^  ^ There was a very strong call, 
mainly from workers, for ‘essential reforms’, in contrast with the minor revisions made 
each year in the official books of instructions compiled by the central authorities.
1. Reasons fo r the reform
Generally speaking, economic reforms became necessaiy because previous socio­
economic policies resulted in a very unsatisfactory economic performance, which had 
important and negative political and ideological consequences. This can be seen in 
three basic spheres: growth, efficiency and standards of living.
Table (2.1) 
Basic Indices of the Polish Six Year Plan (1950-55)
Indicator Planned for 1955 Actual 1955
National Income 212 175
Total Investment 240 262
Gross Output of Industry 258 270
Gross output of Agriculture 150 113
Employment 160 156
Real Wages 140 104
Source: Zielinskiy 1973:4.
In the case of Poland, however, the 1956 attempt at refomti was triggered not by growth 
considerations- growth had been very rapid by any standards- but by gross 
inefficiencies of the system and the prices paid for it in terms of complete failure to 
raise real wages. As can be seen from Table (2.1), investment and employment figures 
were close to those planned. However, the results in terms of national income and real 
wages were much lower. In fact, the Polish six-year Plan growth strategy lacks the
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were to be discontinued.^^
What happened exactly was this: in order to offer some kind of decentralisation, a new 
system of the so-called branch associations within each industry took on the role of the
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balance between investment and consumption, between Sector I (production means of
production) and Sector II (producing consumer goods), and among the different 
branches of the economy. It assumed a very high rate of growth and favoured not only 
investment at the expense of consumption but also investment in heavy industry at the 
expense of investment in the consumer goods industiy^^. The result was a drop in real 
and peasant income with accompanying disincentive effects; severe shortages of 
consumer goods and agricultural investment goods; decapitalisation of the consumer 
goods industry; and a number of disequilibria within the priority heavy-industry sector
and the economy as a whole. '^* Besides, the Polish party policy towards growth, i |
planning process, agriculture, and non-socialist economic sectors outside agriculture
(private manufacturing and building enterprises employing up to fifty people; private
retail and wholesale enterprises; private service sector: restaurants, barbershops,
laundries, etc., all kinds of artisans) was too taut^ .^ Therefore, a need for reforms
existed.
,The main changes the 1956 economic reforms called for were: (1) a drastic ÿ
reorganisation of the administration and management of the economy, emphasising 
decentralisation and the financial independence of individual enterprises. (2) an 
injection of quasi-market conditions into the relations between state enterprises and 
wholesale and retail distribution. The basic overall aim was to substitute “the profit 
motive and other economic incentives for administrative directives as the mainstream Æof economic activity”. (3) the dismantling of the bureaucratic superstructure of the
• ■economy. The basic economic unit was to be the self-governing and fully independent . g
1-enterprise. Each of these independent economic units was to operate according to the 
principles of cost accounting, and the highest possible degree of profitability was to be
'■I;-the main concern of its director (acting together with the workers’ council, which had at 
that time full rights of co-management). (4) all forms of state-subsidised production
II
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government ministries. At the same time they were still subordinated to the ministries, 
and had to adhere to the requirements of the plan. But they were endowed with some 
discretion to allocate the available funds among their constituent enterprises, to enable 
them to introduce some badly needed flexibility into the productive system. Moreover, 
Workers’ Councils were established on 19 November, 1956^ .^ The Councils were 
given a few unequivocal rights: (1) with due regard for the directors’ opinion, they 
could adopt decisions concerning the sale of surplus machines and installations; (2) 
they were entitled to settle the distribution of the enterprise Fund or of the share of 
profits due to be paid to employees; and (3) they were to work out the internal 
regulations of the enterprise. The Council’s power to determine work norms, wage 
tariffs, and rules for the granting of bonuses was not so clear-cut. Decisions had to be 
made in consultation with the factoiy councils, on which management and Party were 
heavily represented; they were also supposed to conform to the collective agreement 
signed by workers and management as well as to the (undefined) ‘rights of the 
enterprise.’ The director, who was an ex officio member of the Council, was to be 
appointed and recalled ‘by the appropriate state organisation in consultation with the 
workers’ councils. The latter was free, however, to put forward motions bearing on the 
appointment or dismissal of the enteiprise’s chief executives’^ .^
Strong pressure from the former Soviet Union was then put on the Gomulka regime to 
‘stop playing with fire’. By mid-1958, the traditional elements in the party leadership 
had regained the initiative and were able to frustrate all attempts to implement the 
reforais advocated by the Economic Council and approved in principle by the Polish 
government^^. Therefore, after 1958, the Polish economic policy returned to the 
orthodox priorities.
The result was that the 1956-7 attempt at reform led to short-lived measures of 
decentralisation and workers self-management. Hence, this attempt at reform failed to 
create a new stmcture to manage the economy, and enhanced bureaucratic control over 
individual enterprises^**. Only a permanent reversal of collectivisation in major parts of 
the agricultural sector had occurred.
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One can conclude that the first attempt at reform has given the Polish economy the 
features of a mixed economy, at least in the agriculture sector. But was the agriculture 
private sector efficient enough to enhance the performance of the whole Polish 
economy, during the Communist period?. In fact, the high restrictions that were 
imposed on private farming, such as; land cannot be traded; an upper limit on private 
ownership; and compulsory deliveries of main agricultural products (grain, meat, 
potatoes, milk) at low, state-fixed prices, had a negative impact on the performance of 
the agriculture sector^*.
By the early 1960s, the reform process had come full circle, and the pre-1956 status quo 
had been essentially re-established. This circle constituted communist Poland’s first 
‘reform cycle’. Gomulka survived challenges from every direction until the end of 
1970. He suppressed the ‘revisionists’, and outmanoeuvred the ‘Partisans’ How was 
the economic performance during the period 1955-1970?.
As can be seen from Table (2.2), the annual growth rate of the national income 
produced (in 1977 prices) averaged approximately 3%, 7%, and 6% during the periods 
1955-60, 1960-65, and 1965-70, respectively^^. The share of the labour force engaged 
in industry and construction increased continually, while that in agriculture continued to 
fall, during the period 1955-70. Available statistics show that rates of labour and 
capital productivity growth fell throughout this period. Declining capital productivity 
meant that progressively larger shares of the national income had to be devoted to 
investment in order to maintain economic growth rates; declining labour productivity 
growth meant that increases in employment often had to exceed planning rates in order 
to provide enterprises with the requisite labour force. Investment’s share of national 
income rose from below 15% in 1956 to 23% in 1970, and the growth of consumption 
continued to lag behind that of national income^ "*. The share of agriculture in NMP 
declined by around 20%, but increased by 17% for industry. One can observe that the 
policy of industrialising the Polish economy had been successful. But, the question that 
should be asked is; “Was the whole process efficient enough?.”
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Table (2.2) 
Selected Economic Indicators in Poland (1955-70)Indicator 1955 m o 1965 1970National Income Produced (NMP) 40.4 55.5 74.9 100.0(1970=100)Gross Industrial Production 28.2 44.8 67.0 100.0Gross Agricultural Production 57.2 68.8 79.0 100.0% of labour force engaged inAgriculture 48.2 43.3 39.1 34.0Industry 30.8 32.0 34.3 36.4Share of NMP produced byAgriculture 42.3 34.5 29.7 22.7Industry 37.8 44.8 49.1 55.7
Source: Slay y 1994:31y based on data from the Central Statistical Offlcey Warsaw, Poland.
Generally speaking, the economic situation in Poland during the 1950s and the 1960s 
brought spectacular achievements!^ Poland was among the World’s ten most rapidly 
industrialised countries^®. This was thanks mainly to an acceleration of investment 
projects completed during the expansion, which managed to alleviate consumer 
disequilibrium^’. As a result, Poland’s position in the world’s economy definitely 
changed, and her share increased in the world’s production of electricity, coke coal,
sulphur and sulphuric acid, cement, etc.^  ^ The high growth of industry was 
accompanied by a relatively slower progress in agriculture, although the Polish 
agricultural production increased by the same average of the world farm growth rate as 
a whole^^. Growth rates of the Polish economy during the 1950s and 1960s created an 
impression that central planning could generate sustained economic development.
Despite the overwhelming achievements during the second half of the 1950s and in the 
1960s, Poland had to face two serious problems: protecting its ‘infant industries’,"*** and 
finding sufficient demand for the products produced by these new ‘infant’ industries"**. 
The first problem was solved through the state monopoly of foreign trade. State 
monopolies for foreign trade"*^  protected the Polish ‘infant industries’ from external 
competition. The second problem was also solved because Poland, as a member of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)"* ,^ did not have to worry about 
selling its new industrial goods, because of the endless demand from the Eastern
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European market, especially the Soviet. The Soviet Union used to pay for goods in 
kind (raw materials and energy), thus guaranteeing the supply of these products to the 
COMECON area. More than half of Poland’s foreign trade was with COMECON
countries"*"*.
On December 12, 1970, strikes and demonstrations sparked in Gdansk and then all over 
Poland, as a result of the increases in prices instituted by Gomulka’s regime. These 
events weakened Gomulka’s regime, as he was unable to develop a general and an 
effective economic policy that would provide the hope of an improved standard of 
living for the Polish people."*^  Gomulka resigned on December 20, 1970, eclipsing his 
great achievements"* .^
Edward Gierek (the provincial party leader in Silesia), the new Party leader, from 
Katowice had to pick up the pieces.
c. Gierek’s Regime Era (The 1970s): (New Development Strategy)
Like any new leader, Gierek had to pursue a new package of policies and abolish some 
old ones, but at the same time keep the basics of the Socialist system as they were. 
Gierek started strengthening party relations with the workers, by adopting a Tisten-to- 
them’ policy. This policy was widely welcomed by workers, as they found a sincere 
and honest leader who understood their problems. As a result, he attracted more 
members to the party, hence, the party’s legitimacy became more acceptable."*’
Gierek’s ‘New Development Strategy’ was based on an idea of modernising the Polish 
economy, by increasing living standards, consumerism, and increased integration into 
the world economy"* .^ That was because of the fact that the ‘dual protectionism’ policy 
within the COMECON area deprived the Polish economy of the chance to keep up with 
the technological progress of the rest of the world
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The philosophy of this strategy was that part of Poland’s manufacturing capacity would 
be transformed into industries which would subsequently earn the hard currency needed 
to pay off the loans along with the interest. The remaining portion of the loans would 
be used to stimulate what was called accumulation (i.e. investment), and domestic
consumption50
Gierek’s strategy (of ‘import-led’ growth) became the foundation of the Five Year Plan 
(1971-75). Therefore, Poland borrowed relatively large sums during the Five Year 
Plan, allowing investment to continue growing at a high rate in 1974-5^ \  Foreign 
borrowing allowed Polish planners to prolong the expansion of the early 1970s. As a 
result of the heavy borrowing in the first half of the 1970s, a number of modem 
factories in heavy and light industry (like, Iron founding in Katowice; Computer 
equipment; Ursus tractors; Fiat cars; Berliet (Buses); Thomson (TVs) and Textile 
factories) were established. Moreover, the infrastructure was modernised, and new 
transport facilities were built. On the other hand, ‘bottlenecks’ in constmction 
appeared, and the number of unfinished investment projects increased. Simultaneously, 
the expansion of heavy and light industries (which were not competitive in the world 
market) caused problems with the repayment of foreign credits^ .^
Meanwhile, in 1970/71, Gierek’s regime embarked on a programme of reform, which 
was another attempt at revision. Gierek took a step toward decentralisation by setting 
up ‘large economic organisations’, the so-called WOG (Wielka Organizacja 
Gospodarcza), as intermediate agencies between the individual plants and the economic 
ministries. The main purpose of those associates was to assist in planning investments 
and production, and in allocating resources. In this attempt economic power spread 
away from both centre and enterprise to the intermediate level of so-called ‘WOG’. 
That is to say an amalgamation of horizontally integrated enterprises, organised as 
independent corporations and designed to maintain the centre’s grip on the economy 
through the monitoring and control of a small number of large units, in spite of their 
greater exposure to market signals. Institutional innovations included greater flexibility 
of the enterprise wage funds, linked to value-added indicators rather than being
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centrally fixed, and the retention of a small fraction of currency earnings by exporters^^. 
Gierek’s regime raised the purchase price that the government paid private farmers for 
their agricultural goals and abolished the system of farmers’ compulsory deliveries to 
the state. His aim was to improve the standard of living of the working class.
In the first half of the 1970s, gross industrial output, labour productivity, the rate of 
investment, and agriculture production rose rapidly. For example, real investment grew 
at an annual average of nearly 11% during the period 1970-75, and as a result industrial 
production showed a 9% annual average increase during the same period^ "^ . At the 
same time, external debt increased from US$ 1.0 billion in 1971 to a US$ 8.4 billion in 
1975. The trade balance with West worsened dramatically, and reached US$ 1.5 billion 
deficit by the end of 1973, compared with a surplus of US$ 109.0 million in 1971^ .^
In the second half of the 1970s, the Polish economic situation showed a reverse 
direction growth in comparison to the last two decades. This was because the sources 
of growth (large-scale investment in heavy industry and the absorption of labour from 
the mral sector) were being exhausted^^. Gierek’s policy that Poland could repay the 
external credits by exporting the manufactured goods produced by the new plants, did 
not work.
Table (2.3) shows that the trade balance went sharply into deficit, peaking at nearly 
US$ 3.0 billion in 1975. Net Material Product fell by 2.3% in 1979 and by 6% in 1980; 
net Western debt, which had been negligible in 1970, reached US$ 23.5 billion, or 40% 
of GDP, in 1980, compared to US$ 7.6 billion in 1975; annual inflation steadily 
increased from 2-3% in 1971-5 to 7% - 9% in 1978-80.
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Table (2.3) 
Macroeconomic Indicators for Poland ( 1975-80)Indicator 1975 1 9 7 ^ Ï977 1978 1979 “1980National Income Produced 9.0 6.8 5.0 3.0 -23 -6.0Gross Investment {% change) 10.7 1.0 3.1 2.1 -7.9 -12.3Consumption (% change) n.a. 7.8 58.7 0.8 2.4 1.2Gross Agricultural -2.1 -1.1 1.4 4.1 -1.5 -10.7Production (% change)Retail price inflation (%) 2-3* 4.0 4.5 8.4 7.4 8.5Imports from non-socialist 12.2 11.4 -10.1 -2.0 -4.5 -7.2countries (% change)Exports to non-socialist 5.8 12.3 4.0 2.9 2.1 5.0countries (% change)Trade Balance ($ billions) -3.0 -2.8 -1.8 -1.5 -1.9 -0.7Net western debt ($ billions) 7.6 11.2 14.3 16.9 20.7 23.5Debt service ratio (%) 263 34.4 45.6 60.8 75.0 83.2
Source: Slay, 1994:44, based on data from the Central Statistical Office, Rocznik 
Statystyczny, Different Issues, Warsaw, Poland; and Poznanski, 1986:461. Note: Data in rows 1-4, 6, and 7 are in constant prices. * Average for 1971-75.
The Government had lost control of the economy. It made a half-hearted attempt to 
reassert its economic authority by announcing an “economic manoeuvre” in December, 
1976 which would supposedly guide the economy from frenetic expansion to more 
balanced growth. The new policy aimed for balanced trade with the West by 1980, a 
cut in investment spending, and moderate wage growth^ .^ It was partly successful as 
can be seen from Table (2.3). Investment spending was curtailed and imports were 
curbed. But reduced imports availability made production more difficult; the growth 
declined and an export drive was mounted.
i. Critique on Gierek^s Strategy
A  review of the development of ‘economic development strategies’ all over the world 
during the Seventies, indicates that Gierek’s modernisation strategy was not wrong, as 
it was in an era when creditors were extremely cheap and easy to obtain. In fact, many 
developing countries followed this path quite successfully. In the case of Poland, 
Gierek’s strategy accelerated the decay of State socialism by bringing about total crisis- 
political, economic, demographic, ecological, etc.. The crisis was not only the result of
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import-led modernisation strategy; it was also caused by the Gierek regime’s inability 
to assure social compliance and stability through noneconomic measures. The most 
negative point in the opening strategy was that wide doors were opened only to imports; 
it was not accompanied by changes in the economic system to make firms responsive 
the stimuli of international markets.^®
The major assumptions of import-led strategy were incompatible with what was 
institutionally feasible. Gierek’s modernisation strategy was flawed on several counts. 
First, it did not include institutional changes that would provoke the best response from 
economic actors. The dominant view of the new policy among the ideologues was that 
wage increases would provide a strong motivation to increase productivity. A 
simultaneous expansion of consumption and investment would thus guarantee rapid 
growth in productivity; economic growth would be consumption led. The basic flaw 
was the lack of reasons to suppose that increased wages would indeed boost labour 
productivity unless the rewards were unambiguously linked to an improved 
performance beneficial to the economy as a whole. Second, the strategy designers 
realised that any growth in labour productivity was conditioned on both work intensity 
and on technology. This was to be accomplished thi'ough the increased imports of 
Western “know-how” and capital equipment. The Gomulka regime policy of keeping 
hard currency imports in line with hard currency export revenues was to be discarded. 
Thus the development was to be import led until a viable export sector was established. 
Yet the economic system remained both fused and closed. Third, the relaxation of 
controls over the economy distinguished the policies of Gierek’s regime from the other 
state socialist countries. Gierek seemed to believe that a major obstacle to economic 
growth was rooted in laws that defied economic rationality and in the shortages of 
inputs caused by Gomulka’s excessively deflationary policies. He failed to grasp that 
all these constraints were ‘substitutes’ for decentralisation, competition, and economic 
discipline. In the absence of markets, less coercive methods of governance than those 
of the Gomulka regime produced a ‘centrally planned anarchy.’ Fourth, the success of 
Gierek’s strategy of indebted development hinged on the development of an 
internationally competitive industrial sector. Yet no significant changes had been 
introduced in the institutional system, which was incapable of competing effectively in
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the international markets for manufactured goods, although credits were used to 
improve industrial competitiveness. In other words, the closed system logic turned out 
to be incompatible with the increased imports from the West. Therefore, the blame for 
the lack of focus on export promotion in investment policy could be put not only on 
flawed policies but above all, on the institutional limitations of state socialism^^.
In addition, one could say that the investment strategy failed to encourage inter-sectoral 
specialisation, and did not lead to the formulation of a pro-export investment strategy 
focused on a few branches of the economy, or to a significant redesign of the 
organisational structure of foreign trade. Moreover, the rapid expansion of energy- 
intensive industries (such as metallurgy and heavy engineering) coincided with neglect 
in the fuels and energy-producing sectors. Planners tended to give preference to large- 
scale, energy-intensive projects such as the prefabricated house industry, or to the 
expansion of cement and nitrogen fertiliser production. Despite warnings from experts 
that the energy production sector was underinvested, maintenance was neglected, and 
its capital equipment, increasingly outdated and worn-out, was subject to growing 
breakdown rates. Finally, there was a bias against the private agriculture sector, which 
provided another limit to economic growth by exacerbating disequilibria^^.
As a result of the collapse of the general economic situation in the late 1970s, and the 
increases in prices initiated by Gierek’s regime in August, 1980, strikes started on 14 
August, 1980, in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, and in the next few days became the 
catalyst for other cities all over Poland. The response of the Party leadership to the 
hopeless situation was to dismiss Gierek, and to make public the details of corruption 
and economic mismanagement of the Gierek years^\ Kania became the new Party 
leader. The new leadership, for the first time, agreed to negotiate, and some 
concessionary social contracts with workers were signed. The contracts resulted in the 
emergence of the ‘Solidarity’ trade union of the Gdansk shipyai'd, in August, 1980^ .^
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d. Kama’s & Jaruzelski’s Regimes Era (1980s): (The rise of Solidarity, New 
Management System for SOEs, and Martial Law)
In fact, the economic downturn that began in 1979 accelerated in 1980-82. As can be 
seen from Tables (2.3) and (2.4), national income produced (in real terms) declined by 
23.6% from 1979 to 1982; investment fell by 44.9% and consumption by 2.0%. These 
declines were driven by a catastrophic 54% fall in the volume of the hard-currency 
imports on which the Polish economy had come to depend and were accompanied by a 
169% increase in retail prices. Combined with the PZPR’s lack of credibility in Polish 
society, internal pressure from Solidarity and external pressure from the former USSR 
and Poland’s Western creditors created an environment for the design and 
implementation of economic reforms unprecedented in the Soviet bloc. That was the
1980-81, new official economic reform programme'63
indicator
Table (2.4)
The Economic Collapse of 1980-81
T M T “
GNP (% change)
NIP (% change)
Gross Investment (% change)
Consumption (% change)
Gross Agricultural Production (% change)
Retail Price Inflation (%)
Imports from non-socialised countries (% change) 
Exports to non-socialised countries (% change) 
Net western debt ($ billion)
~ m r
-5.3 -0.6
-12.0 -5.5
-22.3 -12.1
-5.2 -12.3
-3.8 -2.8
18.4 109.4
-31.5 -24.2
-22.1 0.9
25.5 25.4
Source: Slay, 1991:53, based on data from the Central Statistical Office.
At this stage, it is of importance to mention that the PZPR’s disarray in 1980-81 led the 
government, first under Kania and then under Jaruzelski, to adopt a conservative 
attitude towards economic reform, in which primary emphasis was placed on 
maintaining control over the official reform debate. "^^  The size and clumsiness of the 
official Committee for Economic Reform were consequences of this attitude. The
I
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committee was a Leviathan of 500 members, with fourteen separate working groups 
that took more than a year to produce the official reform blueprint {Kierunki reformy 
gospodarczej 1981). This official reticence stood in sharp contrast to the more radical 
plan completed by Balcerowicz’s group in November, 1980, as well as other unofficial 
reform projects proposed in 1981^ .^
The official reform programme, which can be considered the first attempt of a radical 
breakthrough systemic reform, aimed to reduce considerably the extent of direct 
controls over the economy, and to replace them with a variety of indirect economic 
measures, working through the mai'ket mechanism. The main achievements of the 
1980-1 ERP were the following:
a) Central plans became forecasts, rather than instruments to determine the structure 
and volume of production^^.
b) Enterprises were to be self-managing, self-determining and self-financing, or the so- 
called the 3-Ss. According to the new ‘Law on Socio-economic Planning’ of 26 
February, 1982, enterprises were freed from compulsory targets imposed from above 
and allowed to set their own production and sales programmes. They were also given 
limited powers to decide on the distribution of profits and incomes. Firms were to 
cover costs with sales revenues, and inputs were to be available through regular* 
commercial transactions, thus breaking with the traditional rationing system^ .^ 
According to the 3-Ss slogan, enterprise managers and workers’ councils (to which the 
managers were supposed to be accountable) were to design their own production plans 
and arrange their own supply and distribution networks without obligatory physical 
targets from the central authorities. Managerial and worker incentive systems were to 
be linked to yearly enterprise profitability. The compliance of enterprises with the 
central plan was to be influenced through financial instruments whose magnitudes 
would be determined both administratively and by market forces; this element implied 
major changes in the role and scope of central planning. Direct-planning targets for 
enterprises could be issued only to meet COMECON trade obligation, for national 
defence production, or for national emergencies. Approximately 75% of total
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investment was to be decentralised to the unfinished central investment projects left 
over from the 1970s^ .^
c) Administrative price controls were indeed lifted for a majority of products, but 
important restrictions remained, covering among others, coal, fuel, energy, steel 
products, cement, fertilisers, basic consumer goods and services, as well as procurement 
prices for agriculture products paid to private farmers. Some other prices, the so-called 
‘regulated prices', although not directly fixed by the government, were subject to 
indirect controls and still could not be set freely by producers.
Moreover, prices for primaiy goods were supposed to be fixed at the level 
corresponding to international prices, but this did not happen until 1990®^ .
As a result of the deregulation of the prices of the above mentioned products, and the 
maintenance of the so-called soft financing of state enterprises, i.e. easy access to 
external sources of funds, Poland witnessed, for the first time since the imposition of 
the socialist system, a phenomenon that until then was unknown in the socialist 
countries, namely, open inflation. Double-digit inflation appeared in 1981, when prices 
rose by over 20%, and by 200% in 1982. The Polish authorities managed to reduce 
these rates to 30% in 1987, but they rose to 73% in 1988^“.
d) As for foreign trade, the most important change that occuned in the first half of the 
1980s was that ‘state monopoly of foreign trade’ was relaxed, and that all public and 
private enterprises could apply for a licence to export or import provided that certain 
conditions were fulfilled^ \
e) A new exchange rate regime was established, in which the zloty was pegged at the 
sub-marginal level ensuring the profitability of 75% to 85% of exports. In fact, 
convertibility was the ultimate goal. Moreover, exporters were permitted to retain a 2- 
5% of their export earnings in hard currency, which became an important incentive for 
export expansion^^.
However, a number of factors constrained the implementation of this attempt at reform 
designed in 1980-81. Some of these factors included; "'the lack o f competitive market 
and entrepreneurial traditions; industrial-policy decisions made before the 1980s,
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favouring such sectors as shipbuilding, mining, and energy production, which created 
favoured sectors with strong lobbies able to perpetuate industrial structures 
incompatible with strong emphasis upon enterprise self-financing and profitability; the 
lack of hard currency, which prevented the appearance of any thing more than 
symbolic import competition; conflicts inherent in trying to reconcile greater enterprise 
autonomy and an emphasis on profitability with the bureaucratic nature of COMECON 
trade; and the desire to prevent enterprise bankruptcy and the appearance of open 
unemployment”?  ^ Besides the imposition of ‘Martial Law’ on 13 December, 1981, 
which interrupted the self-government movement that had been gaining momentum in 
the second half of 1981, especially in big industrial plants^ "^ .
As a result of the above taken measures and the slight modification in the systems of 
both taxes and subsidies, the Polish economy witnessed a significant improvement in 
the late part of the first half of the 1980s. National income produced increased in real 
terms by almost 16% between 1982 and 1985; open inflation during that time was 
reduced from triple-digit to near* double-digit levels; and after three years of hard- 
currency merchandise trade deficits, Poland posted surpluses starting from 1982 (see 
Table 2.5).
In the mid-1980s, the economic situation started to deteriorate as a reaction to the 
growing imbalances and slowdown in the Polish economy (see Table 2.5). Therefore, 
the Polish Government decided to launch ‘another stage of reform’ in late 1986. In 
1986, a new five-year plan for 1986-90 was prepared, and approved by the Parliament 
after an extensive discussion among economists and policy makers. In April, 1987, the 
government of Messner, presented in the ‘Polish Diet’ the ‘ implementation 
programme’, comprising, initially, a package of bills which introduced among other 
things, the long-postulated transformation of the structure of the so-called Centre, or the 
central state administration, primarily the economic administration^^.
60
Table (2,5) 
Macroeconomic and External Trends, 1983-89
Indicator 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
National Income Produced 
(% change)
6.0 5.6 3.4 4.9 2.0 4.9 -0.2
Gross Industrial Production * 
{% change)
6,6 5.6 4.1 4.4 3.4 5.3 -0.5
Gross Agricultural Production 
(% change)
3.3 5.7 0.7 5.0 -2.3 1.2 1.5
Retail Price Inflation 21.4 14.8 15.0 17.5 25.3 61.3 243.8
Labour productivity 
(% change)
6.9 5.7 3.0 4.8 2.6 5.8 0.7
Hard currency Merchandise Trade Balance ($ bln) 1.44 1.53 1.06 1.07 1.23 1.01 0.77
Net hard currency debt ($ bln) 25.2 25.5 28.1 32.1 37.6 37.3 39.3
Net Ruble debt (TR bln) 3.5 4.5 5.3 6.3 6.4 6.3 5.3
Source; Slay, 1994:80, based on 
Statistics, different issues. Note: industrial sale.
data from the Central Statistical Office, Annual data in rows 1-3 are in constant prices. * gross
An examination of the macroeconomic indicators (Table 2.5) shows that the ‘second 
stage’ of reform of 1986-7 could not eliminate the major drawbacks of the previous 
reform programme of 1980-1, and in the late Eighties, the whole system came to an 
end. See Section Three below for a detailed discussion on the events of 1989.
To sum up: the 1956-7, 1971-2, 1980-1, and the 1986-7 attempts at reform aimed at 
variously conceived decentralisation and marketisation, and were concerned almost 
exclusively with improving the Decision-Making processes, but not at transforming the 
economy. These reforms were imposed from above, programmed and implemented by 
the government and the ruling party, with distinct pressure from the unfavourable 
economic situation, and from a dissatisfied society, which demanded a better standard 
of living. Therefore, these attempts at reform could not manage to improve the 
performance of the Polish economy. Hence, the Polish economy fell into a vicious 
circle of cyclical behaviour. Each cycle ended with more violent and widespread 
protests. Periods of accelerated growth, fuelled by extensive programmes and
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implemented at the cost of stagnation or declining consumption, were followed by 
periods of rapidly growing economic disequilibiia and social discontent.
What was the legacy of the CSS in the late’ Eighties?. The next part of the section 
summarises some key aspects of the macroeconomic situation in Poland in the late 
1980s. The main aim is to give an idea of the macroeconomic indicators which are 
used in Section Four to assess the performance of the Polish economy during the period 
1990-95.
2. The Legacy of the SociaUst System in Poland in the iate 1980s
Poland’s legacy from the CSS was mixed. On one hand, the countiy suffered from 
severe macroeconomic imbalances as it was drifting into hyperinflation, with major 
shortages, a huge external debt in default, nearly exhausted international reserves, and 
virtually no external or domestic credibility of economic policy making. On the other 
hand, Poland did have some experience with market-type solutions, as most of her 
agriculture was noncollectivised, and small businesses had been allowed to operate for 
some years.
a. Share of the private and the public sector in GDP and Employment
As can be seen from Table (2.6), in 1989, State-Owned and Co-operative industry, 
which together comprised the socialised or public sector, accounted for about 81.0% of 
GDP and 65.0% of the total employment in the Polish economy. Divided by economic 
activity, the highest share of the Socialised sector was in the industrial sector, which 
accounted for about 84% of industrial value added, and about 71% of employment. 
The most important branches are engineering, food processing, and fuel and energy, 
which together account for over 60% of sold production in Socialised industiy (Table 
2.1 in the Appendix). Thanks mainly to the Party’s policy of controlling the most vital 
economic sector in Poland. The lowest share of the Socialised sector was in 
agriculture. In 1989, it accounted for only 22.4% of the total value added of the
■
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agricultual sector. Thanks mainly to Gomulka’s strategy of decollectivisation of most 
of the agricultural sector in 1956. What do the above figures indicate?. In fact, these 
figures do not clearly define the rights of state ownership. These rights are very well 
defined in Western thought; the right to determine the resources use; the right to the 
eanings of the resources; and the right to dispose of the resource. In Poland, as in other 
Eastern and Central countries economies, the ownership structure was ill-defined. 
Those rights were rather vaguely distributed among the workers, managers, and state 
bureaucracies. The philosophy of central planning was that the State should maintain 
all ownership rights. Each SOE had a “founding body”, usually a branch ministry, 
which maintained formal oversight of the enterprise. The function of the enterprise was 
determined by the annual central plan. After the 1980-1 reforms, the situation in 
Poland became highly muddled, because the reforms could not manage to create hard 
budget constraints for the enterprises. State enterprises in Poland had been 
decontrolled, but without introducing real competition at the same time. The result, a 
worsening of financial discipline of the firm and eventually, of the macroeconomy. The 
state enterprise system did not rely on the capital market to allocate credit. Investment 
spending was typically negotiated between enterprises, the relevant government 
ministries, and the central planning commission. Once approved, investments were 
paid for by various reserve funds set aside by an enterprise, centrally allocated 
investment funds from the national budget, and loans from the national bank. No 
adequate assessment of investment prospects was required for these funding sources.
The total share of the private sector in GDP and employment in 1989 was 19%, and 
35%, respectively (Table 2.6). The highest share of the private sector in production and 
empoyment by economic activity was in the retail trade (59.3% and 72.7%, 
respectively). The lowest share of the private sector in both production and 
employment was in transportation; 11.5% and 14.3%, respectively. The share of the 
private sector in industrial production and employment was 16.2%, and 29.1%, 
respectively. These shares are small by any standard. But they are fascinating when 
compared with most of the countries in the region.^^
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The private economy has survived in Socialist Poland, in two forms: one is legal 
private activity in such areas as garden plots, or farms, and small service or 
manufacturing firms; the second is unofficial or illegal activity in ‘the second economy’ 
and on ‘the black market’
Table (2.6)
Economic Activity Private sector Public Sector
TotalGDP 19 81.0Employment 35 65.0IndustryOutput 16.2 83.8Employment 29.1 70.9AgricultureOutput 77.6 22.4Employment n.a. n.a.ConstructionOutput 33.0 67.0Employment 37.4 62.6TransportationOutput 11.5 88.5Employment 14.3 85.7Retail TradeOutput 59.3 40.7Employment 72.7 27.3
Source: The Central Statistical Office, 1995, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, No,52.
The factors responsible for the survival of the private sector in Communist Poland 
during the past 4 decades can be summarised as follows: (1) the economic crises that 
hit the Polish economy in 1956, 1970, 1979-82, led the leaders of the Polish 
Communist Party to decide to give the private sector some shares in the economy, 
especially in the sectors that were considered strategically unimportant for a veiy long 
time, like agriculture, small service or manufacturing workshops. (2) the appearance 
of the foreign debt crisis since the late 1970s, has forced the authorities to encourage 
the creation of the so-called ‘Polonia firms’ and ‘Joint Ventures’. (3) in some sectors, 
such as housing, the crisis has increased the importance of the private sector simply as a 
result of the decline in socialised provision of the state and co-operative housing to 
individuals. (4) the reforms of 1986/7 allowed socialised enterprises to enter into 
economic relations with the private sector, in the form of customers as well as
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suppliers, thanks to the ‘revisionist wing’ leaders like Messner and Mazowiecki, who 
were far less ideological than the ‘hard-liners’ like Bierut. (5) in the 1980s, 'market 
socialism ' as an ideology has become bankrupt in Poland. Many of the 'nomenclature 
managers' no longer believe that Socialism is either just or effective. (6) the 
importance of services has been growing in all advanced countries, and indeed, though 
at a slower rate, in the socialist countries. Thus, as the demand for services grows, the 
cost of restricting the private sector increases. Unless restrictions are imposed, the 
general presumption that private economic activity should be permitted in services will 
of itself lead to increases in the size of the private sector as demand increases. (7) 
finally, the most important factor behind the growth of the share of the private sector in 
Poland is that the effectiveness of the Centrally Planned System has become 
unacceptably low to the ruling elite. The Polish authorities had no other alternative but 
to encourage the growth of the private sector.^^
b. Sources of output and employment
As can be seen from Table (2.7), divided by economic activity, the highest share of 
GDP and employment came from the industrial sector, as it generated more than 40% 
value added, and employed more than 40% of the labour force in Poland, in 1989. The 
lowest share was from transportation and telecommunication, as it generated less than 
5% of the total value added, and employed less than 6% of the total labour force. As 
noted above, more than 80% of the output of the industrial sector has been generated by 
the Socialised sector. The high share of the industrial sector in GDP and employment 
indicates that it is the most important in Poland. Therefore, the crucial question that 
should be answered is; “Was the industrial sector economically efficient during the 
Socialist period?.”
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Table (2.7)
Indicator 1988GDP Employment 19^9GDP Employment
Industry 41.7 28.8 44.1 28.6Construction 10.7 7.9 8.2 7.7Agriculture & Forestry 13.1 28.1 12.9 27.3Transportation and Telecommunication 5.6 6.1 4.4 5.7Trade 13.7 8.7 16.3 8.5Other 15.2 20.4 14.1 22.2GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: The Central Statistical Office, 1990, Rocznik Statystyczny, Warsaw, Poland.
c. The effectiveness of the Industrial Sector in Socialist Poland
Many studies have been conducted to assess the effectiveness of the Polish industrial 
sector during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.^° At this stage of analysis, I would like to 
discuss the findings of one of these; the World Bank/Konovalov (August, 1989) study. 
The World Bank/Konovalov (August, 1989) survey study on 88 industrial enterprises, 
covered 191 product activities. The main purpose of the study was to measure the 
competitiveness of industrial activities in Poland, during the period 1961-1986. The 
study was based upon three interrelated approaches to assessing economic efficiency 
and distortions in prices in Poland. These approaches are: (1) The Total Factor 
Productivity^^ (TFP). TFP was used to provide an outline of structural change and 
dynamic efficiency of the industrial sector over the period 1960-85. This approach 
analyses performance at branch level. (2) The Domestic Resource Cost®^  (DRC). 
DRC compares the use of resources (capital and labour) in Poland against value added 
in world prices. (3) Distortions in traded goods prices were assessed from a more 
macroeconomic perspective. The extent of the tax and subsidy elements of various 
policy interventions in the trade sector were assessed. This was done by expressing the 
taxes and subsidies as a proportion of the total values of the appropriate trade flows 
(exports and imports). The main findings of the study are:
1. Based on an extensive survey in mid-1987, only about 30% of Poland’s industrial 
structure was economically efficient (at official exchange rates). These include
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subsectors such as engineering, textiles, metal products, and precision instruments. 
However, after making allowances for the over-valuation of the exchange rate, it 
appeared that about 60% of the industrial sector could be internationally competitive. 
The overall results were adversely influenced by the poor performance of the main 
activities within the ferrous metallurgy, food processing and transport equipment 
subsectors. These activities were in the heavy and more traditional industries. The 
food processing sector stands out particularly as lacking competitiveness. For this latter 
sector, the value of input exceeds that of output. The lack of competitiveness of these 
industries was largely responsible for the inefficiency of sample on average.
2. The DRC estimates have argued that efficiency gains were more likely with a shift to 
more indirect and market oriented means of resource allocation® .^
3. The estimates suggested that there was a need for restmcturing operations to be 
undertaken in conjunction with policy refonu. These would be directed towards 
improving the underlying technical efficiency of subsectors such as ferrous metal and 
agro-industry, and a reallocation of resources out of these less productive subsectors to 
more productive uses.
4. It appeared that larger enterprises were, on average, less efficient than small 
enterprises. This might be because larger enterprises tended to be more monopolistic, 
and face fewer competitive pressures, and that increasing costs of managing large 
enteiprises tended to outweigh any economies of scale. Small enterprises were easier to 
manage; resources at their disposal could be more easily reallocated; and there were 
lower costs of operation, energy or transport.
5. The TFP results were consistent with the well known stages of Polish economic 
development since 1960. The results confirm that in the 1960s and 1970s, the pattern 
of growth in Poland was very extensive. In other words, output growth was driven by 
growth in factor inputs. In the crisis period of 1979-82, the TFP analysis again 
highlights the extent of the crash, and also which sectors have been able to weather the 
storm better than others. Those sectors which relied heavily on imported inputs did not
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do too well during the crisis, while those sectors with less reliance on imports managed 
to stay afloat and continue growing. The recovery since 1982 strongly reflects increases 
in capacity utilisation levels. With the exception of the crisis period, the TFP results for 
Poland were not all that bad, and despite the problems inherent in the statistics, the 
story seems to be consistent and coherent. However, the TFP results were much below 
those in the more dynamic Asian countries, which have undertaken export-led growth. 
Moreover, there were two worrisome aspects of recent performance. First, there 
appeared to have been very little structural change since the early 1980s, with 
significant resources being allocated to inefficient activities. Secondly, output was 
being generated from increasingly obsolete machinery.
6. The study concluded that in order to achieve sustained progress, major components 
of a reform programme should include the following elements; paying labour 
according to its productivity, increasing interest rates to positive real levels, allowing 
both capital and labour to be allocated by market signals, and removing impediments to 
capital and labour mobility.
Combined with these results, the other macroeconomic variables give clear evidence 
about the economic crisis that hit the Polish economy in the late 1980s (Table 2.8). The 
remainder of this part of the study highlights the main features of some of the Polish 
macroeconomic economic indicators in 1988 and 1989.
d. Other macroeconomic indicators
As can be seen from Table (2.8), the inflation rate was 73.9% in 1988, and increased to 
640% in 1989, mainly as a result of liberalising most of the prices of the consumers and 
producers goods. The current account deficit reached 2.7% of the GDP. The gross 
external debt reached 40.6 US$ in 1989, or about 60% of GDP expressed in US$, and 
over 5 times the annualised average monthly level of exports in the first seven months 
of 1989.®"^  International reserves (gross official reserves) were only US$ 2.5 billion in 
1989, or equivalent to 15 weeks of imports.®  ^ At the same time, Poland had full 
employment. The ratio of fiscal deficit to GDP was around 6%. The ratio of subsidies
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to GDP decreased from 16% in 1988 to 10.6% of the GDP, reflecting the decline of 
subsidies, which was initiated in the economic transformation programme of 1989/90. 
The most significant changes were those concerning the taxation of enterprises profits. 
It decreased from 12.7% in 1988 to 7.9% as a percentage of GDP, thanks to the 
amendments to the tax legislation passed in January, 1989. See Section Four for details 
of these changes. Finally, Table (2.8) shows that most of the Polish foreign trade, in 
the two yeai's 1988-89, was conducted with East and Central European countries, 
thanks to the COMECON agreement.
Table (2.8) 
Polish Macroeconomic Indicators in 1988 and 1989Indicator "1988 ..... 1989Real GDP Growth Rate (%) 4.1 0.2CPI Inflation Rate (%) 73.9 640.0Unemployment Rate (%) 0.0 0.0Current Account Balance (in % of GDP) -0.8 -2.7Current Account Balance (US$ Billion) -0.6 -1.8Gross External Debts (US$ billion) 39.1 40.6Gross Official Reserves (US$ billion) n.a. 2.5Fiscal Deficit (% of GDP) -1.4 -6.1Total Subsidies (in % of GDP) 16.0 10.6Total Revenues (in % of GDP) 35.6 25.1Personal Income Tax Revenues (in % of GDP) 0.0 0.0Corporate Income Tax Revenue (in % of GDP) 12.7 7.9Imports (%)EEC 25 31East & Central Europe 41 34Other 31 34
Exports (%)
EEC 24 28
East & Central Europe 42 37
Other 33 35
Source: The Central Statistical Office, Annual Report and Statistical Bulletin, Different Issues.
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e. Foreign direct investment (FDI)
Foreign firms were prohibited from investing in Poland until 1976. In 1976, new 
legislation concerning foreign investors was passed, and opened the door for private 
foreign commercial p r o p e r t y . T h e  1976 legislation allowed the establishment of 
medium and even large, private firms in Poland. These firms were called ‘Polonia 
Firms’, because they were owned by people of Polish origin not resident in Poland. In 
1977, the first three firms were registered; by the end of 1980 their number had 
increased to only 46, employing 1,560 people. In 1981, there were 117 such firms, but 
they employed only 3,478 workers. By 1986, there were 670 firms, employing 61,619 
people (i.e. an average of 90 employees per firm, with the largest employing 800 people 
in 1988). In 1986, employment grew by only 7,330.®^
In 1986, legislation making Joint Ventures (JVs) with Western capitalist firms was 
passed. This kind of JVs was based on the principles of commercial law, and known as 
Commercial Law Companies with foreign capital. One of the greatest weaknesses of 
the legislation was the banning of participation of ‘Polonia firms’ in JVs. An 
expression of the authorities’ desire to fragment the private sector, it prevented large 
Western firms from taking advantage of Polonia firms’ knowledge of conditions in 
Poland, one of the factors which, together with the existence of suppliers and service 
firms independent of the state, could give Poland a considerable advantage over other 
East European countries in the competition for joint venture capital. This stagnation in 
the development of JVs makes the appearance since the mid-1980s of private and 
public limited companies all the more important. By mid 1987 there were some 400 
such companies registered, and many more awaiting registration. Some 4,000 people 
worked for , or were partners in the new companies, and employment ranged from 2-75 
persons, while the average was 10 (five times that in the non-agricultural private sector 
as a whole, and one ninth that of the Polonia firms). Most of the firms are engaged in 
services, and particularly in software and computers, marketing, and technical and 
scientific consulting. A whole group of such firms, dealing in software and mainly 
servicing socialised sector enterprises, have established themselves in Gdynia, in what 
one might call Poland’s ‘silicon bay’. The location is due to easy access to personal
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computer hardware, via the port, and to the skilled personnel of Gdansk Polytechnic. 
Most of the owners of limited companies are relatively young (30 to 40 years) and with 
a university degree.®®
f. Capital markets and banking
Regarding capital markets, they were absent in Poland, like other countries in the 
region, during the whole period of Socialism. However, it is of interest to mention that, 
in Poland, the Stock Exchange market was originally founded in 1817, and closed in 
1939.
As for the banking system, prior to WWn, the Polish banking system was relatively 
well developed. In 1938, Poland had a modem central bank, 3 large state banks, 27 
private banks operating as joint-stock companies (including 4 under foreign ownership),
28 finance houses, 19 credit unions, 353 savings associations, 975 local savings-and- 
loan associations and 5,597 credit co-operatives. Immediately after WWn, all private 
banks were wound up, and a new banking system was created to coirespond to the new 
economic ideology.®^
In 1946, the government began to centralise the system. The National Bank of Poland 
(NBP) became the main lender to key sectors of the economy, assuming the role played 
by the biggest pre-war private banks. With the passage of time, the NBP took over 
more and more of the banking institutions. This process continued unintermpted until 
the mid-1970s, when the last of these mergers took place, with a large bank - 
Powszechna Kasa Osczcednosci- being incorporated into the NBP. The old system 
reduced the role of banks to a minimum, turning the banking sector into nothing more 
than a conduit for centrally allocated funds. For years, banking operated in a non­
competitive environment. Its activity was subject to central administrative decision, as 
regards both the permissible scope of operation, and commercial lending policy
. 1 :
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At the beginning of the 1980s, the Polish banking system was composed of the 
following banks (in addition to the NBP, directly responsible to the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF, with the President of the NBP serving as Under-Secretary of State at the MoF)): 
Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciovej (BGZ); Bank Handlowy w Warszawa SA; Bank Polska 
Kasa Opieki SA. In 1982, a new Banking Act was adopted. The NBP became 
independent of the MoF. From that time on, the President of the NBP was to be 
appointed in the same manner as other members of the Cabinet (i.e. by Parliament, at 
the recommendation of the Prime Minister). The NBP was also given a greater role in 
developing monetary policy. The new legislation opened up the possibility of creating 
banks as joint-stock companies, including ones with foreign equity participation. 
Decisions in this matter were still to be taken by the Government, however. In fact, no 
new bank was created until 1987, when Bank Rozwojn Eksportn SA (the Export 
Development Bank) was set up.^^
3. Conciusion: (An urgent need for a radical transformation 
programme)
In the late 1980s, the Polish economy, like other economies of the communist countries, 
was deteriorating. It can be described as inefficient, permanently in disequilibrium, and 
non competitive in the World Market. At that time, all the Eastern European 
governments decided that the time of CSS was over, and it should be consigned to 
histoiy, and a new era of economic development should be started. This happened 
‘peacefully’ in the mid and late 1980s all over East and Central European countries, 
including Poland.^^
The governmental planners of the Central and Eastern European countries started 
searching for a more humane and efficient economic system. The main dilemma facing 
those planners was whether to choose ah economic system existing in some developed 
capitalist countries, or to look for a ‘third way’. After a long and deep discussion, the 
planners refused to experiment with a newly-devised ‘original’ economic system which 
would be appropriate in the post-socialist situation. They opposed the idea of searching
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for economic development which would be neither socialist nor capitalist. It was 
reluctantly decided by many of these governmental planners to take the road to a market 
economy- or what was understood by them to be a market economy. Poland was no 
exception. Thus, in 1989 a radical economic transformation programme was 
developed, to transform the Polish economy from a socially, centrally planned economy 
(CPE), to a capital, market economy (ME).
It was possible at that specific period of time, in my opinion, due to four main factors: 
first, the disappearance of the political factors that had constrained change in the past 
45 years^®; second, the severe economic crisis that hit the Polish economy in the late 
1980s; third, the support that Poland received from the international community, 
represented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the OECD, as well as the Western 
countries’ governments '^^; and finally, the lack of political will among the ruling Party 
leaders in the former Soviet bloc to continue with the same Socialist system. To 
summarise the above mentioned four factors, one can say that there was a global 
consensus that the Socialist system should be consigned to history.
In the next section, I shall discuss how economic theories and the experiences of other 
countries help in leading the way from a CPE to a ME. Then, I shall investigate how 
Poland chose its radical economic transformation programme. Also, I shall discuss the 
main elements of that programme, in order to investigate how much its elements 
resemble those of the theoretical ones, and the experiences of other countries.
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SECTIO N  (3) THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON ECONOM IC 
TRANSFORM ATION AND THE POLISH EXPERIENCE IN 1989 /90
The main purpose of the first part of this section is to discuss how economic theories, 
and the experiences of other countries, can help in formulating a reasonable economic 
transformation programme to transfer an economy based on central Planning, to a 
modern market orientated one. The puipose of the second part of the section is to 
investigate how Poland managed to adopt its economic transformation programme of 
1989/90, and analyse the main assumptions and components of the Polish programme. 
In addition, the major economic policy changes are also discussed. The main aim is to 
investigate how much the Polish economic transformation programme of 1989/90 
resembles other theoretical models and the experiences of other countries that have 
gone through similar transformation processes. Also, to discren the role of privatisation 
as an element in the whole transformation process.
1. Theoretical background on economic transformation
Economic theories say little on how to transform an economy from a socialist to a 
market orientated one, though offer some models for stabilisation, which suggest that 
private ownership, if accompanied by a high degree of economic liberalisation and 
competition, is the most efficient of the different forms of ownership.^ There is no 
empirical experience to guide transitions of the magnitude of the Central and East 
European countries, but there are some real experiences in other countries that have 
attempted to stabilise or transform aspects of their economies, to learn from. Therefore, 
the task of designing a transitional scenario for the Central and Eastern European 
countries represents an especially challenging task for economists and political leaders 
alike. (1) the problem was new: “no country prior to 1989 had ever abandoned the 
communist political and economic system”; (2) the experience to date indicates that 
countries attempting transition face a number of common problems and difficulties.^ 
However, there are important differences in the inherited situations, as well as the 
choices deemed appropriate by the governments of these countries. The similarities in
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the problems that Poland, among other CPE countries, faced, and the difficulties 
encountered suggest that there was a logic to the transition process. (3) “the absence of 
any close historical par allels and the limited experience of the economies in transition 
offer an opportunity and a challenge for the development of normative transitional 
scenarios.” ^
The development of an economic reform scenario required not only a profound 
knowledge of the mechanism of the market economy, but also an understanding of how 
the elements of any economic reform programme should be structured, and how the 
elements should be sequentially linked. In fact, the task was not an easy one for 
economists at the start of the transition process. From the beginning of the 
transformation process, economists- for example, Clague, 1992, thought that the full 
benefits of a market economy are not realised unless most of its key features are in 
place. That was believed to be the case because Central and Eastern European 
countries attempted only partial market-orientated reforms that produced either small 
benefits or even negative results.
Development in economic theories affects the way governmental planners look at the 
whole process of transformation. For instance, from the 1930s to the 1970s, the key 
advantage of the market economy was perceived by the majority of economists to be its 
approximation of the rules of allocative efficiency. These rales relate to marginal rates 
of transformation and substitution across goods, consumers, producers, and time."^
In recent decades, many economists have returned to the Schumpeterian view that the 
advantage of the market economy lies more in its facilitation of innovative activity, than 
in its allocative efficiency. The experience of the Central and Eastern European 
countries in the past 45 years illustrated that the socialist, centrally planned system was 
surely deficient in both respects, but its shortcomings, as Murrell (1990) argues, seem 
to be much greater in the area of innovation than in allocative efficiency. Williamson 
(1985) argues that innovative activity usually caiTies a high risk of failure, because 
bureaucracies are normally reluctant to engage in behaviour that induces entrepreneurial 
attitudes. While innovation normally generates large externalities in any economy,
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many economists (for example, Olson, 1992; Cooler, 1992; and Stiglitz, 1992) would 
contend that a well-functioning capital market, with cleaiiy defined property rights over 
organisations and ideas as well as goods and factors of production, has been essential 
for increasing a return to innovative activity above what it would be in a society with 
poorly developed market institutions.
Other economic theories have paid increased attention to the motivation of government 
officials, both legislators and bureaucrats. In the 1950s and 1960s, much economic 
analysis focused on market failures, and government action to remedy these failures, 
under the implicit assumption that governmental planners would follow the rules laid 
down by higher authorities.^
Clague (1992) argues that these theoretical considerations have been reinforced by the 
experiences of those ex-socialist economies which have attempted reform through 
decentralisation of decision-making under public ownership. The result was that 
decentralised decision-making, under ‘soft budget constraints’, led to worse results than 
central planning itself.
One can conclude from the above discussion that transforming a CPE into a market 
economy requires complex and untested novel reform approaches. Grigory Yavlinsky^ 
described the process of transformation from maiket to plan as, making fish soup from 
an aquarium, but the reverse transformation , i.e. from plan to market, like trying to 
build an aquarium out of fish soup.^
Despite the previously discussed difficulties, some economists have proposed some 
transformation models to assist the Central and Eastern European countries in their 
transition process.
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'a. Theoretical transformation models
The most important economic transformation models are those proposed by Kornai, 
1990; Lipton & Sachs, 1990 and 1992; Fischer & Gelb, 1991; Clague, 1992; Summers, 
1992; Murrell, 1992; Olson, 1992; Hanson, 1992; The World Bank, 1991; and the 
WB/IMF/EBRD/OECD, 1992.
A summary of the main elements of these models of reform is illustrated in Boxes (3.1-
8), below:
Box (3.1)
Elements of Economic Reform Model Proposed by ____________ Fischer & Gelb (1991)
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation and control
implementation of stabilisation programmes
creation of tools and institutions for indirect macroeconomic control, monetary and 
fiscal
measures to harden budget constraints
dealing with existing problems (monetary overhang, financial system, bankruptcies) 
Social Safety Nets (at first on an emergency basis)
2) Institutional reforms: Human capital and administrative capacity 
legal and regulatory institutions
business management, including the financial sector 
government decision-makers and administrators 
information systems (accounting and auditing)
3) Price and market reform 
domestic price reform 
international trade liberalisation 
distribution systems for products 
creation of market for housing 
wages
interest rates
4) Small- and large-scale enterprise restructuring and privatisation
management systems 
allocation of property rights 
agricultural land 
industrial capital 
housing stock
social protection and insurance rights for individuals
5) Development of financial markets and institutions
banking systems, other financial markets
Source: Fischer, S & Gelb, A (1991) Issues in The Reform of Socialist Economies, In Reforming 
Central European Economies: Initial Results and Challenges, edited by V Corbo, F Coricelli, and J 
Bossak (Washington:WB).
85
Box (3.2)
Elements of Economic Reform Model Proposed by___________ Lipton & Sachs (1990)___________
1) End Excess Demand
2) Create market competition, based on
deregulation, of prices 
free trade (removal of trade barriers) 
full liberalisation of private sector 
demonopolisation of the state sector
3) Privatisation (taking many years)
4) Introduction of labour market policies
unemployment insurance 
job retraining
credit allocation to individuals who start businesses
5) Promoting foreign direct investments
Source; Lipton & Sachs (1990) Creating a Market Economy in East Europe: The Case of 
Poland, In Kennetti D, and Lieberman M, 'The Road to Capitalism: Economic transition in East 
Europe and Former Soviet Union*, (HBSC:NY).
Box (3.3)
Elements of Economic Reform Model Proposed by ________________ Kornai (1990)________
1) Extensive vrivatisation and special protection for the private sector',
2) Economic discipline o f the state sector, subjecting it to strict social control;
3) Stabilisation operation suppressing inflation, restoring budgetary equilibrium, 
controlling macro-demand, introducing a uniform rate o f exchange and
convertibility o f the currency;
4) Accumulation and maintenance o f humanitarian and economic rescues to endure 
the period o f transition. ___  _______
Source: Kornai, J  (I990)The Road To A Free Economy: Shifting From Socialist System, The Case 
of Hungary, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
-i
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Box (3.4)
Elements of Economic Reform Model Proposed by______________ Summers (1992)______________
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation
tightening fiscal and credit policies 
addressing internal and external imbalances
2) Price and market reform
removing price controls 
liberalising trade 
creating competitive market
3) Enterprise reform and restructuring
private sector development 
establishing and clarifying property rights 
facilitating entry and exit of firms 
restructuring of enterprises
4) Institutional reform
redefining the role of the State 
legal and regulatory reform 
establishing a social safety net
reform of government institutions (tax administration, budget and expenditure 
control, monetary control).
Source: Summers, L (1992) The Next Decade in Central and Eastern Europe in Clague & 
Rausser G. (1992) (ed.) The Emergence of Market Economies in Eastern Europe (Basil 
Blackwell ; Cambridge).
::î3-
Box (3.5)
Elements of Economic Reform Model Proposed by ________________Hanson (1992)________
1 ) Financial Stabilisation
2) The decontrol o f prices and quantities, accompanied by demonopolisation when 
necessary
3) The transfer o f assets from state ownership to a variety o f identifiable vrovrietors
4) Opening up the economy to competition from imports in the product market and 
to foreign investors in the capital m a r k e t ________
Source; Hanson, P (1992) Elements of Economic Reform  ^in Clague & Rausser G. (1992) (ed.) 
The Emergence of Market Economies in Eastern Europe (Basil BlackwelhCambridge).
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Box (3.6)
Elements of Economic Reform Model Proposed by_______________ Clague (1992)_______
A) Creating A New Set of Rules
1) Setting up a legal infrastructure for the private sector commercial and contract law 
antitrust and labour law 
environmental and health regulationsrules regarding foreign partnerships and wholly foreign-owned companies courts to settle disputes and enforce the law
2) Devising a system o f taxation for the new private sector defining accounting rules for taxation purposes,organising an internal revenue service to collect taxes from the private sector3) Devising rules for the new financial sectordefining accounting rules for reporting business results to banks and investors setting up a system of bank regulation
4) Determining ownership rights to existing real propertydevising laws relating to the transfer of property laws affecting landlord-tenant relationsresolving the vexatious issue of restitution of property confiscated by communist governments
5) Foreign exchangesetting rules under which private firms and individuals may acquire and sell foreign exchange and foreign goods
setting rules in the same area for the not-yet-privatised enterprises
B) Managing The Economy:
1) Reforming prices
2) Creating a safety net
3) Stabilising the macroeconomymanaging the government budget to avoid an excessive fiscal deficit managing the total credit provided by the banking system
C) Privatisation
1) Small-scale vrivatisationreleasing to the private sector trucks and buses, retail shops, restaurants, repair shops, warehouses, and other building space for economic activities 
establishing the private right to purchase services from railroads, ports, and other enterprises which may remain in the public sector.2) Laree-scale privatisationtransferring medium and large-scale enterprises to the private sector managing the enterprises that have not yet been privatised
3) Financial reorganisationclearing the existing state banks of uncollectable debts and recapitalising and privatising these banksManaging these banks before they are privatised, including arrangements for loans to new businesses.
Source: Clague, C (1992) The Journey to a Market Economy,jn Clague & Rausser G. (1992) (ed.) 
The Emergence of Market Economies in Eastern Europe (Basil BlackwelhCambridge).
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Box (3.7)
Elements of Economic Reform Model Proposed by___________ The World Bank (1991) _______ _
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation
2) Markets:
a) Goods and services
prices; liberalise most prices (including some necessities, such as housing) 
trade: remove quantitative restrictions (adjust tariffs to modest levels) 
distribution: privatise and demonopolise
b) labour market 
deregulate hiring and firing 
liberalise wage bargaining
c) Financial Market 
restructuring and development 
liberalising and privatisation
3) Ownership structure
small enterprises: develop and privatise
large enterprises: evaluate, restructure and privatise
foreign investment: revise regulations
4) Government:
Legal framework: reform property law, commercial law and taxes 
Institutional framework: reform legal and regulatory institutions and fiscal 
administration
Social Safety net: meet emergencies, and institutionalise
Source; The World Bank (1991) Form Central Plan to Market, World Development Report 
(WB; Washington).
Box (3.8)
Elements of Economic Reform Model Proposed by The World Bank/IMF/EBRD/ OECD (1992)»
1) Fiscal Policy:
get rid of the turnover tax
introduce a realistic and simple income tax with non-punitive marginal rates 
phase out subsidies for food, intermediate goods and other services 
curb social expenditure
introduce bond with attractive real interest rates
retain most of the taxing power at the centre, and share revenue downward.
2) External Economic Policy
dispense with multiple exchange rates, and establish a realistic single rate 
agree on a division of responsibility of external debt and foreign exchange reserves 
between union and republics
3) Incomes Policy
index wages to only 50-70% of inflation
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4) Prices
announce timetable for conversion to world prices
Introduce an export tax on energy and mineral products until domestic prices have 
been raised to equal world prices
use a rationing device, probably stamps, to ameliorate shortage problems in the 
consumer sector during the transition.
5) Ownership;
auction off small enterprises in retail trade, and wholesale trade, and during 
transformation
put large enterprises in state holding companies with equity shares (held by state 
initially). ,
preparation to sell off the shares to the public
to end any preference in access to materials for publicly-owned companies 
to end production monopolies, except where they are ‘natural’ (such as electricity 
supply)
6) International trade
to establish a single exchange rate
to introduce a new 30% universal tariff
to liberalise further to match the lower levels in other nations
7) Foreign direct investment
reform of the legal and fiscal structure
any screening of foreign investors must be transparent and non-obstructive 
explicit protection for foreign capital against confiscation and expropriation is 
required
establishment of credit market
8) Banking
convert state banks to joint stock banks and commercialise them under prudent 
banking standards
9) Social security 
reform social security
10) Labour 
abandon tariff wages
get government out of the process of wage determination in the long run, but the 
transition problems require an incomes policy in the short- to medium-term.
11) Legal Reform
create a system of property rights
end all union and republic laws that criminalise behaviour that is both rational and 
economically beneficial (such as speculation).
12) Accountancy
introduce a standardised western system; this is a priority for technical assistance, 
since the valuation of industry prior to privatisation requires standardised accounting.
13) Environment
14) Distribution of goods 
privatisation of the distribution network
15) Transportation
raise rail rate and mass transit fares to provide funds for modernisation
16) Telecommunication
create regional monopolies and reform tariffs in the central network;
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access to modern telecommunications is a high priority in creating a favourable 
business environment.
17) Agriculture 
liberalise all prices
reform land tenure arrangements with guarantees of permanency
defer any new investment in collective agriculture until all reforms are in place
reduce waste of agriculture by introducing food processing
18) Energy
restore output oil, gas and electricity
invest more to augment electrical generation capacity
reform energy prices to bring them in line with world prices
19) Mining and extraction
stop over-capitalisation in this industry
raise prices of output sold to domestic enterprises
increase prices to give incentives for recycling and hence help the environment
20) Manufacturing: 
end monopolies
privatise through the intermediary stage of holding companies 
harden budget constraints 
improve accounting
21) Housing:
reform property rights
facilitate sale of property and leases
create financing opportunities for purchase by individuals
foster competition in housing supply
22) The role of western assistance
primary focus must be technical assistance for legal reform, creating markets and
fiscal and monetary policy
food aid will be required in the transition
project assistance should be a priority to retailing and small-scale wholesaling, 
transportation and distribution networks, telecommunications and food processing.
Source: Kennett, D. (1992) Elements of Economic Reform, in Clague & Rausser G, (1992) (ed.) 
The Emergence of Market Economies in Eastern Europe (Basil Blackwell: Cambridge).
Note: This is a summary of a study done by the leading multi-lateral economic agencies- IMF, IBRD, OECD, EBRD- after a request from the heads of the Group of Seven (G7) countries. The aim was to provide recommendations for the reform of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) economy, and to establish criteria by which Western 
economic assistance could effectively support such reforms. It is important to note that this study was done within a period of four months.
Most of the proposed models agreed that the following broad elements of any 
comprehensive economic reform scenario must be in place for the reforms to be 
considered successful: (1) macroeconomic stabilisation; (2) microeconomic
liberalisation; (3) enterprise restructuring and privatisation: (4) institutional reforms; 
(5) development of financial markets and institutions; (6) and a new system of social
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security, All the above discussed models suggest that privatisation is a very necessary 
element, for any economic transformation programme to be successful. In fact, each 
element has its own set of prerequisites, and each is linked to the others in a complex 
web of logical and practical interconnections. After agreeing on the general 
components of any reasonable reform model, the crucial question that follows is: “How 
should the sequencing of the reform models be structured?”
b. Sequencing of economic reform
The sequencing of economic reform has only recently emerged as a topic of theoretical 
analysis.^ The World Bank (1991) distinguishes between two schools of thought. One 
school of reform (for example, Kornai, and Friedman^) puts change in ownership at the 
head of the sequence, before or alongside changes that address macroeconomic stability 
and markets. The rationale is partly political. With early privatisation, there is less risk 
that the economy will remain state-controlled, and greater pressure for complementaiy 
market-orientated reforms. The other school of thought (for example Sachs, the World 
Bank, and Nuti) begins with macroeconomic and market-building reforms. It leaves 
privatisation -at least for large state enterprises- to a second stage. Under both 
proposals some agricultural, retail and residential assets would be privatised early. The 
rationale is that private ownership requires financial institutions, experience, and 
expertise that do not yet exist in the transitional economies. Without this infrastructure, 
rapid privatisation could lead to widespread corruption, and economic and political 
chaos.
Lipton & Sachs, 1991; Summers, 1992; Fischer & Gelb, 1991, all argue that the more 
fundamental reason for sequencing the reforms is that some changes are preconditions 
for others. For example, macroeconomic stabilisation is needed if price reform is to be 
successful. The systems and skill, which have to be in place for the markets to work, 
need to be developed. So, financial liberalisation is extremely risky, unless a sound 
system of accounting, auditing, prudential regulation and supeiwision is in place, and 
unless the macroeconomic convey is reasonably stable.
. . . I
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It can be concluded that a linear sequence of individual policy changes is not likely to 
succeed. In addition, no single refom sequence will fit all the transitional economies. 
The details of the refonu path any country would follow, therefore, depend on the state 
of the economy, on the tolerance of the population to reform, and on the prevailing 
political situation and the speed with which these new institutions can be established.^^
As stabilisation strategies are among the main elements of any transformation 
programme, it is of importance at this stage of my analysis, to investigate how 
economic theories, and the experiences of other countries, can assist the reseaicher or 
political leader in designing a macroeconomic stabilisation strategy. This gives the 
opportunity to relate the Polish experience to existing macroeconomic stabilisation 
theories.
c. Alternative stabilisation strategies
Economic theories offer two alternative stabilisation strategies, referred to as the 
orthodox approach, and the heterodox approach. The first is based on elimination of 
the budget deficit and the use of money or the exchange rate to anchor the prices level 
(s). With this approach, there is money and exchange rate-based stabilisation, 
depending on which of these variables is used as the nominal anchor. Whereas the 
second is, in effect, a version of the orthodox exchange rate- based stabilisation, 
initially supporting the fiscal adjustment with price and wage controls to deal with the
inertial aspects of inflation. 12
1
1. The Orthodox Approach
This approach has been effective in stopping hyperinflation episodes in low-inflation 
countries. It has been effective in chronic high-inflation cases, especially in the short 
run, in some of the Latin American countries/^
Money-based programmes: There are few examples of money-based stabilisation
programmes in chronic high-inflation countries. The Chilean stabilisation programme 
of 1974-75 is one of the few.^ "^  It was a comprehensive effort that combined a major
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fiscal adjustment with a monetary crunch aimed at stopping inflation. The effect on 
inflation was disappointing. Despite major anti-inflation effort, the rate fell only 
marginally between 1973 and 1975. This disappointing outcome was accompanied by a 
dramatic rise in unemployment (from 4.6% in 1973 to 16.8% in 1975), a large fall in 
GDP (exceeding 14% in 1975) but, an improvement in the current account. In early 
1990, Argentina and Brazil were pursuing monetarist programmes to stop their 
hyperinflation. In both these cases, inflation fell initially- monthly inflation dropped at 
the beginning to one-digit level- but the success only lasted for several months: 
inflation later bounced back to rates above 20% a month in both countries. As in Chile, 
both programmes were recessionary and led to an improvement in the current account.
The sluggish response induced by money-based programmes to reduce inflation, and 
their high costs in terms of output and employment, explain why this approach is 
seldom used in chronic high-inflation countries. In most cases where money-based 
programmes have been adopted, the monetarist phase has been short, with the 
authorities eventually shifting to a strategy that uses the exchange rate as the nominal 
anchor.
Exchange Rate-based stabilisation: This is a programme designed to reduce inflation 
by combining a package of fiscal adjustment with the exchange rate as the nominal 
anchor. The exchange rate rule can take the form of a fixed exchange rate (as in Chile 
in 1980) or a pre-announced rate of devaluation (as in the tabilets in the late 1970s in 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay).
Experience shows that exchange rate-based stabilisation is usually more effective than 
money-based stabilisation in bringing down inflation. In Chile, for example, the 
combination of a tight fiscal stance and the announcement of a schedule of future daily 
values of the exchange rate embodying decreasing rates of devaluation, was more 
effective in reducing inflation than was the monetarist phase. Nevertheless, inflation 
was very persistent, remaining above the pre-announced rate of devaluation for a 
prolonged period. As a result, the real exchange rate appreciated, and in the end the 
economy was stuck with an overvalued currency, difficulties in the external sector and 
the threat of a Balance of Payments (BOPs) crisis.
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2. The Heterodox Approach
Heterodox stabilisation programmes are those that supplement Orthodox measures- 
namely tight fiscal and audit policies and a fixed exchange rate- with income policies. 
They are usually the first stage in a long-teim stabilisation effort. The distinctive 
feature of these programmes is the initial and temporary use of price and wage controls 
and a fixed exchange rate to achieve a rapid reduction in inflation. Once the controls 
are removed, the programme essentially becomes an orthodox exchange rate-based 
stabilisation progranune. Most orthodox programmes start with a period of tight money 
before they switch to the exchange rate as the nominal anchor-one difference between 
Orthodox and Heterodox programmes.^^
Experience shows that few programmes satisfy the definition of heterodox. There were 
just two examples in the 1980s^ ;^ The Israeli programme of 1985, and the Mexican 
programme of 1987-88. Both programmes initially used income policies to achieve a 
rapid reduction in inflation. In both cases, the exchange rate was the main nominal 
anchor and was fixed at the beginning, and both maintained the fiscal adjustment 
throughout. There were differences in the degree to which the two countries applied 
controls. In Israel, the controls were economy-wide, while in Mexico, the Government 
opted to allow a large number of prices to be determined freely. However, these 
differences were ones of degree and not substance. Basically, the philosophy behind 
the two programmes was the same.^^
One feature of heterodox programmes is the ease with which they bring inflation down 
during the eaiiy phase of the programme. This initial fall in inflation, however, is not 
an indication of success, because this outcome is common to both successful and 
unsuccessful programmes (the latter include those that imposed price-wage controls but 
did not persist on the fiscal side). A second feature is that the initial costs of bringing 
inflation down are not very large (as opposed to under money-based orthodox 
programmes). In Israel, unemployment went up marginally for just two quarters, while
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in Mexico there were no indications of costs in teims of unemployment and output 
growth as a result of the stabilisation efforts?^
The first stage is the easy part of a heterodox stabilisation programme, but it is followed 
by more difficult steps later. By using the heterodox approach, policy-makers tend to 
postpone many of the problems that appear early on in money-based orthodox 
programmes. The use of controls does not remove the credibility problem which 
orthodox programmes face in chronic high-inflation countries, and this difficulty has to 
be confronted later, when prices and wages are liberalised (the stage in which flexibility 
is created). This stage is the more difficult one in a heterodox programme, since only 
then do policy-makers have to rely on traditional nominal anchors (either money or the 
exchange rate) to bring inflation down. The typical problems in the flexibility stage are 
a resurgence of inflation, an increase in real wages, high interest rates, an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate and a deterioration in the cuiTent account. '^^
I have already discussed the main economic transformation programmes proposed by 
different economists, the main stabilisation strategies, and the experiences of some 
countries. The following part is devoted to answering the following questions: “What 
kind of reform programme did Poland adopt to transform its economy from CPE to an 
ME?”; “Who decided to adopt that programme?.” “How did the Polish authorities 
formulate their economic reform programme of 1989/90?.” “What are the main 
elements of that programme?.” “Which strategy did Poland adopt to stabilise its 
economy?.” And finally, “How much did the Polish economic reform programme and 
stabilisation strategy resemble any of the theoretical models, and stabilisation strategies, 
discussed above?.”
2. The Polish economic transformation programme of 1989/90
One cannot understand what happened in Poland in the late 1980s, unless one has some 
knowledge of the political, social, and economic environment at the time. In fact, 
Poland adopted a radical programme to transform its economy from a CPE to a market 
one, because the economic, social, and political wills began to converge in the late
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1980s. That was the case because, without unambiguous political agreement on 
decision-making by consensus, a credible reform programme is all but impossible. 
This is particularly relevant to East European countries in general and to Poland in 
paiticular, where the old political structures had lost popular legitimacy, but new 
mechanisms of decision-making by consensus were not yet in place. This question may 
also be relevant for Poland, where the democratic process had been semi-established in 
1989, and fully established in 1990/91, but may still be vulnerable to possible economic 
set-back. Even if the project of moving to a market economy receives political backing 
and wide popular support, circumstances may force policy-makers to pursue other goals 
which may conflict with a rapid move towards a full market economy. Thus, a 
commitment to increase economic efficiency, as in Poland, will tend to contradict with 
the rapid setting up of a market economy. While such decisions about relative priorities 
are intrinsically political, economists drawing up suggested blueprints for reform should 
be aware of the difficult political choices which their proposals may involve.
Once most of the political difficulties of economic transition have been overcome, a 
broad social consensus needs to be reached on the steps to be taken. Even if such social 
agreement is attained initially, there is no guarantee that such a consensus can be 
maintained once the costs of the adjustment begin to emerge. A market economy is 
expected to yield considerable benefits to the population. It was very important that 
reformers made clear the magnitudes of potential benefits, and the likely time scale for 
their emergence, in order to obtain the widest possible support for the transformation 
process. Qualitative benefits from the move to a market economy which were likely to 
appeal’ quickly (such as more individual freedom, increased choices, and the 
disappearance of queuing) should be stressed. Similarly, the prospects for increased 
independence through the secure, individual ownership of wealth may be important for 
constructing and maintaining a social consensus behind the reform programme. Even 
in the oldest democracy, where the rules of decision-niaking by the majority are widely 
accepted, there is still considerable uncertainty about the socially acceptable limits of 
changes in policy. Indeed, increases in inflation or unemployment, or substantial cut­
backs in subsidies or government services, have frequently led to changes in 
governments. There is no reason to believe that the new eastern democracies will find
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it easier to deal with such (hopefully short-iun) economic problems, whatever the 
longer-term benefits of the market economy may turn out to be. An especially 
important question here is whether it is trae that economic chaos leads to a social 
consensus in favour of “shock therapy” or “big bang” adjustment policies, as adopted in 
Poland in 1990 and Yugoslavia in 1989, in contrast to the more gradualist approach 
taken by Hungary for over two decades. However, even if such a consensus in favour 
of shock therapy exists, whether implicitly or explicitly, there is no guarantee that this 
support can be sustained as the costs of the transition increase. There may, therefore, be 
an apparent reversal in reform policies, which is perfectly logical, given the social and 
political context. On the other hand, if a gradual process is adopted, central planning 
may collapse, with no replacement in sight at all. Informal co-ordination mechanisms, 
such as black markets, will tend to emerge, instead of the expected gradual transition to 
the open market. Increasing inequality, open inflation and a rapid increase in 
unemployment, may lead to disenchantment with the incomplete reform process, and 
result in the adoption of a policy of shock therapy. But whether this will help in 
reaching the necessary social and political consensus remains to be seen. How did an 
economic, social, and political consensus emerge in Poland?.
a. Political developments
As noted in the previous section, past attempts at economic reform had failed because 
they were implemented under the umbrella of the Classical Socialist System. In the 
Eighties, the "reformers wing’ in the Communist Party started to predominate, because 
they realised that the Polish economic system was deteriorating at a rapid pace, and that 
dissatisfaction among the general population could no longer be ignored. The ruling 
party and its government could not rely on Western countries for financial support, as 
the Polish State increasingly lacked financial and political credibility. The convergence 
of all these factors prompted the Communist authorities to seek some form of 
accommodation with the opposition^^.
The first attempt towards a compromise taken by the wing of reformers of the 
Communist Party in Poland was led by the Interior Minister, Kiszczak, when he met
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with Lech Walesa^ *^  in August, 1988. At that meeting, the proposition for the so-called 
‘Round Table’ Debate was formulated, sending out a signal that the Party was ready to 
negotiate with the opposition."^
The second attempt towards compromise was the television discussion between Lech 
Walesa and Alfred Miodowicz, the head of the Union, which took place in November,
1988. Its original purpose was to discuss the future of trade unions, but it quickly 
expanded into a general debate on the whole situation in Poland.^^
Political discussions between the Ruling Party and the opposition, accompanied by 
labour strikes, led to the resignation of Messner’s government in September, 1988. A 
new government was formed by Rakowski, in October, 1988. This government 
favoured the acceleration of some reforms by promoting a more central role for the 
private sector. At the same time, it tried to weaken the opposition (party), by 
announcing the liquidation of its birth place, the Gdansk Shipyai'd^ .^ However, due to 
political, social, and economic pressure, the ‘Round Table’ Debate began in February,
1989, and ended in April, 1989, with the ‘Round Table’ Agreement between the ruling 
authorities and the opposition Solidarity trade union, other official trade unions and 
some other interest g r o u p s . T h i s  led to a new political situation in Poland, and a 
semi-free^ ^ election took place on June 4, 1989. Solidarity members won 99 seats in 
the Senate and all freely elected seats (161 seats) in the Sejm (The Polish Parliament). 
General Jaruzelski^^ was elected to the post of State President on 19 July, 1989, and 
Rakowski was nominated to the post of First Secretary of the Communist Party. 
Besides that, Kiszczak (the former Interior Minister, who made the first attempt 
towai’ds compromise with the opposition (party)) was appointed to the post of Prime 
Minister.^^
At the time, Polish intellectuals and leaders of the opposition (party) understood^"  ^that 
this was a very clear signal from the Ruling Party to take the chance to join them in the 
‘new’ political and economic systems. In fact, the leader of the opposition party (Lech 
Walesa) grasped that chance and took another step forwaid. He established a 
parliamentary coalition from the United Peasant Party (ZSL), the Democratic Party
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(SD), and Solidarity. Due to this coalition, Kiszczak (the appointed Prime Minister) 
failed to form a government, and resigned on 17 August, 1989. Hence, a new coalition 
government (i.e. from Solidarity movement members, the SD, the ZSL and PZPR) was 
formed on 16 September, 1989, by Solidarity advisor, Mazowiecki.^^
A look at the new Cabinet explains why it was possible at the time to foim a radical 
economic reform programme: Solidarity members took Portfolios of nearly all of the 
‘economic’ Ministries, including the Ministries of Finance (Balcerowicz), Industry, 
Constraction, and Agriculture, while Communists still kept the most important 
‘political’ ones (i.e. the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of De f en ce ) .Wi t h  
responsibilities divided in such a fashion, how could political compromises be 
achieved?. How would the politicians let the economists achieve their goals?.
b. Economic issues
In his address to the Sejm on 13 September, 1989, Mazowiecki announced clearly that 
political and economic changes would be designed not to improve the previously 
existing system, but to change it radically towards a market economy and western-style 
parliamentary democracy. He indicated that in the short-mn, the highest priority would 
be given to fighting inflation, which had turned into hyperinflation following the 
removal of price controls in August, 1989. The Sejm’s vote of confidence for the first 
non-communist-led government and its economic plan provides evidence that 
Parliament realised that there was no other alternative.^^
It was the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance, in fact the task of Balcerowicz, 
who had been an ai'dent advocate of economic reforms since the late Seventies, to 
formulate a radical reform plan. How did he and his team^  ^accomplish that task?. The 
team encountered dilemmas over the character of the plan itself. At the beginning, the 
main dilemmas which faced them before embarking on the plan were the following:
(1) whether to choose a ‘big bang’ (shock therapy) or a gradual step-by-step approach;
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(2) whether a larger or smaller scope of government intervention in the economy should 
be chosen;
(3) whether priority should be given to the stabilisation programme, or to the systemic 
transformation process; and
(4) whether the Polish economy should be open to international competition.^^
The challenge, therefore, was unique in its system-wide scope, its political, economical, 
and historical context, especially when we know that Poland was one of the first 
countries to discuss the issue of transformation cum economic liberalisation'^^. One can 
thus argue that Poland did not have the guidance that could be gleaned from theoretical 
economic models. The transformation in Poland happened before other economic 
reform programmes appeared in 1990. Poland was already embaiking on its radical 
economic reform programme of 1989-90. The Polish economic reform programme 
served rather as one of the first examples for systematic theoretical debates about such 
reform programmes, and this was subsequently widely disseminated. The importance 
of analysing the Polish experience, therefore, as mentioned in the introduction to the 
study, lies in providing others with a model for economic reform in general, and 
privatisation in particular.
Bear in mind that Balcerowicz belongs to the 'younger generation of Polish 
economists’, and was one of those who formulated the best, most complex, and 
theoretically-advanced ideas to reform the Polish economy in 1980-81. His project at 
the time called for the replacement of central planning mechanisms with market 
mechanisms. Predictably, it was rejected by the Communist regime at the time.'^  ^
Therefore, one can readily accept the fact that on October 6, 1989, less than a month 
after the vote of confidence by Parliament, the first non-communist government 
prepared the first approach’ of its radical economic reform programme.And after 
two months, on 17 December, 1989, Balcerowicz presented to the Sejm a balanced 
budget, and a package of eleven laws designed to lay the foundations of the Polish 
economy for the next five years.
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c. External influences
Why did Balcerowicz and his team opt for a very radical type of reform, a “big bang” 
approach, not a “step-by-step”, gradual approach?"^ "^  From the point of view of the IMF 
team and Sachs (who were members and advisors in the team), “piecemeal changes 
cannot work, since each part o f the overall reform has a role in strengthening the other 
parts. Financial control of the public sector requires active competition. That in turn, 
depends on free trade, and free access to foreign exchange. ”
The team also opposed the idea of strong governmental intervention in the economy, 
and voted for free market solutions. Balcerowicz confirmed several times the 
declaration of his Prime Minister, that the goal “is to establish an economic system 
similar to that of highly-developed Capitalist countries,
From the above discussion, one can conclude that the decisions were made by the Poles 
with the help of a group of foreign experts on whose goodwill Poland depended to 
receive the money to transform the country
d. A two-stage programme
In fact, the Government decided on a two-stage programme. The first phase, until
1989, was to prepare the ground for the main stage, which was to begin on January I,
1990."^  ^ The first phase was called ‘emergency measures’, introduced in the last quarter 
of 1989 to arrest the deterioration of the economy These measures included the 
removal of many price controls, aimed at preparing the ground for major price 
liberalisation in January, 1990; intensified credit restraint to curb excessive money 
creation, which was another major cause of inflation, along with the budget deficit; 
accelerated tax payments and expenditure cuts, a rapid depreciation of the Zloty, and 
100-200% taxes on excessive wage increases ( increases exceeding 80% of the monthly
rise in the cost of living) 50
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The Plan had two packages: (1) a macroeconomic stabilisation and microeconomic 
liberalisation package, aimed at bringing down inflation and restoring market 
equilibrium in the commodity market, and equilibrium of the current account balance; 
and (2) an institutional (systemic) transformation package, aimed at creating a modem 
market economy of the type prevailing in the West. The Plan was later termed "The 
Balcerowicz Plan' by the M e d i a . Box (3.9) shows the main components of the 
Polish Economic Reform Programme of 1989/90.
The Polish economic reform programme includes the main broad elements suggested 
by the proposed models discussed above. Therefore, one can argue that the Polish 
economic reform programme deserves to be described as “Poland's most 
comprehensive and radical attempt to date to stabilise and set the stage for 
transformation into a market economy, and certainly stronger than Yugoslvia’s and
Hungary’s programmes’,52
It is of interest, but no smprise, to mention that the Polish economic reform programme 
was approved by the IMF, and its basic points were set down in the Polish 
Government’s Letter of Intent^  ^to the IMF; and Letter of Policy^ "^  to the World Bank,
The main assumptions of the stabilisation package are: budget balance would be 
quickly restored by a sharp cut in subsidies and investment spending. The growth of 
net domestic credit of the banking system would be tightly controlled, partly through a 
shaip increase in interest rates in the banking system. The exchange rate would be 
devalued and made convertible, and then stabilised at the new depreciated rate. The 
nominal wage would be limited through a tax-based policy designed to limit the rate of 
increase in the wage bills of State enterprises. Prices would be liberalised, except in 
certain regulated sectors, (such as public utilities) where there would be a sharp, one­
time adjustment. 55
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Box (3.9) 
The Polish Economic Re form Programme of 1989/1990
1) Stabilisation & Liberalisation Package: This package includes:
a) the freeing, in January, 1990, of almost all remaining administrative price controls, 
coupled with the increase of official coal and energy prices by 400% to 600%, and 
other prices by roughly 100%;
b) the ‘internal convertibility’ of the zloty, i.e., the unification of the
market for foreign exchange for most current transactions, accompanied by a sharp 
official devaluation of the zloty by 31.6% from zl 6500/1 US $, to zl 9500/1 
US $, with the aim of maintaining the fixed exchange rate for at least six months;
c) the limitation of wage fund growth in enterprises to a small fraction of the price 
inflation (0.3 in January, 0.2 in February-April) through a very restrictive, tax- 
based income indexation policy;
d) the elimination of the budget deficit and attainment of approximate fiscal balance 
by the (general) Government in 1990, through major cuts in food and commodity 
subsidies, reductions of public investment programmes and defence and internal 
security expenditures, coupled with substantial increase of taxes, custom duties 
and other fiscal charges paid by the enterprises; and
e) a major tightening of credit and monetary policy, a strict limitation of the rate of 
domestic credit expansion to government and non-government sectors, together 
with a sharp increase of interest rates, making them positive in real terms
2) Systemic package: This package includes:
a) enterprise restructuring, vrivatisation and the development of the private sector
b) reform of the financial sector
c) the establishment of a Social Safety Net.
Source: Rosaü, 1991a:28; Jones, 1992:103; Kolodko, 1992:132-35; Rosati, 1991b:228-9; PPRG, 
1991:7-9; Nuti, 1993:383; Thumm, 199h
The components of the structural adjustment or systemic package are: (1) enterprise 
restmcturing, the privatisation and development of the private sector, with appropriate 
legislation to impose financial discipline, the establishment of an adequate institutional 
framework for enterprise restructuring (including strict environmental standards) and
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preparation of the ground for privatisation. (2) financial sector reform, with emphasis 
on improved banking regulation and supervision, the introduction of adequate 
accounting and auditing standards (also for non-financial enteiprises), and the 
strengthening and phased restructuring of the banking system; and (3) the 
establishment of a Social Safety Net, with emphasis on adequate unemployment 
benefits, employment services, training, and a progrannne of minimum social assistance 
and improved health policy.^^
It is of interest to mention that the team, after advice from the IMF staff and the 
Western experts, put its main emphasis on the whole package of measures aimed at the 
stabilisation of the Polish economy, especially those measures aimed at fighting 
inflation. The team argued that stabilisation is a prerequisite for any systemic reforms. 
Success in stabilising the economy would give new non-communist governments in 
Poland legitimacy and support for their deep structural reforms. That is why it took 
the first non-Communist government more than six months to announce the Law on 
Privatisation (in July, 1990), more than nine months to establish the Ministry of 
Privatisation (MoF), and more than twelve months to announce the official goals of 
privatisation, as we shall see in section Six. Nevertheless, the most crucial point to 
emphasise is that privatisation is one of the main elements of the Polish economic 
reform programme of 1989/90.
e. Comparisons with economic theories
It is of interest at this stage of my analysis to relate the Polish macroeconomic 
stabilisation and microeconomic liberalisation experience, to economic theories.
The stabilisation programme, which was one of the main elements of the “big bang” 
programme that was launched on January 1, 1990, can be defined as heterodoxy with 
two nominal anchors, the nominal wage and the exchange rate, fiscal and monetary 
tightening.
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The wage policy consisted of a lagged indexation of the wage bill with low coefficients. 
As can be seen from Box (3.9), the wage bill was indexed to the changes in prices in the 
preceding month according to the coefficient 0.3 in Januaiy, and 0.2 in Febmary-April. 
In practice, the latter was ultimately maintained through June, and became 1 in July and
0.6 thereafter. The wage ceilings were to be enforced through a steeply progressive tax
penalty.59
The exchange rate of the Polish Zloty was frozen at 9,500 zloty per US$1, after the 
unification of the parallel and official markets, and the decreed ‘internal’ convertibility 
of the zloty (for current account operations, but not for capital account operations). The 
freeze of the exchange rate was preceded by a sharp depreciation of 31.6%, and the 
measure resulted in a significant overshooting of the paiallel market rate prevailing on 
average in December (about 30%). It was expected that the exchange rate would be 
defended by a special fund (of US$1 billion) to be made available by foreign
governments, as well as by the interest rate policy 60
The fiscal components relied on a balanced budget, to be achieved in 1990. An increase 
in revenues of about 4% of GDP and a small reduction in expenditures of around 1% of 
GDP were to produce an adjustment in the budget.^ ^
The monetary components relied on tight credit conditions in the first quarter of 1990, 
that were partially loosened in the following three quarters of the year. Net domestic 
assets were expected to grow by about 20% in nominal terms in the first quarter, a level 
that implies a real decline of 30%, and to grow at an average quarterly rate of 7-8% in 
the rest of the year, a level that is above the expected rate of inflation. This policy 
would have guaranteed a small real increase in net domestic assets by the end of the 
year. The credit ceilings were complemented by an interest rate policy geared to 
maintain positive real rates throughout the year. Given expected inflation of about 30- 
35%, the Government set the financing rate of the National Bank of Poland, which was
I
to serve as a sort of leading rate, at 36% in January.62
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As noticed in Box (3.9), fundamental liberalisation measures accompanied the above 
macroeconomic policies. The price system was liberalised almost entirely- only 5% of 
goods sold at the retail level remain subject to price controls- and simultaneously the 
administered prices of energy products were raised more than 400%, in order to reduce 
subsidies. The trade system was liberalised by abolishing quantity controls on imports, 
and replacing them with tariffs, and by reducing the quotas for exports of basic 
commodities. In addition, the tax system was revised.
The remainder o f the section analyses these major policy changes, and outlines their 
consequences on the privatisation process. In addition, it outlines the main elements of 
the 1994 Strategy for Poland Plan, which was the first official policy since The 
Balcerowicz Plan of 1989/90.
f. Major policy changes
1. Price Liberalisation
Generally speaking, the authorities in any country are influenced by a number of 
considerations when they set price paths, including the need to reduce inflation and 
social concerns. For example, in the case of Poland, complete and immediate 
liberalisation in the energy and housing sectors has been resisted, given the importance 
the energy sector has as an input for other sectors, and given the social consequences 
that higher rents and utility charges would have for the poorest members of Polish 
society.®^
The idea behind price liberalisation was to create the right price signals to Polish 
enterprises, so that only those enterprises with good economic and financial standing 
could survive, and compete in the international maiket.
The process of price liberalisation could be said to have passed through two phases. 
The first took place in 1990, when prices were decisively liberalised. The second, 
during 1991-93, when price liberalisation was consolidated, a new system of price
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control emerged, and administered prices settled into a pattern of gradual-but faster than 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) or Producer Price Index (PPI)- increases.
The scope of price liberalisation performed when the package was launched in January, 
1990 was veiy limited, since the movement to a new system of price control began as 
eaily as 1982, when a three-part system of prices (administered, regulated, and contract 
prices) was introduced. Administered prices were set directly by the authorities, 
regulated prices were closely monitored, while contract prices were theoretically free.®^
In 1992, a new system emerged, whereby all prices were maiket determined except for 
a core of official (administered) prices, set directly by the authorities and published in 
the budget document for the year ahead, plus a set of prices which was influenced by 
the authorities through taxes. The former included electricity, gas, central heating and 
hot water, basic medicines, rents in housing belonging to local administrative units, 
television fees, and spirits; the latter included fuel for engines, beer, wine, and 
cigarettes.®^
By 1993, as measured by their weight in the CPI, 12% of prices was officially set, while 
8% was tax controlled. In general, the authorities aimed at official (administered) price 
increases that outpaced inflation.®^
Toward the second half of 1993 and eaiiy 1994, three occasions are worth noting where 
specific government actions influenced price behaviour. The first such development 
was a temporary increase in retail prices, which was not justified by cost or tax 
increases, and which was prohibited for a period of three months following the 
introduction of value-added tax (VAT) in July, 1993. Second, the Ministiy of Finance 
issued a list of products®  ^ and a list of ‘monopolistic’ state enterprises®  ^which would 
have to provide a three-week notice to Tax Chambers of any planned increases in 
prices. Third, a scheme of variable import levies in agriculture was devised that would 
have the effect of increasing domestic prices.™
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2. Trade Liberalisation
Trade liberalisation started long before the 1989/90 reform programme. The few 
elements of the State monopoly of foreign trade had been eliminated by January, 1990, 
allowing unrestricted access to external trade activities for all economic agents. 
However, a license from the Ministiy of Foreign Economic Relations was still required 
to trade in transactions involving radioactive materials, weapons and arms, and trade in 
a few selected services, such as franchising.^*
Regarding the tariff system, a new tariff was introduced in January, 1990, based on the 
Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System recommended by GATT. In 
addition, imports, like domestic sales, were subject to turnover tax, as a transitoiy 
measure. This was then replaced by a uniform value added tax. Moreover, all 
quantitative restrictions on imports paid in convertible currencies were eliminated. 
Until 1991, imports and exports from and to COMECON countries were still regulated 
by intergovernmental protocols. After the collapse of COMECON, this trade was also 
liberalised.^^
Trade liberalisation was expected to support the transformation process in three ways:
(1) Removing import restrictions and export barriers raises economic welfare^^. (2) 
Import liberalisation could expose the tradeable sector to competitive pressure from the 
world market such that the lack of dismemberment of giant state firms, or a slow pace 
in privatisation and in the formation of new enterprises, would not result in as much 
monopolistic pricing as otherwise. Imported intermediate goods and capital goods 
should also allow firms to effectively take advantage of international specialisation, and 
thereby reduce costs and improve product quality or diversify both for domestic and 
foreign markets. (3) Export liberalisation could not only allow the exploitation of 
static economies of scale but also the possibility to take advantage of dynamic scale 
economies in research and development intensive industries, in which high price cost 
margins are sustainable in world markets. "^*
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3. Exchange rate regime
During the Communist era, the zloty was not freely convertible, and there were many 
exchange rates to the Polish currency linked to various types of international 
transactions. During that period, one of the main characteristics of the Polish economy 
was the existence of the dollar black market.^®
After the collapse of the CSS, the main issue the first non-communist Government had 
to resolve was which exchange rate regime Poland should adopt. Economic theoiy 
suggests that the selection would depend upon many factors, such as the country’s 
particular economic objectives, the initial conditions, as well as the sources and nature 
of the shocks affecting the economy™.
When Poland started its economic reform of 1989/90, the question which arose was not 
only how to achieve full currency convertibility and how to maintain a stable exchange 
rate regime; but whether exchange rate stability would lead to a situation that sets a 
reliable framework for international trade and capital flows? Private investors need 
guidance for world markets, but without clear international relative price signals, 
privatisation as well as foreign economic liberalisation, would yield limited benefits in 
the transforming economies.
Therefore, in the preparatory phase to the shock therapy, throughout 1989, the zloty 
underwent a series of small, step-by-step devaluations which raised sharply the official 
zloty price of the US$ from around zl 300 to zl 6500 by the end of 1989. As of 
January, 1990, the decision of the Polish authorities was to adopt a fixed exchange rate, 
to brake the emerging hyperinflationary pressures, while fixing the parity at a level 
which would restore and maintain international competitiveness. Indeed, the adoption 
of a fixed exchange rate was very strongly affected by the lack of an organised foreign 
exchange market.^^
Starting from January 1, 1990, the zloty was devalued by 31.6% from the December, 
1989 rate of zL 6500/ 1US$ to zL 9500/ 1US$. At the same time, the zloty was made 
‘internally convertible’^ ®.
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In May, 1991, the zloty was devalued again to zL 11,100/1 US$. The Polish authorities 
planned to move to fully fledged zloty convertibility when economic conditions 
permitted. In October, 1991, Poland switched to a pronounced ‘crawling peg’ exchange 
rate policy (the continuous devaluation of a cuirency in small increments). As a result, 
the zloty was devalued in February, 1992 and in August, 1993, and the exchange rate 
stood at zL 23,8567/ 1 US$ in November, 1994/^
On January 1, 1995, the zloty was redenominated, and the scope of its convertibility 
was extended. These decisions were designed to boost confidence in the national 
currency and expand its use in business transactions.®**
On May 16, 1995, a new exchange rate system was introduced. It allows for floating 
adjustments of the zloty exchange rate in the domestic inter-bank market within the 
band of fluctuations around the average rate, which is determined on the basis of 
principles that were applied hitherto. As of May 16, 1995, this average rate is called 
the Central Parity Exchange Rate (CPR). Apart from the CPR, which is announced in 
the morning, the NBP fixes the closing rate at the end of each day (Fixing Exchange 
Rate FER). It is an official rate used for statistical and accounting purposes. It reflects 
the level of exchange rates in the inter-bank market better than the previous average rate 
and the present CPR. Both CPR and FER are expressed in two currencies: US dollar 
and Deutsche Mark. The central parity exchange rate is based upon the hitherto level of 
zloty devaluation against the basket of currencies (i.e. 1.2%). At the end of December, 
1995, the average monthly fixing rate was US$ 1/zl 2.5139.
4. Tax System
Many changes have been introduced into the tax system. The major reforms were: (1) 
the introduction, in 1989, of an Enterprise Income Taxes (ETT)- a uniform tax on the 
income of legal enterprises. In January, 1991, certain amendments on the EXT law were 
made, and in January, 1992 a new EXT law was introduced. Moreover, other 
amendments on EXT were made in June, 1992; January, 1993; July, 1993; and January,
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1994.®* (2) the introduction, in 1990, of a 2% tax on the gross payroll of enterprises, to 
finance the newly established unemployment insurance scheme administered by the 
Labour Fund. (3) the introduction, in 1992, of personal income taxation (PIT)- a 
comprehensive tax on PIT to replace the income tax of 1972, the wage tax of 1949, the 
wage equilibrium tax of 1983, the wage fund tax of 1982 paid by employers, and part of 
the agricultural income tax of 1984. Several amendments to the PIT were made in 
January, 1993 and January, 1994. (4) the introduction, in 1993, of VAT at a standard 
rate of 22% and a reduced rate of 1% P
g. Major political changes with virtually the same economic policy
Although there was a major political change in Poland after September, 1993, when the 
ex-Communists returned to power, one notices that this change did not have a major 
impact on the general outline of the Polish economic transformation process, as 
alarmists had expected. However, there was a slight shift of emphasis in the new 
government’s economic policy.®®
In June, 1994, the first ex-Communist Government, led by Pawlak, produced a 
programme called ‘Strategy fo r  Poland*. This strategy was the first medium term 
policy framework to be produced since January, 1990. It was formed by Kolodko, the 
Deputy Premier and Finance Minister.®"*
The central theme of Kolodko's Strategy was to boost economic growth while 
containing inflation. Two crucial features for the programme can be distinguished: 
first, the commitment to continue the transformation process, and second, to reduce the 
social costs of the reforms.®®
As can be seen from Table (3.1) the strategy aims for single figure inflation (8.7%) by 
1997. It promises that real interest rates will remain stable and positive to encourage 
savings, stimulate investment, improve labour efficiency and make products more 
competitive. This would also lead to an increase in the accumulation abilities of State 
owned and private enterprises through an increase in real profits, and lower the cost of
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public services, both domestic (thanks to a decrease in interest rates) and foreign (by 
slowing down the rate of creeping devaluation). Moreover, the exchange rate would be 
managed (depreciated) in line with inflation and, more important, inflationary 
expectations. These, Kolodko believed, needed to be ‘talked down’, although differing 
views on inflation held by the Finance Ministry and the National Bank made this
difficult. 86
Table (3.1) 
Strategy for Poland: Major Economic Indicators (%)
YearIndicator
1994
Strategy 1995Strategy
1996Strategy 1997Strategy
GDP 4.5 5.0 5.2 5.5
Consumption 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.6
Investment 6.0 7.0 8.0 8.0
Exports 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0
Imports 2.5 4.0 5.2 6.0
Real Earnings 1.5 2.8 3.0 3.1
Prices (%) 23.6 16.1 12.0 8.7
Unemployment 
end year {%)
17.2 16.7 15.6 14.0
Source; Ministry o f Finance, (1994), Files.
The strategy predicted, and most observers agreed, that this is over optimistic, 
consumer price inflation falling from 23.6% during 1994 to 16.1% for 1995, 12% for 
1996 and 8.7% for 1997. Moreover, the plan predicted that GDP would grow by just 
over 5% over the period 1994-97. Consumption would grow significantly more slowly, 
at 3.5% per annum. Investment growth would be fast however, at just under 8% each 
year. Exports growth was expected to be in line with investment at 8% per annum. 
Imports growth, at just over 5% per annum, was expected to be fast, although less fast 
than exports and very much in line with the GDP.
Moreover, the strategy aimed at a gradual limitation of the budget deficit, from over 5% 
of GDP in 1992 and c.4% in 1994, to c.2-3% by 1997. Debt reduction will be 
accompanied by reform of the public expenditure system, which is expected to allow 
the Government to make the needed structural changes. Public debt reduction will 
include swapping some parts to equity in privatised State Owned Assets (SOAs). The
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access of foreign entities to this programme was conditional on making additional 
financial investments by foreign funds, both in cash and/or in the form of commitment 
to future investment. Thus, this process was expected to result in an intensification of 
stmctural changes, and a flow of new foreign investments into the country. The 
Government’s foreign trade policy, including international contracts, aimed at gradually 
balancing the current account and the trade balance. Its goal is to bring the still 
negative current account balance to the level of c.1.5% of the GDP in 1997.®^
The social core of Kolodko's Strategy was the improvement of living standards. It was 
planned that the successful implementation of this strategy would allow for an almost 
11% increase in average real wages and salaries during the years 1994-97. It was hoped 
that the unemployment reduction programme which was adopted by the Government 
would reduce the unemployment rate from 16% in 1994, to less than 14% by the end of 
1997.®®
Finally, it is of interest to mention that this Strategy enjoyed IMF support and provided 
a basis for a 19 month Stand-By Agreement (SBA).®^
What kind of economic system did the above discussed transformation programme 
create in Poland?. In the next section, I highlight the broad lines of the structure of the 
new economic system which emerged in Poland during the period 1990-95. It is 
expected that the newly emerged market economy was a result of the changes in all of 
the elements of the economic reform programme of 1989/90, including, of course, 
privatisation.
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SECTIO N  (4) THE NEW ECONOM IC SYSTEM  IN POLAND (1990- 
1995)
The main concern of this section is to study the general features of the structure of the 
new economic system that has emerged in Poland during the first six years of the 
transition period (1990-95). The aim is to analyse the impact of the privatisation 
process on the perfomiance of the Polish economy during the period 1990-95. It is 
expected that changes in the economic indicators are a result of the changes in the three 
elements of the economic transformation programme of 1989/90.
When Poland launched its programme, the aim was to transfer its economy from a 
Socialist, centrally planned economy to a capitalist, market orientated one. In other 
words, the Polish economy was supposed to move from price control to price liberty, 
from a subsidised economy to a relatively highly non-subsidised economy, from ‘soft 
budget constraints’ on enterprises to ‘hard budget constraints’, from passive money 
economy to an active money economy, from automatic bank credits to a selective 
(market-motivated) credit policy, from a traditional tax system to a modern tax one, 
from an economy without capital market to one with a modem capital market, and from 
a situation where the State had most of the property rights, to a situation where the 
people would be sharing those rights.^
It is of interest to mention right at the outset that the ‘shock therapy’ plan of 1989/90 
was highly successful. The key macroeconomic outcomes are: (1) the remarked growth 
rates of GDP since March, 1992- Poland was the first country in the region to break the 
recessionary forces accompanying transition. (2) the reduction of the inflation rates 
which were bordering on hyperinflationary levels at the start of the transition in late 
1989 and early 1990. (3) the huge expansion of the private sector in the economy. (4) 
the decline in both producer and consumer subsidies. (5) the introduction of a modern 
tax system. (6) the reduction of the amounts of external debt. (7) the creation of the 
capital market. (8) in addition to the fact that unemployment rates seem to be peaked, 
and started declining since the third quarter of 1994.
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1. Output (GDP)
Output fell sharply by 11.6%  ^ in 1990 against an expected decline of 3%, and by 
almost 7% in 1991. Regarding 1990, the fall in inventories explain 5% of the decline in 
GDP. In fact, GDP of the public sector fell by 19.6%, while that of the jirivate sector 
increased by 7.4%. All industrial sectors were hit by the recession. Industrial value 
added fell by about 23%, while production of socialised industry fell by almost 30%. 
Agriculture was not affected, showing an increase of 2.5%. Private sector sales aie 
estimated to have grown by about 17%, part of which is due to a mere reclassification 
of previous socialised sector activities. The bulk of the increase in private sector 
activities seems to have occurred in trade, services, construction and transport. The 
factors most responsible for the decline in output in 1991 were the collapse in trade 
among COMECON partners, and the attendant worsening in the terms of trade.^
In 1992, GDP grew by 2.6%, thanks to the growth of industrial production by 3.9% 
(compared with a cumulative decline of 36.6% during 1989-91), on one hand, and the 
devaluation of the zloty by (10.7 %) in February, 1992 and gains in competitiveness, on 
the other. Moreover, the growth of the private sector played a prominent role in the 
recoveiy. Output of the private sector in industry increased by 32%, while in the State- 
owned sector, it declined by 5%. As a result, the share of industrial output in private 
hands increased from a fourth in 1991, to almost a third in 1992.^
In 1993, GDP grew by 3.8%.^ The main sources of economic growth were on the 
demand side, especially consumption demand. The high growth rate was the result of 
an upswing in economic activity in almost all the basic branches of the economy, the 
sole exception being transportation. The fastest rate of growth in 1993 was recorded by 
communications (11.8%).^
In 1994, GDP grew by 5.1%, and by 6.8% in 1995. The factors responsible for the 
growth of GDP in 1994 were the growth in exports and the growth in private sector 
investments. Exports grew by 25% (in terms of US dollars), while imports grew by
1 2 2
only 12%. Investments increased by 6%, the highest rate since 1989. Investment 
outlays grew faster, in the private sector (80% in nominal terms), than in the public 
sector (30% in nominal terms).^ In terms of economic activities, the main driving 
forces behind the growth of GDP in 1994 were the growth in the industrial sector, 
which increased by 11.9%, followed by the telecommunications sector, which increased 
by 14.7%.
Based on the official exchange rate, in 1994, Poland’s GDP totalled US$ 94 billion, i.e. 
US$ 2,430 per capita. And if based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Poland’s per 
capita GDP amounts to US$ 4,500-5,500.^ That is to say, the exchange rate of the zloty 
is undervalued by almost 50%.
Figure (4.1) shows the growth rates of the GDP over the period 1990-95:
Figure (4.1)
Growth Rates of GDP % (1990-95)
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Bear in mind that more than half of the GDP in 1994 and 1995 came from the private 
sector. Export and investment expansion also provided the strongest stimuli to 
Poland’s GDP growth in 1994 and 1995. One can conclude that the growth in exports 
and the development of the private sector were the main contributing factors leading to 
the recovery of the GDP since 1992, and allowed economic performance in 1993, 1994 
and 1995 to be even more favourable.
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The consequences of the above discussed developments is shown in Table (4.1). There 
was a shift in the structure of GDP over the six years (1989-94) towards higher shares 
of the services sector and lower shares in the other sectors. As can be seen from the 
Table, the share of industry in GDP fell from around 45% in 1990 to 33% in 1994, 
Agriculture and forestry shares fell from 8.5% of GDP in 1990 to around 6% in 1994. 
The share of the construction sector in GDP fell from 9.2% in 1990 to 5% in 1993. The 
most notable change was in the share of ‘services and others’ in GDP, which increased 
from 14% in 1989 to 36.8% in 1994.
As for the structure of employment, the most important detail in Table (4.1) is the fact 
that Poland still has a very substantial agricultural sector, which employs about one 
quarter of the labour force in 1993. This is a very clear indication of a relative 
backwardness of the Polish economy in its transitional period.
Table (4.1) 
Sectoral Origin of GDP and Employment (Current Prices) ( %
Sector 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Industry- Output 44.1 44.9 40.2 34.4 32.7 33.0- Employment 28.6 28.0 27.2 25.9 25.3 n.a.
Agriculture & Forestry-
- Output 12.9 8.5 6.9 6.9 6.7 6.0- Employment 27.3 27.6 28.1 27.6 25.8 n.a.
Construction -Output 8.2 9.2 10.2 7.2 5.9 5.0- Employment 7.7 7.5 7.2 7.1 6.2 n.a.
Transportation & Telecom
- Output 4.5 4.8 5.6 5.3 5.3 5.2- Employment 5.7 5.6 5.4 5.2 5.0 n.a.
Trade - Output 16.3 12.7 13.1 12.5 14.1 14.0- Employment 8.5 8.4 10.0 10.7 13.9 n.a.
Services & Others -Output 14.0 19.9 24.0 33.7 35.3 36.8-Employment 22.2 22.9 22.1 23.5 23.8 n.a.
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100. 100.0 100.0
Source: The Central Statistical Office, 1995, Rocznik Statystyczny.
2. The growth of the Private Sector
It is expected that the three elements of the Polish economic transformation programme 
of 1989/90 (i.e. macroeconomic stabilisation, microeconomic liberalisation, and
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privatisation) have influenced the growth of the private sector in Poland during the first 
six years of the transition period (1990-95). In practice, it is very difficult to divorce 
the effect of the privatisation process from that of the other factors on the growth of the 
private sector, as the impact of these factors would overlap.
a. Share o f the private sector in the GDP and employment
Poland’s private sector is, relatively, the biggest in the whole region. The most 
important factors responsible for the growth of the private sector during the period 
1990-95 aie: (1) changes in the economic legal regulations, such as easing the rule of 
initiations of economic activity.^ (2) continuing deep decline in output and employment 
in the public sector. (3) reclassification of the co-operative sector from ‘socialised’ as 
of old, to private. (4) classification of ‘limited privatisation’ in the trade, and services 
sector, which to a small extent embraced stores and workshops, in the private sector. 
(5) the establishment of new private enterprises. (6) and finally, privatisation of SOEs 
through different paths to privatisation, especially sale of equity and liquidation.^^
As can be seen from Table (4.2), the role of the private sector in the Polish economy, as 
measured by its share in GDP and employment, has dramatically increased. Two big 
jumps in the growth rates of output occurred; the first in 1991, by 11.2%, and the 
second in 1992, by 5.1%. This was thanks mainly to the expansion of the output in the 
industrial sector. As for employment, there was only one jump in 1991 by 5.4%. This 
was thanks mainly to the increases in employment in the construction and 
transportation sectors.
In 1991, for the first time in the past half century in Eastern Europe in general, and in 
Poland in particular', the private sector employed more people than the public sector. In 
1995, more than 50% of the GDP in Poland was produced by the private sector as 
compared to less than 30% in 1989. In addition, more than 60% of the total labour 
force in Poland was employed by the private sector, in comparison to 35% in 1989.
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The development of the private sector in the past six years has also positively 
contributed to lessen the '''unemployment shock” suffered by Polish economy after 1989 
performing the role of a shock absorber. According to official data, the aggregate fall in 
public sector employment during 1990-94 amounted to about 2.4 million people, 
whereas the number of employees in the private business increased by nearly 1.2 
million people. This net rise in private sector employment should be attributed to the 
‘bottom-up’ privatisation- by the end of 1993 only about 130,000 jobs had been 
transfeiTed from public to private sector through privatisation of SOEs. If one adds all 
forms of a ‘top-down’ privatisation, including the sales of units from SOEs and asset 
stripping, this total reaches no more than 300 thousands. It should be stressed, 
however, that the positive impact of a former SOEs sector on the labour market 
continued through 1994 and 1995. By end-March, 1995 employment in this category of 
firms (i.e. already privatised or in privatisation process) amounted to 1.4 million and 
increased, compared to end-1994, by 4.4%. At the same time, the number of employees 
in public firms not undergoing ownership changes, declined by 0.5%. The highest 
increase of manpower was recorded in companies privatised under the liquidation track 
(39.5%) and in Treasury companies (5.6%). Simultaneously, employment fell in 
companies privatised under the ‘capital’ path (2.7%), the exception being companies 
with foreign majority stake (a rise by 6.2%).^^
Regarding economic sectors: table (4.2) shows that the highest weight of private 
business was recorded in domestic trade and construction, while the lowest was in 
industry and transportation. This was thanks mainly to the privatisation process in its 
broadest sences of the word, i.e. the ‘grass-roots’ or ‘bottom-up’ privatisation, and ‘up- 
down’ privatisation. The share of the private sector in turnover of foreign trade has 
increased dramatically. More than 50% of the total Polish exports was carried out by 
the private sector in 1994, compared to less than 5% in 1990, thanks mainly to the 
favourable changes in foreign trade regulations, and the privatisation process. See 
Table (7.4), Section Seven, for data detail.
I
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Table (4.2)
Share of The Private Sector in Output And Employment in Poland _____________  (1989-9^ (%) _________________
EconomicSector Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Total Output 29.0* 30.9 42.1 47.2 50.0 53.0 59Private Sector Employment 44.1* 48.9 54.3 56.0 58.9 61.0 n.aIndustry Output 16.2 18.3 24.6 31.0 35.1 38.3 n.aEmployment 29.1 31.2 35.8 41.4 43.0 44.0 n.aConstruction Output 33.0 41.8 62.2 77.7 84.3 86.2 n.aEmployment 37.4 42.1 59.5 71.8 71.2 79.3 n.aTransportation Output 11.5 14.2 25.2 33.4 38.7 42.8 n.aEmployment 14.3 15.2 23.0 25.1 27.5 23.0 n.aDomestic Trade Output 59.3 63.7 82.8 86.4 89.0 89.2 n.aEmployment 72.7 82.2 88.3 90.5 92.4 93.4 n.aForeign Trade Exports n.a 4.9 21.9 38.3 44.0 51.1 n.aImports n.a 14.4 49.9 54.5 59.8 65.8 n.aAgriculture Output n.a n.a 40.3 44.4 92.9 95.1 n.aEmployment n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 96.0 n.a
Source; Rapacki, 1995:4  ^ based Poland 1989-93..., 1993;
Information...,1995; GUS, 1995; 
* Output = 19%, Employment =
on data from: Statystyka Polski, 1992; CUP, 1993; Changes in Ownership Structure.., 1994; 
Nowe Zycie Gospodarcze, N o.4,15 June, 1995.
: 35.0, if co-operatives are excluded.
b. Number of registered firms in the Private Sector
The sudden rise in the number of Privately-Owned Companies (POCs) reflects the very 
rapid recent growth of the private sector in Poland. The extraordinarily rapid growth of 
the private sector is concentrated in retail and wholesale trade, and services. There are 
several reasons for the recent fast increase in the number of POCs: (1) these
companies include the large number of newly established foreign joint-ventures (FJVs), 
stimulated by the relatively privileged general conditions for company activity (e.g. tax 
exemptions), as well as by the favourable terms offered by the Polish partners (e.g. 
leasing capital assets- machinery and buildings- almost “for nothing”). Also, once the 
law permitted it, many POCs were established, others taking advantage of links with 
foiTTier members of the 'nomenclature’ and often missmanaging state financial 
resources and property. (2) an increasing number of individual establishments also 
results from the tax exemptions offered for new companies. (3) finally, the enormous
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profit rates in trade act as a “magnet”, attracting new, small sums of capital into
business 12
Table (4.3) 
Economic Units in The Polish Private Sector (1989-94)
Industry Construction Agriculture Trade Total
DomesticCompanies1989 2,975 2,661 n.a 1,7671993 12,914 12,413 1,062 23,1551994 14,258 10,516 1,354 25,996 69,300Joint Ventures 1989 243 12 n.a 341993 4,638 1,147 178 5,9581994 5,841 1,299 282 7,742 19,700Cooperatives1989 17,50019,746 732 n.a 151993 1,018 4,180 3,7841994 19,816 1,050 3,900 3,795 1,900,000Source: (1) Central Statistical Office, Statistical Year Book, Different Issues. 
(2) Central Statistical Office, Statistical Bulletin, Different Issues
As can be noticed from Table (4.3), setting up new private business (either with private 
domestic capital, or with private foreign capital), is the main reason behind the growth 
of the economic units in the private sector in Poland. The fastest growth, in terms of 
the number of economic units in the private sector, has occurred in trade, industry and 
construction. How much was the participation of the privatised companies responsible 
for the growth of the private sector?.
A look at Table (6.2) in Section Six, which illustrates the total number of privatised 
SOEs, shows that the number of SOEs diminished by 3,917 enteiprises by the end of 
December, 1995. However, it is of importance to note that not all were transferred to 
the private sector. That is because 24% of this number, as of the end of September, 
1995, went bankrupt, based on Article 19 of the law of SOEs of 1981. So, a large 
number of those enterprises cease to exist. Therefore, one can conclude that, by the end 
of 1995, a very small percentage (less than 1%) of the increase in the number of 
economic units in the private sector was a result of privatisation.
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There was great regional differentiation in the rate of formation of private companies. 
Most of the domestic companies were established in the provinces of Wai'saw, 
Katowice, Gdansk, Poznan, Krakow, Lodz, Bydgoszcz and Lublin. In the other 
provinces there were considerably fewer. Most of the Joint Ventures were created 
primarily in the provinces of Warsaw, Gdansk, Poznan, Katowice, Krakow and Lodz
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c. Financial performance o f corporate sector
As can be seen from Table (4.4), the financial position and performance of the private 
sector were below the public sector level. More specifically, this refers to gross income 
volume, gross income to costs of goods sold ratio and n e t  profit margin. This was the 
case despite the fact that the private sector showed faster growth pace and higher 
allocative efficiency. On the other hand, the private sector has recorded higher net 
income (except for 1994), net profit margin and short-term liquidity, as measured by the 
super quicKration, compared to public firms. This was mainly due to a lower tax burden
in the public sector and its smaller debt liabilities 14
Table (4,4)
Financial Indicator m i T993 1994Gross income (zl bln) Total 3.9 6.6 12.8Public 3.9 5.7 10.4Private 0.0 0.8 2.4Net Income (zl bln) Total -2.8 -1.1 6.0Public -2.2 -0.9 4.9Private -0.6 -0.2 1.1Gross income/costs of goods sold (%)Total 2.2 2.9 5.1Public 3.0 3.9 6.5Private 0.0 1.1 2.5Net profit margin Total -1.5 -0.5 2.3Public -1.6 -0.6 2.9Private -1.2 -0.3 1.1Super quick ration (%) Total n.a. 16.8 20.7Public n.a. 15.5 20.3Private n.a. 20.5 21.3
Source: Rapacki, 1995:11, based on data from the Central Statistical Office, 1995, 
Informationon Socio-Economic Situation in Poland in 1994, Warsaw, Poland,
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It is worth mentioning that other factors, such as “window dressing” or “creative 
accounting” practices aimed at reducing tax liabilities, and deflating wage bills so as to 
lower- the liability for social security contribution, were responsible for the poorer 
financial performance of the private sector. Private firms tended to over-report costs 
and under-report profits.
3. External trade
Table (4.5) shows that during the last two years the growth rate of exports was 8 times 
more than the growth rates of the whole 1989-93 period. However, during the whole 
transition period, the dynamic of exports was lower than the dynamic of imports. In 
1995, in relation to the level of 1989, exports (counted in US dollars) grew by 70.4%, 
and imports grew by 171%. The main reason behind the high increase in imports and 
modest increase in exports up until 1993 was the low profitability of exports as 
compared with domestic sales. The low profitability of exports is due to the following 
factors: (a) the very high price and limited quantity of working capital has put Polish 
exporters under strong pressure to secure immediate payment by foreign customers, 
because credit was not a limiting factor for Western firms. This is reinforced if one 
knows that Polish exports were virtually transacted under payment schedules of a 
maximum of 3 months, which means that Polish exporters sold their products at much 
lower prices than suppliers in Western countries, (b) Polish companies were weak in 
the area of creating export dealings. Most producers still sell their products through 
intermediaries. This process detracted some ratios from their export profitability, (c) 
the competitiveness of Polish exports in foreign markets is still suffering from a lack of 
funds for upgrading technology and production processes, (d) and finally, the lack of 
promotion schemes to exporters.
Table (4.5)
1989* 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Exports 13.5 14.3 14.9 13.2 14.1 17.2 23.0Imports 10.7 9.8 15.5 15.9 18.8 21.5 29.0Trade Balance 2.8 4.5 -0.6 -2.7 -4.7 -4.3 -6.0
Source: Central Statistical Office (1995) Poland: Quarterly Statistics y VoLIII, No. I, PP32. * Note: data on 1989 covers only the socialised sector.
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Figure (4.2) shows trends of exports, imports , and trade deficit over the period 1989- 
1995.
Figure (4.2)
Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance
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As can be seen from Tables (4.6), (4.7), and (4.8), the deterioration in the Trade 
Balance was accompanied by two other major changes: (1) a reorientation of trade 
from Eastern to Western Europe, mainly to the EEC countries. There was an increase 
in imports from the developed countries, mainly from EU and EFTA, and a decline in 
imports from East and Central European countries and the former Soviet Union. Table 
(4.6) shows that in 1990, exports to EU increased from 47.2% of the total Polish 
exports, to 70.5% in 1995. Whereas, total exports to East and Central Europe 
decreased from 21.4% of the total Polish exports in 1990, to 12.0% in 1995. Regarding 
imports, Table (4.6) shows that imports from EU increased from 45.6% in 1990 to 
64,5% in 1995, while imports from East and Central Europe declined from 22.3% in 
1990 to only 10% in 1995.
The main reasons behind these changes are the collapse of the COMECON agreement, 
and the establishment of an ‘Association Agreement’ between Poland and some other
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Eastern European countries and the European Union, which became effective in March, 
1992.
(2) A significant change in the commodity structure. Concerning the composition of 
exports, Table (4.7) shows that there was a decline in the share of mineral fuels, 
lubricants and related materials, machines and transport equipment, and a higher share 
of chemicals, manufactured goods and food and live animals, beverage and tobacco. 
As for imports. Table (4.8) shows that there was a decline in the shares of crude 
materials, oil and fats, lubricants and related materials, and an increase in the shares of 
chemicals, manufactured goods, and machinery and transport equipment.
Table (4.6) 
Geographical Distribution of Exports and Imports in Poland
Year Total Exports to DC ofwhichEU EFTA LDC E-CE
Total Imp­orts to DC
ofwhichEU EFTA LDC E-CE
1990 65.3 47.2 13.8 13.3 21.4 67.1 45.6 16.8 10.6 22.31991 73.8 55.7 14.1 9.4 16.8 68.4 40.7 14.8 12.3 19.31992 72.0 57.6 10.6 12.9 15.1 72.3 52.8 13.2 11.4 16.41993 74.3 62.9 7.5 12.9 12.8 75.3 56.7 12.0 14.4 10.31994 76.4 62.6 4.8 10.1 14.5 79.5 57.5 17.7 10.5 10.01995 75.5 70.5 5.0 7.5 12.0 79.5 64.5 9.5 10.5 10,0Source: GUSy 1995 (August) Poland Quarterly Statisticsy Vol HI, No,l.
Table (4.7)
Category 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 19941- Food and live animals,beverages & tobacco
8.2 11.3 11.5 13.5 13.4 10.9 11.5
2- Crude materials, Oil & Fats 7.4 6.0 7.0 9.3 8.7 5.7 4.83- Mineral fuelslubricants & related materials
15.6 9.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 9.7 9.0
4-Chemicals,manufactured goods 28.6 39.0 44.6 48.0 48.1 52.7 54.95-Machinery and transport equipment 40.2 34.0 26.2 18.5 19.1 21.0 19.8
Source: GUS (August, 1995), Poland Quarterly Statistics, VolJII, No.L
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Table (4.8)
Category 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1-Food and live animals, beverages & tobacco 9.8 12.4 7.6 12.6 10.6 10.5 9.62-Crude Materials, Oil & 
Fats
11.1 9.0 7.5 5.7 6.1 5.2 5.9
3-Mineral Fuelslubricants & related Materials
21.6 12.4 21.5 18.7 16.8 12.5 10.4
4-Chemicals,Manufactured goods 27.7 33.5 26.3 29.5 36.7 42.2 54.25-Machinery and Transport Equipment 9.82 32.7 37.1 33.5 29.8 29.6 28.9
Source: GUS (August, 1995), Poland Quarterly Statistics, VolJII, No.l*
During the whole period 1990-95, Poland’s imports originated mostly in those countries 
which were the major purchasers of Polish goods.
It is of interest to mention that external trade in Poland is now conducted by about 70 
large foreign trade enterprises. These enterprises are descended from the old central 
agencies, and close on 100 thousand other economic agents. The latter include both 
State-owned and private enterprises involved in production, which have in the 1990s 
embarked on export and import dealings on their own account, and a host of new 
private firms, which mainly act as intermediaries in foreign trade.M oreover, private 
companies accounted for almost 75% of Polish exports and 57% of Polish imports in 
1994. Private companies predominate in trade with the European Union (63% of 
imports and 68% of exports), while trade with the Central and East European countries 
is still conducted for the most part by State-owned companies (90% of exports and
68.5% of imports). 17
4. The State Budget
As can be seen from Table (4.9), the state budget deficit peaked in 1991 at 7.0% of 
GDP, and started declining to reach 3.0% of GDP in 1994.
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a. Revenues
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As can be observed from Table (4.9), the structure of the revenues shows a systemic 
change in the taxes: away from taxing enterprises’ profits and toward taxing personal 
incomes and consumption. Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) revenues declined from an 
average of 11.5% of GDP during the period 1988-90, to an average of only 4.8% of 
GDP during the period 1991-93. ETT reached a peak of 14% of GDP in 1990. The 
introduction of a modern Personal Income Tax in 1992, contributed to the increase in 
revenues from this source, from 3% of GDP during 1988-91, to over 8% of GDP during 
1992-93.^^ The main factors responsible for the change are reflected iai'gely in the 
transitory impact of historical cost accounting in a highly inflationary environment, and 
the increase in the importance of consumption and income taxes.
:il':8i
Turnover tax revenues (including Excise Tax revenues) bottomed out at 6.3% of GDP 
in 1990, but because of expansions in the tax base, adjustments in tax rates, and 
improvements in tax administration, they increased to 10.6% of GDP in 1993. Value 
Added Tax which replaced turnover taxes in July, 1993, yielded higher revenues 
than turnover taxes almost from the very beginning.
Table (4.9) 
Fiscal Budget: Revenues and Expenditures as % GDP1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995Fiscal Balance -1.4 -5.0 0.6 -7.0 -6.0 -2.7 -3.0 naA) Revenue 35.6 25.1 33.3 25.7 27.4 29.1 29.4 naa)Tax Revenues 33.9 21.6 28.2 21.9 24.3 26.2 na na-Enterprise Incentive 12.7 9.7 14.0 6.1 4.4 4.0 na na-Personal Income tax - - - - 6.3 7.6 n.a. n.a.B) Expenditure 37.0 30.1 32.7 32.7 33.4 31.8 32.4 n.a.a)Producers subsidies 6.0 4.5 3.4 1.7 0.8 0.8 n.a. n.a.b)Consumer Subsidies 10.0 8.4 3.9 3.4 2.5 2.5 n.a. n.a.c)Social Security 9.4 11.2 10.6 17.3 19.9 20.4 n.a. n.a.Benefits- Pensions 7.1 8.2 8.1 12.2 14.8 15.0 n.a. n.a.- Unemployment - - 0.2 1.2 1.7 1.2 na na
Source: World Bank, 1994:115.
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b. Expenditures
Overall Government expenditures averaged 48.5% of GDP during 1988-89, and 49.5% 
during 1992-3. There were significant changes in the composition of expenditures. 
The most notable changes were in producer and consumer subsidies.
1. Producer subsidies
Producer subsidies underwent a dramatic reduction during the transformation. Starting 
from a level of 6% of GDP in 1988, they decreased to less than 1% of the GDP in 1993. 
This was due to the need to impose ‘hard budget constraints’^  ^ on SOEs and to ensure a 
more efficient allocation of resources. Also, the reductions were a logical consequence 
of introducing a modern system of enterprise taxation in 1989, which decreased both 
the scope and the need for cross-subsidies and profit remittances to the budget.^^
Reducing producer subsidies was relatively easy, in comparison with many of the other 
areas of reform, for three reasons: “first, the system of cross-subsidies (punitive 
taxation and discretionary subsidies) was at best a zero-sum game; second, revoking 
these subsidies was not perceived as revoking entitlements; and third, at least over the 
short run, some enterprises were composed for the reduction in producer subsidies by 
increasing tax arrears and/or interenterprises arrears.”
The cuts in producer subsidies probably reinforced other factors that adversely affected 
enterprise profitability, including increases in wages and salaries, the cost of raw 
materials and energy, and interest payments. Also, cuts in producer subsidies may have 
reinforced other factors that adversely affected aggregate demand, such as reductions in 
the Government’s capital expenditures and its expenditures on purchases of goods and 
services, and external factors, such as the collapse of the COMECON arrangements.^"^
The main positive impact of reducing subsidies is the reduction of government 
deficits.^^ Reducing subsidies has some other consequences. To elaborate, enterprises 
faced a multitude of constraints during the transition, including restricted access to
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credit, the problem of exporting to traditional markets, and sometimes controlled 
producer prices at artificially low levels (an example was utilities). At the same time, 
the main help was the reduction in taxes imposed on enterprises’ profits. Hence, the 
withdrawal of producer subsidies was only one amongst many constraints faced by 
SOEs. The importance of the withdrawal of producer subsidies would be the fact that it 
brought into the open the extent to which each SOE was able to stand on its own feet; 
in this sense, it also contributed to output reductions in 1990 and 1991, layoffs (as will 
be discussed below), curtailments of investment, and the emergence of tax arrears and 
interenteiprise arrears.
2. Consumers^ subsidies and Social Security Benefits
There was a pronounced shift from consumer subsidies to Social Security expenditures 
(including pensions). With the liberalisation of prices in 1990, extensive subsidisation 
of consumer goods became impossible. As can be seen from Table (4.9), subsidisation 
of consumer goods was reduced from 10% of GDP in 1988 to less than 3% in 1993. At 
the end of 1993, only a few direct consumer subsidies remained in effect. Still, in 
addition to direct subsidies, there were a number of consumer subsidies provided in the 
form of prices that were administered below market-clearing levels, such as municipal 
transport prices. The cost of this kind of subsidies is not directly reflected in the 
Budget, but they are not without cost: it is no coincidence that transport companies, as 
they operate with administered output prices, also had significant tax arrears.^^
It is of importance to mention that at the same time that consumer subsidies were 
reduced, more people obtained access to Social Security payments, particularly 
pensions. For example, pension expenditures increased from 7.1% of GDP in 1988 to 
15% of GDP in 1993, largely fuelled by a boom in early retirement. The number of 
pensioners increased by 27% (1.9 million) between December, 1989 and late 1993. 
However, the increase in Social Security benefits and the simultaneous reduction in 
consumer subsidies would also suggest that many of the transition-induced social costs 
were shouldered by Social Security arrangements rather than by more temporary social 
assistance schemes.^^
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5. The capita! market, the banking system, and the money markets
The other aim of the whole transformation process in Poland is the creation of capital 
and money markets, and the modernisation of the banking system.
Since the beginning, there has been some debate about the relative merits of bank 
finance and equity capital in suppoiting the transformation process. One school of 
thought emphasised that transition economies should focus on the development of 
commercial banks, which when placed on a sound footing, would be the main channel 
for providing finance to firms. Others emphasised that firms would be better able to 
raise capital from equity markets, since they would be largely free of the adverse 
selection effect. Furthermore, stock markets were seen to have a significant role in the 
privatisation process by setting the market value of privatised companies on an ongoing 
basis, thereby facilitating the valuation of newly privatised ones. The existence of a 
capital market was seen also as providing support for the development of a 
supplementary pension system as well as forcing the banking system to become more 
competitive.^^ What happened in practice?.
The Polish authorities gave attention to both sides of the equation from the start of the 
transition process. They believed that the privatisation process will create a capital 
market, therefore from the very beginning they created the legal framework for the 
capital market, and at the same time started restructuring the banking system. How did 
the capital market emerge in Poland, and what is the contribution of privatisation?.
a. Capital market and the development of the Stock Exchange
The capital market is one of the few areas of the Polish economy which had a complete 
and comprehensive legal framework from the start and has not been suffering from 
legal ‘loopholes’. T h e  Waisaw Stock Exchange (WSE) was reopened on April 16, 
1991, 52 years after its closure.^' Officially, it opened at the beginning of July, 1991. 
The delay was caused by parliamentary debate over the Bill regulating the capital 
market in Poland. It ended with the passing of the Public Trading in Securities and
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Mutual Funds Act. The WSE is one of the very few new capital markets whose 
reputation has not been tarnished. This is mainly due to the introduction of 
comprehensive legislation right from the start. Initially, only the first five privatised 
enterprises had shares listed on the WSE.^^ These are Exbud, a Kielce based 
construction company with a substantial export and overseas construction business; 
Silesian Cable in Czechowice; Krosno Glass, another major exporter based in south 
east Poland; Prochnik, a clothing manufacturer at Lodz; and Tonsil, an electronics 
firm.^  ^ By the end of 1991, their number went up to nine, and by the end of November, 
1995, there were 50 companies quoted in the basic market of the WSE, and 12 
companies were quoted in the parallel market.
At the stai't all the shares listed belonged to enteiprises which were privatised by public 
stock subscription. The reason the companies listed are growing slowly is because the 
process of privatising State-owned assets through public offer of shares has proved to 
be more difficult than was expected. Most companies are not interested in being listed 
since it is costly and requires the full disclosure of financial data on a regular basis.
The WSE was established from scratch, and at first every session was perceived as a 
great success. However, specialists are criticising the fact that the WSE is so strictly 
regulated. The system of setting prices for shares is far from what might be called a 
market-driven system. Many economists indicate the need to deregulate the WSE. But 
bear in mind that the capital market does not function in an economic and political 
vacuum. The recent political controversies in Poland, as well as difficulties in the 
transition from a Centrally planned towards a market orientated system, have without 
doubt had a negative impact on the speed of development of the WSE.^^
The main instruments of the capital market are: Securities issued or guaranteed by the 
State (such as, Treasury Convertible Bonds, Dollar Bonds, Corporate bonds), and 
Shares of the companies
For the time being, the WSE does not significantly influence the Polish economy, nor 
can it be referred to as its barometer. However, the Polish capital market will change
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significantly when the 512 companies in the Mass Privatisation Programme aie listed in 
the WSE. This programme will create two types of financial instmments: shai'es 
certificates and shares in the funds for which the certificates are exchangeable under 
certain circumstances, as explained in Section Six below.
b. The banking system
:
The banking sector in Poland is presently in the process of thorough-going 
transformation. In addition to the ownership reform and financial strengthening of the 
banks, many regulatory changes are also taking place.
In 1989, a genuine reform of the Polish banking began, designed to establish a two-tier 
system (the Central Bank and Commercial Banks). On January 31, 1989, the Sejm 
adopted a new Banking Act and the National Bank of Poland (NBP) Act. According to 
the new NBP Act, the NBP became the Central Bank in Poland, the bank of issue and 
the bank of banks, with a main objective of strengthening the Polish currency.Other  
duties of the NBP include the passing of opinion on the plan for the Balance of 
Payments BOP, the elaboration of reports on the condition of the Zloty, and drafts of 
the guidelines of monetary policy^ .^ At the same time, NBP is obligated to submit to 
the Sejm a report on its objectives, a report on the implementation of monetary policy, 
and recently its financial plan. Beside this, NBP is required to see to the proper 
operation and development of the banking system, by exercising supervision over the 
banks, licensing banking activities, issuing regulations to laws and imposing their 
implementation. The Bank’s tasks in this regaid also include supervision of the Bank’s 
credit policies, collecting and distributing information about the banking system, its 
financial position and liquidity, and counteracting irregularities in the banking system 
that might threaten confidence in its solvency and honesty. It must be remembered that 
banks, being public tmst institutions, must rely entirely on the depositors’ faith in their 
honesty and good management of the money entrusted to them.
In addition, NBP collects (from banks and other institutions) data needed for the 
preparation of reports on the BOPs, guidelines of the monetaiy policy and reports on its 
implementation, and for periodic appraisals of the monetary situation. The NBP is
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empowered to issue foreign exchange permits to banks as well as corporate bodies and 
natural persons and to exercise foreign exchange offices which sell and buy co-operates 
with international banking institutions and foreign banks with a view to pursuing the 
interest of the State. Finally, NBP acts as ‘the lender of the last resort’ by supplying 
refinancing credit to the banks, including credit in the form of rediscount credit and 
lumbered credit, with securities being used as collateral.'^ ®
The Banking Act of January 31, 1989 laid down a new legal framework for the 
operation of the banking system, while also vesting substantial supervisoiy powers in 
the President of the NBP and facilitating the application of pmdential banking 
standards. The General Inspectorate of Banking Supervision assumed the role of the 
primary supervisory agency within the banking sector. Its responsibilities in this 
respect include collecting statistical data reported by the banks, analysing this data, and 
supervising the observance of statutory regulations and prudential practice.
In February, 1992, major amendments to the Banking Act were adopted. Those 
amendments reinforced the supervisory functions of the NBP (in particular, enhancing 
the powers of the president of the NBP). The institutional independence of the NBP 
from the Government was also increased, and provisions were made for instruments 
designed to support bank privatisation.
There are three main categories to the banking sector in Poland; Specialised banks, 
conunercial banks (State-owned , privatised and privately-owned), and co-operatives.
1, Specialised banks
There are six specialised banks in Poland; Bank Handlowy S A, the major source of 
trade financing; Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci - Bank Panstwowy (PKO BP), which 
maintains its predominance in consumer savings and construction loans; Polska Kasa 
Opieki SA (PKO SA), which concentrates on consumer foreign-currency savings and 
transactions; BGZ; the Polish Development Bank; and the Export Development Bank,
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which was established in 1988 and privatised in 1992, mainly engaged in providing
finance.
2. The Commercial Banks
The Banking Law of 1989 laid out a liberal approach to the entiy of new private banks. 
As a result of the changes in legislation and administrative procedures a relatively large 
number of new private banks opened. By the end of 1990, the number of private banks 
had grown to about 75 and by the end of 1992 nearly 90 private banks were in 
operation. Due to the problems in the private sector, the number of private banks fell to 
about 85 in 1993. Among the commercialised banks in Poland there were nine State 
banks. Four of them were privatised by the end of 1995.
3. Co-operative Banks
There are over 1,600 co-operative banks in Poland, accounting for 6% of total banking 
sector assets. The co-operative banks, which were operating initially under the 
umbrella of the Bank for Food Economy (BGZ), are small, with average total assets of 
zl 2 billion per location in 1993, and service the agriculture sector. Since September, 
1992, the NBP has become the de facto supervisor for co-operative banks. The co­
operative banks are no longer fully autonomous; credit decisions are taken by a credit 
committee that includes representation from the associate bank. Co-operative banks 
have also been prohibited from issuing guarantees, since off-balance sheet activities are 
a major part of the problem facing these banks.
c. The money markets
The main result of the emergence of a relatively modern banking system is the creation 
of money markets. The most popular financial instruments traded on the money market 
are: bank deposits; Certificate Deposits (CDs) denominated in various currencies; 
Treasury bills; Treasury bonds; bank bills; and commercial papers. The majority of 
transactions concluded on the money maiket, however, involve bank deposits and
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Treasury bills. The size of the money market, measured by daily trading volume, was 
between 12-20 billion (old) zloty. The number of transactions was not more than a few
hundred daily.43 i:
At this stage, I would like to investigate the performance of inflation and credits of 
banks to nongovernment agents over the transition period.
1, Inflation
Poland was able to reduce the average inflation rates from a hyperinflationary levels 
(585.8% in 1990) to 21.6% in 1995. However, these rates are still high in comparison 
to those in other countries in the region.'^ Inflation is of both a demand-pull and cost- 
push chaiacters. Among the excess demand factors contributing to inflationary 
processes are the following: a budget deficit financed by the banking system; the 
excessive growth of the money supply in nominal terms in relation to GDP; the increase 
in mutual debts in inter-firm settlements; the increase in the level of wages and salaries 
(despite a fall in real terms). Whereas the main sources of cost-push were: the increases 
in the prices of energy, rents and housing maintenance costs, and tax liabilities; the 
crawling-peg devaluation of the Zloty, which drives up inflation; the introduction of 
excise tax and VAT.'^^
Figure (4.3) shows the trend of inflation rates in Poland over the 1989-95 period.
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2. Credit
As can be seen from table (4.10), credit to non-government was sluggish during the 
period 1991-93. In real terms (using the CPI as the deflator), credit to nongovernment 
declined by nearly 13% in 1992 and by 4% in 1993. Credit granted to State enterprises 
has been especially tight, declining in real terms by 22% in 1992 and by 12% in 1993. 
Credit to the private sector grew very rapidly from a low base in 1991, but declined in 
real terms in 1992; this credit grew by 2% in real terms in 1993. The most rapidly 
growing component of credit was loans to households.
Table (4.10)
Credit to ;Nongovernment (percentage change in real terms)m i  1992 1993
Total Houshold State Sector Private Sector
1.2 -12.9 -4.0 n.a. 15.5 36.9 -8.9 -22.1 -12.0 
54.9 -3.4 2.0
Source: IMF, 1994:43,
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The Banks’ caution in lending to enterprises contributed to the hardening of budget 
constraints faced by firms. Apparently, a major source of finance for firms has been 
retained earnings rather than external finance.'^ *^
6, External debt
Poland’s external debt in convertible cunencies amounted at end-August 1995 to US$
43.8 billion, compared with 48.0 US$ billion in 1990. This represents a decline of US$
4.7 billion (Table 4.12). This was mainly due to an agreement concluded with 
Commercial Banks affiliated to the London Club (LC) and implementation of stage two 
of an earlier debt deal with the Paris Club (PC) of official creditors. v|î
'i
Under the terms of the LC agreement the debt owed to this group of creditors was 
reduced and rescheduled in October, 1994. The operations involved in this deal 
comprise debt buy back for a price of US$ 1.324 billion and a reduction of US$ 5.142 
billion in the amount of the debt. The obligations outstanding after the buy-back and 
reduction have been converted into long-term (mostly 20 and 30 year) Government 
Bonds. The liability incurred by the issue of the bonds into which the principal and 
interest payment due to the London Club creditors have been converted after the buy 
back and reduction operations amounts to about US$ 8.0 billion.
April, 1994 saw completion of stage one and the commencement of stage two of the 
debt-reduction agreement concluded with the PC. The first stage provided for a 
reduction of 30% of the debt owed to this group of creditors. The reduction took the 
form, depending on the option chosen by creditors, of an 80% remission of past interest 
due, or writing off the principal. In 1991-94 a total of 2.9 million US$ worth of 
principal maturates and about US$ 6.1 billion worth of interest payments was written |l
off. With the commencement of stage two of the debt-reduction deal in April, 1994 
there came a cancellation of principle payments due amounting to US$ 3.3 billion. This
write-off automatically reduced the sum on the basis of which interest is assessed. | |
.Thus, on 31 December, 1994 Poland’s debt to the 17 creditors belonging to the PC 
stood at US $ 26.818 billion.'^^
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Table (4.11) 
External Debt And Debt Service Burden 1989-95
Specification 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995Debt US $ billion 40.8 48.5 48.4 47.0 47.3 42.2 43.8Debt/Exports (%)Debt Services due ratio (%) 538.6 446.5 379.3 336.1 3478 247.1 298.0Interest 45.8 36.0 26.7 33.3 28.9 14.8Principal 40.9 42.6 42.5 13.2 10.3 3.6Debt Services due /Exports (%) 86.7 78.6 69.2 46.2 39.1 18.4Debt Services Due/Exports (%) 20.6 6.8 10.5 11.0 13.2 8.8Source: The National Bank o f Poland, Information Bulletin, Different Issues.
As can be seen from Table (4.11), the reduction of external debt obligations to its 
biggest creditors not only reduced the amount of the external debt, but also significantly 
affected indicators reflecting the size of the debt and servicing costs as well as the ratios 
of both debt and debt service due to exports.
In addition, this would diminish the risk level of foreign investment in Poland. Hence 
this, together with the relatively high rate of GDP growth, and the reduction of units 
labour costs makes Poland a more attractive area for investment. In particular, the bull 
market on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE), the implementation of the National 
Investment Funds Programme NIFP and the possibility of conducting debt-Equity 
swaps could have a significant impact on the stimulation of interest among foreign
investors 48
7. Foreign direct investment
The history of foreign direct investment in Poland dates back to the 1970s. However, 
real progress in this field was only recorded in the last three years 1993-95,'^  ^ thanks 
mainly to a booming national economy, cheap labour, a large domestic market, and the 
significant intensification of merger and acquisition activities.^® There was also the 
adoption of the Act on Companies with Foreign Capital of June, 1991. This law has 
extremely liberalised foreign investment procedures. The law was constructed on the 
basis of equal treatment of foreign and domestic firms, with some minor exceptions.
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As can be seen from Table (4.12), total FDI has increased from US$ 8 million in 1989 
to US$ 5.9 billion in 1995. Foreign direct investment in Poland amounted to US$ 2.1 
billion in 1995, compared to US$ 4.3 billion over the whole 1988-94 period.
Table (4.12)=
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
FDI 8.0 105 323 1,408 3,000 4,321 5,933
Source: The Polish Agency for Foreign Investment (PAIZ), 1995:34. * Note: This table includes data on FDI exceeding $US 1.0 million.
As for countries of origin of the biggest foreign investors, Table (4.13) shows that the 
USA is at the top of the list, accounting for 30.6% of the total value of foreign 
investment in Poland in 1995. Multinationals came second (15.4%), and Germany third 
(10.4%).
Table (4.13) 
Foreign Direct Investment in Poland, as of December 1995
Country Investment 
made 
(US$ mln)
% of total
Investment
made
Investment 
committed 
(US$ mln)
Number of 
companies
USA 1,815 30.6 1,618 58
Multinational 912 15.4 194 13
Germany 614 10.4 417 71
Italy 390 6.6 1,748 10
Netherlands 360 6.1 218 12
UK 350 5.8 165 19
France 335 5.6 191 25
Austria 248 4.3 16 23
Switzerland 196 3.3 69 15
Sweden 178 3.1 100 15
Other 535 8.8 403 68
Total 5,933 100.0 5,139 329
Source: The Polish Agency for Foreign Investment (PAIZ), 1996,
Regarding the sectoral structure of the biggest foreign investments in Poland, the 
electro-mechanical sector predominates and outpaces the finance sector, food
processing, energy, and communication.51
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8. The labour market
a. Employment
During the period 1989-94 employment across the economy as a whole fell by some 2.5 
million people (Table 4.14). In the public sector the decrease amounted to 3.5 million; 
in the private sector, however, the number of jobs went up by 1.1 million. In other 
words, there was a significant structural shift between public and private enterprises: 
the private shaie of employment in the national economy grew from 46,6% in 1989 to 
61.6% in 1994, and it now employs 3.5 million people more than the public sector.
Table (4.14) 
GDP, Employment and Disguised Unemployment1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994GDP (1989=100) 100 88.4 81.7 83.8 87.0 91.3-Total No. Of Employed(1000) 17002 16280 15326 14677 14584 14754-Index 1989=100 100 95.7 90.1 86.3 85.8 86.6-Disguised unemployment (relative to 1989)-In Million n.a -1.3 -1.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.8-As % of Employment n.a -7.6 -9.3 -2.9 -1.4 -5.2-Productivity 100 92.4 90.7 97.1 101.4 105.2
Source: Bossak, 1995:75, based on Rocznik Statystyczny, 1993 and 1994; and GUS, 
1995, Informacja o Sytuacji Spoleczno-gospodarczej Kraju w, 1994r. Note: 
Disguised Unemployment = (1989 Employment * GDP index (minus) actual Level 
of Unemployment in each year).
As can be seen from Table (4.14), in the employment curve two phases can be 
distinguished and linked to fluctuations in GDP. The first phase spanned the years 
1990-91. A decline of 18% in GDP was accompanied by a decline of 10% in 
employment. A similar pattern was noticed in industry: output down by 33.2%, jobs by 
13.2%. The time-lag factor (the ratio of the fall in production to the fall in 
employment) amounted in the first case to 1.8 and in the second to 2.5.
The highest level for disguised unemployment was in 1991, 1.4 million persons in the 
national economy. As from 1992, the gap between the increases in output and 
employment began to grow smaller. In 1993, it was eliminated almost entirely.
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Productivity returned to neai' the 1989 level. In 1994, a new phase began, consisting of 
a reduction in the disguised unemployment that had been present in the economy before
the launch of the transformation process 53
One of the causes of unemployment has been the gradual trimming of the excessive 
employment levels in SOEs. This veiy clear from Table (4.15).
Table (4.15) 
Unemployment in Poland (1990-95)End"Quarter Total (oGo) Unemployed as a result of mass- layoffs
Unemployment Rates (%)
1990 I 277 15.1 1.5II 568 58.1 3.1III 926 126.4 5.0IV 1126 183.1 6.11991 I 1322 250.5 7.1II 1574 315.3 8.4III 1741 422.1 10.4IV 2156 498.0 11.41992 I 2216 539.5 12.1II 2297 565.6 12.6III 2498 606.7 13.6IV 2509 603.6 13.61993 I 2649 608.2 14.2II 2702 585.9 14.8III 2830 569.7 15.4IV 2890 562.4 15.71994 I 2950 550.3 16.7II 2933 484.2 16.6III 2916 n.a. 16.5IV 2838 n.a. 16.01995 I n.a. n.a. 15.8II n.a. n.a. 15.1III n.a. n.a. 15.0IV n.a. n.a. 14.9
Source: Bossak, 1995:73, based on GUS, Biuletyn Staty Styczny, No,12. VolJII, Warsaw, Poland.
data from: Bezrobocie Rejestrowane, 1991-93; GUS, (1995) Poland Quarterly Statistics, No.l,
Table (4.15) shows that unemployment grew rapidly in the first two years, then at a 
much reduced pace. For the first time since the start of the transformation process, the 
rates of unemployment decreased in the third quarter of 1994, as the economy began to 
generate more jobs than it shed. Therefore, one could argue that one of the 
symptomatic features of the evolution of the labour market has been an extremely rapid 
increase in the rate of unemployment, which rose from 1.5% (first quarter 1990) to peak
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at 16.6% in the first quarter of 1994, then started to decline in the second quarter of 
1994, to reach 14.9% by the end of December, 1995.
One would expect that the rate of unemployment would increase to reflect one of the 
negative consequences of the Mass Privatisation Programme, due to expected high 
layoffs. However, in the light of the huge expansion of the private sector, one could be 
optimistic and assume that many of the layoffs would be absorbed by the private sector.
What has been done to counteract the problem of high rates of unemployment?
1. The enactment o f 16 December, 1994
A law establishing a new national collective bargaining wage increases was the main 
event of 1994 in the field of industrial relations. This law abolished the wage controls 
introduced in 1990 in the form of a progressive tax on increases in excess of a specified 
rate (the so-called “popiwek’^ ), with an upper bracket of 500%, subsequently reduced 
(earlier in 1994) to 300%. The new system, effective since January, 1995, applies to 
the whole corporate sector, private as well as State. It represents a turning point in 
relations between government employees and unions. Its key elements are the 
following. '^^
2. The establishment o f the Employment Fund in 1992
The chief means of counteracting unemployment in Poland have hitherto been labour 
market programmes financed by the Employment Fund. These programmes reform two 
different kinds of functions: passive- provision of a safety net to ease the consequences 
of unemployment (relief payments, pre-retirement benefits, early retirement); and an 
active- stimulation of re-employment procedures opportunities (training schemes, 
public works, self-employment grants, etc.). What actually happened? The 
unemployment rate was increasing steeply, which indicates that the programmes, the 
so-called “active labour market policy” have not been particularly effective.^^
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Table (4,16)
1992 1993 1994 1995
TotalExpenditures 22,827 31,474 44,600 61,900ActiveProgramme 1073 3545 5700 7,500Passive Programme % Spent on
21,754 27,929 38,900 54,400
Active Prog. 4.7 11 13 12Passive Prog. Beneficiaries 95.3 89 87 88Total(xlOOO) 216.9 214.2 380 415ofUnemployed 9.2 11.5 13.6 15.0
Source: Bossak, 1995:81.
The Employment Fund is financed from revenues from “tax on payrolls” (3% of gross 
wages) paid by employers. This source of revenue accounted for 36.5% of the Funds’ 
revenues in 1993 and 37.2% in 1994; and secondly, from Central Government grants. 
As can be seen from Table (4.16) above, expenditures on these programmes amounted 
to zl 5.7 trillion (i.e. 13% of the total Expenditure Fund).
2. Wages
As can be seen from Table (4.17), nominal wages increased by more than 900% during 
the period 1990-93, while real wages fell by 33% during the same period, and for the 
first time since the start of the transition process, increased by 3.2% in 1994. In the 
industrial sector, real wages decreased by 36% during the period 1990-93, and 
increased by 7.4% in 1994.
Table (4.17)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Nominal Wages 291.8 398.0 70.0 38.9 31.3 36.5Real Wages 11.6 -27.4 .02 -2.9 -3.0 3.2Real Wages (Industry) 9.1 -32.1 -1.9 -2.5 0.0 7.4
Source: Central Statistical Office.
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Among other factors, it was the high decline in real wages and high rates of 
unemployment that returned the ex-Communists to power.
9. Conclusion
The combination of policies has succeeded in dramatically reducing and containing 
macroeconomic imbalances. Poland was the first country in the region to break the 
recessionary forces accompanying the Eastern European transition. Since March, 1992 
Poland has been one of Europe’s fastest growing economies. The restoration of growth 
occurred simultaneously with sustained declines in inflation rates, which in 1989 had 
reached hyperinflationary levels. Poland has made progress in attaining external 
balance and increasing external creditworthiness. Poland’s foreign trade has been 
definitively reoriented away from the former members of the COMECON toward the 
developed capitalist countries of the OECD. Poland has established the region’s largest 
private sector, and the Warsaw Stock Exchange enjoyed an impressive improvement in 
1993, 1994, and 1995. Productivity has increased substantially in the private sector and 
in many SOEs. Unemployment appears to have peaked, and started declining in the 
third quarter of 1994.
However, Poland’s economic successes have been neither complete nor widely 
applicable to other countries. State Budget deficits in the order of 2.9-6.7% of GDP 
have persisted since 1990, and foreign investment, although increasing, has been less 
than expected or needed.
Bearing in mind that the main aim of the thesis is to study the privatisation process in 
Poland. In the next section a theoretical framework on privatisation is created. This is 
followed by an examination of the concrete experience of privatisation in Poland.
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Endnotes:
* This section is a compaiison between the features of the new economic system, and 
those of the legacy of the Socialist system in Poland in the late 1980s. It will be a 
comparison between Socialist Poland and Capitalist/Transtionalist Poland.
 ^ These figures have been criticised by many economists. For example, Berg & Sachs 
(1992) estimated the decline in GDP by only 8%. They attributed this decline to a 
sharp reduction in inventories, since the fall in domestic consumption was more than 
compensated by the increase in net exports.
 ^ Ebrill, 1994:3.
 ^ Ibid.
 ^ According to estimates of the Central Statistical Office (GUS). GDP grew by 4% 
according to IMF estimates; and by 4.6% according to the Institute of Market Economy 
Reseaich estimates.
 ^ Bossak, 1994:52.
 ^ Bossak, 1995:38.
 ^ Tiusanen, 1995:13; Bossak, 1995:38
 ^ The major change in the legislation after the collapse of the Socialist system was the 
amendment of the Polish Constitution. This resulted in the elimination of the 
protection given to some forms of ownership. Article (1) states: “Undertaking and 
cairying on an economic activity shall be free and allowed to every person on equal 
terms”. Article 6 declares that the “Republic of Poland shall guarantee freedom of 
economic activity irrespective of ownership”, and Article (7) that “It shall protect 
ownership and the rights of inheritance and shall guarantee full protection to personal 
property.”
I was told by the Central Statistical Office (CSG) that not only the newly established 
enterprises are ‘greenfield’ (new) businesses, because they include those enterprises 
which are established from the assets of the liquidated SOEs. Also, that small 
businesses which employ below 5 people are not included in private sector statistics 
(The Central Statistical Ojfice, 1995, Personal Communications).
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policy committed to the principle of fiscal neutrality (Bossak, 1994:103).
Kornai (1980:302-4) fixes five sufficient conditions that fulfil and guarantee a 
perfect hardness of the budget: first, prices have to be exogenous, i.e. prices of inputs 
and outputs should be given to the firm. That is to say firms have to be price-takers not 
price-makers, regardless of who determines the price. Second, the tax system should be 
hard, which means the formulation of the tax rules (laws and regulations) cannot be 
influenced by our firm, they are given exogenously for it; the tax system links taxes to 
various objectively observable and measurable criteria; the firm cannot receive any 
individual exceptional exemption; the tax imposed should be collected unconditionally 
on the prescribed terms. Third, there should not be free State grants, i.e. the State does 
not give any grants to cover current expenses, nor make any free contributions to 
investment. Fourth, there should be no credit, i.e. all inputs purchased must be paid for 
exclusively in cash. Fifth, there should be no external financial investment.
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Article, 5.2 
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The main factors which blocked the inflow of FDI during the first three years of the 
transition period (1990-92) were the following: (1) political instability and uncertainty 
in Poland as well as more anti-foreign sentiments, especially among the peasant and 
nationalist parties; (2) a high level of legal instability and uncertainty; (3) unclear 
division of responsibility in the area of privatisation decisions; (4) the very late 
liberalisation of foreign investment law (June, 1991); (5) restrictive land legislation;
(6) the high amounts of external debt to international private banks (Blaszczyk & 
Dabrowski, 1993:58-59). In fact, most of these factors have now changed.
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PART THREE: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON PRIVATISATION, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF POLAND'S PHILOSOPHY ON PRIVATISATION, 
STATISTICAL AND ECONOMIC RESULTS OF PRIVATISATION IN 
POLAND (1990-95), AND THE IMPACT OF PRIVATISATION ON 
ENTERPRISES
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SECTIO N  (5) THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON 
PRIVATISATION
The main purpose of this section is to create a theoretical framework on privatisation to 
serve as a general background for our empirical work on the Polish privatisation 
process in the following sections. In the first part I discuss the concept of privatisation, 
focusing on the meaning of privatisation in Eastern Europe. Secondly, I discuss the 
main issues of privatisation in Eastern Europe, specifically: the overall role of 
privatisation, compartmentalisation of privatisation policies, corporate governance and 
property rights, and finally the problem of privatising large enterprises. Then the main 
methods and techniques of privatisation used in Eastern Europe, with their advantages 
and disadvantages are discussed. Finally, the main challenges to privatisation in 
Eastern Europe are analysed.^
1. The meaning of privatisation
The word privatisation carries different meanings depending upon the type of economy 
we are in, and the purpose it is used for. In general, privatisation has two main 
concepts; the broad concept, which means “an increase in the private sector activity, 
including the creation of brand-new (start up) private enterprises, without any 
reduction in the activity of State enterprises"', and the narrower, but probably most 
common, definition of privatisation, which involves ''the transfer of ownership of State 
assets to private hands" Generally speaking, the word privatisation means “relying 
more on the private sector and less on government to satisfy society’s needs”. ^
In Eastern Europe, privatisation can be seen as a process that takes the State (political 
bodies as well as government administration and the nomenclature) out of the decision 
making over the allocation of the returns from SOEs; and the need to create a new 
ownership structure that would effectively oversee the management of the newly 
privatised enterprises.^
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2. The main issues of privatisation
A review of the literature shows that the theoretical debate on privatisation revolved 
ai'ound the four ’’old” questions; “Why to privatise?”; “To whom to privatise?”; “What 
to privatise?”; and “How to privatise?”. These questions deal with four main issues 
which affect the quality of privatisation in Eastern Europe. These are the overall role of 
privatisation in the transitional process, the compartmentalisation of privatisation 
policies, property rights and corporate governance, and the problem of privatising large 
enterprises.'''
a. The role of privatisation
This issue deals with two main points; (1) the speed of privatisation; and (2) the main 
goals of privatisation in Eastern Europe. Many researchers (such as Hare & Brosfeld, 
1991; Lipton & Sachs, 1990; Schwartz, 1995) argue that the virtual absence of well- 
established and functioning financial markets, and the lack of an established and well- 
understood legal and regulatory framework, require great care to be taken in 
determining the place of privatisation in the sequence of transition.
Initially, the discussion of the role of privatisation in the process of transition focused 
on the speed of privatisation, and it was far from clear whether privatisation should 
lead, accompany, or follow the process of transition. Volumes of literature are 
available which discuss the issue of sequencing of the main four elements of any reform 
programme: restructuring, privatisation, stabilisation, and liberalisation. As the last two 
elements have been discussed in above section, our discussion will focus on the first 
two elements: privatisation and restructuring.
The restructuring controversy concerns State enterprise financial, organisational, and 
physical restructuring. There are several kinds of financial restructuring: (1) 
restructuring the balance sheet of the company. Assets recorded on balance sheets at 
book values well above estimated market values should be written down to market 
values. (2) Debt may be rescheduled by an extension of maturities. Debt may be
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converted into equity. The government may absorb some of the enterprise’s debt, in 
order to give the enterprise adequate positive net worth. (3) An enteiprise may be 
recapitalised by the injection of new capital. For example, a State enterprise can be 
transformed into a new corporation whose equity consists of the government’s 
contribution in kind of assets of the former State enterprise, and funds provided by 
private investors. (4) Bankruptcy acknowledges that liabilities exceed assets, that the 
enterprise cannot be put on a sound footing, and that it should be terminated with some 
creditors’ claims unsatisfied. Because creditors will commonly be other State 
enterprises or State banks, the government ultimately bears the losses of unsatisfied 
creditors.^
Organisational restructuring usually involves the division of a larger entity into smaller 
parts: (1) the enterprise can be broken up into several legal entities. (2) the enterprise 
can be transformed into a holding company with shares in subsidiary enterprises that 
acquire the assets and liabilities of the original enterprise. The aim is to privatise some, 
if not all, of the subsidiaries. (3) some productive facilities may be sold. (4) some non­
business activities-like housing, health care and recreation for employees- can be taken 
by local government agencies.^
Bear in mind that the economies of Eastern European countries are biased towards large 
enterprises. Therefore, demonopolisation is an important aim of organisational 
restructuring. And in order to make them more competitive, large enterprises should be 
restructured before privatisation.^
Physical restructuring involves the upgrading or replacement of obsolete plant and 
equipment, the introduction of new technological processes, and investment to improve 
energy efficiency and environmental protection. The government should avoid such 
rehabilitation of assets before divestiture. Particularly in a period of fiscal stringency 
under macroeconomic adjustment, the government should not incur additional costs for 
an enterprise that may not be recoverable at its sale, hi any case, potential investors are 
likely to have different views from government about how to rehabilitate the facility. 
Thus, physical restructuring should be left to the new private owners.^
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Advocates of ‘commerciar privatisation (for example, Fisher & Gelb, 1991; 
Walkowiak, 1990; Kierunki, 1990; Rzadowy, 1990; Zamierzenia, 1991) based their 
ideas on Western (mainly UK) experience. They usually proposed restructuring prior to 
privatisation, in order to make the latter more profitable for the State budget. Whereas 
the opponents of this approach (for example Blaszczyk, 1991; Dabrowski, 1990) argued 
that the State has very limited capacity to deal with enteiprise restructuring, especially 
in post-communist economies where the State apparatus is extremely weak and the size 
of the State sector is enormous. Moreover, restructuring is a time, and money­
consuming process, very sensitive to political pressure and lobbying. The 
representatives of this way of thinking were in favour of quick privatisation using a 
simplified procedure of selection, valuation and decision.
Practical experience justified the second approach rather than the first. However, some 
preparatory measures should be taken by the government administration prior to 
commercialisation and privatisation. Moreover, the intention to distribute the former 
State-owned assets among the whole of society was seen for a long time as 
contradictory to the necessity of enterprise restructuring. While the former implies 
widely diffused ownership, the latter needs the presence of a strategic share holder with 
a controlling package of shares. Practical experience shows that a reasonable 
compromise was possible. Under the capital privatisation scheme a controlling package 
is sold to a selected ‘strategic’ investor and the rest is offered partly to employees (up to 
20%, usually less) and partly to the general public through open subscription. Under 
the Mass Privatisation Programmes, the investment funds would take the role of 
strategic investors dealing with the restructuring process.^
Proponents of slow privatisation put forward three basic arguments: (1) macroeconomic 
stabilisation, domestic price liberalisation, and current account convertibility have to 
precede privatisation because efficient decisions can only be made on the basis of 
correct relative prices; (2) the introduction of competition to prevent monopoly profits; 
and (3) the introduction of modern tax systems and accounting procedures, and 
financial market and capital market reforms, have to precede privatisation to allow for
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proper enterprise valuation,'® Proponents of fast privatisation basically pointed towai'ds 
the broader macroeconomic consequences of continuing to burden the economy with a 
large and inefficient State enterprise sector for decades to come.
It has become widely accepted that the transition from plan to market, and the urgently 
needed improvements in enteiprise efficiency, are unlikely to occur without extensive 
and rapid privatisation This view is reflected in the mass privatisation programmes 
that are discussed and set up in countries like the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Romania and Poland. With all Eastern European countries swiftly implementing 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies, domestic price liberalisation and current account 
liberalisation, arguments for delaying privatisation were significantly weakened. The 
rapid progress that was achieved on devising mass privatisation schemes that would 
allow for fast nominal divesting of State assets, while delaying the question of asset 
valuation, further strengthened arguments in favour of fast and comprehensive
privatisation. 12
After agreeing on a form of sequencing, some fixed goals should be determined for 
privatisation. Privatisation may comprise a fairly large number of general policy 
objectives. Box (5.1) lists the main declaied goals of Eastern European privatisation 
programmes.
Box (5.1) 
The Main Declared Privatisation Goals
(1) to change the social structure, and create a middle class. (2) to increase the ability of the 
economy to adapt to external conditions. (3) restructure the viable enterprises in order to make 
them competitive under market conditions. (4) to promote demonopolisation in order to 
provide an efficient market structure. (5) to contribute towards the creation of a well- 
functioning market economy. (6) to reduce the share of State owned enterprises in the 
economy. (7) to generate funds from the sale of enterprises. (8) to ensure a wide range of 
diffusion of ownership of privatised assets. (9) to provide an effective system of corporate 
governance. (10) to create conditions conducive to raising productive and allocative 
efficiency, etc..
Source: Schwartz, 1995:31; Estrin, 1994; Hare, 1994; Blanchard et al, 1991; Bolton 
& Roland, 1992; Frydman et al, 1993,
161
--I'/.'?  yf- yyyy,.:.. "S.:''’
Generally speaking four objectives of privatisation can be distinguished: economic 
(microeconomic and macroeconomic), social, political, and systematic g o a l s , T h e  
remainder of this part discusses these goals in some detail,
1. Economic Goals
Privatisation is expected to improve the economic efficiency of individual enterprises, 
branches composed of them, and thus the economy as a whole. In this aspect, Bornstein
and (3) the absence o f protection against imports}^
::k
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(1992) distinguishes between two types of efficiency: productive and allocative. He 
says that "productive efficiency can be improved if the same (or greater) output can be 
produced at lower cost. In State enterprises the incentives to managers and workers 
for productive efficiency are weak, for several reasons. Plan assignments stress output 
rather than cost reduction. Job security is a societal obligation of the enterprise. 
Losses are covered by budget grants or automatic bank credit at subsidised or even 
zero interest rates. In contracts, under private ownership, without government support,
f
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enterprise managers are subject to contractual discipline by shareholders seeking 
profit maximisation, to take-over discipline, by potential private bidders and to 
bankruptcy discipline by creditors. Thus privatisation of a State enterprise can, for 
example, reduce overstaffing and cut excessive use of material and energy."
On the other hand, "allocative efficiency advocates the assignment o f resources to their
most productive uses by profit-seeking entrepreneurs when prices reflect relative
scarcities, production and trade controls and barriers to entry and exit are absent, and
competition is perfect. Under public ownership, allocative efficiency may suffer
because State enterprises, controlled by government directives and protected from
competition by law and trade policies, have weak incentives to respond to prospective
.buyers ’ demands concerning quantity, quality and assortment o f goods and services. 
Privatisation can improve allocative, as well as productive, efficiency if competitive 
pressure is exerted by three forces: (1) the rivalry o f many domestic sellers and buyers 
of the same or substitute goods and services; (2) the lack of barriers to entry and exit;
Gleb and Gray (1991:31-32) argue that "it is possible that a relatively small number of 
State enterprises could operate reasonably efficiently in an economic system in which 
most economic activity is private. But a small private sector can only operate ' f
successfully if private ownership and the pressure of competition stimulate 
efficiency.
One can argue that significant gains in efficiency are more likely if certain major public 
monopolies aie privatised, but only if they are exposed to competition and their 
monopoly power reduced. Moreover, when accompanied by microeconomic 
liberalisation to foster competition and by regulation to prevent monopolistic practices, 
privatisation can increase not only productive efficiency but allocative efficiency as 
well, in that it should lead to a structure of output that is more highly valued by 
consumers, given social costs of production”.'^
Other economic goals of privatisation include budget revenue from asset sales, or the 
fiscal impact of privatisation, absorption of some of the ‘monetary overhang’ of 
households’ liquid assets, or the monetary impact of privatisation, and an inflow of 
convertible cunency from foreign direct investment (FDI). I shall only discuss the 
fiscal impact and the impact on FDI, as it is believed that the impact of privatisation on 
cutting ‘monetary overhang’ is minimal.'^
a. Fiscal Impact
It is believed that raising revenues for the State budget would only work if assets of 
privatised enterprises could be sold in the market at more than give-away prices, and if 
the resulting revenue is not entirely absorbed by the administrative and transaction costs 
associated with carrying out the privatisation.'^ It is expected that revenues to the State 
budget from levies on SOEs profits would fall after privatisation. However, part of 
these revenues would be offset by taxes on profits of privatised firms. Therefore, to 
avoid an expected increase in the budget deficit, as a direct loss of profit tax revenue, it 
might be of importance to reduce government expenditures and /or amend the tax 
system to adapt to the newly created economic system.
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Regarding expenditure, it is expected that it might increase in the short tenn, especially 
if the amount of expenditure for the administration of privatisation is larger than the 
drop in government subsidies?®
2. Impact on FDI
It is expected that the sale of State assets or company shares to foreign investors can 
improve a country’s balance of payments. In the short run, the inflow of foreign 
cuiTency strengthens the capital account. In the longer run, on the current account, 
foreign investment may generate additional exports (or reduce imports) by an amount 
greater than that devoted to the repatriation of profits. Moreover, FDI- which is 
expected to be mainly private- can provide know-how in technology, production, 
finance and marketing; and connections with export markets and international financial 
markets. However, Eastern European privatisation programmes are to a certain extent 
free to impose some restrictions on foreign investors. For instance, local governments 
can totally exclude some branches (such as transport, energy, oil refining) from the 
privatisation process. Foreign investment may be excluded from some branches 
(mainly small-scale privatisation such as retail trade and services) which are scheduled 
for privatisation, but for which the government believes domestic sources have 
adequate capital, technology and management ability. How then, can FDI be 
motivated?. One can talk about five different ways to promote FDI. These are the 
following: (I) foreign ownership may be authorised for most or all of a firm’s equity.
(2) repatriation of profits and capital in convertible currencies may be promised. (3) 
foreign investors can be given tax incentives like reduction in profits taxes for five or 
ten years. (4) specific enterprises may be advertised abroad for privatisation through 
foreign investment.^' (5) and foreign investors could be treated as local investors with 
few exceptions.
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2. Social and Political Goals
One of the social goals of privatisation is the redress of past injustice when private 
property was expropriated by the State without proper compensation. In this case, the 
restitution of the property (or, if that is not possible, financial compensation) is 
proposed. Another goal is to reduce inequality in the distribution of wealth and income 
by the repatriation of some State property equally among all (resident adult) citizens, 
for instance by free transfer of shaies in operating companies or holding companies that 
have some shaies in operating companies. Dividends from these shaies would decrease 
inequality in the distribution of income. Also, it is hoped that such ‘popular capitalism’ 
will create public (electoral) support for further privatisation, for economic freedom and 
for political pluralism and democratic institutions.^^
Finally, privatisation can weaken the old power structure of the communist elite in State 
enterprises, and the Ministries and Government agencies supervising Ministries and 
enterprises. However, specific individuals from this 'nomenclature' may remain as 
managers, and perhaps become owners, of privatised enterprises.^^
3. Systematic Goals
One can argue that without privatisation, no meaningful market conditions could begin 
to exist. To elaborate: the transfer of State ownership is essential to achieve four major 
goals: first, to create competition among enterprises in the market place; second, to 
promote entrepreneurship and risk-taking in economic initiative; third, to spur 
innovative production and management; and finally, to favour the development of a 
new managerial class that is fully committed to achieving cost efficiency in combining 
different factors of production.
In practice, a typical set of privatisation policy objectives may include; choosing the 
“right” buyer; getting a “fair” price; privatising a certain number of enterprises within a 
given period of time; safeguarding employment; and obtaining investment guarantees. 
As it is very difficult to simultaneously control all five variables- ownership, price.
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time, employment, and new investment- trade-offs are inevitable. For example, by 
selecting a strict time frame for privatising the economy, the other four variables would 
normally have to be left more or less free of restrictions.^'' Given multiple and not 
necessarily compatible goals it comes as no surprise that privatisation programmes also 
operate with multiple privatisation tools, and the trade-offs that exist at the level of 
privatisation objectives are closely associated with similar trade-offs that exist at the 
level of privatisation tools. For instance, “mass” privatisation programmes, designed to 
transfer ownership rights of a large number of SOEs to the citizens at large, are closely 
associated with meeting time goals. With time being dominant, there can be little 
selectivity about price, ownership and employment. Similar conclusions hold for other 
privatisation tools: for instance, one-by-one asset auctions would be the most 
appropriate procedure for policy-makers wishing to maximise proceeds from sales, 
whereas special employee or management buy-out or leasing programmes target 
specific groups of potential buyers. In general, the number of privatisation goals should 
equal the number of privatisation tools that policy-makers wish to pursue.^^
b. Compartmentalising privatisation policies
Once agreement is reached that privatisation is a cornerstone in the whole transition 
process, the next important issue is how the privatisation policies should be 
compartmentalised. In fact, the existence of trade-offs implies that policy-makers have 
to decide what part of the privatisation process should be controlled. However, given 
rather broadly defined objective functions, policy makers in most countries have opted 
for a similarly broad range of privatisation tools to be adopted. As no single tool is best 
to meet all policy objectives, and given that the demand for the various parts of the 
existing portfolio of State assets is also highly differentiated, privatisation policies in 
many Eastern European countries have become compartmentalised in the sense that 
separate policy objectives should be pursued for specific subsets of SOEs: that is, new 
owners are carefully selected for some SOEs, prices are maximised for others, a strict 
time frame is pursued for a third group, employment guarantees are safeguarded in a 
fourth group, and so on. The many privatisation policy objectives, and the highly
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differentiated demand for the existing portfolio of State assets, have brought about a 
whole range of privatisation tools being adopted. See Part Three of this section.
It is of importance to mention that while some cases may be extreme in their degree of 
compartmentalisation of privatisation schemes, there are a number of important 
commonalties. For instance, one of the common elements is special rules for the 
privatisation of small enterprises, such as retail stores, hotels, restaurants, gasoline 
stations, small service enterprises and cinemas. Private savings were generally 
sufficient to purchase these enterprises and accordingly, they have had strong domestic 
demand in all Eastern European countries. For example, by the end of 1991, Hungary 
had managed to privatise 90% of all its small enteiprises. East Germany managed to 
privatise 80% of small commercial entities by the end of February, 1992.^^
One other common element in Eastern European countries is that in almost their 
privatisation programmes, there is an element of restitution (reprivatisation) available. 
In general. Eastern European countries have decided in favour of physical restitution 
rather than financial compensation, but some countries did severely limit the property 
subject to restitution. For example, in the Czech and Slovak Republics, a strict 
deadline for filing claims and the decision to restrict restitution claims to property that 
was nationalised under Communist rule (i.e. between 1948 and 1989) effectively limit 
the amount of property subject to restitution. In Hungary, physical restitution only 
exists for agricultural land; non-agricultural property is only compensated for by giving 
securities to the former owners.
The other element common to Eastern European privatisation programmes is the largely 
demand-determined early privatisation of companies in good financial condition. 
However, only Romania has an explicit programme for enterprises in good financial 
health.
There are also marked differences among Eastern European countries, particularly with 
respect to the acceptance of mass privatisation and the acceptance of foreign 
investment. In general, domestic credit in Eastern Europe is severely constrained,
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particularly in relation to that available to potential Western buyers. Hence in the 
absence of mass privatisation schemes, domestic credit constraints would make sales to 
foreign investors almost unavoidable. For example, in Hungary, the rejection of mass 
privatisation has necessarily meant a strong openness to foreign investment. Other 
countries, paiticuiarly those in which mass privatisation is expected to play an 
important role, have sometimes placed more restrictions on foreign investment. Stricter 
controls on foreign investments have usually been reasoned out by the need to ensure 
congruence of interests between enterprises and nations regarding long-term corporate 
strategies.^^
c. Corporate governance and property rights
The term corporate governance, as used by economists, refers to ''the corporate- 
governance arrangements by which shareowners hire and fire managers and monitor 
and reward them in order that they serve optimally the shareowners ' interests. Every 
system of corporate governance is a structure of control rights, and the owners of 
enterprises want the system that is best for the price of their shares and thus best for 
them. In analysis of these arrangements, the shareowners are said to be the 
"principal*’ and the problem is to choose and to motivate a manager, called the 
"agent”, to pursue their interests to a cost-effective extent. Corporate control is not 
the standard agency problem, though, since there are many "principals” in a large 
enterprise and the "principals” want to be able (if the terms are favourable) to transfer 
their control rights to new principals”
Property rights refer to "these rights pertaining to the permissible use o f resources, 
goods and sei-vices. Ownership of an asseP consists o f the following rights: to use that 
asset, to change its form and substance and to transfer all rights through sale. 
Ownership of an assets is not unfettered because some restrictions are generally 
imposed by private contract or law”?^
The issues of corporate governance and property rights are of importance in Eastern 
Europe in general because of two reasons: first, the lack of confidence in the
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managerial class, where many managers owe their positions to their Communist party 
allegiances rather than to their technical competence. Secondly, Eastern European 
countries lack many of the individual and institutional actors that are normally involved 
in corporate governance in the Western countries.^*
Bear in mind that the whole idea of privatisation is the transfer of ownership of State 
assets to private hands. Privately owned enterprises lie at the heart of market 
economies.^^ The issue of detecting whether private ownership really does govern 
privatised enterprises and control their management can be approached through three 
main concepts: corporate control, property rights and power within organisations 
backed by three theories, respectively the theory of corporate control, the theoiy of 
property rights and the theory of organisations.^^
Although the theory of property rights has had a strong impact on the analysis of 
privatisation, it is a “follower” of the theory of corporate control at least in one respect: 
it has been elaborated as a reaction against the idea of a managerial capitalism, and 
sometimes derived from the study of corporate control. "^^
As a rule, two models of corporate control are distinguished: outsider control model, 
which is found in the UK and the USA; and the insider control model found in most of 
Western Europe and Japan.^^
"Outsider control” is basically that of owners, whether they are “hard core” 
shareholders, family members of a former tycoon, banks, institutional investors 
(investment funds, insurance companies, etc.) or, that of any coalition of these owners. 
The State and its agencies can obviously have some shares in the capital of a joint stock 
company, or even dominate the coalition of external stakeholders supervising the 
company. An extensive definition would include business partners, suppliers, 
customers, trade unions, trade associations and even some competitors among the 
participants to a possible outsider control over a corporation.^^
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On the other hand, "insider control” pertains to situations in which the chief officer, 
senior executives, managers or personnel have the last say on strategic decisions. A 
coalition of insiders can also capture corporate control. A specific case of "insider 
control” is of course the managerial corporation where managers are empowered to 
take decisions and are not appointed but practice self-appointment; they usually decide 
their own salaries, bonuses and stock options. Another specific case is the “social 
corporation”: it is a joint stock or limited liability company ruled by its employees, who 
appoint the managers, and employee share ownership is at least one part of a mixed 
ownership of the social capital fund. "Insider control” is assumed when it is not 
possible to identify any significant shareholder, that is to say when no individual or no 
obvious coalition of shareholders concentrate more than 5% or 10% (or lower) of total 
corporate capital.^^
The main features of the outsider model are: (1) dispersed ownership, and separation of 
ownership and control; (2) little incentive for outside investors to participate in 
corporate control, and consequently weak commitments of outside investors to the 
long-term strategies of firms; and (3) friendly and hostile take-overs, and frequent 
mai'ket entrance and exit. On the other hand, the main features of the insider model are:
(1) concentrated ownership, and association of ownership and control; (2) corporate 
control being exercised by shareholding parties (banks, other firms, employees), with 
outside interventions being limited to periods of clear financial failure; and (3) absence 
of take-overs, and frequent market entrance and exit.^^
Hence, one can argue that an increasing degree of real (capitalist) privatisation is 
dependent on the possibility of alleviating or getting rid of corporate governance by the 
State or by enterprise insiders.
The theory o f property rights attempts to identify who makes decisions on corporate 
assets and who is empowered to discipline managers and worker s . E c o n o m i c  
efficiency is assumed to depend basically on the exercise of corporate governance by 
owners (shareholders) over managers and the whole enterprise. In the case of small 
enterprises in which the boss is the sole owner, there is no question. But in the case of
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large enteiprises, numerous shareholders must delegate decision making on the use of 
assets, on the use of assets income and, sometimes, on the disposal of property. The 
capacity of monitoring managers appears then to be a crucial issue for shareholders, 
otherwise their property rights will be alleviated by managerial behaviour of rent- 
seeking and of maximising take-home gains (higher wages, bonuses, personal cars, 
etc.). In fact, the more scattered the distribution of corporate capital, the higher is the 
shai'eholders information costs for monitoring management."  ^^
The roots of linking dispersed ownership to ineffective coiporate governance dates back 
to Berle and Means (1932). They showed that even at the top executive levels of the 
modern corporation there is a great gap between ownership and control, and a 
corresponding great opportunity for discrepancy between the goal of owners (profit) 
and the goals of managers (career status, wealth, a quite life, and so on). Then, many 
theories were put forward about the best avenues to alleviate the governance problem. 
For example, Demsetz (1988) suggests that the governance problem is largely 
overcome in practice through a mixture of managerial compensation based on stock 
prices, and an adequate size of share ownership by minority shareholders. Moreover, 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) show that an enterprise’s market valuation tends to 
be lower when management holds a very small shaie of the enterprise capital than when 
it holds a moderate amount of enterprise capital.
Bear in mind that there are two strategies to create proper corporate control. The first is 
to create the owner forthwith and to hope that suitable mechanisms of enterprise control 
will evolve with time. The second is to introduce rudiments of an efficient enteiprise 
control mechanism from the beginning in the process of widespread privatisation. 
The question that should be answered at this stage of analysis is; “What method or 
technique of privatisation would be suitable to create an appropriate owner in the 
Eastern European privatisation process, which in the end would establish an effective 
structure of corporate control?.”
To answer this question, I would like to discuss the consequences of two paths to 
privatisation, namely, “take-over” and “mass privatisation”.
171
' ' ' ■ '  '   :-------------------
1. Take-overs
It is ai’gued that "the market for corporate control through take-overs is highly 
imperfect, with significant externalities and asymmetries of information. Therefore, the 
market cannot be relied upon to do a good job in matching potential owners and firms: 
many efficient take-overs may never be achieved, and many inefficient take-overs may 
be consummated. The main problem is the fact that take-over bidders may be forced to 
raise the price of the take-over, and therefore, often do not undertake the effort even 
when efficiency considerations would recommend it. ” On the other hand, some take­
overs may go forward even when they are not justified by efficiency, if the take-over 
process results in a gain in wealth for the bidder not as the result of a rise in efficiency, 
but by a transfer of wealth from some stockholders in the target firm.^^ Moreover, it is 
shown that "take-over bidders may deforced to raise the price of the take-over bid to a 
point that exhausts most or all of the potential financial benefits to them of the take­
over. This is because the incumbent shareholders in the target firm have an incentive 
to free-ride on a take-over bid, by holding on to their shares if they believe that the 
enterprise will become more valuable if the take-over bid is successful. Thus, in order 
for the take-over bidder actually to acquire a firm, the bidder must make an offer that is 
generous enough to tempt the incumbent shareholders to part with their shares. ” In 
their study on hostile take-overs, Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) showed that "the 
bidder gain little in the take-over bid, while all o f the gains are appropriated by the 
shareholders o f the target firm.”
2. Mass or voucher privatisation
In the case of “mass” or “voucher” privatisation, it is expected that the capital of a 
privatised enterprise would be scattered. In this case, the theory of property rights must 
conclude that shareowners obtain only alleviated property rights on assets insofar as the 
cost for monitoring managers would be too high for each small shareholder. Voucher 
or mass privatisation creates a host of shareholders. This in turn means that none of 
them can really influence the management of their enterprise. Each one of the
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shareholderjhas two options; either to sell his or her shares to “the core (large stack) 
investor” or remit them to investment funds, or complain that he or she keeps shares 
with alleviated property rights. In the first case, the result would be a concentration of 
capital which is, according to the theory of property rights, a precondition for some 
owners to monitor the film management."^  ^ The ‘core investor’ involves some type of 
mutual funds that act as core investors and which in turn are owned by the general 
public. Lipton & Sachs (1990) envision core investors created by the government, 
which would also endow them with certain initial equity holdings and appoint their 
initial directors. Frydman & Rapaczynski (1991) propose free entry into the mutual 
fund market, and competition among the mutual funds to obtain shares from the public. 
Sachs (1991) ai’gues against allowing mutual funds to gain a majority stake in 
individual enterprises, whereas, Frydman & Rapaczynski (1991) propose auctioning of 
enterprises to the different mutual funds in such a way as to ensure a few large initial 
shareholders. Schwartz (1995) argue that "countries that are actively considering mass 
privatisation with mutual funds have, implicitly or explicitly, given a large role to the 
insider model o f corporate governance. On the other hand, those that largely rely on 
individual sale, notably Hungary, have not yet made a clear decision on the system of 
corporate governance. In any case, in all countries where privatisation has been slow, 
there has been a continuation of a system where corporate governance is largely 
exercised by the State. ”
Once the capital distribution has been concentrated, the question to be answered is; 
“Who can discipline managers and workers, and who can dispose of assets in privatised 
enterprises?.” If the answer was: the State or its bodies, such as State banks, State 
holdings, and State insurance companies, can dispose of assets because they still hold a 
majority or a substantial minority of total shares, then we must ask, “Who can 
discipline managers, except themselves?”. Owners’ property rights would be 
alleviated, and the privatised enterprise would not actually be a private enterprise. Such 
an outcome is partly confirmed by the fact that Czech investment funds, which hold 
together a majority share in 860 enterprises, did not embark either on restructuring 
productive assets or on paying very high promised dividends to smallholders who 
remitted them vouchers formally. In other words, investment funds and other financial
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intermediaries do not yet behave either as if they were private investors, or as if they 
will discipline managers; all this contradicts the full exercise of the property rights of 
owners (smallholders in the last r e so r t ) . T h e n  comes the issue of proper manager 
incentives.
A privatised enterprise is not genuine, in this theoretical framework, as long as 
managers and/or employees remain capable to make decisions as regards use, income or 
disposal of assets, in particular since their behaviour as wage eainers (resistance to lay­
offs, wage claims, in-house benefits in the work place, etc.) prevails against their 
possible strategy as shareholders. Efficient management and enterprise restructuring 
thus require either appropriate managerial incentives, or a coalition backing 
restructuring and efficiency which is less likely the more capital distribution is 
scattered. Such a situation is well known in the theory of property rights as a principe- 
agent problem in which the principai is in possession of less information than the agent 
(moral hazard) and must design a suitable procedure for inciting managers (agents) to 
act according to the principal interest (maximising profit and the value of assets).^^ In 
spite of reservations about the principal-agent model, some authors (such as, Mayhew 
and Seabright, 1992) suggest implementing a contractual incentive system within the 
State enterprise before privatisation, insofar as this latter will supposedly scatter 
corporate capital in the hands of numerous shareholders.
Transforming privatised into private enterprises in Eastern Europe requires the 
emergence of shareholders with property rights non lessened by managerial behaviour. 
Concentration of a significant “bundle” of shares is needed for a group of shareholders 
to satisfy the conditions of majority control. A concentration process of this kind has 
rapidly raised the issue, in the Czech and Slovak Republics, of publicising the names of 
main shareholders in privatised enterprises. Publicity has been provided on the 
secondary market for shares, but it has triggered a side effect in attracting the demand 
for shares toward companies involving foreign investors. In addition, the emerging 
capital markets in Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, Moscow and so on, are still too tiny to 
provide an anonymous process of capital concentration. Moreover, most of the 
privatised enterprises are not quoted. Capital concentration in the hands of stable “hard
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cores” of monitoring shareholders will be therefore a rather slow process in Eastern 
European countries. It is expected that owners’ capacity to discipline managerial 
behaviour through the threat of a possible external take-over will remain weak in 
quoted enterprises, and non-existent in non-quoted privatised enterprises, in the 
foreseeable future.
One of the basic underlying assumptions of the theory of property rights is that private 
shareholders aim primarily at economic efficiency and profit maximising. Can this 
assumption fit firms as specific as formally privatised enterprises aie?.
The theory o f organisations can help in answering this question. This theory argues 
that the implementation of a business plan requires to be backed by a stable coalition of 
stakeholders within the corporation; it could be either a coalition of insider or outsider 
s takes .Al though  it can be argued that conflicts among stakeholders, even among 
insiders, such as between managers eager to restructure the enterprises and employees 
then threatened with unemloyment, can hinder the emergence of an insider coalition. '^  ^
This introduces the question of real economic power within an enterprise considered as 
an organisation, and drives the analysis to issues such as the strategic behaviour of 
different economic agents and groups, alliances, authority and ideology- the “enterprise 
or organisation workshop”.^  ^ In this approach, the enterprise is a room for co- 
ordination- and not only for discipline- between economic behaviours and activities, 
namely that of employees, managers, senior executives, chief officers and shareowners. 
Among these participants in the enterprise, some subsets or groups can coalesce around 
a mutual target of satisfying results under the hypothesis of a restricted rationality of 
economic agents. At any moment, some coalition dominates the enterprise, but can be 
removed by another in the making. The ruling coalition should adopt a management 
providing the highest return on assets if we want a formally privatised enterprise to be 
transformed into a private firm maximising its profit. The type of coalition in power, 
and contingencies of economic environment, determine according to the theory of 
organisations, the kind of target which must reach a satisfying level in the firm: 
efficiency, or survival, or profit, or autonomy, or growth, or asset value.^^ The 
emergence of a new dominating coalition within the enterprise can obviously change
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the prevailing target/^ Survival usually characterises insiders’ coalitions, in paiticular 
when the enterprise encounters some kind of deep crisis endangering its existence.
Enterprises from the State sector in Eastern European countries are cases in point.
Once privatised, the survival target becomes the highest enterprises priority in an 
environment of increased competition and harsher economic circumstances (inflation, a i
recession, etc.) to which the insider coalition was not prepared until now.^^
In a fully-fledged market economy, efficiency and profit are preconditions for enterprise 
survival in the medium term, It would be expected that the newly privatised enterprise, 
to be transformed into a private enterprise, has to cope with the following problem:
How can its targets change from growth and autonomy to efficiency and profitl. As 
noted above, the two former targets are usually favoured by insiders’ coalitions, 
because insider power and jobs very much depend on growth and autonomy, while the 
two latter targets are supported by outsider coalitions of shai'eholders. Also as noted 
above, a basic prerequisite for privatisation success lies in weakening the power of 
insiders’ coalition within the enterprise, and strengthening the power of outsiders’ 
coalition. The problem is that power distribution among coalitions is rather stable in 
organisations and targets of a coalition can be considered as “homeostatic”.^  ^ In other 
words, a ruling coalition and its targets cannot be changed overnight by the legal 
procedure of privatisation. According to Mintzburg (1986), major factors of target 
stability are the organisation’s (enterprise’s) ideology, resource slack, and the co­
ordinating role of the chief executive officer (company director). In the Eastern 
European privatised enterprises, though one could argue that the second factor is 
decreasing compared with Soviet times, the rule of the director and enterprise ideology 
are likely to be crucial factors of evolution towards a genuine private firm or a 
managerial corporation, or an employee-monitored (some self-managed) enterprise, or a 
quasi-public company. The fact that many directors and managers, who have been in 
place for a long period of time, remain at the head of newly privatised enterprises in 
Eastern Europe, and maintain a stable network of relationships among themselves, 
would probably preserve insiders’ coalition in power.
176 ■«
-  :  -   '   :   ■ ■ .
d. The problem of privatising large enterprises
One of the main features of the economies in Eastern Europe is that they are biased 
toward large-scale enterprises, such as mines, steel mills, shipyards, petrochemical 
complexes and textile mills.^  ^ The main issue here is the fact that privatisation of these 
enterprises has been proceeding with much slower speed. This has been due to two 
main reasons: (1) large enterprises usually have an obsolete capital stock and employ 
obsolete production technologies, and may therefore be unlikely to attract interested 
buyers at positive p r i c e s , (2) large enterprises account for a big share of employment 
and production in the economy, and privatisation or shut-down may be politically 
difficult for various reasons, ranging from nationalism to the potentially strong adverse 
impact on output and employment,^^
To solve these problems, Schwartz (1995) suggest five choices: (1) shut-down and 
liquidation in parts; (2) massive investments to modernise the capital stock of these 
enterprises. Given the fact that local individual^have the financial resources to carry 
out the necessary investment, governments in Eastern European countries have three 
other choices: (3) find ways to attract foreigners on a large scale; (4) establish diluted 
share ownership by local individuals via mass privatisation; and /or (5) break up the 
existing large-scale enterprises into smaller units that are privatised separately.
Given the scale of the problem. Eastern European Governments have been hesitant or 
unable to tackle the question of large enterprises in a comprehensive fashion. Instead, 
they have begun to construct privatisation policies around the possibility that these 
enterprises remain State-owned for a while. Usually, this involves the construction of 
“half-way houses”. Halfway houses come in various forms, but usually involve putting 
the enterprise under the control of an independent board of executive directors, and 
transforming it into a joint stock or limited liability company. For example, in 
Hungary, property rights were redefined to make the State Property Agency (SPA) the 
sole owner of all SOEs; the enterprises were then given a board of directors who 
required them to produce properly audited balance sheets, and the SOEs were 
supervised continuously with the help of independent contractors. The Czech Republic 
has adopted a more radical position, where the speedy transfer of ownership rights to
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the private sector was thought to alleviate the need for halfway houses. Some 
researchers (for example, Bruno, 192; Sachs, 1991) have argued that halfway houses to 
privatisation are generally inevitable, unless one is willing to take the line that what 
cannot be privatised instantaneously had better be junked immediately. While 
“corporatisation” entails a number of problems, the perceived advantage is that SOEs 
stait being covered by normal commercial law, and obtain corporate governance 
through a professional board of directors.
In general, “halfway houses” do not solve the problems of privatising large enterprises. 
In particular, they fail to fully expose SOEs to a uniformly hard budget constraint that 
implies the risk of bankruptcy, may induce decapitalisation by the firm’s managers, and 
can easily put the Government in a position where it either has to provide a bail-out for 
the firm or let it go bankrupt. While “halfway houses” may allow Governments some 
more breathing space, eventually decisions will have to be made.^^
3. Various Privatisation Models: Advantages and Disadvantages
Many privatisation methods and procedures have been initiated in the developed, 
developing, and the former Centrally Planned Economies. Box (5.2) summarises these 
methods and techniques.
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Box (5.2) 
Main Tools of Privatisation World Wide
(1) Sale by public offering o f shares, or by private treaty (closed or limited), or by public auction(2) Selling a proportion o f the whole operation(3) Selling parts to private buyers(4) Leasing assets or firms(5) Management and/or workers buyout(6) Free (or almost free) distribution o f shares/vouchers to the citizens, or to theworkforce/management, or to social institutions(7) Restitution o f property to former owners(8) Privatisation via liquidation or bankruptcy,(9) Privatisation via bankruptcy(10) Diluting the public sector(11) Buying out existing interest groups(12) Deregulation via private associations(13) Encouraging alternative institutions(14) Making small-scale trials(15) Repealing monopolies to let competition grow(16) Encouraging exit from State provision(17) Admitting demand pressures(18) Curbing State powers(19) Withdrawal from the activity(20) The right to private subsitiution(21) privatisation by installment
Source: Pirie, 1988; Vuysteke, 1988; The World Bank, 1991; Bornstein, 1992; 
Blommenstein & Hare, 1993; Hare, 1994; Frydman & Rapaczynski, 1994,
In fact, the above 21 techniques of privatisation can be grouped into three main 
methods.^^ The rest of this section will be devoted to analysing, in some detail, the 
advantages and disadvantages of the three methods.
Box (5.3) 
Methods of Privatisation
How To Whom?
Sale Employees General people Foreign previous
To Managers or domestic 
EMBOs Stock Market investors
owners
Privatise?
Free
Distribution
spontaneous Vouchers 
Privatisation, emlpoyee privatisation
management, take-over 
of assets
restitution
Source: Estrin, 1994:21.
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a. Sale of SOEs
The sale can be completed by the auction of selected assets, management/workers buy 
outs, and public or private sale of shares by various techniques; selling parts to private 
buyers, selling by instalments, or selling a proportion of the whole operation. The most 
important problem facing any Government adopting this method of privatisation is the 
valuation of the enterprise assets.
1. Sale to Enterprise Employees
Bornstein (1992) argues that employees have the chance to buy their enterprise, either 
with all or part shares. In the case of buying the whole enterprise, a leveraged buyout 
can occur, all the shares can be acquired and thus control of the enterprise. Regarding 
the case of buying part of the shares, it is more relevant for larger enterprises. He 
suggests that employees can be given the right to buy 10-20% of the shares at 
concessional price.
This type of sale has advantages and disadvantages. Among the advantages, employees 
are the obvious potential buyers because they are acquainted with the enterprise, even 
though, like the population at large, they have no experience in the purchase and 
holding of shares. Employee share ownership may strengthen incentives for at least 
productive, if not allocative efficiency. Sales of shares at a concessional price 
compensate employees for loss of property rights if a workers’ council exercises some 
degree of control over production and investment decisions under State ownership of 
the enterprise.
As for the disadvantages, budget revenue will be lost if shares are sold at discount. In 
regard to equity, conventional share prices for employees favour workers in some 
enterprises over the rest of the population. With respect to efficiency, it is questionable 
how much employee share ownership improves efficiency in larger firms where harder 
work by an individual cannot make much difference to total profits. Moreover, if 
workers have control of the firm, there is a risk of excessive wages, avoidance of
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layoffs of surplus workers, and underinvestment in plant and equipment. In addition, 
there is the question of social justice. They argue that free or subsidised distribution to 
workers involves fundamental inequalities,since some workers, would have the chance 
to receive an undeserved ''manna from heaven”, while other citizens would be left with 
nothing because they are employed in the State administration, or the private sector.
2. Sale to Other Domestic Investors
Assets of small enterprises can be sold at auction to the highest bidder, but large 
enterprises should be transformed into joint-stock companies first, and then offered for 
sale at fixed price or by auction to the highest bidder. This kind of sale has advantages 
and disadvantages as well. The advantages are: they bring in more budget revenue than 
discounted sales to employees, or free transfer shares. With a given wealth distribution, 
sale by auction can achieve an optimal allocation of shares in the sense that they are 
purchased by the buyers willing to pay the most for them. Compared with people 
acquiring shares by free transfers, buyers of shares are more likely to want, and may be 
more able, to exercise control over the enterprise. The main impediments to public sale 
of shares are: (1) potential buyers’ skimpy knowledge about equities; (2) lack of capital 
to purchase many shares; and (3) the likelihood of considerable inequality in purchase 
and ownership of shares.
3. Sale to Foreign Investors
This kind of sale can provide: (a) additional capital for the country; (b) foreign 
cunency for the BOP; (c) know-how in technology, production, finance, and marketing; 
and (d) connections with export markets and international financial markets. The 
disadvantages of selling to foreign investors: (1) there may be reluctance to sell part of 
the national heritage, created by decades of collective saving and investment, to 
outsiders; (2) some specific branches or large enterprises may be deemed too "basic” or 
"strategic” to permit foreign control; and (3) the consequences of underpricing may be 
considered more serious when foreigners gain at the expense of nationals.^^
181
In Eastern Europe, households (as well as institutions and banks) lack experience in 
buying shares in IPOs or in a secondary market provided at a Stock Exchange. Prudent 
investment in shares requires understanding of the Stock Market as a whole, enough 
securities available at sufficiently low prices to diversify risk in a person's portfolio, a 
regulatory framework for disclosure of relevant information about particular* companies 
through prospectuses and financial reports, and independent advisory services 
furnishing evaluations of stocks and buy, hold and sell recommendations. Even when 
there is interest in equity investments, domestic liquid assets of individuals are too 
small to purchase a significant portion of the thousands of State enterprises to be 
privatised.
Also, the distribution of share ownership would be unequal, reflecting the existing 
distribution of wealth and the probability that the wealthier would be more inclined to 
invest in shares-partly because the wealthier include managers, bureaucrats and others 
with better information about specific companies’ status and prospects. Furthermore, 
among the wealthier will be former Government or Party officials, or black marketers 
who became rich under the pre-reform Regime.
Sometimes privatisation through the sale of shares to institutional investors such as 
banks, insurance companies and pension funds is recommended, on the grounds that 
they will be superior to individuals as buyers of shares because such institutions will 
have funds to buy large stock, and will have greater interest and technical capacity to 
monitor and evaluate the performance of the enterprises’ management. However, in 
Eastern Europe there is no set of well-capitalised institutional investors able to buy 
large amounts of State property. Commercial banks are only now being developed, and 
it would be inflationary for them to create money to buy shares, although they might 
acquire some shares through debt-to-equity swaps for pait of their outstanding 
(especially the bad) loans to enterprises. Only in the relatively distant future could 
shares be sold to institutions yet to be created and capitalised, like insurance companies 
and pension funds.
: VAS
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b. Free transfer: personal entitlements and endowments to Institutions
This type of transfer can involve personal entitlements, endowments to institutions, or 
combinations of the two. Personal entitlements can be to former owners (the 
restitutions or reprivatisation), employees and/or managers, and the citizens as a whole, 
while endowments to institutions can be to banks and/or pension funds. All these 
approaches have some advantages and disadvantages. In this part of the study, I 
examine two variants which involve personal entitlements (free distribution to 
employees and free distribution to citizens at lai'ge), and one variant which involves 
endowments to institutions (holding companies).
1. Personal entitlements
a. Free transfers to employees
The success or failure of this approach depends upon the purpose of adopting this kind 
of transfer. To elaborate, free distribution of shares to employees can be adopted by the 
Eastern European Governments to compensate employees for the value of assets 
resulting from employees’ earlier decisions to forego wages and benefits, or for a loss 
of property rights exercised by workers’ councils. Also, free distribution of shares to 
employees (say, 10% or 15% of shares in an enterprise), could help the concerned 
Government to make more shares available for a ‘strategic’ (domestic or foreign) 
investor to control the enteiprise.
b. Free transfer to citizens
This type of divestiture of State property can be conducted through three variants of 
transfer: (1) voucher coupons to bid for shares in operating companies; (2) actual shares 
in operating companies; (3) shares in investment trusts like mutual funds, or holding 
companies that in turn possess shares in operating companies. Each variant has certain 
advantages and disadvantages.^®
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1. Voucher coupons for share auctions
In this case, each adult citizen is offered the right to buy, for a nominal sum intended to 
cover some of the administrative costs, a voucher book with a set of coupons that can 
be used to bid in auctions of some of the shares in some joint-stock companies. The 
coupons are denominated in points, not the national currency unit. The price of a share 
is established only when shares are later resold.^ ^
The main advantages of this variant are the following: (1) it is a fair approach for 
transferring assets, as each adult citizen gets the same number of voucher points at the 
start of the transfer process, the price is objectively determined in an auction, and the 
worth of a share in money is determined by the performance of the company. (2) no 
initial valuation of shares in money is required. (3) the person has the freedom to 
decide his/her own portfolio, with shares going to those willing to pay the most (points) 
for them.
The main disadvantages are: (1) as the people have no experience in such auctions, it 
is doubtful whether they would have adequate knowledge to bid sensibly for company 
shares.^^ (2) as there would be millions of people bidding for shares in hundreds of 
companies, the auction process would be complex and confusing. An alternative 
process would be needed until a price (in points) for each enterprise’s shares is found 
such that all of the shares to be sold in all of the enterprises involved are placed among 
bidders, and all coupons offered are accepted. If the auction process leaves some 
unsold shares or some unabsorbed coupons, presumably the point valuations of the 
shares are not correct.^^ (3) whenever resale for money of shares purchased with 
coupon is permitted, there would be great dissatisfaction on the part of ‘losers’ whose 
shares command lower money prices, and whose ‘investment’ of voucher points proved 
disappointing in comparison with the outcomes of the bids of others. "^^
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2. Shares in operating companies:
In this approach, citizens receive a free portfolio of shares in a set of operating 
companies. Because the number of adult citizens is larger than the number of operating 
companies, it would be expected that each portfolio could have approximately the same 
book value with a different number of portfolios to each adult citizen. The main 
advantage of this variant is that citizens would get a diversified portfolio. Whereas, the 
main disadvantage is that citizens have no choice about the shar es of their portfolios
3. Shares in investment trusts
This variant gives citizens free shares in an Investment Trust (IT) that in turn has been 
endowed with free shares in some operating companies. Each citizen receives the same 
portfolio of IT, although the ITs need not have the same portfolio of company shar*es. 
The IT shares would be non-tradable until the value of ITs and their shares was 
established through trading in the shares of operating companies.
The main advantages of this variant, compared to the first two, are: (1) it is fairer, 
because every citizen gets the same portfolio of IT shares and thus of underlying 
operating company shares held by ITs. (2) a person’s portfolio will be more diversified, 
because each of the five or ten IT shares held corresponds to part of the IT’s portfolio of 
shares in many companies. (3) àlso, when company and IT shares become tradable, the 
prices of IT shares should be less volatile than the prices of shares of individual 
companies. Finally, it is of importance to mention that the success of this approach 
would depend on the nature and operation of the ITs that receive institutional 
endowments of company shares.
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2. Institutional endowments
a. Holding companies
This valiant is a version of variant three (shares in investment trusts). The IT is a 
Holding Company (HC) endowed with a portfolio of operating company shai'es spread 
across branches, both to provide diversification and to avoid monopoly control in a 
particular branch. 10-20 HCs might be established, depending on the size of the country 
and the number of enterprises to be privatised in different branches. A "lead' HC will 
have a dominant position in each operating company, say at least 30- 40% of the shaies. 
A portion of each operating company’s shares would be held by other HCs, each of 
which has a small "passive investor” position. The lead HC exercises control of the 
operating company, even if the Government (represented by the State Treasury or MoP) 
retains a percentage of the shares greater than that given to the lead HC. The lead HCs 
control of an operating company involves; restructuring it as necessary; appointing, 
motivating and evaluating the operating company’s management; and eventually 
disposing of shares in the operating company as a further stage of privatisation. Shares 
might be sold on the Stock Market to citizens and other investors, or spun off to people 
with share in the HC.^^
c. Combinations of techniques
This involves the employment of more than one method, but not necessarily all of them, 
because each method has advantages and disadvantages.
I
aI4. The main challenges to Privatisation In Eastern Europe
The challenges to the Eastern European privatisation processes are unique, in their 1IIsystem-wide scope, in their political and historical context, and in the desired speed of reform. These constraints can be classified into the following categories: stock-flow, 
fiscal, information, administrative and political, the acceleration dilemma, ‘Top Down’
versus ‘Bottom Up’ privatisation, motivation in the State sector before privatisation.
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organisation of the State sector, enterprise restructuring, lack of a capital maiket; the 
shortage of household savings; identification of enterprises chosen for privatisation; 
valuation; restructuring; demand for shares of privatised companies; and internal 
organisation of privatisation administrations/^ In this part, I discuss only those which 
are not covered in the other parts of the section.
a. Political Constraints
Politics is probably the most important braking factor on the whole privatisation 
process, especially privatisation of medium and lai’ge-scale enterprises. In fact, when 
the political constraints to the privatisation process are discussed, it is not always clear 
what the concept of political constraints mean. This concept includes the people, trade 
unions, workers’ councils, the Parliament, the Government and the President. So who 
constrains the privatisation process in this case?. Some times the constraints come 
from the Government, when there is a lack of a government will, but at other times the 
government tries to accelerate the process and the constraint comes from Parliament, or 
the President. On other occasions constraints come from the trade unions, the workers 
councils, and the people. However, it has been proved that politics is the main 
constraint to privatisation in Eastern Europe.
b. Identification of enterprises chosen for privatisation
The problem at the start of the privatisation process was how to specify the best 
enterprises to be privatised in order. This task was very critical since it creates certain 
precedents and can form (or destroy) the confidence of the people in this new form of 
savings investment. The previous financial records of the firm can hardly be used as a 
basis for selection, because these were related to a time of different financial, fiscal and 
monetary regimes. Therefore, the criterion of ‘potential growth’ has an important 
meaning, such as; brand name, competitiveness on international markets, managerial 
staff performance and technical equipment.^®
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c. Valuation
There were two categories of opinions concerning the evaluation of privatised 
enterprises in Poland: a group of people who believe that enterprises should be
evaluated by the market; and another which believes in case-by-case valuation to 
enterprises, even if it causes some delay in the implementation of the privatisation 
process. The delay could be the result of lack of the necessary skills in Eastern Europe. 
It is very important to mention that the first Polish Government rejected the idea of 
‘market valuation’, because, according to the Government point of view, lack of 
information, speculative and/or random trading, distorted prices, and lack of investors’
confidence, could lead to fraud 80
d. Low levels of demand for shares of the privatised companies
Limits of demand for shares create one of the most serious and controversial problems 
of mass privatisation. By very rough estimation, the book value of the State-owned 
enterprises, when compared with the savings of the population, leads to the conclusion 
that the privatisation of the existing assets would last over a hundred years! Hence it is 
unavoidable to augment the demand by issuing free vouchers as quasi-money. 
However, the free-voucher system in its logistic dimension creates immense problems!^ 
The key advantage of this scheme over the others suggested is that it does not affect the 
companies themselves prior to privatisation. It handles some of the demand-side 
problems without prejudging the supply side of the market; it treats all citizens alike but 
does not treat all companies alike.
The idea is much more complicated when considered as a logistical problem. First of 
all, and paradoxically, the introduction of a free vouchers scheme, by its very (massive) 
scale, creates an additional demand which is difficult to satisfy on the supply side. For 
example, if one assumes the voucher value equals US $ 50 per head (which is equal to 
two weeks’ average salary) and that the vouchers can ‘buy’ one-third of the offered
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stock, then we arrive at a total value of US $ 6 billion of privatisation offers being 
needed to absorb the vouchers issued.
e. Lack of capital markets
This factor is related to the problem of valuation. At the start of the privatisation 
process in Eastern Europe there was no capital market to give the right value of the 
assets of the SOEs proposed for privatisation. Later, some Stock Exchange Markets 
were esablished. However, these markets are still tiny, so it is not possible to rely on 
them to give the right price for the SOEs’ assets.
f. Low levels of credit to the private sector
For instance, Polish data suggests that credit to the private sector as a fraction of 
domestic bank assets is rising quite slowly. It was 16.6% in December, 1990, and rose 
to 17.3% in mid-1991. As the private sector accounts for more than half of the GDP 
and total employment, the State sector should reduce, or at least stabilise borrowing, 
while the investing private sector should receive a rapidly increasing fraction of credit. 
In the case of Poland, this is exactly what has happened. See Section Four. Moreover, 
the private sector has to finance not only its working capital, but its acquisition of 
assets, as small-scale privatisation gathers speed.®^
g. Protection of new owners
The Privatisation Law of 1990 must provide for the protection of the new owners’ fight. 
For example, as is already stated in the legislation governing foreign investments in 
most of Eastern Europe, an enterprise cannot be nationalised or expropriated without 
prompt and effective compensation should be included.
Against the above theoretical background, what is the meaning of privatisation in 
Poland?; What are the main governmental goals of privatisation in Poland?. How did 
Polish privatisation philosophy develop?. How did the various economic, political and
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social groups affect the final shape of that philosophy, during the period 1990-95?. 
What kind of privatisation models did Poland use to privatise its SOEs during the 
period of the study?, and Why?. How did the whole privatisation path progress in 
Poland?. These questions are answered in the next Section.
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SECTIO N  (6) T h e  D e v e lo p m e n t o f P o la n d ’s  P h ilo s o p h y  o n  
P r iv a tis a t io n
The main purpose of this section is to analyse the development of Polish privatisation 
philosophy from the late Eighties to the end of December, 1995. The main proposals 
that were initiated in Poland during that period are discussed, and related to the Polish 
economic, political, and social set up. The aim is to tiy to discern whether there is a 
change in the attitude of the Polish governments to the privatisation policy, or not, and 
to ascertain the main reasons behind that change. The main questions that are tackled 
in this section are: first, did Polish privatisation philosophy change in the last part of 
the period of the study (September, 1993- December, 1995), in comparison to the start 
of the period of the study- when the non-communists were in power (September, 1989- 
September, 1993)? Second, why certain privatisation methods were chosen, above 
others? Third, how much the political, social, and economic pressure groups were able 
to shape (or reshape) Polish privatisation philosophy during the period under analysis?
The analysis of the development of privatisation philosophy in Central and Eastern 
Europe has a special flavour. That is because it is a landmark in the whole transition 
process, not only in the post-war history of Eastern Europe, but in the history of the 
communist world. This is understandable. But, in the case of Poland, two facts enrich 
our discussion: first, those who started the transition (the Solidarity leaders) were no 
longer in power after September, 1993, as the ex-Communists emerged as the dominant 
party. Second, as noted in Section Four, there are many conflicting forces that shape 
Polish economic policy in general, and privatisation policy in particular.
For analytical purposes, I would like, in this section, to divide the period of the study 
into three sub-periods: the first period summarises the debate on privatisation before 
the collapse of the Communist regime in 1989; the second covers the era when the first 
three Solidarity-led governments were in office (i.e. September, 1989-September,
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1993); and the third covers the period when the ex-Communists were in power (i.e. 
September, 1993-December, 1995^).
1. Polish privatisation policy before 1989: (Communist era)
My discussion of the features of the Polish economic socialist system, in the second 
section, showed that during the 1945-89 period there was a continuous resistance to 
privatisation especially in the industrial sector, and the attempts to reform the Polish 
economy were concentrated on the issues of decentralisation and decollectivisation 
rather than privatisation. That was because of the fact that in the previous communist 
system, private ownership was only marginal to economic life, and to economic and 
political thinking as well.^
Bear in mind that privatisation is a comparatively new concept, and that the private 
sector in general was ideologically incongruous, politically suppressed, and 
economically to a certain extent tolerated during the communist era, especially when it 
came to the industrial sectors. The first sign of relaxing some of the restrictions on 
private sector activity (apart from that in 1956) was after the economic crisis of 1980- 
82. During that time, the Communist government realised that a plurality of ownership 
was needed. However, this was not a call for a full transfer of ownership from public 
into private, rather it was a call for the citizens to set up their own new firms. When 
Mlessner (who seemed to be from the ‘revisionist wing’ of the Communist Party) took 
office as Premier (during the period 1985-88), some steps were taken to encourage the 
private sector. For example, some regulations for setting new firms were relaxed, 
accounting requirements were lessened, and permission was given for private 
businesses to contract freely with the dominant state sector. Moreover, in 1986 new 
regulations were formulated, permitting the establishment of small-scale joint venture 
firms. Messner’s aim was to create market competition, in the environment of ‘soft 
budget constraints’, but without ownership changes.^
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a. Nomenclature’ privatisation phenomenon
When Rakowski replaced Messner in 1988, several steps were taken to open property 
rights, promote competition and reduce centralisation. The most important action that 
was taken to open up property rights was the adoption of the Act on Economic Activity 
of December 23, 1988. That legislation abolished the requirements of possessing a 
permit to carry on economic activity (with a very limited number of exceptions, namely 
mining and quarrying, processing and trading in precious metal, explosives and #!
pharmaceuticals, the distillation of alcohol and manufacture of tobacco products, and 
air and sea transport services). All a businessman was obliged to do was to register the 
said activity with the relevant local government office. The previous ceilings on 
employment in private firms and on the size of private farms were revoked. At the 
same time. Parliament also passed the Act on Foreign Involvement in Economic 
Activity, in 1988, which liberalised the regulations on foreign investment in Poland.
The Act was taken like a call for the transfer of the SOEs into joint stock public 
corporations, where state ownership is combined with an independent board of 
directors.'^
The predictable conclusion is that managers of SOEs, as an ‘interest group’, which used 
to be closely related to the Polish Communist party, and which had been, in fact, 
subjected to various political controls^, saw this call, which was initiated by 
Rakowski’s government, as a rare opportunity to improve their power position in their 
enterprises. Therefore, they began to 'privatise' the economy by establishing joint 
stock companies (JSCs). Two types of JSCs were established; the first group of 
enterprises formed by the large-scale enterprises, was basically owned by the state; i.e. 
by other state enterprises (through ‘cross-ownership’). The second type of companies 
was put in the hands of the managers (members of 'nomenclature').^ Usually, the 
property of the privatised state enterprise was undervalued, thus private shareholders 
(directors of state enterprises or members of their families and other prominence) could 
purchase a portion of the state property veiy cheaply to include in their newly-formed 
company. Private shareholders, using their managerial posts in state enterprises, gave 
the new companies many concessions which brought about further losses to state
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companies. This process termed ‘nomenclature’ privatisation was politically and 
publicly unacceptable.^
As for workers, they are a 'heterogeneous' interest group. Two main general workers’ 
groups can be distinguished, when it comes to how they perceived privatisation. The 
first group saw privatisation, which was initiated by the government of Rakowski, as a 
way to secure their jobs. The other group, that is the more organised independent 
workers’ unions, saw privatisation as an assault on the workers’ councils, similai* to the 
measures that followed the enforcement of Martial law in 1981. That was because they 
continued to insist on the formula of genuine self-management with public ownership."^
The general result was that this kind of privatisation {nomenclature) was rejected by 
Polish society. Therefore, one can easily understand why the Solidarity delegation, 
during the 'Round Table’ negotiations, opposed the idea of privatisation^, and was 
unwilling to believe the idea of a real market and capitalist economy, preferring the idea 
of social ownership and democratic planning.
In public circles, the issues of private enterepreneurship and ownership changes in the 
public sector evolved in a theoretical and academic way. This was represented by the 
Conference; “Proposals For The Transformation of The Polish Economy”, which was 
initiated by a group of scholars from Warsaw. The main question that was to be 
answered; “What would you propose to do with the Polish economy if it were up to you 
and if the freedom of choice was not impeded by the current political restrictions?”.
The main proposed answers revolved around the following four ideas; (1) the 
reorganisation of the public sector (M Swiecick); (2) or group ownership (M 
Dabrowski); (3) or privatisation methods based on the ‘British model” (S Kawalec); (4) 
and, as always the case in Poland, a great idea came from the north, from Gdansk, the 
idea of ‘non-equivalent’ ‘mass’ privatisation with the use of vouchers (Szomburg and 
Lewandowski).^^
What happened after the great political victory following the ‘Round Table’ talks?. A 
new political, economic, and social era began. Therefore, it is of importance, at this ; :
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stage of this work, to give some political and social background on Poland during the 
new era.
b. Political and social background on Poland
Poland is a parliamentary Republic. Legislative authority is vested by the Constitution 
in a bicameral Parliament with a 460-member, more powerful Lower House (The 
Parliament, or "Sejm") and a 100-member Upper House (The Senate). The President is 
Head of State and possesses some executive authority. The Government (The Council 
of Ministers), which has responsibility for domestic and foreign policy, is chaired by the 
Prime Minister (PM). The President and Parliament are elected by universal suffrage. 
The PM is chosen by Parliament following a nomination by the President. The 
Government is appointed by Parliament following a recommendation by the PM, who 
presents the proposed composition of his Cabinet. This Government is then responsible 
to Parliament.
During the period of our study, three parliamentary and two presidential elections have 
been held. The first presidential election took place in December, 1990, and was won 
by Walesa- who was the leader of the ‘unofficial’ opposition party, the Solidarity 
movement. President Walesa remained in office until December, 1995. The second 
presidential election was held in November, 1995, and was won by Alexander 
Kwasniewski, who was the leader of the SLD party^\
The first parliamentary election was held in June, 1989 and the Solidarity movement 
won all the seats that were freely elected. Box (6.1), in the footnotes '^ ,^ shows the Party 
Affiliation of Parliament Deputies, elected in June, 1989, compared to the composition 
of the Parliament in 1985. The second was in October, 1991. Box (6.2), in the 
footnotesshows the composition of the October, 1991 Parliamentaiy results. The 
third parliamentary election was held in September, 1993. The voters turned out parties 
originating from the Solidarity movement, and chose the parties which sprang from the 
former communist parties: the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasant 
Party (PSL). Box 3.2, in the footnote^^, shows the composition of the September, 1993,
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Parliament in Poland, and reveals that the majority in the Polish Parliament was held by 
the ex-Communists.
During the period under analysis (September, 1989-December, 1995), Poland witnessed 
Four Solidaiity-led governments and Two ex-communist governments. The Four 
Solidarity-led governments are: first, the Mazowiecki government which was in office 
from September 12, 1989 to December 10, 1990; second, the Bielecki government 
which assumed office in Januaiy, 1991 until December, 1991 -after the election of 
Walesa as the President of Poland- third, the Olszewski government which took office 
from December, 1991 to June, 1992; then Pawlak was appointed as PM in June, 1992, 
but failed to form the Government. After that, Suchocka came and formed the fourth 
government for the period August, 1992 to September, 1993, though the Paiiiament 
brought her government to an end by a vote of no confidence in June, 1993.^  ^ The Two 
ex-communist governments are: Pawlak’s Government (September, 1993- March, 
1995), and Oleksy’s Government.
At this stage of my analysis, an idea should be given about the various conflict groups 
in Poland, i.e. those who have an influence on the decision making process. In fact, six 
main different conflict groups can be distinguished in Poland. Each group has some 
role in shaping the Polish privatisation philosophy. These groups are: (1) the managers 
of the state enterprises; (2) the workers’ councils (3) the trade unions, (4) the 
government, (5) the Parliament, (6) and the President.
The Government is the first side of the equation, and obviously not a neutral actor that 
imposes only policies that are economically sound and neutral. Rather, it is one of the 
strongest groups in society. Also, the one that, on the basis of its ability to define the 
formal institutions, has the greatest role in determining the future course of the 
economy. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to grasp the inner motivations of the 
various governments. Three different types of governments emerged in the post-war 
history of Poland: (1) a communist government; (2) a non-communist, Solidarity-led 
government; (3) and, an ex-communist government.
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The other groups, i.e. the workers’ councils, the trade unions, the Parliament, and the 
President, are the other side of the equation which decides to what extent it is possible 
for a government to realise its ideas and wishes. A ‘strong’ government would emerge 
when the government’s own interests coincide either with that of the opposition or with 
a number of small and well-organised groups (or both). In the case of Poland, the first 
non-communist government was able to foraiulate its privatisation policy after a long 
debate with these different groups.
The main features of the political situation in Poland after the collapse of the 
Communist system are; the paiticipation of the Solidarity pai'ty in the Polish parliament 
for the first time since its establishment in 1980; the absence of a majority party in the 
parliament, until September, 1993, which in effect weakens the power of parliament; 
and the return of the ex-communists to power in September, 1993.
The main question that will be tackled is; “How did the different governments perceive 
a privatisation policy?”.
2. Polish privatisation policy after the collapse of Communism 
(September, 1989-December, 1995)
A. Privatisation policy during the ex-communists era (September, 1989- 
September, 1993)
After the collapse of the Communist system, the central debate on privatisation all over 
Central and Eastern Europe was concentrated on the feasible pace of an effective 
privatisation strategy. In other words, the discussion quickly moved from the issue of 
whether it is right to restore the market and private ownership to the problem of how 
fast and in what way this should be done.^^
Poland was the second country after Hungary to discuss the ownership issue and the 
necessity of ending the monopoly of state ownership. The Polish government was the
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second, after the Hungarian, which adopted privatisation as an ‘ajficiaV economic 
policy in 1990.^^
1. MazowieckVs Government Era (September, 1989-December, 1990)
This government declared a strong commitment to reintroduce a capitalist market based 
on private ownership within two to three years. That was clear, as noted in Section 
Three, from its transformation programme which was formulated in the last quarter of 
1989, and implemented on January 1, 1990.
During this government’s era, most of the techniques and methods of privatisation that 
are used in Poland were determined, the Law on Privatisation was formed, and the 
institutions that control and regulate the privatisation process were fixed. The questions 
that should be answered are; “What were the main techniques and methods of 
privatisation that were initiated during this period?”; “What are the institutions and 
regulations that control and regulate the Polish privatisation process?”; “How and why 
these techniques and methods, not others, have been chosen?”; and finally, “Was the 
privatisation law formed for the benefit of the government, other ‘interest groups’, or 
the Polish citizens at large?”.
The Mazowiecki’s government faced considerable difficulties and delays in the 
preparation and enactment of the necessary legislation concerning ownership changes. 
That was because of different social, political and economic factors, namely: (1) 
suppressed ‘interest groups’ resurfaced. (2) it was difficult for this government in the 
‘new democratic era’ to impose its will, as communist governments had done during 
the past 45 years, especially in the absence of a parliamentary majority. See Boxes 
(6.1) and (6.2) in the Footnotes. (3) the fact that the government gave priority, as noted 
in Section Three, to the issue of stabilising the economy, rather than to restructuring 
and ownership matters. However, small-scale privatisation started directly after the 
declaration of this government, late in 1989, that its policy is to reintroduce a capitalist 
market based on private ownership.
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a. Control over the privatisation process, and the decay of ‘nomenclature” 
privatisation
The economic leaders of this government believed that poor economic performance was 
inextricably linked to poor corporate governance, and the related questions of the power 
of 'nomenclature' and workers’ councils. Therefore, concerning the privatisation area, 
the responsibilities of this government were to find proper and permanent answers to 
the following questions: “How could 'nomenclature ’ privatisation be stopped?”; “Who 
should replace the State as a new owner?”; “How could the power of the ‘insiders’ (i.e. 
managers and workers of the state enterprises, and trade unions) be reduced?”; “To 
what extent can privatisation be spontaneous, and to what extent can it or should it be 
controlled by the government?”; “How could the appearance of ‘strategic’ or ‘core’ 
investors who would .take responsibility for the privatised SOEs via the Mass 
Privatisation Programme (which would disperse ownership) be assured?”. Finally, and 
most importantly, “How to integrate privatisation into the other elements of the 
economic transformation programme?”.
When it took office, the first step this government took, was the establishment of a 
governmental office, the Plenipotentiary for Ownership Changes, to stop the 
unauthorised 'nomenclature' privatisation of state property, and this attempted to 
reassert state control over the privatisation process. By early 1990, therefore, the 
government had managed to block 'nomenclature ’ privatisation.^*
b. ‘British model’, ‘employee’ vs. ‘citizen’ ownership and ‘insiders’ pressure
From the very beginning privatisation efforts of the first Solidarity-led government 
focused on selling larger industrial enterprises through the “British-model” approach, 
which is based on the idea of offering shares to the public. This model reflected in part 
the view of the liberal economic leaders of Mazowieski’s govemment.^^ Advocates of 
privatisation through public offering argued that it could give the most objective 
assessment of auctioned assets, and eliminate the problem of possible preferential 
treatment resulting from more limited methods of distribution. More importantly, it 
was believed that privatisation via public share offering (of course, alongside the other
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elements of the economic transformation programme) would be an efficient method to 
reduce the “monetary overhang” from the economy. Whereas, opponents argued that it 
is a very expensive and time-consuming method, the existence of some technical 
difficulties of determining enterprise value in the absence of a well-functioning stock 
market, and a very limited demand for shares in the context of the relatively >small 
purchasing power of Polish households. Also, not every enterprise would qualify for a 
public offering. If this was the exclusive method of privatisation, it would be a very 
slow process, focused on large enterprises in good economic conditions.^^
On the other hand, trade unions and workers’ councils initiated an approach based on 
allocation of shares either free or at nominal price, only to employees of the privatised 
enterprises.^"* The advocates of ‘employee ownership’ (i.e. managers and workers of 
SOEs) argued that this kind of ownership would motivate the workforce, increase the 
enterprises’ effectiveness, minimise demands made by workers, and reduce the 
employer-employee conflict. Moreover, they saw employee ownership as a natural 
continuation of employees’ self-management of the 1980s, when Poland had a 
relatively good experience and positive results. Whereas, the opponents of employee 
ownership (i.e. the liberal economic leaders of this government and some of the Polish 
intellectuals) argued that this kind of ownership would lead to a lack of social justice, 
danger of wage pressures, and a continuation of the communist system.^^ They also 
believed that the workers or managers firms that would be established might have 
difficulty in raising funds on the capital market.^® In fact, the opponents expected that 
this system of ownership would not work in Poland, as it had failed in Yugoslavia.^^ 
Therefore, a conflict appeared between the government and the enterprises’ ‘insiders’. 
The first wanted to reduce the power of the ‘insiders’, while the second wanted to 
decenti'alise control over ownership at the enterprise level.
In the second half of 1990, disappointment at the slowness of the privatisation process 
refreshed the idea of free distribution of vouchers to all Poles, presented by 
Lewandowski and Szomburg in 1988. Therefore, the privatisation debate focused on 
the idea of achieving economic and social justice in the new ownership structure, and at 
the same time, on the idea of fighting pressure from the enterprises’ insiders.^^
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One can conclude that during the last quarter of 1989 and the first half of 1990, the 
privatisation debate concentrated on two approaches; 'employee ownerships vs. 'citizen 
ownerships. Meanwhile, the Polish Parliament was working on the privatisation law.
How could the power of ‘insiders’ be reduced?. In fact, it was believed that the process 
of liberalising prices and foreign trade that had gone on since January, 1990, would 
create a market environment for the products manufactured by state enterprises, so that 
only the economically and financially strong enterprises would survive. In practice, 
price liberalisation did not lead to bankruptcy. This was because state enteiprises 
continued to have access to the available resources of state or inter-firm credits, and 
followed a new strategy of cutting back on investment. Therefore, the economic 
leaders of the government (together with their Western advisors) believed only pressure 
from shareholders would discipline the managers’ behaviour.^^ As a result, a new form 
of property regime had to be introduced, a form that would lead to a reduction of the 
powers of ‘insiders’ and, at the same time, solve the question; “Who owns what?.”
0 . New form of ownership: (‘corporatisation’ or ‘commercialisation’)
The idea came from Krzysztof Lis - the first Plenipotentiary for Ownership Changes in 
Mazowiecki’s government. He introduced the concept of 'commercialprivatisations, 
or '^corporatisations which was earlier developed by Kawalec in 1989.^°
The idea of 'corporatisation' was understood in different ways by different people. 
Some took it generally to mean de-statisation of SOEs, making them interested in 
greater profits, and development thus ensuring a strong competitive position on the 
market. Such firms would be ready to undertake risks and to expand and innovate at 
the micro level, thus removing the main sources of imbalance and inflationary 
pressures. In effect, this meant that ‘commercialisation’ would make state firms behave 
like private ones.^^
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Others saw 'commercialisation’ as a way of creating a fully competitive market 
environment around the state sector as well as eliminating unequal treatment of state 
enterprises in comparison with private ones. However, the most frequent interpretation 
of the ’commercialisation' idea concentrated on changing the legal status of the SOEs, 
i.e. on converting it into a joint-stock company solely owned by the Treasury. Such a 
step was advised strongly, both by many Western experts (see for example, Fisher & 
Gelb, 1991) and by Polish ones (see for example Walkowlak, 1991). What does 
'commercialisation' or 'corporatisation’, according to the Polish privatisation law of 
1990, mean?. And, what other paths to privatisation does that law offer?.
d. Legally controlled process and privatisation methods
After a long discussion, the Mazowiecki government managed to clarify most of the 
problems, which had been a subject of dispute. Ten months after the government came 
to power, on July 13, 1990, the Law on Privatisation of SOEs won the approval of the 
Sejm and two months later, in September, 1990, the Ministry of Ownership 
Changes^^ was established, to replace the Plenipotentiary for Ownership 
Transformation Office within the Ministry of Finance (MoF). The first Minister of 
Ownership Transformation was Waldemar Kuczynski, who took the office for a very 
short period of time (from mid 1990 until the beginning of January, 1991, when 
Mazowiecki’ government left office).^ "*
Besides the law on privatisation of SOEs of July, 1990, which came into force on 
August 1, 1990, the Polish privatisation process is regulated by the following laws:^^
(1) the Law on SOEs of September 25, 1981; (2) the Law on Management of 
Agriculture Properties of the State Treasury and the Establishment of the Agency for 
Agriculture Property; (3) the Law on National Investment Funds and their Privatisation 
of April, 1993; (4) the Law on the Financial Restructuring of State Enterprises and 
Banks of 3 February, 1993; (5) the Banking Act of 1990; (6) the Bankruptcy law of 24 
August, 1934; (7) the Annual Budget laws; (8) the Commercial Code of 1934, as 
amended in 1990; (9) the Act on Public Trading of Securities and Mutual Funds, which 
was enacted on 22 March, 1991, and amended in 1995; (10) the Law on Companies
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with Foreign Participation of 14 June, 1991; (11) the Act on Economic Activity of 
December, 1988; (12) and the Act Regulating the rental of trade premises, as amended 
in June, 1990.
These laws and acts regulate the scope, mles, and procedures of privatising small, 
medium and large-scale SOEs, and designate the parties authorised to carry out the 
process of privatisation in Poland. Moreover, they provide a flexible legal framework 
for privatisation allowing different methods and forms of ownership, including the free 
distribution of vouchers, sale on preferential terms to employees, communal or 
individual ownership, as well as sales through public offers, auctions, or direct 
negotiations.
This long list of laws that regulates the process of privatising SOEs can block, and, at 
the same time, can push forward the whole privatisation process. It can be a barrier, if 
we consider the time period required to go through different bureaucratic procedures in 
order to initiate privatisation. For example, as will be seen below, the main factor 
responsible for the low percentage share of the number of privatised SOEs via the 
‘liquidation’ path (under Article 19 of the law on SOEs of September, 1981) in the total 
number of privatised SOEs, was the difficult legal and commercial procedures which 
must be undergone in order that the firm could be liquidated.
However, this can be a ‘push factor’, because it gives policy makers a solid legal 
ground to privatise any firm, based on its size, financial standing, and economic sector. 
In other words, the variety of laws provides a large number of possibilities for 
ownership transformation, and reduces the likelihood of centralising the privatisation 
process. In fact, the wide range of legal measures plays a major role in decentralising 
the whole privatisation process. In practice, several government agencies are involved 
in the whole privatisation process. For example, the MoP is responsible for converting 
large and medium-scale enterprises into commercial companies, and exercising the 
state’s ownership rights in the converted companies, the selling of state companies and 
assets, and training professionals in the field of corporate governance and the securities 
market. Local authorities were responsible for privatising small-scale enterprises. The
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Ministry of Finance is responsible for privatising the banking system, based on Articles 
(861) and (865) of the Banking Act of 1990 and the relevant provisions of the 
Commercial Code of 1934. The Agriculture Property Agency of the State Treasury is 
responsible for privatising or liquidating 1,659 state-owned agriculture enterprises. 
One can conclude that the process of privatisation in Poland is rather highly 
decentralised.^^
Did the Law on Privatisation of SOEs of July, 1990 fix specific targets and tools for 
privatisation?. Did the Law define the parties that would replace the government?. Did 
the formulation of the law on privatisation and the establishment of the MoP help in 
reducing the pressure of ‘insiders’ on the government?. How does the Law deal with 
the ‘insiders’ issue?.
Our study of the Articles of the Law on Privatisation of July, 1990 shows that this Law 
did not fix targets to privatisation to be achieved, but very clearly, with other laws and 
regulations (which are listed above), did specify the main tools of privatisation. As a 
result, the government of Mazowiecki was criticised. Later, the government 
announced eight general goals for privatisation.
The law on Privatisation accepts the idea of a "multi-track" approach to privatisation. 
Based on Article (1) of the Law on Privatisation of SOEs of July, 1990, privatisation of 
an SOE is based on (1) offering to third parties shares or stocks of a company evolving 
from the transfer of an SOE and owned exclusively by the State Treasury, or (2) 
offering to third parties the assets of an SOE or the sale of the enterprise.
The problems of mass privatisation aroused less concern, although there was huge 
pressure on the government from some ‘Solidarity’ experts (e.g. T Stankiewicz), some 
Members of the Polish Parliament (to be expected) from Gdansk (e.g. J Merel, J K 
Bieiecki), and the authors of the concept (Lewandowski and Szomburg).^^ However, 
Article 25 of the Law makes it possible to implement mass privatisation based on 
vouchers. It states: “ (1) Parliament shall, at the request of the CoMs, adopt 
resolutions concerning the issue and value of privatisation notes serving as payments
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for. a) Acquisition of rights to shares issued as a result of the transformation of SOEs\ 
b) Acquisition of titles of participation in financial institutions (societies o f joint 
investment) which will have shares issued as a result o f the transformation of SOEs at 
their disposal', c) Acquisition of enterprises or organised parts of the assets of SOEs 
specified under Article (37). (2) Privatisation notes issued on the ground of Section (1) 
above shall be allocated free of charge to all nationals of the Republic of Poland, 
domiciled therein, and in equal amounts. (3) The CoMs shall, in a regulation, set out 
the time limits of validity of the notes of particular issues, the form, and the principles 
of distribution and realisation thereof, as well as the principles of limiting or possibly 
prohibiting the transfer thereof" However, aiticle 25 has not given rise to mass 
privatisation.
According to Article (2) of the Law on Privatisation of 1990, the Polish Parliament, 
based on a motion of the CoMs, should determine annually the general directions of 
privatisation and specify the use of sources obtained from privatisation activity. 
Parliamentary decisions are made jointly with the enactment of the annual budget. 
And, based on the same Article, the CoMs should, by decree, specify those SOEs which 
are particularly significant to the national economy, and whose privatisation requires 
the approval of the CoMs.
The main methods of privatisation provided by the Law on Privatisation of 1990 are 
‘capital’ privatisation and ‘privatisation via liquidation’.
1. ‘Capital’ privatisation
This method was defended by the government with the support of several of the 
‘Solidarity’ experts and the silent support of the Members of Parliament from the ex- 
communist left.^  ^ This foim of privatisation means in Poland the sale of shares of large 
and medium sized SOEs transferred into companies solely owned by the State 
Treasury- the so-called State Treasury Companies (STCs). Therefore, ‘capital’ 
privatisation is composed of two steps: (1) transformation of SOE into a joint stock or
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limited liability company based on Articles 5 and 6, the so called 'commercialisation' , 
or 'corporatisation'. (2) Disposing of shares of State Treasuiy company to Third 
Parties, based on Articles 18-30, and governed by the regulations of the Commercial 
Code of 1934. The second step can be termed ‘real’ privatisation, because through this 
step ownership rights move from the State Treasury to third (private) parties.
Step One: Transformation o f SOE into a Company: (corporatisation)
The Law on Privatisation of SOEs of July 1990 gives the right of transferring SOE into 
a company either to the Minister of Privatisation (based on Article 5), or to the Prime 
Minister upon a request of the Minister of Privatisation (based on Article 6). The 
Minister of Privatisation could transfer any SOE into a STC provided that the request of 
the founding body"*** is submitted with the consent of the executive director and the 
employee council, after obtaining the opinion of the general assembly of employees 
(delegates). The main contents of the request include an economic and financial 
evaluation of the transformed enterprise, a draft of the company’s founding act- 
provided for by the Commercial Code- as well as the planned scope of the enterprise 
employee’s preferences at purchasing shares in the company from the State Treasury. 
The Law stipulates the Minister of Privatisation has the right to refuse transformation of 
an SOE into a company taking into account the enterprise’s economic and financial 
situations, or an important national interest. The Minister of Privatisation has to specify 
a statement of reasons and a list of conditions upon which the transformation will be 
permitted. In fact, the Minister’s decision is also subject to appeal (Article 5). The new 
company which emerges from the process of transformation remains exclusively owned 
by the State Treasury, and assumes all the rights and duties of the transformed SOE and 
the Commercial Code of 1934 applies (Articles 7 & 8).
One should note that the legislature gave the ‘insiders’ a major role in the process of 
privatising their enterprises due primarily to the pressure they had put on the 
government since the beginning of the transformation process. In fact, the management 
and the employees of the privatised enterprises have an effective veto over Article 5.
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Figure (6.1) illustrates the overall structure of the capital privatisation process:
Privatisation  T hrough Transform ation
►Step 1: initiation
►Step 2: Feasibility Study 
►Step 3: Decision
►Step 4; Complete 
Documentation
I  Th* enlerprisa approaches iha governm enl and expresses an 
I  interest. This is the usual path.
Alternatively the Piime Minister can  order privatisation on proposal 
from Minister of Ownership C hanges.
Usually th is  IS d o n a  Oy a  c o n su ltin g  lirm
Piivaiisation through transformation. Privatisation through liquidation flo b e  covarsd  in /utura issu»).
A. M ariagem enl applies (or privatisation.
a . Worlrers' Council applies for privatisation.
C, Opinion of W orkers' D elegation.
0 . Opinion ol Founding Body (e.g . Ministry ol industry).
E. Proposal by W orkers' Council on Employee S h are  Ownership Schem e - up to a  max. of 20%  of total sh ares  or avg. workers 
salary in the s ta le  sector multiplied by the num ber ol workers.
P. Draft ol com pany 's s ta tu tes  an d  proposed capilatisation.
G, Decision ol Anti-Monopoly Office.
►Step 5: Additional 
Appointments (as required)
►Step 6: Ministerial 
Decisions
Advisers (chosen by tender) to work on:
A. Auditing.
B. Legal analysts.
C. B usiness plan and valuation.
D. Privatisation options.
►Step 7: Transformation
'■►Step 8: Strategy
" €
Minister dec ides on:
Transform ation with or without conditions.
C om pany 's s tatu tes.
Selection of 2/3 of the Supervisory Board (1/3 chosen  by 
em ptoyees).
Capital structure.
Leading to transformation; switch from a siate^owned enterprise to 
staie^owned corporation governed  by commercial code.
•N otary registration of com pany,
•C ourt registration of com pany.
L _ fD ecision on privatisation s trategy  and pricing.
A. T rade sa le  » to on e  or m ore persons.
B. Public offer for sa le  of s ita res.
C , M anagem ent/Em ployee buyout, [inatu ium  is sire)
Im plem ent em ployee sh a re  schem e.
C hoice ol one o r m ore of A to C plus Employee scheme.
^ S t e p  9; 
implementation
Advisers a ss is t on: 1 Appoint additional ativisers a s  n ecessary
A. Saies  docum ents/advertisem ents. 1 Advisers prepare:
B. Contfoiled auction. I A. Prospectus.
C. Selection of shorl-llsted bidders. 8 . Public relations cam paign.
0 . Contract negotiations. C. Share distritxition system .
c. Due diligence. 1 6 . Marketing to tarne investors,
3_I
PRIVATISATION
Source; MoP, 1995.
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Szomburg (1995) argues that this was not new, but dates back to 1981 when the 
government at the time, was forced by a 10 million - strong Solidarity movement, to 
pass legislation which gave state owned enterprises’ managers and employee councils 
wide ranging decision making powers with respect to their productive and investment 
activities. But what matters more is how many shares the ‘insiders’ are given when the 
enterprise is privatised, as this affects the issue of corporate governance in the future. 
That is because the most important issue following the withdrawal of the state from its 
ownership position is who replaces it and controls and monitors the management of the 
privatised enterprise. Frydman & Rapaczynski (1994:143-44) ar-gue that if the state 
withdraws from its ownership position and leaves the power to ‘insiders’ to control the 
privatised enterprise, while their incentives are not radically changed, there is a high 
likelihood that ‘insiders’ would continue to pursue policies and strategies to force the 
state into a new system of political enterprise governance, with all the negative 
consequences of government intervention. The questions that should be answered; 
“Would the process of 'corporatisation’ or 'commercialisation’ reduce the power of 
‘insiders’?”; and, “Would it be an opportunity to restructure the commercialised 
companies?”.
It seems that the legislature was fully aware of this matter, as the process of transferring 
SOEs into companies solely owned by the State Treasury would reduce the power of 
insiders (managers, employees’ councils; and trade unions) which was granted to them 
under the Law on State Enterprises of 1981, and would allow it to restructure the 
companies. A transition period between 'corporatisation’ and the sale of stock was 
created to allow the "restructuring of the company, including discharge of its debts, 
replacement o f management, sale of unnecessary or burdensome property, in order to 
enhance the efficiency of firms before they were fully privatised. Increased efficiency is 
to be achieved through radical changes in the commercialised firms organisational 
structure’’ (Articles 19-22). The most significant change in how commercialised finns 
are mn is the elimination of employee councils. This change shifts a company’s 
internal power structure from the self-management model to that of professional 
management. By doing so, the importance of trade unions in the firms declines rapidly.
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Without the workers council, the unions would not be able to dismiss members of the 
managing board, as a consequence losing their most powerful weapon against 
management. 'Commercialisation' was designed to institutionalise this new structure 
of managerial power in the firm, by limiting employee influence over management and 
strengthening the managing board’s power. Supervisoiy boai'ds were created to inject 
economic rationality into commercialised firms. As opposed to the employee’s council, 
whose interests were mainly directed at a level of wages satisfactoiy to the workers. 
The supervisory board was established to represent the financial interest of the owner in 
the profits of the firm. There was a strong belief that the ‘outsiders’ or ‘external’ 
control would be more efficient and rational than the control exercised by the workers 
(or the so-called ‘insiders control’). Government supervision was to be limited to 
controlling the privatisation process. The newly formed companies were granted 
considerable independence from government interference in management decisions."**
The main question that should be answered; “Did commercialised enterprises adjust to 
market conditions?, or, “Did 'commercialisation' improve the performance of 
enterprises?”. This is discussed in some detail in Section Eight, below.
Step Two: Disposing o f Shares o f STC to Third Parties
Aiticle 18 states that the process of disposing of shares to third parties should take place 
in compliance with provisions of the Commercial Code, which requires the consent of 
the Councils of Ministers. This process should be canied out within two years (Article 
19). The law states that shares of STC can be transferred to third parties by auction, 
open offer, or by negotiations entered into through public invitation. It is necessary to 
obtain the consent of the CoMs for another form of sale."*^  The third parties could be 
the managers of SOEs, workers of SOEs, other domestic investors, foreign investors, or 
the State Treasury.
Regarding the extent of insiders’ shares in the ownership of the new company. Article 
(24) limits that to only 20% of the total number of the STC’s shares. Employees have 
the right to purchase their shaies on preferential terms (i.e. 50% of the price fixed for
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public). This limitation is the main reason why Management/Employee Buy-Outs 
(MEBO) were not populai' in the case of the capital privatisation path in Poland. The 
Finance Minister, at the time, explained that limitation by saying that Polish 
privatisation must not lead to an economy which is radically different from the West
State legal persons (for example, government institutions or SOEs) are not allowed to 
acquire these shares-exceptions need a special consent of the CoMs. What is also 
interesting in the Law is that it takes into consideration the shortages of the private 
sector’s savings. This is very clear in Article (27:3) which allows Polish nationals to 
purchase shares by instalment plan.
Why does the Law on Privatisation of 1990 distinguish between citizens, ‘insiders’ and 
the State?. Who then aie the ‘insiders’ and who is the ‘government’?. These questions 
are clearly answered when one realises that the very logical aim of the whole Polish 
privatisation process is "to promote a wider share of ownership among the public at 
large , including employees of enterprises”. See goals of privatisation below. This 
means that the legislation aimed at a measure of economic justice when this law was 
enacted. Section Seven investigates and assesses the economic and statistical results of 
privatisation achieved in the first six years of the transition.
2. Privatisation Through Liquidation' '^^
This privatisation path is designed for enteiprises characterised by medium and small 
scale employment, which are in good financial and economic standing. The law gives 
the founding body the power, acting upon the consent of the Minister of Privatisation, 
to wind up a state enterprise in order to: “(1) sell the enterprise or any organised parts of 
its estate; (2) contribute the enterprise or any organised parts of its estate to a company; 
(3) turn over the enterprise or any organised parts of its estate to non-gratuitous use for 
a specified time”."*^
The law states that the founding body has the right to take a decision to wind up a SOE, 
on its own initiative or upon the request of the Workers’ Councils of the enterprise.
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Figure (6.2) illustrates the procedures of privatisation thi'ough liquidation.
Privatisation Tlirough Liquidation
-►Stepi:
initiation Enterprise or Fpunping body considers s tep s  necessary  to privatise and decides to initiate tite p ro c ess  often with a  consulting lirm. J
"•S tep  2: State-Owned 
Enterprise's Decision
I  ' • ‘Step 3:
I Founding Body's 
! Decision
"•S tep  4: Ministerial 
Decision
•►Step 5: 
implementation
'• S te p  6: 
Mettiods
W oilters' Council p re sen ts  opinion on wtiether to privatise. S tate-O w ned 
Enterprise (SOE) ch o o se s  its preferred m ethod -  (a sse t sale , contribution 
into com pany, buy-out). B usiness plan is drafted and Ministry ol 
O w nership Translorm ations' questionnaire regarding financial and  legal 
da ta  IS com pleted, Consulting firm is u sed  for valuation ol com pany,
I Docum ents are  given to Founding Body (Voivodaship governm ent or 
branch Ministry).
1) Founding Body appoints Preparatory Team  to exam ine docum en ts and 
renders an opinion on the application. If P reparatory  T earn is not satisfied 
with valuation a different consulting lirm is hired by the Founding Body.
2) Preparatory  T eam  opinion is d iscu ssed  if n ec essary  with SO E. 
Preparatory  T eam  ca n  ch o o se  a m ethod o ther than  on e  preferred by SOE.
3) Founding Body exam ines resu lts of docum entation subm itted by 
P reparatory T eam  and renders an opinion and drafts d ec ree  on liquidation 
of enterprise.
4) Documentation and  decree  is subm tted to Ministry of Ownership 
Transform ations.
Ministry of O w nership Transform ations reviews docum ents and  ev a lu ates  
the iinancial and  legal status; approves or d isapproves of privatisation 
plan. I
1
Founding Body adm inisters
liquidation p ro c ess
Problem reso lved  in 
cooperation with 
Founding Body.
Asset I
Ü
C o n trib u tio n  in to  C o m p a n y . A new 
com pany is created  betw een T reasury 
and  dom estic or loretgn Investor. 1 M an a g em en t/E m p lo y e e  B uy-out20%  capital lest; sate  on  instalment,I
Source: MoP, 1995. I
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Article (37) of this law gives the employees’ council and the executive director of the 
enterprise the power to object against the decision to wind-up their enterprise"* .^ While, 
as noted above, in the case of 'commercialisation', the MoP has the right, according to 
Article 5(3), to refuse transforaiation of SOEs into a company."*^
The main procedures that can be used to liquidate any SOE, as specified by the law of 
privatisation of SOEs of July, 1990, are: (1) the sale of the assets of the SOE; (2) 
leasing, (3) contribution in kind into new companies, (4) or, mixed procedures of the 
above.
In this type of liquidation, the successor of the liquidated enterprise takes over both the 
assets and the liabilities of the liquidated enterprise, and the Law did not fix a limit on 
the participation of employees of liquidated enterprise. Special rules giving preferential 
rights to the employees apply to this type of privatisation followed by leasing. In such 
cases, the employees’ council in consultation with the general meeting of enterprise 
employees may initiate the privatisation. In making any decision about leasing state 
property, preference should be given to a company composed of private individuals 
only and joined by the majority of the employees from the liquidated enterprise. This 
company can lease the assets of its former enterprise (or of pait of it) on a negotiated 
basis (without public auction). Article (8:5), however, specifies that the above 
mentioned company should accumulate a capital of 20% of the book value of the 
liquidated enterprise.
One might argue that this type of privatisation looks like 'nomenclature ' privatisation. 
But the fact is that there are three main differences between this type of privatisation 
and the 'nomenclature' privatisation of Rakowski’s government; first, this type of 
privatisation is now controlled by the MoP. Second, this type offers an advantage to 
the ‘insiders’ of the liquidated enterprise to handle the process for their own interests. 
And, third, these groups of enterprises show better economic results than expected and 
‘insiders’ try to use the assets of these enterprises more efficiently"* .^
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At this stage of my analysis, it is of importance to mention that in Poland, there is 
another type of liquidation- the so-called ‘bankruptcy liquidation'/^
3. Bankruptcy Liquidation
This type of liquidation is based on Article (19) of the Law on SOEs of September, 
1981. The main differences between this type of liquidation and the one based on 
Article (37) of the Law on Privatisation of SOE of July, 1990, are: (1) the one which is 
based on Aiticle (37) concerns enterprises in a relatively good economic and financial 
situation, while the other concerns enterprises in a veiy poor financial situation. (2) in 
the first case as noted above, the successor of the liquidated SOEs takes the assets and 
liabilities of the liquidated enterprise, whereas, in the second case, onlv assets of the 
bankrupt enterprises are sold at auction, in most cases to the ‘insiders’ of the 
enterprises. In fact, enterprises which did not go bankrupt, survive in a new form and 
their assets can be used in an efficient way so that their employees find new 
employment^**. (3) liquidation via the Law on SOEs of September, 1981, "are not, 
strictly speaking, bankruptcies, since the only “unpaid creditor” is most often the State, 
which also happens to own the enterprises in question. Such liquidation is often only a 
covert form of ownership transformation, with the assets of the “bankrupt” sold at 
auction, most often to enterprise ‘insiders ' who support the process. Nevertheless, this 
form o f winding up is the most common consequence of insolvency, and its effect, 
despite the differences with respect to traditional bankruptcy, is the closest Poland now 
has to a disciplining force hardening somewhat the notoriously “soft budget 
constraint” of the state enterprises."^^ Whereas, liquidations under Article (37) of the 
Law on Privatisation of 1990 are not insolvency-related, and are in fact asset-sale forms 
of privatisation.^^ (4) it is expected from a logical point of view that the new 
enterprises, which are established from the assets of their old bankrupt enterprises, 
should be better off financially, and perform better economically than in the case of the 
liquidated enterprises based on Article (37). That is because these enterprises would 
not be forced to survive in their old form^ .^ (5) Unlike liquidation via Article (37) of 
the Law on Privatisation of July, 1990, those based on Article (19) of the Law on SOEs
A"
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of 1981 do not have to be approved by the workers’ councils (although the councils 
must be consulted).
One can conclude that such liquidation (i.e. those based on the Law on SOEs) is the 
only mechanism for winding up firms that the State (in which it is the firms’ owner) 
recognises should no longer exist or that can be relatively easily transformed into viable 
private businesses. Fortunately, this liquidation involves small and medium-sized 
SOEs, where the resulting social problems are limited.^ "*
e. Involvement of foreign Investors in the privatisation process
It is of interest to mention that during the period of the first Solidarity-led government, 
there was disagreement on the involvement of foreign investors in the privatisation 
process. The liberals were in favour of not only allowing, but even actively 
encouraging foreign investors to purchase shares in as many enterprises as possible, 
except in some restricted fields. In this case, the government was criticised not only for 
selling the country to foreigners, but also selling it at cheap prices. Others (the 
nationalists) were against the involvement of foreigners in the privatisation process^^. 
This issue will be tackled in the following section below. However, it is of importance 
to mention that the Law on Companies with Foreign Participation of July, 1991, allows 
foreigners to purchase up to 10% of the assets of the privatised enterprise freely, and up 
to 100% of the assets, after obtaining approval from the MoP, which is expected to be 
almost automatic except in some special cases.
One could argue at this early stage of analysis that, due to the absence of large-scale 
participation of foreign capital on the one hand (as will be seen below), and the 
shortages of domestic savings on the other, the ambitious timetable of privatisation was 
not fulfilled.
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f. Reprivatisation
The other main issue which was intensively discussed during the first non-communist 
government era was reprivatisation. However, until the end of 1995, Poland still does 
not have a reprivatisation or restitution law. At the beginning of 1995, the ninth 
amended draft law on reprivatisation: Act on the Compensation for losses of Real 
Estates Taken in Violation of Regulations Issued in the Years 1944-1962 was the 
subject of a vivid debate. It was positively revised by a specially established 
Consultative Committee on Reprivatisation and initially accepted by the Council of 
Ministers. It was expected that in the second half of 1995, this draft law would be the 
subject of Parliamentary Debate, so that the Act would be passed through Parliament. 
One of the consequences of the delay in restitution legislation in Poland is that in many 
cases the claims of former owners of property lead to the withdrawal of potential 
foreign investors, who are afraid of the legal difficulties that could arise from unclear 
ownership titles.
g. The declared goals of privatisation
Mazowiecki’s Government officially announced its main goals of privatisation, after 
criticism that its Law on Privatisation of July, 1990, does not include any hints on the 
main goals of Polish privatisation policy. The goals published in January, 1991, 
although general, were very clear, and specify a time scale for the Polish privatisation 
process. It states that the government aims at “privatising of half of the present state 
owned sector within three years; and achieving the same ownership structure as 
Western Europe within five years
In very plan, the Government pointed out that the main objectives of the privatisation 
process are the following:
“(1) shifting the economy from a centrally planned system to an open market system to 
foster efficiency and competition; (2) improving the performance of enterprises through 
increased efficiency by installing private initiative, and motivated management and 
labour; (3) reducing the size o f the public sector and burden on the public budget and
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administration; (4) promoting wider share ownership among the public at large, 
including employees o f enterprises; (5) develop entrepreneurs and managers with 
initiative, drive and a keen sense of opportunity; (6) generate funds from the sale of 
enterprises, which can be used for enterprise restructuring”.^^
The most important goal for privatisation to achieve is to "prevent the collapse of the 
stabilisation process which started in late 1989”.^  ^ This was because liberalising 
prices and trade, and creating a market environment for products produced under state 
ownership, were not sufficient to discipline the managers’ behaviour.'
Some implicit and explicit factors played a major role in shaping these goals. Among 
the explicit factors, the most notable are; (1) to increase the efficiency of the 
enterprises; (2) to reduce or even stop the annual amount of subsidies deducted from the 
State budget; (3) the will of the government to move away from the communist system, 
to promote wider share ownership among the public at large, and to generate funds 
from the sale of enterprises. Whereas, the most important implicit factor is the will of 
the Polish Government to join the European Union, as can be understood from the 
second general goal of the privatisation plan®^ .
Some of these goals are broadly defined. The Polish policy makers wished to achieve a 
broad number of policy targets, which may or may not be compatible with enhancing 
efficiency. The Government aimed at privatising the Polish economy in the shortest 
possible time ("half of the present state owned sector within three years”). It is very 
clear that not all of these objectives can be achieved at once, and trade-offs and 
compromises are inevitable. For instance, when a policy decision is made to privatise a 
given number of SOEs (say half of the 8,441 SOEs) as quickly as possible (say in 3 
years time) to obtain rapid improvements in efficiency- any constraint imposed on the 
other objectives will tend to slow down the process of privatisation, and limit the actual 
extent of efficiency gains. In other words, successive Polish Governments aimed at 
privatising the economy as quickly as possible. However, due to the lack of domestic 
savings, and the legal restriction imposed on employees’ shares (maximum 20%), and 
the low participation of foreign investors, that goal was not achieved, even after six
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years from the start of the privatisation process in 1990. One can conclude that the 
Polish policy makers who announced that goal were either over optimistic, or wanted to 
convince (or even please) some national (workers councils, trade unions?) or 
international groups^  ^ (such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank (WB)).
It is of interest to note that for the first time in the history of broad privatisation 
philosophy, privatisation is used to create a market economy. When introduced in the 
Western and developing economies, privatisation was supposed to enhance the 
functioning of the existing market economies. In the case of Central and East European 
economies in general, and in the case of Poland in particular, the first goal for 
privatisation to achieve is to shift their economies from CPEs to open, market- 
orientated economies to foster efficiency and competition.
2. BieleckPs Government Era (January, 1991-December, 1991)
The Bieiecki^ "* Government came into office after the first Presidential elections of 
1990, which were won by Walesa® .^ Obviously, when this government took office, the 
Law on Privatisation was in effect, the Ministry of Privatisation was already 
established, and the official goals of privatisation were also already announced. What 
was the role of this government afterwards in shaping Polish privatisation thought?.
This government changed the ambitious plan for privatisation aiming at privatising half 
of the 8,441 SOEs from three to five years, but stuck with the general aim of changing 
the structure of ownership along Western Europe lines within five years. Bieiecki 
recognised that further delays in privatisation could ultimately jeopardise the success of 
the whole transformation programme, therefore, his Government introduced a new 
philosophy for privatisation.^^
In fact, before the formation of Bieiecki's government, President Walesa adopted the 
idea of capital vouchers in the election campaign. He promised to give each Pole a 
credit of 100 million zloties to buy shaies to accelerate the privatisation process.
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However, his idea was not included in the official election propositions “New 
Beginning” on November 11, 1990. Nevertheless, it was kept in mind by both 
supporters and opponents of the new President.Then, the idea was developed by 
Koziewicz, under Secretary of State in the Presidential Office, so that each citizen 
would receive the equivalent of US$ 10,000 in the form of long term investment credit 
with a 20-year maturity- free of interest during the first 10 years. In fact, both proposals 
(zl 100 million and US$ 10,000) were completely unrealistic and irresponsible from the 
macroeconomic point of view, because they would have deprived the State budget of a 
possible source of revenue, and increased the total money supply in the Polish economy 
by 15 times, i.e. it would have added some inflationary pressure.
A new version of this idea was proposed by the Solidarity trade union (the “Network of 
leading Big Enterprise Union Organisation”) at the end of March, 1993, and politically 
endorsed by President Walesa. In the new version, every adult citizen would obtain zl 
300 million of credit. Lewandowski encouraged this approach as he believed that it 
was relatively simple, fast and inexpensive. Neither idea was ever put into practice.^^
a. A shift towards citizens’ ownership
In Bieiecki’s Cabinet, the new Minister of Privatisation was Lewandowski. The first 
predictable step this Government took, after realising that the whole process of 
privatisation was progressing very slowly, was to prepare a 'revised programme for 
privatisation’. The revised privatisation programme opened the door for the 
implementation of the original Lewandowski-Szomburg idea of free distribution of 
vouchers to all citizens^^. On 20 June, 1991, Lewandowski- the MoP- introduced his 
‘Mass Privatisation Programme’. Four hundred SOEs would be chosen for 
transformation into STCs. Shares in these companies would then be distributed as 
follows: 10% to employees free of charge; 60% to all adult citizens, also free of charge; 
and the remaining 30% would be retained by the State Treasury. The shift towards the 
citizen’ ownership concept was closely connected with attempts to accelerate the 
privatisation process, to keep out rapacious foreigners, and to achieve economic justice. 
Steps had been taken at that time to organise the first mass distribution of shares among
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the population. It was expected that they would manage to do that by the end of 1991. 
But the idea of ‘mass privatisation’ have not been implemented.^^ That was mainly due 
to the following reasons: “(1) the resistance within the government by supporters of 
‘conventional’ privatisation methods. (2) the resistance by consultant firms which 
naturally linked large demand for advisory services with the case-by-case method and 
not ‘mass privatisation’. (3) the resistance of the organisers of the capital market: the 
eventual issue of millions of vouchers and their turnover with millions of people 
participating drastically changed existing forecasts on the functioning of the Stock 
Exchange and of the regulated capital market.”'^  ^ Moreover, some criticisms were 
directed toward the programme, including: (1) “the quasi-privatisation character of the 
programme, as enterprises would not have a real owner as a result of dispersed 
shareholdings”. (2) “the threat of inflation: the likelihood that the poorest section of 
the population would sell their vouchers, using the money for consumption purposes”. 
(3) “the uneven accumulation of wealth: the potential threat that a small group of 
people would acquire assets at lower prices”. (4) “the influence o f foreign experts: the 
difficulty in ensuring the national interest with foreign managers in the investment 
funds”P
b. Adoption of Foreign investment Law
The other important achievement of this government is the strong belief in the 
participation of foreign investors in the privatisation process. That is highly explicit in 
the argument of Bieiecki (1992), which states that “the programme of privatisation - 
especially o f large enterprises- could not be carried out effectively without 
participation by foreign investors”. In fact, this very strong belief of the Prime Minister 
of a revisionist government, had a major influence on the Parliament; after six months 
of Parliamentary debate, a very important Law on Companies with Foreign Capital 
Participation was passed, in July, 1991. The Law gives foreign investors the possibility 
of not only participating in the privatisation process, but also the chance of setting new 
business (greenfield) and establishing joint ventures in the country '^ .^
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c. Sectoral privatisation programme
This programme was unique to Polish privatisation/^ In fact, Bieiecki (1992:329) 
argues that this approach was an attempt to integrate privatisation with the Polish 
industrial policy and foreign investment. The core of the programme was to be the 
synthesis of analyses of the economic situation and competitiveness of specific sectors 
of the economy, in general, and of particular enterprises in each industrial sector, in 
particular.^^ The programme involved a comprehensive feasibility study for each 
industrial branch by Western consulting firms. The aim of the feasibility studies was to 
evaluate those sectors, branches, and enterprises for restructuring and privatisation. 
The consultants would then attempt to sell large chunks of stock in the firms belonging 
to that branch. Theoretically, a number of SOEs could be sold at once via this 
programme to both domestic and foreign investors, although the programme was 
oriented mainly toward foreign investors.^^
By July, 1991, 173 SOEs of various sizes, in 34 industrial sectors were selected for the 
programme. And by December, 1991, a total number of 250 firms, employing more 
that 300 thousand workers, had been included in the programme.^^
The most advantageous points of this programme are: (1) it helps in overcoming the 
information barrier facing the State as owner of the State sector. (2) it can also lead to a 
significant acceleration of the privatisation process by broadening the field of 
operations. And (3) it can improve the reliability of the information base and increase 
flexibility in the choice of particular t e c h n i q u e s . W h a t  is interesting in this 
programme is the fact that it can be implemented either through the use of ‘capital’ 
privatisation or the ‘privatisation via liquidation’ path.^ ®
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d. Restructuring privatisation programme
This government developed another privatisation programme called “restructuring 
privatisation programme”. This programme involves a competitive tender for a 
management group, the task of which shall be to restructure the company and increase 
the value of its assets. During the tender, the management groups must include in their 
offers restructuring plans and a proposed initial value of the company they are bidding 
for. A successful management group must make a financial contribution, treated as a 
pre-payment for the shares in the increased share capital of the company. This meant 
that upon the fulfilment of the contract, the management group obtains shaies of the 
company in return for its financial contribution. The management group receives a 
commission equal to 70% of the real increase of the company value when selling it to 
an outside investor. In addition, the management group has an opportunity to 
participate in profit sharing. Upon successful completion of the restructuring 
programme (approximately two years) the company will be sold. The management 
group, by virtue of the contract, is given the option to purchase up to 80% of the 
shares.
e. Regional offices
This government announced that only the 500 largest enterprises would be privatised by 
the MoP itself or under its strict control. The rest of State industry and trade would be 
corporatised and privatised in a decentralised way. At that time the MoP had 
established regional offices to supervise the process. Privatisation can be initiated not 
only by the affected firm itself, but also by an outside party willing to buy a stake in the 
firm.®^
f. Local government involvement
Another decentralised path is small privatisation, where local government mainly takes 
care of the organisation of the bidding process. Therefore, special encouragement was 
given by Bielecki’s Government to ‘small privatisation’, a concept which for some time
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had also been strongly supported by Walesa. It involves, first of all, the enlargement of 
existing, and the establishment of new, private fiims by eliminating barriers that 
previously restricted the functioning of private enterprises. As will be seen below, 
many new small private businesses were established, despite the lack of experience and 
sufficient capital, which demonstrated that there was no shortage of enterpreneurship in 
Poland.
Local political developments interrupted economic policies in Poland. The 
Parliamentary elections of October, 1991, resulted in a new government- Olszewski’s 
Government.
3. OlszewskVs Government Era (Decembery 1991-June, 1992)
This was a coalition government, supported by Christian National Unions (ZCHN), the 
Centre Alliance (PC) and a number of smaller parties, plus PSL. Gruszecki was the 
Minister of Privatisation. He was a strong advocate of the idea of 
‘commercialisation’ The government had to frame an economic programme which 
could come to grips with a number of exceptionally difficult dilemmas. The main 
dilemma concerning privatisation: “ At what pace, and in what new foims to go ahead 
with privatisation?”. The group which supported this government called for a sharp 
‘breakthrough’, a break with the policies of the past two governments. '^^ According to 
Parliamentary groups supporting the Olszewski’s government, the ‘Balcerowicz Plan’ 
had led to the decimation of Polish industry and agriculture by exacerbating the 
recession and refusing to intervene to help stricken firms. The stabilisation 
programme’s anti-inflationary emphasis should therefore be replaced by anti­
recessionary policies; a more interventionist, projectionist industrial policy was needed 
to repair the damage done by the liberals. More importantly, the previous two 
government’s privatisation policies came in for criticism. This government attempted 
to articulate its economic programme in the White Paper 'Principles o f Socio­
economic Development’, submitted to the Sejm in mid-Febmary, 1992, and in the 
auxiliary planning document 'Principles o f Socio-economic policy for 1992-94’, 
released in March, 1992.'®'^
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*In fact, Olszewski contributed to, and was caught in, a debilitating political struggle 
with both President and the Parliament. As political manoeuvring began to dominate 
all else, privatisation activity ground to a standstill: during his Government’s short 
stewardship of national affairs no substantial privatisation took place. Privatisation of 
large state enterprises was practically brought to a halt.^ '  ^ Sectoral privatisation was 
scaled back by Gmszeck and marginalised after 1991. This government collapsed in 
June, 1992.*''
4. Suchocka^s Government Era: (July, 1992 - September, 1993)
Suchocka** was able to form a coalition government. Lewandowski was brought back 
to head the MoP. The economic strategy of the new government was based on three 
fundamental principles: a social market economy, privatisation and a pro-Europe 
orientation. This government believed that the answer to the question; “How to 
improve the economic situation in Poland lay in executive decrees which would help to 
put the market economy and privatisation more rapidly in place. Opponents argued 
that the effectiveness of government action would be much greater if it focused on 
framing an economic policy oriented to moving the country out of recession.
The main achievements of this government are the so-called State Enterprise Pact, the 
adoption of the Mass Privatisation Programme, and the (almost) completion of small- 
scale privatisation, and the adoption of the Law of Financial Restructuring of 
Enterprises and Banks at the end of 1992. The results of small-scale privatisation are 
discussed iri detail in Section Seven, below.
a. State Enterprise Pact
This Pact was signed by representatives of the government, trade unions and employers 
on February 22, 1993. It included a package of new laws and amendments of old ones, 
aimed at providing new operation conditions for State enterprises, and at winning 
populai- support for those changes. The Pact was to provide for more employee
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participation in the process of economic transformation taking place in Poland and , by 
the same token, to change the prevailing attitude represented by trade unions from that 
of a demander to one which involves joint responsibility for economic development. 
The pact’s objective was, by its very nature, to mitigate social tensions, create new 
institutional forms for negotiations and for settling disputes among trade unions, 
employers and the government. The pact was to contribute to more efficient 
management, improvement of financial standing and speeding up of privatisation of 
SOEs. The SOEs Pact covers privatisation matters. The government proposed some 
amendments to the Law on Privatisation of SOEs of July, 1990, aimed at the 
introduction of a bigger variety of privatisation methods, in order to speed up this 
process in the interest of both the State and employees. However, irrespective of what 
privatisation methods, employees would be given preferential treatment. They were to 
receive 10% of the equity free of charge, to elect one third of the Supervisory Board and 
to have an influence on the choice of privatisation methods. The choice of privatisation 
path would depend on whether the enterprise had or had not lost its financial liquidity. 
If it still had that liquidity it could choose one of the following privatisation methods:
(1) privatisation through sale of shares to a large domestic or foreign investor, or 
through a management or employee buy-out; (2) sale of shares through public offering; 
(3) assignment of a control parcel of shares to a trustee (e.g. an investment fund, a bank, 
etc.).^ ^
b. The Mass Privatisation Programme ®^ (MPP)
The Law on Mass Privatisation Programme won the approval of the Parliament and the 
Senate for the National Investment Funds in April and May, 1993, respectively. What 
are the bases of this programme?. What are the main steps of implementing the 
programme?. What are its implications to the citizens, the NIFs, the companies, and 
the whole Polish economy?.
228
1. Basis of implementation
The basis for implementation of the MPP is known as the Law on National Investment 
Funds (NIFs) and Their Privatisation of April 30, 1993. The Law came into force on 
June 15, 1993. This means that mass privatisation is a process with a film legal basis, 
being implemented pursuant to a decision of a parliament elected in democratic 
elections. The official name of the programme is “The Programme of NIFs”. Mass 
Privatisation Programme (MPP) is a more common, “working” name, as it is already 
well-established among the public; this is why both names are used interchangeably. 
MPP is the only programme of ownership transformation which has been sanctioned by 
a Parliamentary Act. This was a result of the endeavours of consecutive governments 
which, though they did not hold a majority in Parliament, attempted to enact the 
necessary legislation. It was possible thanks to a clear and comprehensive economic 
concept, developed by the MoP.
2. Aims of the MPP
The official view of the rationale behind the MPP is explained by their document. The 
MPP Department argue that: the capital privatisation method proved to be insufficient 
to meet the economy’s restructuring needs; there was an urgent need for an active 
owner for the companies, capable of carrying out effective restructuring of 
management, capital and mai'keting; it attempted to avoid valuation, as it is costly, 
time-consuming and not very reliable, since there is no perfect market mechanism to 
distribute the assets to all citizens; citizens should receive compensation for 45 years of 
Communism; they should/ however, be burdened with responsibilities/duties which are 
beyond their competence?^
3. The structure of the NIFs programme
According to the law of NIF and their privatisation of 1993, the structure contains 5 
main steps: commercialisation, the establishment of NIFs, contribution of joint Stock
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companies (JSCs), held solely by the State Treasuiy, distribution of shares, and finally, 
the introduction of NIFs shares onto the Stock Exchange.
The first step means that SOEs should be transferred into Joint Stock Companies 
(JSCs) held solely by the State Treasury. A requirement to qualify for the programme 
has sales exceeding US $ 5 million and a net profit before tax. The second step 
involves the establishment of the NIFs by the State Treasury in the form of JSCs 
(Article 3). Their assets include shares of privatised firms, contributed by the State 
Treasury. A selection Committee, appointed by the Sejm, Senate, the government and 
trade unions, selects members of the first supervisory boards of NIFs. It is also 
responsible for carrying out a tender for fund managers. The third step involves the 
stmcture of share holding of the companies involved in the programme. Each company 
has the same share holding structure: 33% held by a ‘lead’ NIF, 27% distributed equally 
to all other NIFs; 15% distributed free of charge to employees; and 25% retained by the 
State Treasury. In fact, the companies lose the status of SOCs held solely by the State 
Treasury and from then on are treated as private entities. The fourth step involves the 
distribution of Share Certificates (SCs). Upon payment of a small registration fee, all 
adult citizens receive bearer securities -Shares Certificates- which give the right to 
participate in the programme. Those securities can be traded freely, both on and off the 
Stock Exchange. The fifth  step involves the introduction of NIF shares onto the Stock 
Exchange. After the Securities Commission admits shares in all NIFs to trade on the 
stock Exchange, SCs can be exchanged for a portfolio consisting of one share in each 
NIF.
1
4, MPP Timetable
As at the end of December, 1995, the following is the status of the Programme:
a. National Investment Funds
15 NIFs were created on December 15, 1994, as Joint Stock Companies (JSCs) and 
now operating as closed-end fund. Their principle purpose is to increase the value of
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their assets- namely the shares of those Polish companies participating in the MPP- for 
the benefit of their shaieholders. Each NIF is controlled by a supervisoiy Board 
charged with representing the interests of its shareholders - the Polish citizens who are 
holding (or will hold until November, 1996) SCs. The supervisory Boai’d members 
have already been selected by the selection commission and already accepted by the 
Prime Minister. Each NIF holds 28 lead share holdings (33%) and over 513 minority 
share holdings in companies in the programme. In addition to the management of the 
NIFs on a day-by-day basis, fund managers will assist in obtaining access to capital, 
new technologies and new markets for the companies in the programme.
The fund management team managing each NIF will report to the supervisory Board 
under a management contract and performance contract which have a ten year term, and 
will provide them with financial incentives to increase the long-term value of the fund. 
After the first year it is intended that each NIF will seek a listing on the WSE. The fund 
manager will also consider listing companies in its portfolio as appropriate.
b. The companies
512 large and medium-size Polish enterprises are participating in the MPP. These 
companies come from a broad range of industrial sectors, including metallurgy, 
machineiy and precision engineering, chemical engineering, and paper, foodstuffs, 
constmction and transportation equipment. Each company has the same shareholding 
structure as mentioned above. The distribution of the 33% lead shaieholdings is 
decided according to an agreed procedure designed to ensure fairness. Each company is 
one of 28 enterprises held as a core investment in its lead NIF.
Shares in the companies may be sold by the NIFs directly to strategic investors and 
some companies may be sold in their entirety to Polish or international companies or 
investors. Some may be placed in Joint Ventures or remain as long term investments or 
funds. Eventually, it is hoped that many of the participating companies will themselves 
be listed on the WSE.
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c. The Polish Citizens
The MPP has been designed to ensure that the Polish citizens are the principal 
beneficiaries of the mass privatisation process. All resident Polish citizens aged 18 or 
over are entitled to participate in the programme by purchasing a Universal Share 
Certificate (USC). The fee for a USC is no more than 10% of the national average 
monthly wage, currently equivalent to zl 20. On receiving the Share Certificate, the 
owner will immediately be able to trade it in bearer form and soon after trade it on the 
WSE. In due course, once the NIFs are listed, the SC can be converted through a 
broker into one share in each relevant publicly-quoted NIF. Because the value of all 
SCs is not linked solely to the performance of a single company or group of companies, 
but represents a broad spread of investments in several hundred enterprises, this 
approach is expected to offer all Polish citizens a diversified interest in key Polish 
industries. It will also enable sophisticated investors to choose more targeted 
investments, such as particular NIFs or companies in the Prograname, should they so 
wish. The SCs are in the form of physical bearer securities, convertible to shares in 
each of the NIFs. The share certificates are exempted from public trading regulations, 
and can be traded in their initial issued bearer form. Therefore, intermediaries such as 
banks, Kantors (Foreign Exchange Offices), etc. are trading the Certificates in the same 
way as they trade currencies. This form of trading serves the needs of those holders 
wishing to sell or buy further USCs at minimal cost without the overhead of opening or 
running brokerage accounts. For those holders wishing to take advantage of the 
inherent security of the National Depository, the USCs will be eligible for deposit and 
dematerialisation via a brokerage house. In dematerialised form, the USC will be 
admitted to trading on the WSE. The process of distributing the SCs to Polish citizens 
commenced on 22 November, 1995, and will last for one year.
d. Overseas Involvement
Institutional, strategic and private investors from abroad can participate in the MPP in a 
variety of ways: (1) they can purchase SCs from those citizens who wish to trade them, 
either in bearer form, or in dematerialised form on the WSE. These Certificates are
I
232
convertible into shares in individual NIFs once the NIFs have been listed on the WSE.
(2) investors can purchase and trade in shares in the NIFs after they have been listed on 
the WSE. (3) financial and strategic investors can actively participate in the 
restructuring of individual participating companies by purchasing shares in them as and 
when they become available, by taking part in new shai'e issues, by providing equity or 
non-equity finance, by acquiring companies in their entirety, or by forming strategic 
joint ventures. (4) institutional investors may choose to purchase shares in individual 
participating companies when they become publicly listed in the future.
5. Implications for companies, citizens, and the whole Polish economy
a. Implications for the companies
The structure of a SOE is particularly impervious to attempts at reform. The director, 
formally reporting to the State administration, is in practice, a captive of the employees, 
since his (her) election depends primarily on the Workers Councils. As a result of the 
extremely powerful position of trade unions, any attempts at transformation of SOE by 
the management, are only sporadically successfiil. Support for reforms is fostered by 
the difficult economic situation of companies, however. Usually, capital assistance 
from outside the company is necessary. This requires a prior change of the structure of 
a company (commercialisation) and the sale of some of the shares. Only into such a 
transformed company can a potential investor “pump in” any financial resources (the 
costs of purchase are taken by the State Budget).
The MPP eliminates those inconveniences. SOEs become private JSCs as soon as their 
shares are contributed to a NIF. After that there are various possibilities for direct 
capital support; a new issue of shares (after invalidating the pre-emptive right of the 
existing shareholders); a joint venture; credit or credit guaiantee provided by an 
investor.
The ownership structure (33% the leading NIF, 27% dispersed among the remaining 
NIFs, 25% the State Treasury, 15% employees) is reflected in the composition of the
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supervisory Board. The management Boai'd is usually composed of the existing 
management, which knows the specific nature of the company and its problems. The 
leading NIF does not limit the independence of a company; its task is to stimulate 
development through efficient use of financial instruments . Advisory support in the 
foim of a fund management will allow the verification of the plans of the management 
in a fast and efficient manner. The international connections of a NIF and its strong 
position in negotiations with foreign partners will allow it to seek investment capital 
effectively and to develop exports.
It may be reasonably expected that as a result of release from mechanisms limiting 
wage increases in the State sector, combined with shaies in profits and participation in 
management, employees will, to a great extent, identify themselves with their company. 
This will also help to reform the employment structure.
b. Implications for Citizens
The MPP offers all citizens the possibility to participate in the emerging market 
economy system in Poland. SCs aie available (since 22 November, 1995) for a fee not 
exceeding 10% of the average monthly wage (zl 20). For this price a buyer can become 
a pait-owner of several hundred reasonably good companies. There is no restriction on 
individuals or other persons wishing to trade bearer, physical foim Certificates on the 
basis of private arrangements between themselves. It is expected that various 
organisations, including certain Foreign Exchange Offices CKantors”) and individuals 
would organise trading in the Certificates. There is no requirement for special permits 
to trade in SCs as a business, but they must appear in the Business Register. After all 
NIFs have been admitted to public trade, shares of the Funds will be subject to more 
sophisticated trading on the SE. For investors willing to penetrate the over-the -counter 
market, the programme offers several hundred securities representing a full spectrum of 
technical parameters and risks. For those who are not interested in investing on the 
Stock Exchange, an SC will be a safe investment, or a source of additional one-time
profit.93
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c. Implications for the Polish economy
The establishment of several strong financial institutions- the NIFs, and simultaneous 
restructuring of several hundred medium and large companies, will be a strong impulse 
for the development of the whole economy. One of the major effects of implementation 
of the NIF programme will be a tremendous growth of the capital market in Poland. 
Implementation of the MPP will result in issuance of three types of securities: (1) 
shares in the privatised companies; (2) Share Certificates convertible in the future into 
shares of the NIFs; and (3) shares of the NIFs themselves. As for the companies shares, 
eligible employees of the MPP companies can obtain up to 15%, free of charge. It is 
possible that the companies concerned will deposit these shares with local banks, and 
will issue depository receipts to the employees instead of physical shares. In most 
cases, the company shai’es will be traded privately on restricted, company-managed 
markets. In most cases, these markets will initially take the form of notice boards 
maintained by the companies, matching buy and sell orders between eligible 
counterparts. Later, they may be admitted to public trading on the WSE or possibly the 
OTC market.
Regarding SCs, they have been available to eligible Poles since November, 1995. For 
those holders wishing to take advantage of the inherited security of the National 
Depository, the Certificate will be eligible for deposit and dematerialisation via a 
brokerage house. In dematerialised form, the certificate will be admitted to trading on 
the WSE. Shares of the NIFs will be tradable, once they are admitted to public trading. 
They will take book entry form in the same manner as other shares currently traded on 
the WSE. Holders of SCs are able to convert each certificate into a single share of each 
NIF.
It is of interest to mention that certificates will remain tradable for several years at least, 
as a safe investment which does not require an investor to be familiar" with the capital 
market. NIF shares will also be relatively safe (a NIFs portfolio shall include several 
majority shai*es and several hundred minority shares). As the financial condition of 
companies participating in the programme improves, they will be able to seek capital on
235
the domestic market through a public investment offer created within the framework 
emerging from this programme.
For small companies, of local significance, conditions will be created for over - the - 
counter trade of their shares. In the first stage, as a part of trade among primary 
shareholders (employees and NIFs), and then as a part of regulated over ~ the- counter 
trading. Particular solutions will depend on the specific nature of a given security. 
Some government officials in the MOP hope that the development of the capital market 
will foster initiation of the reform of the budgetary sphere; notably Social Security and 
Health Care. They argue that in order to establish competitive (commercial and/or 
partially subsidised by the State) insurance and health insurance companies, there must 
be a deep, stable and efficient securities market of sufficient liquidity. Therefore, the 
establishment of a strong sector of dynamic private companies, managed in a modern 
manner, as well as strong new financial institutions (NIF), will help to reduce the 
burden on the State as the main employer and a party in wage disputes; it will, at the 
same time, reinforce the State role as an efficient regulator of the economic process.
6. Critique over the MPP
As only a few countries in the world have undertaken such a huge privatisation 
programme^" ,^ it is extremely difficult to predict the outcome of such a process. I agree 
with Murrell, 1992 that such a Mass Privatisation Programme provides an element of 
learning by doing. However, the most serious criticism that one could register against 
this programme is the fact that, though it was established to help in creating a market 
economy in Poland, it broke the rules of the market economy. This programme is not 
based on the very basic conditions of the market, i.e. demand and supply.
c. Law on Financial Restructuring o f Enterprises and Banks
The Law on Financial Restructuring of Enterprises and Banks was approved at the end 
of 1992. This law allows banks to institute accelerated composition agreement 
procedures in relation to indebted enterprises in order to reduce their debts (including
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inter-enterprise ones, as well as indebtedness to the budget and banks and “bad” credits 
at banks) or spread it out over time on more favourable terms. Moreover, the law 
makes it possible to convert claims into shares of one-person companies of the State 
Treasury and state enteiprise. Hence, creditors who hold at least 30% of the total 
claims against a company or state enteiprise have the right to use this ‘debt for equity 
swaps’ procedure. There were also some influential people, within and outside the 
government, who warned against selling the country to foreigners.
The government of Suchocka was brought down by a non-confidence vote in the Sejm 
in June, 1992, but continued to govern until September, 1993. The Paiiiament was then 
dissolved by President Walesa. As a result, Parliamentary elections were held on 13 
September, 1993. The elections brought a large victory to ex-communists. The 
question arises; “What would the impact of this major political shift be on the Polish 
privatisation policy?”.
B. Privatisation policy during the ex-Communist Era (September, 1993- 
December, 1995)
During this period there were two ex-communist governments: the first, led by 
Pawlak, came to office in October, 1993 and ruled until March, 1995. The second is 
the Oleksy Government, which took office from March, 1995 until January, 1996. The 
main focus of the ex-communist governments was to reduce the social cost of the 
transformation procès s.
1. Pawlak^s Government Era (September, 1993 - March, 1995)
This government, which came to power after the September, 1993 elections, was the 
first ex-communist government. Its economic policy was announced in its medium- 
term development strategy approved by the Parliament in the Autumn of 1994, in the 
form of 'Strategy for Poland (1994-97)', which discussed in Section Three below. 
Concerning privatisation, this government announced its intention to commence 'mass
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commercialisation programme’, which many analysts deem a substitute for, rather than 
a stepping-stone to, full-fledged privatisation.^^
One of the main programmes of this government, concerning privatisation, is 'The 
Stabilisation, Restructuring and Privatisation’ (SRP) Programme, which was approved 
by the government in October, 1994.
a. The Stabilisation, Restructuring and Privatisation Programme®^ (SRP)
The SRP is a medium-scale privatisation scheme that became one of the top priorities 
of the Ministry of Privatisation. This programme differs from other SRP schemes 
proposed by the European Bank for Reconstmction and Development in other 
countries. The programme is targeted at enterprises (so-called SRP companies) that are 
in a critical condition, thus can be privatised in the immediate future. This can be 
achieved by providing appropriate cash injections, ensuring appropriate corporate 
governance and turn-around management expertise. Enterprises that meet specific 
criteria would be entitled to participate in the SRP programme on a voluntary basis, 
subject to approval of the MoP.
The first phase of the SRP would include 40 medium-sized enterprises in 1994. The 
enterprises would be privatised in two stages. In the first stage their shares and assets 
would be. contributed by the Polish banks and at its discretion by the State Treasury 
and/or Agency for Industrial Development (IDA) to several so called Investment 
Vehicles (IVs). In the second stage, these shares would be sold to private investors 
within a limited period of time. If not sold, the IVs would be liquidated to ensure 
timely conclusion of the programme within five years. It was also intended that the 
SRP companies would pay dividends to the IVs within the first three years.
Each TVs would be a company created by EBRD jointly with one participating bank. 
The parties would contribute the equity and debt financing. Each bank would 
contribute equity (after conversion of the enterprises debts) and/or assets. The State 
Treasury and the IDA could contribute their assets, shares or cash, at their discretion.
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The enterprise would be selected for the SRP Programme under streamlined procedures 
developed jointly by the MoP and Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT). The 
contribution of shares or assets would be done in a manner to avoid public sales to the 
extent permitted by the Privatisation Law of July, 1990.
The programme assumes that contributions in cash and in kind would be treated 
differently. Partners or shareholders (depending on the form of the company) making 
contributions in kind shall have ordinary rights to distribution of profits, return of 
capital, distribution of surplus on liquidation and their voting rights may be limited. 
Others, making cash contributions, shall have cash preferred rights to all the above. It 
was intended that IVs would be managed by professional management agreed between 
the EBRD and the banks. Management contacts might be used and management cost 
would be covered by the TVs, but any profits to the management would only be payable 
if the IVs are profitable.^^
2. Oleksy Government Era (March, 1995- December, 1995)
This Government took power in a period where many unknowns and many unanswered 
questions with regard to the future course of Poland’s economic policy, were in place. 
The most notable are the newly announced 'mass commercialisation programme’, 
which came in the form of an amendment to the Law on Privatisation of SOEs of 1990, 
and the long delayed of the MPP. Concerning the amendment of the Law on 
Privatisation, Parliament did not pass the new amendments. The main achievement of 
this government is the implementation of the MPP, which started in November, 1995. 
This government went out of office in January, 1996, after the Second Presidential 
elections of November, 1995.
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4. Conclusions
It was always stressed that the initiatives since the beginning were clearly from the neo­
liberals and supporters of self-management. However, the most difficult problem the 
Poles had always faced was the conflict between the neo-liberals’ ideologies and the 
realities of the Polish economy. Moreover, as the above analysis shows, the only 
important issue in the privatisation debate was the foim of ownership, not how to 
achieve that form of ownership, that is to say, there was little discussion on the method 
of management of the SOEs before being privatised.
To sum up, the Polish political environment was always under fire, and unstable. The 
whole privatisation process was progressing in an environment of strong pressure 
groups, frequent elections and a fragmented party system, apart from other important 
external conditions, like the collapse of COMECON.
In contrast to the era before the collapse of the Communist system, the 1990-93 period 
was not marked by struggle between the ex-communists and Solidarity. Instead, the 
dominant trend was that of Solidarity’s disintegration. This was most evident in the fall 
of the Solidarity-based Suchocka government in June, 1993. Whereas, the September, 
1993- December, 1995 period was marked, on one hand, by struggle between ex- 
communists and their alliances, and Solidarity, on the other.
Over the past six years (1990-95), Poland has had seven different Prime Ministers, with 
the negative consequences that had on the privatisation policy. It has been mentioned 
that privatisation policy has varied with the different views of the privatisation 
Ministers. The consequences can be seen in the different weightings for privatisation 
methods and techniques utilised in practice. For instance, Lewandowski favoured the 
MPP and trade sale, but Kaczmarek prefers to focus on the MPP and initial public 
offerings (IPO), and to a lesser degree on trade sales. In addition. Prime Minister 
Bielecki started a ‘sectoralprivatisation’ programme, but Olszewski stopped it.^ ^^
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Box (6.4) summarises the main achievements of the different governments concerning 
privatisation.
Box (6.4)
Government/Political Party /Period Achievements
1) Mazoyv\&ck\jSolidarity (September 89- December 90) - Law on Privatisation“ Announcement of the official goals of privatisation
2) 13\e\ie,ck\lSolidarity(January 91 - December 91) - Sectoral Privatisation- Regional privatisation- Foreign Investment law- Decentralisation of privatisation- Privatisation through Restructuring
3) Olsz^y/sVii/Solidarity ....... -(December, 91- June, 92)
4) Pawlak/ One-man government / (June- July, 1992)
5) SncYiQoksdSolidarity (July, 92- September, 93) - Approval of the Mass PrivatisationProgramme (MPP)- State Enterprise Pact- Law on Financial Restructuring of Enterprises and Banks
6) VawlsAU&y^-communist(September, 93 - Marcb, 95) - The Stabilisation, Restructuring- Privatisation Programme (SRP)
7) Oleksy/Qx-communist (Marcb, 95- December 95) - Implementation of MPP
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Endnotes:
 ^ In fact, the third ex-communist-led government of Oleksy went out of office in 
January, 1996. But our concern in the study is until the end of December, 1995 for 
data-safe reasons.
 ^ Jedrzejezak, 1993:88.
 ^ Poznanski, 1992:642
Poznanski, 1992:643-44; Bauman, 1994:21 
 ^ For instance, in the 1980s, they were challenged by the independent unions, which 
were interested in self-management, although the imposition of Martial law in 
December, 1981 curtailed the powers of the unions; nearly 2/3 of the managers were 
replaced. After the lifting of military rule in June, 1983, managers were subjected to 
renewed pressures from the workers. Moreover, following the erosion of communist 
power in 1988, many party units in factories were either voluntarily disbanded or 
removed by militant workers. As a result, managers were left with even less protection 
against workers’ encroachment on their authority {Poznanski, 1992:648).
 ^ Poznanski, 1992:644
 ^ PPRG, 1991:13-14; Frydman & Rapaczynski, 1994; Poznanski, 1992; Gomulka & 
Jasinski, 1994:221.
 ^ Poznanski, 1992:648-650.
 ^ ’'Nomenclature' privatisation in the Polish context can mean ‘informal’ raanagement- 
buyout privatisation (MBO).
Blaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1992:13 
Lewandowski, 1994:4.
The Polish Constitution, Article 57.
This party is one of the successors to the ex-communist party (PZPR). The PZPR 
was disband by its delegates on 28 January, 1990, during the XI Extraordinary Congress 
of the Party, and transformed into the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic.
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Source: Lewis, P (1990) Non-competitive Elections And Regime Change: Poland 
1989, Parliamentary Affairs^ 43(1):90~107,
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Source: PPRG (1991).
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Source: Blazyca & Rapacki, 1996; 88.
Blaszczyk & Dabrovski, 1993; Blazyca, 1994:2 
Upton & Sachs, 1990:296
19 Blaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1993:13
Lewandowski, 1994:7; Blaszczyk, 1995:75. 
Gomulka & Jasinski, 1994:221 
Poznanski, 1992:615; Slay, 1994:104. 
Blaszczyk, 1995:78-79.
I
Party PUWP UPP DP Catholic SolidarityYear
1985 245 (53%) 106 (23%) 35 (8%) 74 (16%) -----  -----
1989 173 (38%) 76 (17%) 27 (6%) 23 (5%) 161 (35%)
The Party % of Seats
Democratic Union 12.31Democratic Left Alliance 11.98Catholic Electoral Action 8.73Citizen’s Centre Alliance 8.71Polish Peasant Party 8.67Confederation of Independent Poland 7.50Liberal Democratic Congress 7.48Peasant Alliance 5.41Solidarity 5.05Others 10.13
The party No. of Seats % of Seats
SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) 171 37.2Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 132 28.7Freedom Union (UW) 74 16.1Labour Union 41 8.9Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN) 22 4.8Non-Party Block to Support Reforms (BBWR) 16 3.5German Minority (Other) 4 0.8
Total 460 100
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Blaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1993:15.
Ibid: 15
Sachs, 1990
Blaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1993
Ibid.
Frydman & Rapaczynski, 1994:13.
In fact, the idea of this concept was initiated by the International Monetaiy Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB) mission during their negotiations with the Polish 
Government on its development policy. This idea was an integral component of a 
Standby arrangement (SBA) with the IMF, and the Structural Adjustment loan (SAL) 
Agreement with the WB {Thumm, 1992:54; Blaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1993:17-18.
Mujzel, 1991:44; Blaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1993:18-19
15 drafts had been submitted to the Sejm, and after a long debate the cuiTent one was 
accepted {MoP, 1995, Personal Communications).
In fact, the official designation of the Ministiy was subject to controversy. The Sejm 
had rejected the Government’s proposal to designate the new ministry the Ministry of 
Privatisation^^ (MoP). The rationale behind that was that the concept of privatisation is 
narrow enough and would not include other forms of ownership changes, which should 
be considered, such as co-operating workers’ ownership, commercialised State 
enteiprises and State-private partnership {Fallenbuchl, 1991:54).
PPRG, 1991:29.
MoP, 1995, Personal Communication.
MoP, 1995, Personal Communication. During the period 1990-95 the total number 
of privatised enterprises thiough the ‘privatisation via liquidation’ path was 870 SOEs. 
Whereas the total number of privatised enterprises via all paths (including the number 
of enterprises handed over to the State Agricultural Agency) was 3,123 SOEs. The 
share of the first in the second is (32%).
MoP, 1995, Personal Communication.
Lewandowski, 1994:8.
Ibid.
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The founding body is either a Minister (in most cases, the Minister of Industry and 
Trade) or Provincial Governor. In Poland, there are 70 such founding bodies (MoP, 
1995, Personnal Conununication).
Chèlminski, Czynczyk, and Stemiczuk, 1994:188-190.
Articles 18and 23 of the Law on Privatisation of 1990.
Jones, 1993:110.
This technique of privatisation appears to be unique to Poland {Duke & Grime, 
1994:160).
Article 37 of the Law on Privatisation of 1990.
Based on Article 61 of the State Enterprise Act of 25 September, 1981, and its 
amendments.
I tried to get an explanation for this during my visit to the MoP, but my attempts 
were fmitless.
This is based on an interview in the Department of Small and Medium Sized 
enterprises, MoP, Warsaw, Poland, on 23 October, 1995. This arguement is confirmed 
by the findings of some of the survey studies conducted by the Gdansk Institute for 
Market Economics (GIfME), and Institute of Political Studies (loPS).
The English translation of the Polish data on Privatisation, carried out by the Polish 
Agency for Foreign Investment (PAIZ), is misleading. It gives the same headings to 
different liquidation procedures. After an interview with the Director of the 
Department of Small and Medium Size Enterprises, the picture became clear.
I was told in the Department of SME, MoP, that this type of bankruptcy in most 
cases led to insolvency and much of the unemployment caused by layoffs, as shown in 
Section 4 above, is related to this type of winding up.
Frydman e? a/, 1993:168-169.
MOP, 1995, Personal communications; Frydman etal, 1993:169.
In fact, this is confirmed by the MoP {MoP, 1995, Personnal communications),
Frydman et al, 1993:169.
Fallenbuchl, 1991:54. This issue will be tackled in the following section below. 
However, it is important to mention that under the Law on Companies with Foreign 
Participation of July, 1991, we find that foreigners can purchase up to 10% of the 
assets of the privatised enterprise freely, and up to 100% of the assets, after obtaining
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approval from the Ministry, which is expected to be almost automatic except in some 
special cases, when I discuss foreign involvement in the privatisation process 
Kilick, 1995:26.
MoP, 1995, Personal Communication 
Program Prywatyzacji... ,1991:2.
Ibid.
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Lipton & Sachs, 1990:127; Fiydman & Rapacznski, 1994:12-13. 
Frydman & Rapacznski, 1994:12-13.
In fact, Poland started from the beginning of the transition process, an evolution in 
amending its laws aiming at introducing the European Union, in order to join the 
European Community as soon as possible.
It was Balcerowicz, the Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister at the time, 
who announced in his speech in the IMF, that the Polish Government aims at 
privatising 1/2 of the 8,441 SOEs in 3 years’ time {World Bank, 1991)
Olszewski was supposed to undertake the task of forming a Govermment, but a 
disagreement between him and Walesa on whether to keep Balcerowicz as Minister of 
Finance led to Bielecki forming a Government. Walesa wanted to keep Balcerowicz as 
a guarantee to the IMF for the continuity of the main directions of the economic reform 
programme, especially the stabilisation package {PPRG, 1991:36).
The first free Presidential Elections were held in November/December, 1990, after a 
meeting between the ex-President of Poland Jaruzelski, Prime Minister Mazowiecki, 
The Senate Speaker, The Sejm Speaker, The Solidarity Leader Walesa, and Primet 
Jozef Glemp. The result of the meeting was that Jaruzelski agreed to shorten his stay in 
office and permit a new free election.
Fallenbuchl, 1991:55-6; Coricelli & Rocha, 1991:106-7; Bielecki, 1992.
Lewadowski, 1994:11.
Myant, 1993:146; Blaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1993:18.
® Blaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1993:18; Fallenbuchl, 1991:59
This idea was known in the West and dates back to the writings of Friedman (1976), 
however, for Eastern European countries, it is unique. This technique of privatisation
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has never been attempted in any country the world before the collapse of the Socialist 
system (DMÂ:e & Grime, 1994:149).
Blaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1993:16; Fallenbuchl, 1991:59; Poznanski, 1992:645; 
Frydman & Rapaczynski, 1994:150-51.
Lewandowski, 1994:11.
Ibid: 13.
I shall come back to this issue in detail in Sction Seven below, when I discuss 
foreign involvement in the privatisation process.
Bielecki, 1992:329.
MoP, 1995, Personal communications.
Slay, 1994:106.
Ibid.
Bielecki, 1992:329; Berg, 1994:176-77.
MoP, 1995: Personal Communication.
This infoimation was handed to me after an interview in the MoP, on 23 October, 
1995.
Ibid
Blaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1993:20.
Balcerowicz, 1994:80; SLAY, 1994:111.
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Slay, 1994:114.
Slay, 1994:116; Balcerowicz, 1994:80. 
Ibid.
In fact, Pawlak had been asked by President Walesa to form a government in June, 
1992, which he failed to do.
Bossak, 1993:10.
Ibid: 171-177.
The information on this Programme was handed to me following some interviews in
the MoP, in October, 1995.
MoP, 1995, Personal communication.
An information campaign developed and implemented by a professional advertising 
agency, contracted by the MoP, will inform the general public of the advantages of 
treating an SC as a long-term investemnt. The objective of the campaign will be to
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convince those who may intend to sell their SCs immediately after they have purchased 
them, not to do it, since excess supply could result in a temporary drop in the price.
The experiences in other Eastern European countries are also very new.
Blaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1993:28-9; Fallenbuchl, 1991:54; Bossak, 1993:172-176.
Bossak, 1995:10.
Bossak, 1995:9, 50.
The information on this programme was handed to me after an interview in the 
Economic Department, at the MoP, in October, 1995.
This programme seemed to be highly unsuceessful. My attempts to arrange an 
interview in the Department of Stabilisation, Restructuring and Privatisation, at the
■MoP, was fmitless. I was informed afterwards that the Department was unable to 
complete work on this progamme. Only four enterprises were privatised through this 
programme.
Myant, 1993:135.
MoP, 1995: Personal Communication
SECTIO N  (7) STATISTICAL & ECONOM IC RESU LTS O F 
PRIVATISATION IN POLAND (1990-95)
The main puipose of this section is to analyse the statistical and economic progress of 
the different paths of privatisation in Poland during the period 1990-95. The rationale 
is to assess the Polish privatisation process, by examining some of the main objectives 
set out by successive Polish governments. Specifically, to assess the following goals: 
to privatise half of the 8,441 SOEs within five years; to achieve a wider share 
ownership among the public at large, including employees of enterprises; and to 
generate funds from the sale of enterprises.
According to the documents of the MoP, eight general paths of privatisation were used 
in Poland during the first six yeais (1990-95), utilising 12 techniques of privatisation. 
The 8 general paths are the following:
(1) the privatisation of small local businesses - shops, catering, consumer services, 
construction, transport and wholesale trade business - is handled at local level by 
municipalities and communes, through management/employee buyouts, leasing, sale of 
assets, management contracts, and auctions and tenders.
The privatisation of medium and lai'ge scale enterprises is done through the following 
ways:
(2) ‘Capital’ privatisation;
(3) Privatisation via liquidation; using the Law on Privatisation of SOEs of 1990;
(4) Bankruptcy liquidation based on Article (19) of the Law on SOEs of 1981;
(5) National Investment Funds (NIFs)and their Privatisation Programme, or the Mass 
Privatisation Programme (MPP);
(6) Privatisation through Restructuring;
(7) Stabilisation , Restructuring, and Privatisation Programme (SRP); and finally,
(8) Sectoral privatisation.
Box (7.1) shows the 12 different techniques of privatisation utilised in Poland to 
privatise SOEs.
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Box (7.1)
Methods And Techniques of Privatisation Used in Poland (1988-1995) Method & Techniques Application in Poland
A) ^Nomenclature^ Privatisation
B) Small-Scale Privatisation1. Sale2. Leasec) Medium and Large-scale3. Initial Public Offering (IPO)4. Negotiated trade sales5. Public bidding6. Leasing and similar methods, usually with the right to buy at the end of the contract period
A) During the 1988-1989 period, before the passage of the Law on Privatisation of July, 1990, Illegal afterwards. 1, 2) Carried out in 1990-92.
3,4,5) All three methods have been broadly applied since 1990, especially in so-called ‘capital’ privatisation 6) Used very frequently, especially in cases of small enterprises, since 1990.7. Sales of property in cases of bankruptcy 7) Used very frequently as a liquidation, insolvency, or arrangements privatisation method since 1990 with creditors8. Debt-equity swaps
9. Partial privatisation with large sharesheld by the State10. Pre-privatisation with Restructuring
11. Management Contracts
12. Free distribution of shares
8) Legally possible since 1993.Not yet applied.9) Sometimes used, for example in the case of banks 10) Begun in 1994 within the framework of the SRP Programme for 40 enterprises11) Applied very infrequently asa privatisation method.12) Implementation started within the National Investment Funds Programme, in late 1995.
Note: The classification of privatisation methods partially follows Blaszczyk (1995).
Contrasting Box (7.1) with Box (5.1) in Section Five, one notices that Poland applied 
twelve out of twenty one techniques and methods of privatisation available in the 
world. Poland, however, added two new techniques. National Investment Funds and 
Their Privatisation, and Liquidation Privatisation under Article 37 of the Law on 
Privatisation of July, 1990.
In fact, each path of privatisation has slightly different economic and social goals, and 
usually also applies to different groups of SOEs. Box (7.2) shows that different 
procedures could be applied to privatise SOEs, broken down by size and financial 
standing. For instance, a large SOE (which has 700-1300 employees, and very large 
with 1300-30000 employees), with poor financial standing (i.e. permanently indebted;
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loss-making) could be wound up through the following ways: commissary 
management, conciliatory and aiTangement proceedings; debt-equity swaps, etc.
If the firm’s financial standing is average (i.e. moderately indebted; near-zero 
profitability), it could be wound up through the following procedures: incorporated 
trade sale, participation in the NIFs programme, etc..
If the financial standing of the firm is good (i.e. receivables are greater than liabilities; 
profitability is more than 5%), it could be wound up through the following procedures: 
incorporation, then IPO or trade sale, incorporation without subsequent privatisation, 
etc..
I. Small Privatisation
This type of privatisation was made possible by the Act on Economic Activity of 
December, 1988 and the Act regulating the rental of trade premises, as amended in 
June, 1990.  ^ The most important techniques of privatisation used in Poland to privatise 
small-scale enterprises are leasing arrangements and sales of assets.
This kind of privatisation is the most successful part of ownership transformation in 
Poland. Table (7.1) shows that during the period 1990-92, the ownership of 31,662 
retail shops, 19,690 service and crafts memberships, 1,186 small factories, 54,591 
pieces of real estate, and 67,151 apartments were transferred to private hands. That 
accounts for over 95% of the total number of small-scale enterprises all over Poland. 
However, progress with small privatisation was rather uneven. Local officials in some 
areas resisted small privatisation and local governments often seemed to prefer to lease 
State-owned shops and stores rather than sell them.
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The end result was that small privatisation often left “privatised” property in state 
ownership. Leasing arrangements made under small privatisation were more likely to 
leave the physical structure (and thus official control) intact.^
The predominant form of privatisation of retail and service premises and small factories 
was leasing, while for building lots and departments it was sale. Table (7.1) indicates 
that only in the case of small factories has there been a clear upward trend in the 
dimensions of privatisation. Downward trends have occurred in the privatisation of 
shops and service premises, though there has been an increase in the ratio of sales to 
leasing. Finally, after a marked downturn in 1991 in the scale of privatisation of 
building lots and apartments, business on this market clearly recovered in 1992.
Table (7.1) 
Properties Sold and Leased Under Small-scale PrivatisationType 1990 1991 1992 Totalof Property Sold Leased Sold Leased Sold Leased Sold LeasedRetail Premises 778 13,101 296 10,587 824 6,076 1,898 29,764Service Premises 428 7,252 271 6,777 852 4,110 1,551 18,139Small Factories 38 218 113 224 249 344 400 786Building lots 16,420 8,001 5,460 15,698 7,224 40,119 14,472Apartments 33,930 690 8,384 2,408 17,862 3,877 60,176 6,975Total 51,594 23,049 17,065 25,456 35,485 21,631 104,144 70,136
Source; Own calculationSj based on data provided by the Small and Medium sized Enterprises Department, MOP, Warsaw, Poland,
The most characteristic feature of trade and services privatisation is not only the radical 
change in ownership and management of former State, co-operative and municipal 
shops, but the parallel expansion of new trading outlets all over Poland. For example, 
in 1989, the number of shop premises in the whole country was less than 150,000, and 
by 1992 it exceeded 540,000. It is of importance to mention that both privatisation and 
the growth of the private sector in trade and services, plus intense competition from 
street vendors, radically improved the quality of trade services in Poland.^
The sale of small-scale service enterprises has been administered by local councils. 
Shops, restaurants and building services were legally transferred to local authorities in 
May, 1990."^  The sale of the assets of these small businesses started after October, 
1990. However, most of them were rented or leased before that. This indicates that
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small-scale privatisation was done without a special government programme, because 
the Government concentrated on the transfer of the real estate on which these 
businesses had been operated. In Poland, as well as most Central and East European 
countries, the privatised units did not include real estate. Typically, the buyer 
purchased inventory and equipment, and acquired the right to lease the premises from 
the owner, usually the State or Municipality. While this type of arrangement is, of 
course, normal around the world (and real estate might be privatised separately), it 
might create disincentive for new owners if the term of the lease is too short or 
inflexible.^
Privatisation of small economic units, such as shops and service outlets, is frequently 
lumped together with the sale and leasing of somewhat larger production units under 
the common rubric of small privatisation.^
The most important objective of the privatisation of small trade and services 
establishments is a speedy introduction of owner-management businesses. Frydman & 
Rapaczynski (1994) argue that such individual or family-run units have some 
advantages. First, it can quickly adapt to changing circumstances and reallocate the 
existing stock of consumer goods. Second, it can create room for action by relatively 
numerous entrepreneurial individuals. Third, it can also create an important middle- 
class constituency for the new regime.
The process of transferring businesses to what is called ' employee-buyout 
arrangements’ has often been opposed by concerns about the justice, fairness, and 
efficiency of the process and the commitment to the use of market mechanisms in the 
course of privatisation.^
At the start of the privatisation process, the Polish Government, like other governments 
in the region, announced its intention to rely on open auctions as the preferred or 
exclusive method of small-scale privatisation. However, in practice, only a small 
percentage of the overall number of municipally-owned shops rented during the period 
1990-1992 was allocated by auction, despite the fact that prices set at auctions were
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often 30-40 times higher than the bureaucratically-set rents. This was for the following 
main reasons: (1) the strong pressure from the enterprises’ ‘insiders’, which usually 
resulted in a series of special preferences, either in the form of price reductions or entry 
restrictions. (2) the municipal and local governments favoured the use of 
administrative allocations, as it gave them the possibility to favour their political 
clients, which resulted in some cormption.^ However, the MoP explains that by saying 
that the process of preparing an auction (i.e. from the time of opening the auction, until 
the time of signing the contract) is money and time consuming.^
2. Medium and large-scale privatisation 
a. The pace of ownership transformation
When Poland started the privatisation process, there were 8,441^  ^ lai’ge and medium 
sized SOEs. By the end of September, 1995, there were 3,500 SOEs.
Table (7.2) shows the number of SOEs included in the process of ownership 
transformation, by the main privatisation paths, during the last six years (1990-1995). 
Out of the total number of 8,441 SOEs, 5,208, or 61.7% were included in the process of 
ownership changes in different s t a g e s H o w e v e r ,  Table (7.3) shows that only 1,575 
SOEs, or 18.7% of the total number of 8441, completed the process of ownership 
changes, i.e. privatised or liquidated. So, the MoP was unable to privatise half of the 
8,441 SOEs in the five years time span^ .^ As can be seen from Table (7.2), 1,074 
SOEs were transformed into companies solely owned by the State Treasury; 1,098 
SOEs were assigned for ‘privatisation through liquidation’, based on Article (37) of the 
Law on Privatisation of July, 1990; 1,377 for bankruptcy liquidation based on Article 
(19) of the Law on SOEs of September, 1981; 1,659 State-owned farms ( shown in 
the Table) were handed to the State Treasury Agriculture Agency to be privatised or 
liquidated; 513 SOEs and STCs were included in the Mass Privatisation Programme.
As can be seen from Table (7.3), from the very beginning of the privatisation process 
until the end of December, 1995, only 159 out of 1,074 STCs were completely 
privatised through the ‘capital’ privatisation path, and about 350 STCs were included in
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the National Investment Funds (NIFs) programme. The remaining 565 STCs are still in 
various transitional stages of the ‘capital’ privatisation path.'^
Table (7.2) 
The Number of SOEs in the Process of Ownership Transformation by Path of Privatisation (1990-19
Date end o f December
Total Transformed into STCs Liquidation Bankruptcy Article (37) Article (19) AgricultureAgency
1990 130 58 28 44 -1991 1249 260 449 540 -1992 2056 480 719 857 5391993 2526 527 917 1082 13421994 3002 713 1041 1248 15951995 3549 1074 1098 1377 1659
Source; Data provided by MOP, Economic Department.
As can be very cleaidy seen from Figure (7.1), both curves which illustrate the number 
of SOEs that were privatised or liquidated are increasing at a declining base starting 
from 1993, while the curve which illustrates the number of SOEs which were converted 
into State Treasury companies, is (almost) increasing at an accelerating rate, especially 
since 1993. This general trend reflects the ex-communist Governments’ privatisation 
policy, which tried to slow down the privatisation process by adopting a policy of 'mass 
commercialisation ’.
Table (7.3)
End o f December Total CapitalPrivatisation Liquidation Article (37) Bankruptcy Article (19)
1990 6 6 0 01991 228 27 182 191992 612 51 475 861993 977 99 707 1861994 1,325 134 897 2931995 1,575 159 1,032 384
Source: Data provided by MoP, Economic Department.
Figure (7.1) illustrates the number of SOEs privatised and liquidated by different paths 
of privatisation, during the period (1990-95).
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Figure (7.1)
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Table (7.3) shows that out of the 1,098 SOEs starting the process of liquidation under 
Article (37), 88% of them were completed. Out of 1,377 SOEs starting the process of 
bankruptcy liquidation, based on Article (19) of the Law on SOEs of 1981, only 29% of 
them were completed. This indicates that the path of privatisation via liquidation under 
Article (37) is the fastest track of privatising medium and large SOEs, i.e. the most 
time-effective, and most popular way of property rights transfer in Poland.
To make the whole picture clear, 1 would like to briefly discuss the other forms of 
ownership changes. As of December 31, 1994, 263 SOEs were communalised (i.e. 
handed over to local governments under the Law on Communalisation); 118 SOEs were 
transformed into 58 companies of the State Treasury under the Law of February, 1993 
of Transformation of Enterprises of Special Importance to the State (temporarily they 
aie not subject to privatisation). 449 SOEs were liquidated under bankruptcy 
procedures. Altogether, up to the end of December, 1994, 5,427 SOEs were subjected 
to different ownership changes. Including the number of SOEs which were subjected to 
different ownership transformation as at the end of December, 1995, altogether 5,841 
SOEs were subject to different ownership transformation. Hence, about 70% of the 
total number of 8,441 SOEs started the process of ownership changes, at the start of the
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transformation process. One can conclude that the Polish authorities were unable to 
privatise the 8,441 SOEs in the five years time/span.
Table (7.4) shows the number of SOEs in the process of ownership changes by 
economic activity and privatisation path, as at December, 1994.
Table (7.4) 
Number of SOEs in the Process of Ownership changes hy Economic
Economic Activity Total Capital
Privatisation
Liquidation 
Privatisation 
Article (37)
Bankruptcy 
Liquidation 
Atricle (19)
National Economy 3002 713 1041 1248
Industry 1298 582 341 375
Construction 805 97 371 337
Agriculture 319 2 56 261
Forestry 11 2 3 6
Transportation 158 13 23 122
Telecommunication 1 0 I 0
Trade 269 14 169 86
Other 141 3 77 61
Source: MoP, December, 1994, Dynamika Prywatyzacji, No, 23,
Table (7.4) shows that most of the privatised SOEs via the ‘capital’ privatisation and 
bankruptcy liquidation paths are from the industrial sector. Whereas, the construction 
sector ranks first in the case of privatisation via the liquidation path. The 
Telecommunication sector seems to be uninvolved in the process of privatisation, 
except for one case through liquidation.
Table (7.5) shows that most of the SOEs included in the process of ownership 
transformation are concentrated in 12 out of 49 voivodships in Poland. In the total, 
Katowic ranks first, followed by Warsaw, Lodz, and Poznan. In the ‘capital’ path, 
Katowic ranks first, followed by Olsztyns, Warsaw and Poznan. Warsaw ranks first in 
the path of privatisation via liquidation, followed by Katowic, Lodz and Poznan. 
Katowic ranks first in the path of bankmptcy liquidation, followed by Warsaw and 
Wroclaws.
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Table (7.5)
Number of SOEs in the ^ocess of Ownership Changes by Vi and Method ofJPrivatisation (as at December, 1994)ovodshipVoivodship Total CapitalPrivatisation Liquidation Privatisation Article (37)
Bankruptcy Liquidation Article (19)Poland 3002 1248 1041 713Warsaw 191 56 90 45Bielsko 67 21 15 31Bydgoszcz 100 41 31 28Gdansk 108 35 43 30Katowice 290 105 84 101Krakow 113 41 43 29Lodz 140 59 55 26Olsztyn 115 73 32 10Poznan 136 56 55 25Szczecin 77 10 48 19Wroclaw 115 30 53 32
Source: MoP, December, 1994, Dynamika Prywatyzacji, No, 23.
1. ‘Capital’ Privatisation
‘Capital’ privatisation is made possible by the Law on Privatisation of SOEs of July 13, 
1990, based on Articles (5), (6), and (19). Capital privatisation, which was intended for 
medium and lai'ge enteiprises, consists of two phases of action: first, the transformation 
of a State enterprise into a single-person company of the State Treasury and secondly, 
putting its shares up for sale.
a. Techniques o f privatisation via the ‘capitaP path
Table (7.6) shows that, in all cases, enterprises were privatised via the ‘capital’ path, 
using mixed privatisation techniques. These techniques combined Initial Public 
Offering (IPO), employees and management buy-outs (EMBO), foreign investors, 
domestic investors, and in some cases, the State Treasury kept some stocks 
Throughout the period 1990-September, 1995, surprisingly, in only one case, the STC 
was 100% sold to its employees. That was in 1990, when the MOP’s Capital 
Privatisation Department privatised Zaklady Miesne Inowroclaw sp. z.o.o (meat plant) 
in the town of Inowroclaw to its employees In addition, two cases were 100%
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privatised through IPO, in 1994. The first was in January, Rafako SA, and the second
was in December, the Bytom SA 17
Table (7.6) shows that out of 146 STCs privatised through ‘capital’ privatisation as at 
the end of September, 1995, only 23 STCs were privatised through the so-called IPO, 
and their shares were traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange; 53 STCs were sold to 
domestic investors; while 70 STCs were sold to foreign investors.
f .
Table (7.6) 
Number of STCs Privatised By Technique of Privatisation (1990-95)
year Stock sold by IPO Stock sold toDomesticInvestor
Stock sold wholly or partially to foreign active Investor
Total number of privatised companies
1990 5 - - 61991 6 11 7 241992 1 3 17 211993 3 18 27 481994 7 15 14 361995 (Sept) 1 6 5 12Total 23 53 70 146
Source: Own calculation based on data provided by the MOP, Department o f Capital Privatisation, Warsaw, Poland.
Figure (7.2) illustrates the number of State Treasury Companies privatised during the 
period 1990-95.
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It can be obseved that the direct sale of shares of privatised companies to foreign or 
domestic investors was generally more prevalent than privatisation through Initial 
Public Offerings. Around half (70 out of 146, or 48%) of the capital privatisation 
projects were executed with the engagement of foreign capital. The main reasons 
behind the fact that ‘sale to a strategic investor’ is the most popular way of privatisation 
via the ‘capital’ path are: (1) the shortages of household savings; (2) to attract foreign 
investors; (3) the limit which was put on the participation of employees in this path of 
privatisation; and finally, (4) to improve the corporate governance of these companies.
In fact, the pai’ticipation of foreign capital was the highest in larger projects, where the 
size of joint stock was above 500 billion zloty.^ ®
Did the MoP achieve the goals of wider range of ownership via the ‘capital’ path of 
privatisation?. Did it generate funds to the Budget?
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h. Privatised STCs via the ‘capitaV path by the economic sector
Table (7.7) shows that out of 146 enterprises privatised through the capital path as at 
September, 1995, 116 belong to the industrial sector and 12 to the construction sector. 
The remaining enterprises belong to transportation and telecommunication, as well as 
trade sectors. This reflects the importance of having a clear and solid industrial policy 
in Poland during the transition process, as the high percentage share of the industrial 
sector in the privatisation process affects the whole process of economic development 
in Poland.
Table (7.7) 
The Number of STCs Privatised Via * Capital' Path by Economic
Sector 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total
Industry 5 19 20 39 33 116Construction 1 3 1 4 3 12Agriculture 0 0 0 2 0 2Telecom 0 0 2 0 1 3Transport 0 0 0 2 0 2
Total 6 22 23 47 37 146Source: Own calculation. based on data provided by the MOP, Department o fCapital Privatisation, Warsaw, Poland.
d. Assessment o f the effects o f ^capitaV privatisation path
One may observe that from the quantity point of view, out of all transformed SOEs 
until September, 1995 (i.e. 1,531), only 9.7% have been privatised through the ‘capital’ 
way, or only 1.7% of the 8,441 SOEs at the beginning of the transformation process. 
One should remember, however, that these enterprises are much bigger than others, 
employ more people and represent an important part of the former State owned sector. 
From the quality point of view, one should add that most enterprises privatised on the 
capital track, especially through foreign equity investment, show very good economic 
performance, and in many of them, an in-depth restructuring process has been launched.
Thus, one can conclude that this type of privatisation covers a small number of 
enterprises, and is limited by its cost, which is estimated by the MoP to be up to 10% of 
the value of privatised assets. Costs cover the valuation and the execution of the
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transaction, implementation time (on average about one year) and political 
controversies. However, this type of privatisation has an important impact on the 
performance of the whole economy, if one bears in mind that these enterprises were 
restructured, and their performances improved.^*
2. Privatisation through Liquidation based on Article (37)
This path of privatisation is destined for medium and small scale sized SOEs in a 
healthy financial situation. Three main types of procedures (or combinations of 
procedures) ai'c possible in liquidation under the Privatisation Law of July, 1990: the 
sale of an enterprise’s assets, leasing, or entering them as a contribution in kind into 
new companies.
Table (7.8) shows the number of privatised enterprises under Article 37 of the Law of 
Privatisation of SOEs of 1990, by disposal of assets.
Table (7.8) Number of privatised Enterprises under Article 37 by Method of
Enterprises Privatised by liquidation Total in %
TotalSaleContribution of assets into privatised companies leasingmixed procedures
1041 100.0 179 17.2
46 4.4 736 70.7 81 7.7
Source: Own calculation based on data provided by the MOP, Department o fCapital Privatisation, Warsaw, Poland.
Table (7.8) shows that out of the total number of SOEs privatised through liquidation, 
as at the end of December, 1994, 70.7% were leased to either employers or managers; 
17.2% were sold; 4.4% had their assets contributed to privatised companies, and the 
rest were liquidated using mixed procedures. The high share of leasing is explained by 
the relatively simple legal form of such transformation, and the support of employees 
and managers for this type of privatisation.^^
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The leasing technique can be classified as a quasi-sale method because of the time-shift 
in payments and different possible purchase facilities foreseen by the Law. The price 
for such a lease is an effect of negotiations without public bid and the payments are 
made by instalments. The facilitated access to the purchase of such companies does not 
mean that this privatisation path is without difficulties. In most cases, the employee- 
owned firms have a difficult financial situation because of repayment of principal and 
interest and limited access to credit. They aie spending too little on investment. 
Despite these difficulties this group of enterprises shows better economic results than 
expected and makes efforts towards more rational use of their assets, and to a more 
efficient ownership structure of their capital.^^
3. Bankruptcy liquidation based on Article (19)
This privatisation path is destined for small and medium sized SOEs with a poor 
financial situation. The assets of these enterprises are sold by the liquidator to third 
parties in a public bidding by auction, and the proceeds go to pay off the creditors. The 
Law on SOEs of 1981 states that an SOE with assets insufficient to pay off all its debts 
may also be declared bankrupt on the basis of the bankruptcy Law that applies to 
commercial companies.
As can be seen from Table (7.2), as at the end of December, 1995, 1,377 SOEs were 
involved in this type of privatisation. Table (7.3) shows that out of this number, 384 
enterprises were completely liquidated. Although the successors to the liquidated SOE 
under Article 19, are not obliged to take on liabilities in the majority of cases, especially 
when the State is the creditor, it is noticeable that the percentage share of this type of 
liquidation projects completed (32%), is smaller than that under privatisation through 
liquidation under Article (37) of the Law on Privatisation of 1990. That is mainly 
explained by four major factors: (1) lack of support by ‘insiders’ to this kind of 
liquidation, mainly because of the high likelihood of losing jobs. (2) low levels of 
demand for such assets. (3) the lack of a ‘cohesive’ group interest in the rapid 
completion of this procedure for any given SOE. (4) the long and complicated legal 
and commercial procedures needed for this type of liquidation. For instance, it takes
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time to search for and appoint a liquidator, and then it takes time and effort to sell the 
assets of the liquidated enterprise. Finally, there is some delay in paying of the 
enterprises’ obligations in cases where the creditor is not the State.^^
Table (7.2) shows that there is a general decline in the number of SOEs privatised 
starting from 1993, This can be explained by the new privatisation policy adopted by 
the ex-communist Governments. After September, 1993 the MoP tried to slow down 
the privatisation process, in order to prevent severe unemployment stemming from 
these privatisations in general, and from liquidations in paiticular. This conicides with 
the declared policy of reducing the social costs of the transition process annnounced by 
the first ex-communist Governmnet of Oleksy in the Autumn of 1993.^^
3. The involvement of foreign investors in the privatisation process
The history of foreign capital in Poland dates back to the 1970s, as noticed in Section 
Two. However, no real progress in this field was recorded by the end of 1988. 
Following the changes in the economic system in Poland, the number of companies 
with foreign participation started to grow rapidly
a. The extent of participation of foreign parties in privatisation
The extent to which foreign parties participate in the privatisation of SOEs is 
determined by: (a) the Law of 1981 on SOEs; (b) the Law of 1990 on Privatisation of 
SOEs; (c) the Law of 1993 on NIFs and Their Privatisation; (d) and the Law of 1991 on 
Companies with Foreign Participation. Under the provisions of the Law of 1990 on 
Privatisation of SOEs, foreign parties may participate in privatisation in the cases of :
1) 'commercialisation^ by purchasing the shares of cormnercialised enterprises through 
tender, in a public offer, as a result of negotiations undertaken after a public invitation, 
and in special cases another method is possible, upon the consent of the CoMs on the 
recommendation of the Minister of Privatisation.
2) Liquidation, by purchasing the whole enterprise or organised parts of its assets, by 
creating a company together with the State Treasury to which the whole liquidated
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enterprise or the whole liquidated enterprise or organised parts of its assets are 
contributed, or by leasing the liquidated enterprise or organised parts of its assets.
3) Launching a rescue programme, by creating joint-venture companies with a Joint- 
Stock Company owned by the State Treasury, or with an SOE, by concluding a 
managerial contract with a Joint-Stock Company owned by the State Treasury, or by 
taking part in the Mass Privatisation Programme through participation in Supervisory 
Boards and management commissions of NIFs.
Most of these transactions have to be approved by the Minister of Privatisation. 
Another significant limitation of the participation of foreign parties takes place in the 
process of employee lease of assets, where the scope of persons taking part in 
privatisation is limited mostly to the employees of privatised enterprises.^^
The participation of foreigners, according to the Law of 1993 on NIFs and their 
Privatisation, is limited to not more than one third of the Board. A foreigner may not 
be the President of the Board. Investment Funds may conclude agreements concerning 
the management of their assets with firms selected by public tender. Only Polish 
citizens are able to acquire share certificates in NIFs.
b. The scope of foreign investment in Poland
Taking the investment objective as the main criterion, it may be assumed that foreign 
subjects are able to engage in four kinds of investment in Poland^^;
1.(1) Direct investment, in which the main criterion is conducting business activity for 
profit. These are mostly long-term investment projects of a tangible nature. (2) 
Portfolio investment, aimed at attaining profits from trade in securities and derivatives 
of financial markets. These are mostly short-term investments. (3) Purchase of real 
property, treated separately due to its specific nature, which can be realised also for 
purposes other than those mentioned in (1) and (2) above. (4) greenfield (new) 
investments/^
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In fact this classification is not perfect, as it is very difficult to determine the type of 
investment without knowing the investors’ intentions. To elaborate: a purchase of 
shares on the Stock Exchange, which can relate to both direct and portfolio investment, 
is a good example here. In such a case, the nature of investment can only be guessed at 
from the size of the purchased interest. In the case of Poland, it is assumed (by the 
National Bank of Poland) that the purchase of shares of 10% or the share capital of a 
company is a portfolio investment. The purchases above that limit are regarded as 
direct investment.^ ^
Foreign direct investment (which can be either direct acquisition (privatisation) or 
indirect acquisition (Joint-venture)) is the most welcome form of investment by all 
countries. Such investment creates jobs, and contributes to the economic development 
of the host country. In Poland, the following regulations apply for EDI: (a) the Law of 
1920 on Purchasing Real Property by Foreigners; (b) the Regulation of 1976 of the 
COMs on conditions, mode and organs appropriate for issuance permits for foreign 
natural and legal persons to settle permanent establishments (branch, representation) on 
the territory of the Polish People’s Republic to perform economic activity, (c) selected 
provisions of many legal regulations, in particular those pertaining to financial services, 
telecommunications, transport and maritime economy. Foreign investors may without 
a permit (with the exception of clearly specified cases in the Law of 1991 on 
Companies with Foreign Participation or on separate regulations) take up activities in 
the form of a joint-stock company, limited liability company, or permanent 
establishment (branch, representation, etc.).
In the case of companies, the general rule is the absence of any upper or lower limits on 
the share of foreign capital in the company. Foreign parties may acquire or purchase up 
to 100% of the company’s shares. They can do this by: “(1) establishment on their 
own or together with Polish partners (shareholders) a completely new company, i.e. 
greenfield investment; (2) purchasing shares of companies on the primary and 
secondary security market; (3) entering direct transactions with the owner, especially
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the State Treasury which seems to have a lot to offer to foreign investors in the 
privatisation process”?^
Portfolio Investment in Poland is regulated by two laws: first, the Foreign Exchange 
Law of 1994 and the Regulation of June 18, 1993 of the Minister of Finance on the 
General Foreign Exchange Permit, based on the previous Foreign Exchange Law. 
Accordingly, foreign investors may transfer abroad or reinvest in Poland, only the 
incomes from securities foreign persons are allowed to trade in, purchased for the 
Polish currency acquired from the sale of convertible currency to foreign exchange 
banks, or purchased against the Polish currency being income from these securities. 
Second, the Law on Public Turnover in Securities and on Trust Funds of 1991. The 
scope of purchasing securities may be determined in the prospectus by their issuer, 
however, the issuer must get a permit from the State Commission on Securities to be 
able to put securities into public turnover.^^
In the case of Poland, the opportunities for portfolio investments are provided first of 
all by the Warsaw Stock Exchange, where securities of several tens of companies, 
including banks, are traded. Until recently, considerable restrictions were applied to 
the purchasing of securities on the Stock Exchange by foreign parties. Namely, foreign 
subjects were required to obtain a permit from the MoP or other competent Ministries 
for every transaction of purchasing shares of a company conducting activities subject to 
licensing or permits. It can be assumed that this administrative requirement was a 
particular barrier to short-term investments (portfolio investments). This issue found an 
advantageous settlement for most companies represented on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange through using the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of July 26, 1994. It 
specified cases in which the activities mentioned in Article 6 paragraph (I) of the Law 
on Companies with Foreign Participation do not require a permit. However, permits for 
the acquisition of shares of companies in public turnover are still required in the case of 
firms: (a) managing sea-or airports or, (b) operating in real property agency and 
turnover.^‘^
268
' ' -  u.„:_______________________________________________  _ _ _       _
c. Involvement of foreign investors in the privatisation processes
The concern of this part of the study is to investigate, specifically, the involvement of 
foreign investors in the privatisation process. This section assesses how successful the 
privatisation process was in attracting foreign investment into Poland. Therefore, the 
following analysis focus on companies with foreign participation established as a result 
of privatisation procedures set forth by the Law on Privatisation of SOEs of July, 1990. 
Data is only available on two privatisation procedures:
1) the transformation of an SOE into a joint-stock company owned solely by the State 
Treasury followed by individual sales and their contribution to the equity of the newly 
established company;
2) liquidation of an SOE enabling contribution of its assets to the equity of the newly 
established company.
Table (7.9) shows the number of companies with foreign participation established in the 
process of privatisation of SOEs, by establishment (acquisition of shares of joint-stock 
companies owned by the State Treasury and contribution of assets of liquidated SOEs), 
during the period 1990-95.
Table (7.9) 
Number of Companies with Foreign Participation By Establishment
Year Total Acquisition of Shares of Joint- Stock STCs Contribution of liquidated SOEs Assets of
No. Number (As a % of Total *) Number (As a % of Total *)1990 2 20.0 - - 2 50.01991 15 32.6 7 23.3 8 50.01992 39 48.8 24 47.1 15 51.71993 75 48.1 51 52.0 24 41.41994 91 45.6 65 49.6 26 38.31995 107 n.a 70 n.a 37 n.a
Source: Durka, 1995:86, based on data from the Central Statistical Office, 1994, Prywatyzacja Przedsiebiorstw Panstwowych wg stanu, Wasrsaw, Poland.Note: * Total refers to the total number o f private companies established through transformation o f SOEs or contribution o f assets o f liquidated SOEs..
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As can be seen from Table (7.9), the number of companies with foreign participation 
set up as a result of the privatisation of SOEs increased from 2 at the end of 1990 to 107 
at the end of 1995. Likewise, the share of companies with foreign participation in the 
total number of private companies established as a result of transformation or 
contribution of assets of liquidated public enteiprises increased from 20% at the end of 
1990, to 45.6% at the end of 1994.
As Table (7.9) shows, foreign entities which paiticipated in the acquisition of shares of 
joint-stock companies owned by the State Treasury is twice the number of cases than in 
privatisation through contribution of assets of liquidated SOEs.
Table (7.10)
Number of Companies with Foreign Participation By Establishment and Investor Countiy(1990-95)_______________ _
Country of Origin Total Acquisition of Shares of Joint-Stock STCs
Contribution of Assets of liquidated SOEs
Germany 31 22 9
Netherlands 12 8 4USA 12 11 1Austria 3 1 2Luxembourg 2 2 -
Spain 2 2 -Denmark 2 - 2
UK 5 3 2Russia 1 - 1Switzerland 4 2 2Sweden 4 2 2Finland 1 1 -Hong Kong 1 1 -Canada 1 - 1Italy 1 1 -France 1 1 -
Source: Durka, 1995:87, based on data obtained from the Central Statistical Office, 1994, Prywatyzacja Przedsiebiorstw Panstwowych, Wasrsaw, Poland.
The main characteristic in the participation of foreign investors in the process of 
privatisation of SOEs was their concentration in the privatisation of industrial firms. 
As much as 80% of companies established through the acquisition of shares of State 
Treasury-owned companies (STCs), or through the contribution of assets of liquidated 
SOEs, operated in industry. During the period under analysis, it is noticeable that only 
one such company was established in each of the agriculture, transport, trade and 
communications sectors. This indicates that in the sphere of material production the
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role of foreign capital in the privatisation of public assets corresponds with the general
tendency whereby foreign capital investment in Poland is concentrated in industry. 35
Table (7.10) shows that most companies established through the privatisation of state- 
owned assets involved participation of foreign capital from the European Union 
countries as well as from the USA and Switzerland. Germany is ranked first, with the 
USA and the Netherlands joint second. i
4. Revenues from Privatisation
Table (7.11) shows that the total stream of revenues from privatisation in 1991-94 
amounted to zl 3030.6 million (i.e. some US$ 1.6 billion), its rate of growth 
considerably exceeding inflation levels. For example, in 1994 total privatisation 
proceeds increased by 204%, while the GDP deflator amounted to 21.6% and CPI 
32.3%. On the other hand, one should bear in mind that during the 1991-93 period, the 
budgetary goals of privatisation tend to underperform. Also, one should overestimate 
the weight of privatisation receipts in overall budget revenues: in 1991 the former 
constituted only 0.8% of the latter, and in 1992 and 1993 it was 1.5% and 1.7%,
respectively. It rose to 2.5% in 1994, with an expected 2.9% in 1995.36
Table (7.11)
Path
privatisation
of 1991 1992 1993 1994
Total 170.9 484.4 780.4 1594.9
Divesture of SOEs 140.5 312.6 493.4 1272.0
Liquidation 30.4 171.8 287.0 322.9
Source: Data provided by MoP.
The percentage share of the total revenues from privatisation to GDP increased from
0.2% in 1991 to 0.5% in 1993, and to 0.7% in 1994.^  ^ The income resulting from 
privatisation was disappointingly small in comparison with the expectations of the 
politicians, who saw privatisation as a financial source which would aid in the i
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consolidation of the State Budget. This aspect of privatisation, however, comes into 
coflict with other goals of privatisation, especially those of the restructuring and 
modernisation of enterprises. Some enterprises (especially those privatised through 
management buy-out or employee buy-out methods) experience serious difficulties in 
the payment of the purchase price (which is often to be paid over a period of several 
years as part of a leasing agreement or a similar arrangement) or limit their investment 
activity in order to be able to make such payments.
5. Conclusions
Did the Polish privatisation process achieve the goals mentioned at the start of this 
section?.
Regai'ding the goal of fast implementation of the privatisation process, the answer 
depends not only on what we mean by fast or slow, but also on whether we are studying 
the pace of the different paths of privatisation, or comparing the different sectors of the 
economy, or even whether we are comparing the pace of the privatisation process in 
Poland with that in other countries in the region.
A glance at the total number of privatised enterprises in the past six years 1990-95 t
shows that the implementation of the whole process of privatisation was slow. The
objective of the Polish Governments to privatise half of the SOEs within five years, has
not been realised. Only about 70% of the total number of 8,441 SOEs has been
included in the process of ownership changes, while less than one fifth has actually
been privatised or liquidated.
■The process of privatisation was slow during the period September, 1989-December, 
1991, due to the lack of a legal and institutional framework for privatisation. But it was 
fast during 1992~September,1993, when it can be described as "revolutionary by the 
historic experience of the country and the region, and extraordinary by Western 
experience". It started slowing down again after September, 1993, due to the ex- 
Communist Governments’ policy of reducing the social cost of the transformation 
process.
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As for the method of privatisation, small-scale privatisation was very fast, as Poland 
was able to privatise more than 95% of the small-scale retail wholesale, and 
constmction enterprises, by the end of 1992.
As for economic sectors, the industrial sector accounts for more than 30% of the total 
number of privatised enterprises. The constmction sector ranks second.
Regai'ding the path of privatisation, Bankmptcy liquidation ranks second, while 
‘privatisation through liquidation’ comes first.
As for the size o f enterprise, small-scale enterprise was the fastest, followed by medium 
and large enterprises.
Contrasting the pace of privatisation by the financial standing of the enterprises, the 
data shows that enterprises with good financial standing were the fastest, but those 
which required restmcturing (i.e. those commercialised before being privatised) needed 
more time.
Therefore, one can conclude that Poland failed to proceed with privatisation as swiftly 
as had originally been hoped.
To sum up, one can argue that lack of capital markets, shortages of households savings, 
lack of domestic or foreign investors, strategic public opposition, and political 
constraints, are the main factors responsible for the slow pace of privatisation. See 
Section Five for other reasons behind the slow pace of the privatisation process.
Regarding the goal of achieving a wider share ownership among the public at large, 
including employees of enterprises, one cannot tell exactly how many people in Poland 
as a whole participated in the privatisation process, and have some shares in the 
privatised enterprises. This applies to employees of privatised enterprises as well. 
However, one can argue that through the MPP a wider share ownership would be
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achieved/® but whether this would be to the benefit of privatised enterprise and the 
economy as a whole, it is difficult to assess. However, one can examine the type of 
control over firms that has emerged as a result of privatisation, and then recommend 
one type of control over the other, according to the possible and desired impact on the 
firms. Hence, there is a need to investigate the impact of the privatisation process on 
the privatised enterprises.
As for the goal of generating funds from the sale of enterprises, it was to a large extent, 
disappointing. This was because the vast majority of enteiprises were liquidated rather 
than sold.
In the next section, I shall investigate the impact of privatisation on the performance of 
enterprises during the period of study.
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status due to the restitution process could be a serious impediment to privatisation. 
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business if it is uneconomical or risky for a foreign investor to make a greenfield 
investment. This type of acquisition works best when pooling resources and 
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technology and know-how; the local partner contributes a plant site, qualified labour, 
and knowledge of the local laws and government operation.
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SECTIO N  (8) 
E N T E R P R ISE S
THE IMPACT O F PRIVATISATION ON
The main concern of this section is to investigate the impact of privatisation on the 
performance of enterprises. More specifically, this section analyses the performance 
of privatised enterprises, the State Treasm-y Companies, and SOEs, before and after 
privatisation.
It is argued that it is much easier to initiate reform programmes such as price 
liberalisation and privatisation than it is to actually change the behaviour of 
enterprises. Without adjustment in the behaviour of enteiprises, however, 
improvement in economic performance will at best be limited, and the ability of 
reformers to sustain their reform programmes will be threatened. ^  From this 
argument, the importance of this section of the study arises.
The hitherto privatisation effects can be analysed either in the context of particular 
paths of ownership transformations, or viewed from the angle of the ownership 
stmcture resulting from privatisation. The question that should be answered is; 
“What type of ownership system has emerged in Poland?”.
1. Who are the new owners?
Legally, the following types of ownership structure can be distinguished in Poland:
(1) Public sector: SOEs, STCs, State legal persons, and mixed.
(2) Private sector: domestic co-operatives; individual proprietorships; domestic 
partnership; foreign; and mixed.^
The degree of affinity between these different kinds of nominal private ownership 
and the typical behaviour of effective private ownership varies. The difficulty in 
forms of ownership in the private sector are those of “domestic co-operative
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ownership”, and “domestic partnerships’ ownership”. The first represents a form of 
ownership of a kind that was developed within the Socialist economic framework, 
and basically designed to resemble State ownership. More complicated is the 
composition of entities classified under the second form, where some of the 
enterprises in this group aiose either as new fiims, or as a result of the transformation 
of individual proprietorships’ ownership by means of private Polish capital (or with 
the participation of foreign capital). However, many of the large firms now 
assuming this legal form of ownership are products of privatisation of SOEs.^
The transformation process in Poland created de jure rather than de facto private 
property. However, one should not expect that a change in the form of ownership of 
an SOE means that overnight, or even from one year to the next, its current and 
strategic objectives begin to resemble those of private business in advanced market 
economies.
The criteria for classifying firms according to the different types of corporate control, 
was provided by Berle and Means (1932). Their classification focused on the stake 
owned by one party- individual, family, financial group, etc.. Most researchers 
“^classify corporations according to the following types of control:
(1) privatised companies with a dispersed investor, in which the majority of the 
equity is dispersed among a wide set of stockholders, none of whom has a 
controlling interest;
(2) companies in which a single foreign investor has a majority holding (51-100%);
(3) a foreign investor has a majority minority holding (30-50%) and the rest of the 
stock is dispersed;
(4) companies in which a domestic investor has a majority holding (51-100%);
(5) a domestic investor has a majority minority holding (30-50%) and the rest of the 
stock is dispersed.
(6) managerial/employee control - if there is no base for external control.
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foreign strategic investor.^
The whole arithmetic of corporate control relies on the implicit “o/re share- one
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The groups bearing the greatest resemblance to West European private ownership are 
the second and third; to a much smaller extent, this can be said of the fourth and fifth 
groups. In the first group, the process of development into effective private 
ownership is running into numerous difficulties connected with, among other things, 
the inertia of the old system of ownership and in particular, employee interest. For 
this group consists primarily of SOEs sold off on a leasing basis to companies 
formed by their employees. It is often emphasised that if these companies are to 
become fully-fledged private business enterprises, they have to find a domestic or
:ii
In Section Five, we distinguished between two general types of control; ‘insiders’ 
control and ‘external’ or ‘outsiders’ control. With an increasing number of directors 
sitting on more than one board of directors, it is difficult to detect the network of 
interlocking directorates. To detect the existence of monitoring shareholders, some 
thresholds should be defined for qualified majority control, minority control, 
blocking minority, and dominating influence. If no one threshold is reached by an |
individual or a coalition of shareholders, one can conclude that a managerial control 
prevails.^
vote” assumption, according to which any vote at a shareholders meeting has the 
same weight whatever corporate capital concentration could be. It is of importance 
to mention that such an assumption is of course debatable, in particular when some
shareholders are within the firm (and hold insider information); in this case, although 
they are entitled to decision-making in proportion to their property rights, they 
actually enjoy stronger economic power within the corporation than other 
shareholders. Hence, it is often the case that corporate control increasingly relies on ; :
the control of information, and is decreasingly based on capital ownership.^ What is 
the case in Poland?
2. Corporate control and privatisation in Poland
a. Corporate control in ‘capital’ privatisation
Bear in mind that one of the main aims of privatisation is to establish legitimate and §
effective private control over enterprises. In Poland, the main consequence of 
privatisation of SOEs is the move from a State or “political” and/or “self­
management” Socialist control system, to another system of coiporate control.* The 
aim of this pait of the study is to examine thi'ee privatisation approaches adopted in 
Poland, in terms of their effectiveness in establishing legitimate and effective private 
control over enterprises.
I
The type of control created through this form of privatisation is in two stages; the 1j
first is the move from self-management control to State Treasury control. This new 
form of corporate control involves the establishment of a board of directors to 
replace the self-management and workers’ councils, new managers, and some forms 
of enterprise restructuring. In the second stage, there was a move from State 
Treasury control to other types of control, such as ‘outsiders’ control (domestic or l
foreign ‘strategic’ investors), oiMEBO ‘insider’ control.
As explained in Section Seven, Table (7.6), for the whole period 1990-September, S
1995, shares of 70 STCs which were privatised via the ‘capital’ privatisation 
path, were sold to foreign ‘strategic’ investors. Also, shares of 53 STCs were sold to 
domestic ‘strategic’ investors. This means that only about 123 companies in a 
situation of external control.
Table (8.1) shows the distribution of shares of privatised STCs by the percentage |
share of new investors.
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Table (8.1)
Year Total Majority
(51-100%)
Majority minority 
(30-50%)
Majority
Management/
Employees
Dispersed 
Ownership 
(IPO, DI, ST, 
EMP, Mgt)FI DI FI DI
1990 6 - -/I 5
1991 24 6 8 2 - 6
1992 23 14 7 -  “ - 2
1993 48 20 12 2 3 -/2 5
1994 36 10 14 1 1 8
Total 137 50 41 2 6 1/3 26
Source: Own calculation^ based on data from MoP, Department o f Capital
Privatisation, Warsaw, Poland. Note: FI: Foreign investor, DI: Domestic 
Investor. IPO:Initial Public Offering, ST: State Treasury, Emp: Employees, Mgt: 
Management.
As can be seen from Table (8.1), in 1990, only six enterprises were privatised in 
Poland. The shares of one of these (Zaklady Miesne Inowroclaw limited liability 
coup any- meat plant) were 100% sold to its employees. This enteiprise is now under 
an ‘insiders control’. The shares of the other five were sold through IPO. For 
example, the shares of one of them (Exbud S.A. -construction civil engineering) were 
sold as follows: 45% of them through IPO, 20% to its employees, 17.5% to the 
management, and 17.5% to the International Trading and Investment company (of 
the USA). Since 45% of the shares was sold through IPO, in which the exact number 
of shareholders is unknown, it is difficult to detect exactly who sustains a monitoring 
position over corporate management.
Table (8.1) shows that in 1991, out of 24 STCs privatised by the MoP via the 
‘capital’ privatisation path, the majority of shares (67-80%) of 6 STCs was sold to 
foreign ‘strategic’ investors. For example, 80% of the shares of Polbaf S.A. (potato 
processing), at Glowno, was sold to an American food company (Basic American 
Food Inc.). The other 20% of shares was sold to its employees. So, one can assume 
that these 6 companies are under ‘external control’.
I
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Table (8.1) shows that the majority minority of shai'es (30-50%) of 2 STCs was sold 
to foreign ‘strategic’ investors. In this case, it is difficult to assess who exactly has 
the power of controlling these companies.
In addition, Table (8.1) shows that the majority of shai'es (60-80%) of 8 STCs out of 
the 24 was sold to domestic ‘strategic’ investo7s. For example, 80% of the shares of 
Norblin Walcownia Metali (rolling mill), in Warsaw, was sold to the well-known 
Polish ‘Universal’ Company. The other 20% of the shares; 19.9% was sold to the 
employees, and 0.1% was sold to the State Treasury. So, one can assume that these 8 
companies are under “external control”. Finally, the shares of 6 STCs were 
dispersed among a wide set of stockholders. It is difficult, therefore, to identify 
exactly who has the power of controlling these enterprises.
Table (8.1) shows that in 1992, out of 23 STCs privatised via the ‘capital’ 
privatisation path, the majority of shares (51-80%) of 14 STCs was sold to foreign 
‘strategic’ investors. The majority of shares (53-80%) of 7 of the 23 was sold to 
domestic ‘strategic’ investors. And shares of one STC were dispersed among a wide 
set of stockholders.
The general trend is almost the same in 1993 and 1994. The majority of the shares of 
the privatised STCs went to ‘strategic’ investors (domestic and foreign). Therefore, 
one can conclude that most of the SOEs that were privatised through the ‘capital’ 
privatisation path are now under external control
b. Corporate control in ‘privatisation via liquidation’
The type of control created through this form of privatisation was a move from State 
or self-management control, mainly to MEBO ‘insider’ control. The picture looks 
approximately as follows:
By the end of 1994, 1041 SOEs were privatised through the ‘privatisation via 
liquidation’ path. Out of these, 736 SOEs, 70.7%, was leased mainly to their
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personnel, and are now under ‘insider’ control It is expected that companies that 
have the character of an MEBO ‘insider’ control nature will change to ‘insider’ 
MBO or ‘outsider’ control nature companies.^
c. Corporate control in Mass Privatisation Programme
Mass privatisation in Poland means a move from State Treasury control, in the case 
of STCs, and/or self-management control, in the case of enterprises which werfe not 
participating in the ‘capital’ path, to a new stmcture of control. Although this is 
explained in Section Six, it is worth remembering that the initial shareholding 
stmcture of companies directly after the contribution of their shares to NIFs is as 
follows: 33% to the “lead’ NIF, 27% to the other NIFs, 15% to the employees of the 
company, 25% to the State Treasury. In fact, this programme involves an extreme 
separation of ownership and control. It ensures that control over each firm is 
attributed immediately to an NIF, in which citizens will own shares. In addition, to 
avoid an excessive concentration of risk, these mutual funds aie partially diversified 
with minority stakes in other companies, ensuring some contest over coiporate 
control.
One cannot tell how the final picture of the ownership stmcture (of the enterprises 
participating in MPP) will look when the Universal Share Certificates are traded on 
the Stock Exchange. So the most worrying aspect is that the dispersion of ownership 
may fail to create the private control over enterprises necessary to harden firms’ 
budget constraints. However, one should bear in mind that the main rationale for 
‘mass’ distribution of shares is the limitation of “political” (State) interference in the 
day-to-day economic management of the enteiprises.
How is the perfoimance of the enterprises under the new form of control?. Or, what 
is the impact of privatisation on the performance of enteiprises?.
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3. Privatisation impact on the performance of enterprises
This part of the study relies heavily on a number of survey studies done by certain 
Polish institutions to evaluate the impact of privatisation on the behaviour and 
performance of privatised enterprises, commercialised enterprises, and SOEs. The 
following is an analysis of the findings of some of these studies.
a Study number one^ ®
This study is based on 187 enterprises (of which 171 were transformed through the 
so-called liquidation privatisation path, and 16 were commercialised) based on a 
questionnaire technique. The main puipose of the study is to investigate the 
following issues, after the transfomiation process: the economic and financial 
performance of these enterprises; the participation of employees in the ownership 
transformation; the main barriers that confronted the ownership transformation; and 
an appraisal of the activities of State enterprises taking part in the privatisation 
process. The study covers the period 1990-1991. It is of importance to note that the 
way of presenting the findings of the study looks like a comparative analysis between 
the performance of commercialised and liquidated enterprises, however, it should 
only be read in a way to compare the performance of these enterprises before and 
after privatisation. The main findings of the study can be summarised as follows:
1. The commercialised procedure embraces mainly large enterprises, whose parent 
body before transformation into a Joint Stock Company was the appropriate 
Ministry. By contrast, the liquidated enterprises are typically small or medium 
single-plant enterprises, subordinated, to voivodships, and transformed mainly into 
Limited liability companies.
2. The study confirmed the belief that privatisation leads to a reduction of 
employment. The average drop in employment in the commercialised firms was 
10% and in those liquidated, 15%. In the commercialised enterprises, the cuts in 
employment in individual groups of workers were similar and did not lead to shifts
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in the pattern of the relationship between the number of people in managerial 
positions and actual workers (11 workers to a manager, on average). In the 
liquidated companies, the cuts affected managerial staff in the first place (down 
25%) and administrative personnel (down 20%).
I3. Regarding the question; (a) “Who initiated the scheme for transformation?”. The |
answer is: directors in three-quarters of commercialised enterprises, and one-half the 
workers’ councils, (b) “Was the transformation process followed by a change in the | |
position of the managing director?”. The answer is: Yes, 9% in commercialised 
enterprises, and 18% in those liquidated. It was found that in enterprises in which 
the director was replaced after the transformation, the initiative came from workers 
councils in double of the cases where the initiative came from the director. This was 
observed both in the commercialised and in the liquidated enterprises. In other 
cases, the initiative came from the director, (c) “What are the sources of financing of 
employee stock ownership?. In most cases the employees earmarked their savings, 
equivalent to one-third of the average monthly wage, for the purpose. In some 30% 
of enterprises, the employees took advantage of the possibility of using the funds of 
the transformed enterprises as credit for the purchase of stock by employees. By 
contrast, only in 10% of enterprises did the employees resort to expensive bank 
loans.
4. The performance of the commercialised and liquidated enterprises after the 
change of the ownership, is shown in Box (8.1).
As can be seen from Box (8.1), the economic performance of the commercialised Ml
■îïenterprises deteriorated more than that of the liquidated ones. Moreover, the 
commercialised enterprises showed a less frequent tendency to remedy the economic I
situation, which is confirmed by shifts in the pattern of costs, the value of fixed I
assets and the smaller drop in the value of sales than among the liquidated 
enterprises. In fact, if we realise that the general trend in the whole economy showed 
a decline in the growth rates, one can have a clear picture on the performance of the 
transformed enterprises. The rate of return in SOEs in 1990 and the first half of 1991 :ï>'#
f}'' \_r-fK '' '- i ..... - .rc
shows that the overall drop was bigger than among the liquidated enteiprises, and 
similar to the level recorded in wholly owned Treasuiy companies.
The fact that the number of loss-making commercialised companies was growing 
considerably indicates that commercialisation alone, without further stmctural and 
ownership transfer, will not significantly improve the economic situation of the 
enterprises. In fact, this is a very early result at a very early transfomiation stage.
Box (8.1)
The Performance of the Commercialised and Liquidated Enterprises
(1) Commercialised Enterprises (2) Liquidated Enterprises
i) Applied to large enterprises
ii) Converted mostly into LLCs
iii) Indebtedness of assets compared to 
the value of their assets was 1/2 of the 
liquidated enterprises.
iv) A deterioration of sales of financial 
products and collection of payment for them.
v) The value of inventories of financial
products rose by 50%.
vi) The growth of receivable was fast.
vii) No information on the value of the
i) Applied to small enterprises .
ii) Mostly converted into JSCs.
iii) Indebtedness is twice that
in the commercialised enterprises
iv) showed the same behaviour as 
that of the commercialised.
v) The value of inventories fell 
by an average of 38%.
vi) The growth of the receivable was slow, 
vii) The value of fixed assets dropped by
assets is given.
viii) The value of the completed investment 
rose . slowly.
ix) The relation of the value of investment 
projects to the value of the assets of the 
enterprises suggests that the level of 
investment spending was low.
x) Costs rose by 58% .
xi) Wages grew by 13.3%.
xii) Net profits fell by 87% before tax 
and by 73% after tax.
xiii) Lower rate of return,
ivx) The number of loss-making 
companies grew at a higher 
rate.
vx) Foreign participation was low 
(2.5%).
13.3%, which would be a sign of an 
attempt dispose of redundant assets, 
viii) The value of the completed 
projects rose quickly, 
ix) same performance.
x) Costs rose by 55%.
xi) Wages grew by 18.6%.
xii) Net profit fell by 68% before tax 
and by 37.6% after tax.
xiii) Higher rate of return.
ivx) The number of loss making enterprises 
grew at a lower rate.
vx) Foreign participation was low as well 
(3.0%).
Source: This is a summary of the findings of the study of Olko-Bagienska,
Pankow and Ruszkowski, 1992, ‘^’Privatisation o f State Enterprises 1990-91: 
Results o f Empirical Studies^% (FESiWarsaw), Poland.
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b. Study number two11
This study is based on interviews with the managers of 20 enterprises, and on data 
provided by the companies surveyed. The chosen enteiprises represent different 
paths of privatisation, different regions in Poland, different industries, and different 
sizes of enteiprises. 13 enterprises were operating in a free market, and most of them 
operate in quasi or full market competition.
The main goals of this study were to investigate the impact of the different paths of 
privatisation on the efficiency of companies’ performance prior to, and after 
privatisation, as well as finding the main baiTiers to, and distortions of the 
privatisation process. The main findings of the study can be summarised as follows:
1. According to the interviews conducted with the managers of these enterprises, it 
was found that the expectations of wage rises were among the most common reasons 
for embarking on transformation processes. The study confirmed that hypothesis. In 
most enterprises, wages increased immediately after the new economic entity had 
started its operations. Only one enterprise showed a temporary decrease in wages. In 
half of the surveyed enterprises, wage increases and the change of the legal form of 
enterprises operating were accompanied by simplification of the wage system. In 
only two, the wage system was inaccessible to the researchers.
2. In most of the surveyed enteiprises privatisation was not accompanied by mass 
employment reduction, because that had happened before the privatisation took 
place-except in two liquidated enterprises.
3. As for the enteiprises transformed using the capital, liquidation, and 
commercialisation paths, the supervisory councils were not changed. In an enterprise 
privatised through the contribution of assets to a joint venture company, it seems that 
the foreign partner is more active in working out a strategy, although all decisions are 
made together. This is an example of full co-operation between the supervisory 
council and the board.
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4. In enterprises privatised through the liquidation path, on the basis of the Law on 
SOEs of September 24, 1981, the stmcture of initial capital resulted in diversified 
participation by domestic and external capital, and various proportions of capital 
distributed among management and other employees.
5. In all of the analysed cases of the sample, a member of the former management, 
usually the managing director, was appointed Chairman of the Board.
6. Banks continued to extend credit to finns which were customers prior to 
privatisation, although banks were unwilling to participate in the privatisation 
process or to finance restmcturing programmes or investments undertaken by 
privatised enteiprises.
7. The study found that in only 3 out of 20 surveyed enterprises, privatisation 
contributed to expansion in the number of selling outlets (mostly foreign markets) 
thanks to assistance from the new institutional co-owner. But in general, 
privatisation did not influence the configuration of supplies and customers.
8. Regarding new capital and know-how, the suiweyed enterprises showed no 
changes, because priority was given to the transformation of ownership rights.
From the above findings, one cannot rely on these results as they are too early, and 
the sample is very small. However, some lessons can be learned.
c. Study number three^^
This study covers the period 1992-93. The findings of this report are more reliable 
than those of the first, as it covers a period when the conditions of a market economy 
in Poland have already started functioning.
This study investigates the responses of the SOEs and commercialised enterprises to 
the process of economic transformation. The study is based on the findings of the
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questionnaire technique, and on open interviews repeated in half-year cycles. It 
follows the standard pattern of questions on financial standing, wage and 
employment policy, organisation structure, production and sales pattern, changes in 
market position, the composition of ownership control transformation, and prospects 
for the future of the enterprises. 50 enteiprises were chosen to represent different 
regions, different branches and industries of the economy (heavy industries and 
municipal companies were not included, owing to the clearly specific features of 
their operation and different sizes of enteiprises. Out of the 50 chosen enteiprises, 
33 were still SOEs, and 17 were commercialised. One weak assumption in the study 
is that SOEs and commercialised companies were assumed to be the same. This is 
not true, because the second is now subject to ‘hai'd budget constraints’ (HBC) not to 
‘soft budget constraints’ (SBC). The main findings of the study can be summarised 
as follows:
1. The profitability of SOEs has declined at the beginning of 1992 for the first time 
in 4 years, but improved in 1993.
2. Loss-making SOEs increased in 1991 by 30%, in 1992 by 40% and in 1993 by 
50%. According to the data of GUS, at the end of 1989 and during the first half of 
1990, profitability of SOEs was 40% and 30% respectively. That is because of SBC 
and a sharp price increase and a one-step devaluation of the zloty against the US 
dollar. However, these extremely advantageous operating conditions disappeared 
when the switch was made to tough financial policies, which provided for a real 
interest rate and the introduction of the internal convertibility of the zloty.
3. The sample shows that profits decreased by 15%, 20% and 9% in 1990, 1991 and 
1992 respectively, because of shock stabilisation. But in the first half of 1993, 
profits in the sample increased, and according to GUS, profits of the SOEs grew as 
well. The study argues that these changes merely unveiled the actual capabilities of 
SOEs in the conditions of an open market and real competition. As soon as the 
sources of easy revenues ran dry, the seller’s market was over, and methods of cost 
and income calculation became rationalised, it transpired that many goods were
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5. The study found that small firms were the first to overcome a financial crisis.
8. The worst affected, in terms of sectors, were the light (mostly clothes) and the
pharmaceutical).
I
unstable, their manufacturing costs were excessively high, and that firms were unable 
to cope with the new conditions. Most of these enterprises were too slow to adjust 
their structures, being either over-expanded or ill-organised.
4. Regarding profitability, the study argues that medium-sized enterprises performed
"ifbest. It seems that large enterprises, operating for many decades in the advantageous 
conditions resulting from financial and political support, have turned out to be 
vulnerable giants, unaccustomed to market conditions and unable to respond 
sufficiently quickly and flexibly to the changes in their environment. For most of 
them, the new operational conditions became a source of mounting difficulties, and -for many of them, the cause of financial collapse.
6. The economic situation of firms holding a monopoly position was not
.,f-q
substantially different from that of other firms, and in the case of several large 
enterprises it was definitely worse than the average.
I
7. The most advantageous economic situation was reported by enterprises which 
were the first to embark on necessary adjustments, regardless of their market position 
or their size. Adopting a “wait-and- see” attitude caused mounting difficulties, 
which as a consequence, blocked any restmcturing of their financial system.
electro-engineering (mostly electronic) industries.
9. Economic Situation: The best economic situation was enjoyed by the mineral 
industries (mostly constmction materials) and chemical industries (mostly
i;
10. Financial Liquidity: The observations of the study were as follows; the ratio of 
inter-company debts to fiims’ turnover has been rising steadily and during the last
•I
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three years has increased more than threefold. The larger the firm, the more acute 
the arrears problem. The total value of payable and receivable of a typical small firm 
almost equals that of its 3 month turnover. The study found that this figure did not 
change much during more than 3 years. However, it more than doubled for medium- 
size enterprises, despite being equal for the two groups of companies at the starting 
point. The figure was a fivefold rise for the large enterprises, which indicates that 
the problem of payment arrears is primarily the concern of large firms. Moreover, 
the growth of inter-company bad debts in this group of economic entities is definitely 
faster than that for the whole public sector, and showed no signs of slowing down.
The study found a specific correlation between the level of payment arrears in 
companies and their profitability. For example, both in firms showing high or veiy 
high profitability and those characterised by average or even low profitability, the 
amount of outstanding payments did not, as a rule, exceed the value of their two or 
three month turnover during the last three years. Firms which were permanent loss- 
makers contributed most to a substantial rise in this ratio within the whole group of 
companies surveyed. The study shows that in the period 1990-93 their payment 
arrears to turnover ratio increased more than threefold, and hence concluded that 
large companies and firms in a very poor financial condition contributed most to the 
creation of payment arreais in the sector of SOEs.
The study concluded that large but economically non-viable firms have for a long 
time been looking for a chance to survive by avoiding paying their debts. Within a 
system of inter-connected channels linking up the whole economy, it is very difficult 
to find the primaiy source oh losses. Quite often social and political reasons are 
taken into account,jprotecting'large enterprises from liquidation. This shows that the 
system of payment arreais has, from the very moment of the introduction of tough 
economic policies, taken over the role of subsidising and rationing which used to be 
the case under the so-called SBC. On the other hand, in 1992, there was a change in 
the attitude of main creditors within the public sector, as many of them were 
encouraged to fight hard to regain their property, because of the deteriorating 
financial liquidity. The study concludes, therefore, that the problem of payment
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an'ears cannot be solved within the sector of State enterprises, and there is a need for 
new regulations to help this situation^
11. Credit Facilities: The study shows that the number of uncreditworthy enteiprises 
again rose considerably. In the whole economy, this figure increased by 80%, 
although in the second half of 1992 this trend was clearly slowing down. SOEs 
which in 1990 abstained from taking credits are now more eager to benefit from 
external sources of financing. It is the lai’ge and least viable firms that take most 
credit in relation to their turnover. In the case of small enteiprises, during the period 
1991-93, the amount of credits obtained approximately equalled the value of their 
monthly turnover, and this ratio turned out to be relatively stable in the same period. 
This led to the conclusion that small and more prosperous firms have, since the 
beginning of transformation, been the most cautious in availing themselves of 
external financing sources, carefully calculating their chances of repaying any credits 
taken. Secondly, large enterprises entered the period of transformation with the 
burden of very sizeable debts, resulting from ‘old credit obtained in the 1980s, which 
seriously affected their economic situation in the 1990s. In order to rescue their 
. situation, they were forced to seek new credit facilities or to defer payments of their 
obligations, with interest capitalisation adding to their debts. Trying to avoid a total 
lack of financial resources, the weakest firms kept on taking credits as long as they 
were able to find creditors. For these firms, credits were the only chance for 
survival, hence their costs had, in this case, only marginal significance for the firms 
in question.
12. Production adjustment and investment: The study discovered that 30% of the 
surveyed enterprises undertook no adjustment, because most SOEs had already 
started to run out of resources. 30% of them introduced new products. Large 
enterprises were quite active in this aspect. The incidence of “no adjustment at all” 
was only slightly higher among monopolies than other firms.
Medium-sized enterprises were the most active in the field of investment. Their 
increased adjustment activity, and to some extent their relatively better opportunities
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for developing financing, were the main factors responsible for their active 
achievement.
Intensified efforts to cut production costs, coupled with environmental protection 
measures, represent a new phenomenon in the field of investment during the period 
of study. In ten enterprises, investment projects were aimed primarily at cutting 
energy and material consumption. One firm even decided to purchase a research and 
development centre. In eight other firms, investment projects were expected to 
contribute first of all to environmental protection, such as sewage treatment plants, 
acoustic shields and dust collection facilities. In the latter, both outside pressure in 
the form of penalties, claims by residents, etc. and also a changed attitude among 
company management and employees towai*ds this issue, due to better recognition of 
environmental hazards, were of special importance.
Regarding sources of investment financing at an enterprise level, the study showed 
that firms’ own resources still account for a major part of investment outlay in the 
case of 20 out 50 enterprises covered by the study.
13. The study found that the proportion of exports in the value of sales of surveyed 
enteiprises amounted to 25%, ranging from 18 to 20% in the following years, and 
reaching its lowest level in 1991. There aie numerous causes for a decline in the 
proportion of exports in turnover. The major ones include: the loss of sales to the 
East (the former Soviet Union) and over-valuation of exports in the first half of 1990, 
due to the exchange rate policy, i.e. a relatively high dollar to zloty exchange rate at 
the start of the programme, followed by the constant depreciation of dollar revenues 
until May, 1991.
The study points out that there was a drop in domestic sales, and attributed it to the 
opening up of the economy, the marked growth in competition on the domestic 
market, the decline in effective demand, and the disintegration of the COMECON 
and USSR, besides the EC market restrictions.
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13. Regai'ding employment, the study of the sample shows that cuts in employment 
affected only some manufacturers, and was the result of the drop in sales and the 
deteriorating financial situation of the enterprises, rather than from an action planned 
as part of market strategy or as an attempt to meet future challenges. Although 
medium-sized enterprises experienced the lowest drop in employment, they enjoyed 
the highest profitability per employee.
14. As for wage policy, the study noticed that among the surveyed enterprises wage 
differentials were growing. Generally wage policy is shaped by the need to eliminate 
tensions among employees. Enteiprises affected by poor financial standing 
attempted to stay within the statutoi'y government limits for wage growth tax 
(EWGT) in their financial plans.
15. Did "commercialisation’ have any paiticular significance, according to the size 
of enterprise?. In this study, there was an attempt to test the hypothesis of 
government officials that commercialisation, apart from paving the way for 
privatisation, would contribute to better management, following the liquidation of 
Employee Councils and introduction of Supervisory Boards in commercialised firms. 
The findings of the study indicate that no such improvement has occurred. 
Regai'ding the performance of large enterprises, commercialisation itself has not had 
any significant impact them. Small enterprises showed the same attitude. Medium­
sized enterprises presented a different case. In many respects, non-commercialised 
medium-sized enterprises out-performed (their profitability was 10.8%) the 
commercialised ones (their profitability was 7.9%). The investment activity ratio for 
non-commercialised enterprises amounted to 3.1 on average, compared with 1.9 for 
the commercialised ones. Only the wage spread (measured as a maximum to 
minimum wage ratio) was somewhat smaller in non-commercialised enterprises than 
the commercialised ones (7.3 to 1 and 8.6 to 1, respectively).
From the above analysis, one could conclude that since 1990, the management of 
Polish State enterprises has been radically altered by a powerful combination of 
internal and external forces. On the one hand, macroeconomic stabilisation and entry
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to the free mai'ket has subjected firms to competitive pressures for the first time in 45 
years, forcing management to transform, rationalise, and streamline existing 
practices. On the other hand, the collapse of the Communist Pai'ty, the renewal of 
the legal recognition of Solidarity, and the reinvestigation of dormant Employee 
Councils unleashed an internal stmggle over managerial roles and competencies. 
Small and medium-sized enteiprises were the first to be exposed to the competition 
environment. Conversely, large and monopolistic enterprises have been slower to 
adjust to the rigours of the market, and less capable of transforming the internal 
straggles that accompanied political change into adjustment strategies. Moreover, 
one could also argue that the steep decline in overall economic output during 1990 
and 1991 was principally the result of internal straggles over management and the 
combination of “competing trade unions”, “powerful Employee Councils” and “weak 
managers” created a “Bermuda Triangle” that blocked the ability of reforms to 
pursue socially painful, but economically necessary policies.
4. Study number four^ "^
This study covers the period January, 1990 until the first quarter 1992. The sample 
covers 55 enterprises- 18 joint stock company, 11 limited liability companies, 9 
companies owned by the State Treasury, 15 privatised through the liquidation path, 
and 2 other legal status. The study states that 9 of these companies are monopolistic, 
30 competitive, 16 not specified. Different paths of privatisation are represented in 
this study: 7 enterprises were privatised using capital privatisation, 7 through 
liquidation privatisation, 8 through bankruptcy liquidation, and 7 through 
commercialisation. The aim of the study was to investigate the impact of the 
different paths of privatisation on enterprises, using different measures, like 
profitability, assets/liability ratio, and liability/net profit ratio. The main findings of 
the study are summarised in Box (8.2).
1
'
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Box (8.2)
A Summary of the Impact of Different Paths of Privatisation on Enterprises
Path of * Profitability * R/P ratio * Changes in * Strategy
Privatisation Field of Prod. Before During After
1) Capital Smallest decline After commercial Second A A A
2) Liquidation After Bankruptcy Biggest decline The biggest P A A/P
3) Bankruptcy Biggest decline After Liquidation Third P P P
4) Commercial After Capital Smallest decline Fourth_____P P P
Source: Own work, based on the findings of Dabrowski, Federowcz and 
Szomburg, 1992, ^^Privatisation o f Polish SOEs”, Second Report.
GlfME;Warsaw, Poland. Note: A -  Active, P = Passive. R/P = Receivable/ 
Payable.
1. The study found that firms privatised following the ‘capital’ path best managed to 
come to terms with the stabilisation shock, and their financial performance is still 
much better than that of an average firm and those of firms transferred in another 
way. The companies in question were not immune to problems affecting all other 
Polish firms (payments arrears, recession, collapse of the Eastern market), but due to 
their position attained in the past, the good quality of their products, and their 
presence on Western markets, they were in a better position. Enterprises privatised 
following the capital path were able to pass relatively smoothly through the first two 
stages of the systemic transformation process. The study ai'gues that it would 
probably be, unjustified to claim that privatisation was the primary cause of the 
financial troubles of many of those firms (e.g. repayment of leasing instalments), but 
it surely had an impact on the financial standing of analysed firms.
2. Although there was a decline in the ratio of receivable to payable in the last yeai' 
of the survey, the study shows that there was a balance in the receivable and payable. 
The study attributes this improvement to the measures that were taken to execute the 
dues, or as a result of privatisation. Moreover, the study argues that the main reasons 
for the steep decline in economic indicators of the liquidated firms are the dramatic 
drop in domestic demand for their products caused by opening up the economy 
(imports) and, consequently, a major rise in competition on the domestic market, a
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collapse of exports to the Eastern markets and a relatively high burden of taxes 
levied by the central budget, due mainly to a drop in output.
3. The study stresses the fact that during the period of their analysis, enterprises 
transformed into companies owned solely by the State Treasury enjoyed a relatively 
favourable financial condition. In 1990 they clearly showed the highest profitability 
ratios. Only a year later, the standing of those firms was subject to a serious 
deterioration, although their situation was still better than that of other privatised 
firms. At this point I argue that when the second step is taken, i.e. when these 
commercialised firms are privatised using the ‘capital’ path, their economic 
performance improves significantly. Thus, one can conclude, bearing in mind the 
short period of time, thoif: commercialisation did not bring about a significant 
improvement in the financial standing of those enterprises.
4. The study argues that capital privatisation gave the enterprises transformed this 
way a chance of financial restructuring, and halted, at least for the time being, the 
drop in profitability of those firms. On the other hand, the first phenomenon 
accompanying privatisation along the liquidation path and commercialisation was a 
quick drop in profitability in those firms, and constantly deteriorating financial 
liquidity. Bankruptcy liquidation is quite different: in this case the transformation 
resulted from the bad economic condition of those enterprises. Quite often, however, 
there was an improvement in the conditions of liquidated firms due to employment 
reduction and sale of fixed and variable assets.
5. In the groups of enterprises privatised by the force of the Privatisation Law, 
responses concerning changes or expansion of the scope of economic activities are 
much more diversified than those in the case of enterprises privatised following the 
capital path. The study states that those actions were taken in a direct connection 
with privatisation. Still, the prospects of changing the ownership status of an 
enteiprise was one of the main reasons for looking for spare capacities inside a firm.
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6. The study found that the rise in average wages (salaries) occurred in enterprises 
privatised following the capital path. Wages (salaries) in commercialised firms were 
lower and wage costs in those finns higher than in their counterparts privatised in the 
capital way. Moreover, enterprises privatised through liquidation following the 
provisions of the Privatisation Law also show a higher than average rate of wage 
increase.
7. The study found that the ownership transformation processes had a substantial 
impact on intensifying the behaviour of analysed firms. Prior to undertaking 
privatisation processes in 38 of 50 entities surveyed (69%), they found a passive 
approach and conservative strategies. Most fiimis in all privatisation paths, except 
the capital, were not very active before privatisation. All firms included in the 
bankraptcy liquidation category were passive, which surely had a marked impact on 
their poor economic condition in later stages. At that time the highest level of 
activity was shown by firms to be privatised later following the capital path and 
firms liquidated following the provisions of the Privatisation Law. This points to the 
fact that many of those firms implemented numerous adjustment measures even prior 
to privatisation and that in their case, privatisation was not a breakthrough, but just 
another stage of their dynamic strategy. Therefore, the study concludes that entering 
a chosen privatisation path resulted in very considerably intensified activities of 
enterprises privatised following the capital or liquidation path. The above supports 
the hypothesis that fiitns in those two groups regarded privatisation as a chance to 
intensify their activities that had, to at least some extent, been undertaken before.
e. Study number five^ ^
The study comprises a sample of 75 large industrial enterprises. It was conducted in 
mid- 1991, and again in mid-1992. A number of findings were made:
1. The budget constraint facing enterprises visibly hardened from 1991 onwards, 
with banks or enterprise loans diminishing and taxes rising;
299
2. Managers played a larger role, and emphasised profits and mai'keting over 
productivity targets;
3. Wages were not set to exhaust profits, but were the result of Western-type 
bargaining;
4. Enteiprises became cost-conscious and began to reduce input use.
IWithin the sample, substantial variations were found, with some firms being profitable while others were not. The profitable firms could be found in a variety of 
sub sectors, which indicated that managerial performance in the face of market 
pressures was an important determinant of profitability. Profitable firms had a better 
productivity performance; but , encouragingly, even unprofitable firms took 
measures to control labour, energy and other material costs- this finding indicated 
that capacity utilisation was an important determinant of profitability.
Financial flows became tighter for both sets of firms when the nine State Banks were 
commercialised in late 1991. Profitable firms continued to have access to investment 
loans and were able to service their debts, whereas unprofitable firms, while 
maintaining some access to loans, found the interest burden was a very substantial 
problem. The sample was also stratified according to whether a given State 
enterprise was commercialised or not. It was difficult to draw definite conclusions, 
both because enterprises were commercialised for only a yeai’ before the study began, 
and because there was considerable self selection amongst those enterprises that 
became commercialised (they tended to be larger employment wise and had a bigger 
initial debt burden). Managers surveyed expressed a preference for
■commercialisation as a way to restructure prior to being fully privatised.
These findings have some bearing on the question of incentives to maximise profits 
for workers-controlled enterprises. Not all worker controlled enterprises have 
exhausted profits by distributing them as wages- as was expected by some observers 
at the beginning of reform. Since this finding was true for some enterprises that were 
not commercialised, it cannot be explained by claiming a loss of institutional power 
for workers’ councils. One reason why worker- controlled firms might be interested
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in profits is to promote employment. The unprofitable finns tended ( as the study 
shows) to reduce employment by a greater amount than did the profitable firms. 
Profits tended to provide some cushion from unemployment levels that reached an 
economy- wide 15.7% by end-1993. Another reason why worker- controlled firms 
might be interested in profits could be an expectation of receiving part of cunent 
profits in a future privatisation deal which gave workers equity at a discount.
e. Study number six^ ^
The study was carried out on a representative sample of Leveraged lease-buy-out 
companies (LLBO) or management employee buyouts (MEBOs). The sample 
included 130 companies; 24% were involved in manufacturing, 45% in construction 
and 31% in trade and services. The following is a summaiy of the main findings:
1. Revenues and costs
The research showed that the situation in the companies is varied. While the general 
trend is for the cost to revenue ratio to be on the rise, the manufacturing companies 
were better off. They had a considerable increase in revenue, with the costs incurred 
growing at a slower rate. A decrease in real revenue occurred in construction 
companies and especially in trade companies, where the drop was most evident. The 
cost to revenue ratio in the selected enterprises rose from 91.8% in 1992 to 93.0% in 
1993.
2. Profitability
Average gross profits for 1993 rose by 40.8%, net profits by 25.8%, compared to 
1992. Good returns have been achieved principally by lai'ge companies (including 
large construction companies) and those manufacturing companies employing over 
300 people. They generally have returns on capital (77%) and on assets (11%).
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Total profitability (gross profit to cost ratio for achieving revenue) in the selected 
companies increased from 7.0% in 1992, to 7.55 in 1993. Profitability of sales (sales 
profit in relation to production costs of goods sold) increased from 25.2% in 1992, to 
29.1% in 1993. In 1992, State enterprises had total profitability at 2.2 and 
profitability of sales at 9.3%, while in 1993, the indicators were 2.9% and 8.5%, 
respectively.
There was a considerable difference among the companies between the profitability 
of sales and total profitability, and it is clear that the payments due as part of the 
lease arrangements (under the LLBO privatisation technique) to the State Treasury 
aie responsible for this. Table (8.2) shows the profitability indicators by industry.
Table (8.2) 
Profitability Indicators by industry
Industry Total Profitability % 
1992 1993
Profitability of sale % 
1993
Manufacturing LLBOs 6.3 10.0 32.6
Manufacturing in 1.9 3.1 13.5
general
Construction LLBOs 9.5 9.6 17.0
Construction in general 4.1 2.4 3.6
Trade LLOBs 2.4 2.0 53.8
Trade in general 0.7 1.3 2.2
3. Capitalisation
During 1993 the capital of the LLBOs increased by 44%; allowing for both inflation 
and the devaluation of the Polish cunency in relation to the US$, real increase lay at 
7.0%. The greatest increase in capital took place in construction companies (72.2%), 
followed by manufacturing (22.2%), and then trade companies (18.8%). The 
companies as a whole used 74.4% of net profits to increase their capital.
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4. Liquidity indicators
Current ratio indicators for all companies under review rose from 1.20 in 1992, to 
1.28 in 1993, whereas for the State enterprises sector there was a drop from 0.96 to
0.92 (this includes 1,700 State enterprises subject to liquidation or bankruptcy 
proceedings). Table (8.3) shows liquidity indicators broken down by industry.
Table (8.3)
Industry LLBO companies State Enterprises 
1992 1993 1992 1993
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Trade & services
1.28 1.18 0.87 0.87
1.29 1.42 1.31 1.19 
1.03 1.11 1.48* 1.30**
*) trade only **) services only
The quick ratio indicator should in general lie at about 1, and when it drops below
0.75 things become worrying. It should be noted, however, that some reserves may 
additionally be of considerable liquidity, and the indicator makes no allowance for 
this. Table (8.4) shows the quick ratio indicators by industry.
Table (8.4)
Industry LLBO companies State enterprises 
1992 1993 1992 1993
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Trade & Services
0.82 0.75 0.51 0.51 
1.10 1.21 1.06 0.99 
0.48 0.52 1.02* 0.66**
*)Trade only **) Services only
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5. Financial Liabilities
The LLBO privatisation procedure gives rise to the companies starting off with 
considerable liabilities (to the State Treasury). Any difficulties faced by them on the 
market may mean that they rapidly lose liquidity and become insolvent. It is thus 
important to keep an eye on potential threats and any delays in payments due to the 
State Treasury, the banks and suppliers. Table (8.5) shows the relation of financial 
liabilities broken down by industry, in 1993.
Table (8.5)
Industry Arrears to Arrears to own Arrears to net 
third party capital profit 
liabilities
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Trade & 
Services
12 25 44 
24 47 75
16 47 135
Manufacturing companies are least threatened, trade companies are at greatest risk.
6. Assets turnover ratio
This indicator shows the relation of the value of sales to the value of assets used by 
the companies. The study showed that there was an improvement in these indicators 
for 1993, compared with 1992.
7. Adaptation o f products to the market
The moves to adapt products to mai'kets in the companies under review were largely 
concentrated on more intensive promotion of their goods and services. Besides 
posters, and press and radio advertisements, they also went in for active promotion, 
such as making offers, acquiring customers, participation in tenders and fairs, etc..
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The fact that both the company’s logo and its name are important to the companies is 
noteworthy.
Activities to strengthen the company’s competitiveness have also grow in 
importance. Around 27% of the companies have undertaken the provision of new 
products and services (in 1992 there were about 18%). Around 17% of the 
companies undertook partial improvement of these (in 1992 it was about 12%). New 
improved products made up 16.5% and 13.1% respectively of products sold. In 
1992, these lay at 20.4% and 21,6%. In eight of the companies, adapting to the 
market led them to give up the production of 7.6% of goods sold the previous year. 
The same was true for four companies in 1992. Production of new products 
generally went hand-in-hand with finding new partners (18 firms in 1992, 24 in
1993). In 1993, six companies started to co-operate with a foreign partner. The part 
played by new and improved products sold by companies modernising in 1993 is 
shown in Table (8.6) broken down by industry.
Table (8.6) 
Modernising Products by Industry
Industry % of New % of Improved 
LLBO products as updated products as 
companies part of production part of 
with new production production 
products sold (%) sold (%)
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Trade & 
Services
47.6 15.8 42.9 19.1 
20.0 15.5 9.0 8.1
25.8 17.5 6.5 4.7
Manufacturing companies are clearly aiming to modernise, whereas due to the 
specific nature of both construction and trade companies, there is less indication of 
such a trend.
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& Employment
Average employment in the companies under review at the time they began operating 
(the end of December, 1991) was at 285, and fell to 242 in 1992- ranging from 3 to 
1,276. In 1993, employment continued to drop steadily (the greatest fall came in the 
first half of 1993) to reach an average 209- ranging from 2 to 1,170.
In 1992-93, employment in the companies under review had decreased by about 
12.0%. The fact that employment fell at a rate greater than revenues gives an 
indication of increased productivity. In 1993, the average increase in productivity lay 
at about 2.9%.
The general fall in employment was more marked among the production workers- for
1992 the rate lay at 13.0%, for 1993 it was 12.3%. The fall in employment took 
place in all the companies regardless of industry- in manufacturing, construction, 
trade and services.
The research showed veiy sharp falls in employment among the construction 
companies. In 1992, the drop was about 16.4%, in 1993 by a further 16.7%. By the 
first half of 1994, the drop was only 3.0%, which allows one to expect a levelling off 
of the fall and a reversal of the trend. For the construction industry as a whole, the 
average fall was 3.1% in 1992, and 6.6% in 1993.
A considerable reduction of employment also occurred among the trade and services 
companies. The greatest drop took place in 1992 and the first half of 1993. After 
that it was limited to 3.0% for every half-year period. For all the trade companies the 
drop in employment lay at 8.4% in 1992 and at 12.2% in 1993.
The manufacturing companies had the most stable employment situation. After a 5% 
drop in 1992, the next half-yearly indicators show a fall of about 1.0% (the total for
1993 was 2.11%). Starting in the second half of 1993, there was a growth in the 
numbers employed even among the non-qualified workers. The general figures for
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all manufacturing companies in Poland for 1992 and 1993 show falls of about 7.8% 
and 1.7%, respectively.
9. Wages
At the end of 1991, the average wages in the companies under review were similar to 
the gross wages for the economy as a whole when compared to the appropriate 
industry. In 1992, the wages rose, but did not match the national average rise (99.8% 
of the national average). The increase in 1993 was smaller than the national average 
(88.8), before catching up again in the first half of 1994 (92.1%).
The level of real wages continues to fall in Poland, at least according to official data. 
In real terms, allowing for the consumer goods and services index (143.0 in 1992, 
135.3 in 1993), average gross income rose by about 5.3% in 1992 before falling by 
about 1.9% in 1993. In the first half of 1994 there was a slight rise of 1.4%.
The wage trends provide evidence of considerable wage discipline in the companies 
under review. Analysis also allows for the opinion that in principle the wage strategy 
over the period under consideration was to guarantee the real value of the wages. 
This goal was achieved, even at the cost of large reductions in the work-force. The 
link between wage increases and an increase in revenue was secondary. While these 
were moving in the same direction, they differed by between 2% and over 10%.
10. Ownership
On average, company ownership is spread out unevenly. As a rule, one quarter of 
the shares comes to about a dozen or so people from the management or the 
supervisory board, while on the other hand, a group of about ten times as many 
employees holds about half the shares. On top of that, the number of shares held by 
the small elite continues to rise in proportion to a decrease among the employees. 
Table (8.7) shows this trend.
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Table (8.7)
Ownership structure in LLBO companies
Ownership groups % of shares owned At day of establishment At time of reproach
Management 10.9 13.7
Supervisory board members 12.6 12.2
Individual employees 67.6 54.1
Polish companies 0.22 1.19
Polish individuals 7.5 16.1
Foreign companies — 0.4
Foreign individuals — 0.3
From 1991 to June, 1994, the average employment in the companies fell from 284 to 
209. The average number of employee-shareholders fell from 248 at the moment the 
company was registered to 148 in June, 1994. Thus, part of the shares was bought 
up by management and the supervisory boards, as well as by Polish citizens not 
employed in the companies. As a result, there has been, and probably will continue 
to be, a concentration of share ownership with those already holding a considerable 
packet of shares. Companies that have the character of an "MEBO ‘insider’ 
control” type would most probably change to a type of management buy-out , or 
“MBOs-insider” control companies.
11, Companies^ control
The research showed that the management of the companies is on the whole made up 
of the directors and management of the former State enterprises. Nothing really 
limits their freedom of decision-making for the management of he companies. The 
make-up of the supervisory boards is subject to greater fluctuations than that of the 
management. Thus, a stable management is responsible to a far- less stable 
composition of supervisory boards. The influx of people from outside the company 
is an indication of the increased participation of outside capital in the companies. 
Management is not sharing real operational control with any “outsiders” (the make­
up of management has petrified) whereas representatives of outside investors have 
been allowed on to the supervisory boards.
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Trade unions do not play any significant role in MEBOs. A percentage drop in the 
number of union members is evident. The decrease in the number and role of the 
trade unions in MEBO companies is obvious.
To sum up, the above reseai’ch showed that Poland’s LLBO companies made much 
better use of their means of production than was the case in the State enterprises 
prior to privatisation. On the other hand, these companies showed a number of 
weaknesses, such as a lack of capital for investment or a great risk of losing liquidity 
in case of some market misfortune, in other words facing bankruptcy. The threat of 
bankruptcy motivates their management to undertake energetic marketing and 
innovatoiy actions. This threat makes employees hold back from making increased 
wage demands, which is beneficial both for the company (its competitiveness) and 
for the economy as a whole (inflation).
ÏThe recapitalisation of companies is possible through a stock increase when Polishinstitutional or foreign investors show interest; the government allows for this where
.the company has proved maturity in the market, and once the shareholders and the 
management have learned and understood their role in a market economy. This 
maturity is clearly evident in management’s bolder and positive business approach as 
their company’s fortunes develop.
4. Critical assessment of the studies and conclusion
As noted in the second part of this section, different modes of corporate governance 
were established. One of the main consequences of the privatisation process is the 
move from ‘‘State corporate control”, to either an “insiders” or “outsiders” system 
of corporate control. However, what is more important is to evaluate whether or not -
the new types of corporate control, which were established as a consequence of the 
privatisation process, have some positive impact on the performance of the 
privatised enterprises. To assess the impact of privatisation on the performance and 
behaviour of enterprises, the remainder of this part of the Section critically analyses 
the findings of the Six survey studies discussed above. The main questions I focused
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the findings of the Six survey studies discussed above. The main questions I focused 
on are; “To Wliat extent can one rely on and generalise the conclusions from each 
study?”; “What is the contribution of each study to an assessment of how far 
privatisation has played a central role in measumble, or unmeasurable, aspects of 
transformation?”; “What is the contribution of each study to an assessment of the 
relative advantages and/or disadvantages of the different methods of privatisation?”;
“What further information might be desirable to make a more complete assessment 
of the specific contribution of privatisation as opposed to other policy measm-es?”.
Different methodologies were applied to do these studies: some are based on 
questionnaires (studies number one, four, five, and six); others on interviews with the 
managers (study number two); and one is based on questiomiaire technique and 
interviews with managers in half-year cycles (study number tliree). Different stages
■■of transition periods were considered (beginning of transition, 1990-1991 (studies 
number one and four); after economic recovery 1992-1993 (studies number tluee and 
six). Varying lengths of sample periods were considered (two years and tliree 
years). Varying numbers of sample enterprises were studied (20-187 enterprises).
Finally, different types of comparative studies were done (SOEs with 
commercialised (study number three); commercialised with liquidated (study number 
one); capital with liquidated, bankrupt, and commercialised (studies number two, 
four and five); MEBO with SOEs (study number six)).
The weaknesses of the studies are: (1) the periods of the sample studies are short;
(2) the samples of the enterprises are relatively small (less than one hundred 
enterprises, the exceptions are studies number one and six); (3) and most 
importantly, the studies are not “like-for-Iike”. That is to say, none of the studies 
compared the performance of enterprises that produce similar products, have similar 
size, operate in the same market environment, privatised tlirough the “capital” path, 
with others that produce the same type of products, have the same size, operate in the 
same market environment, but privatised through different paths of privatisation.
All six studies were done to evaluate the impact of different paths of privatisation, 
and different types of enterprises. The exception might be Study Number Six. It
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compai-ed the performance of enterprises in three different sectors (industry, services, 
and trade), privatised by the “MEBO” method, with the performance of these sectors 
in general; (4) the findings of the six studies are mixed; (5) to evaluate the impact 
of privatisation on the behaviour and performance of privatised enterprises, the state 
sector should be a natural point of reference. The point is, however, that in many 
respects those sectors are incomparable. It stems for instance, fiom different 
conditions of enterprises’ selection for a given privatisation track. For example, 
comparing the good financial standing of capital SOEs selected for capital track 
privatisation with those with a poorer financial status liquidated under Article (19) of 
the Act on SOEs, makes it very difficult to find a similar reference group among 
public firms; (6) moreover, from 1993, the Polish Classification of the National 
Economy (KGN) was replaced by the European Classification of Activities (EKD), 
which obviously gives a different picture of the financial situation of the economy, 
from the former. The EKD was elaborated on the basis of the publication of 
European Communities Statistical Office. There are differences between the two 
methods of classification; the public sector now includes units of mixed ownership,
i.e. economic units with public sector majority. Indirect taxes cover tm'nover tax, 
gambling and betting tax (introduced fiom 10 December, 1992), Value Added Tax 
(VAT) and excise tax (introduced from 5 July, 1993) and import tax (from January,
1994). Sales of industrial products are calculated on the basis of a monthly sample 
survey on price changes of products and services actually received by economic 
units. Price indices published before 1993 are based on net prices, that is, excluding 
VAT encumbrances, while those published starting from 1993 are based on the gross 
price survey, that is, including VAT tax.^  ^ As a consequence of these 
methodological changes data are not directly comparable with those for previous 
years. Therefore, the performance of enterprises is not a wholly accurate reflection 
of the financial performance of enterprises; (7) besides the fact that “window 
dressing” or “creative accounting” practices aimed at reducing tax liabilities, and 
deflating wages bills so as to lower the liability for social security contribution, were 
responsible for the poorer financial performance of the private sector. Private firms 
tended to over-report costs and under-report profits (see Section Four); (8) finally, 
the increases in the profitability and productivity figures might be a result of a
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reduction in the employment figures, rather than a result of a real improvement in 
the performance of the enterprises.
The strengths of the studies are: (1) they covered enterprises by size, type of 
privatisation, and different stages of transition; (2) some of them considered other 
factors that might have some impact on the behaviour of enterprises (such as their 
monopolistic advantage (for example, Study Number Three, and Four); initial 
financial situation (for example. Study Number Six); and regional location in Poland 
(for example. Study Number Two)); (3) the findings of some of these studies (for 
example, Study Number Three concerning the employment figures) confirmed some 
theories of privatisation; (4) most importantly, these studies provide an early 
indicator of the impact of privatisation, bearing in mind the following observations.
The sample of Study Number One represents only two techniques of privatisation 
(commercialisation and liquidation, based on Article (37) of the Law on Privatisation 
of SOEs of July, 1990), but gives no information to assess whether it is 
representative of the different regions of Poland. The study is representative of the 
different sectors of the economy, as it resembles the average trend of the whole 
privatisation process, as shown in Table (7.4) of section seven. Besides that, the 
sample is relatively big, representing 61% of the total number of liquidated 
enterprises, and 82% of the total number of the commercialised enterprises. Some of 
its findings confirm certain theories of privatisation and the findings of Section Four,
i.e. concerning the general performance of the Polish economy. For example, the 
study confirmed that privatisation might lead to an increase in wages and salaries, 
and to a drop in the employment figures. Because these findings were in a very early 
stage of the transition process, and the study was not “like-for-like”, therefore, one 
can hardly generalise. One can, however, consider these findings an initial 
indication or evidence of the impact of privatisation as well as other economic policy 
measures, because it is very difficult to divorce the impact of privatisation from that 
of other policy measures.
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The study showed that the perfoiinance of the commercialised enterprises 
deteriorated more rapidly than the performance of the liquidated enterprises. 
However, commercialisation helped to restructure enterprises, which is an important 
aspect in the transition process although it is a costly process. Commercialised 
enterprises did not show a tendency to remedy the economic situation, which might 
be explained by the fact that, commercialisation gives priority to restructuring rather 
than focusing on improving the enterprises’ competence. The fact that liquidated 
enterprises ai’e now mainly owned by the “insiders” of these enterprises means that 
the “insiders” tend to care more about improving the performance of their enterprises 
than in the past when they were owned by the State. The findings of the study 
confirmed this argument, as the liquidated enterprises performed better than 
commercialised ones, and helped enterprises to adapt themselves to the new 
economic environment.
The sample and the period covered by Study Number Two are very small (20 
enterprises, i.e. 8.8% of the total number of the privatised enterprises, covers only 
one year). Different techniques of privatisation were considered (commercialisation, 
initial public offering, sale, employee buy-out, liquidation, etc.). The sample 
covered different regions of Poland and different economic activities. Although the 
sample contains sufficient techniques, geographical, and economic activity 
variations, its findings are broadly presented. Moreover, some of these findings 
contradict those of other studies analysed in this section and some theories of 
privatisation. For example, the study found that privatisation was not accompanied 
by a mass reduction of employment, because that had happened before privatisation 
took place, and the members of new management are the previous managers of these 
enterprises. Moreover, the study showed that no changes have happened regarding 
new capital and know-how, because priority was given to the transition of ownership 
rights. Therefore, one can hardly assess the contribution of this study to the relative 
advantages and/or disadvantages of the different methods of privatisation, because of 
the generality of its findings.
313
■ v î
The sample of Study Number Tbree is relatively small (50 enterprises, less than 
one percent of the total number of the privatised enterprises), the period covers two 
different stages of economic transition (June, 1990 - June 1993); the first takes place 
in an environment of economic collapse, and the second takes place in a period of 
economic recovery. This study adopted different classification of firms by their size; 
small firms that employ less than 500 persons; medium which employ 501-2,000, 
and large which employ more than 2,000. The researchers argue that the proposed 
classification provides better chances of finding economically and socially relevant 
differences in adjustment mechanism between various groups of companies, than the 
traditional division. In my opinion, this makes the findings less comparable with 
other studies. The study was not representative of different regions. Moreover, it 
considered SOEs and commercialised enterprises the same, which is not true,
privatisation necessary?”. In fact, the answer to the first question might be explained
because commercialised enterprises are subject to harder budget constraints and to a 
financial managerial restmcturing. The study did not compaie the perfonnance of 
“like-for-like” enterprises, and covers only one type of privatisation (i.e. 
commercialisation, which is the first step of “capital” privatisation). It is very 
difficult to evaluate the contribution of this study to assess the relative advantages 
and/or disadvantages of the different methods of privatisation. Because SOEs 
performed better than commercialised enterprises, except in respect of wage spread, 
which was somewhat smaller in non-commercialised than commercialised 
enterprises, this study raised the questions; “What is the main reason behind the 
weak performance of commercialised enterprises compared to SOEs?”; and “Is
'Iby the clearly defined aim of commercialisation, which states that priority should be 
given to the restructuring of companies in the first two years before being sold to 
third parties, rather than focusing on improving their competence. This could 
confirm the argument that restructuring is necessary, but alone is not enough to 
improve the performance of enterprises.
In fact, the strong position of SOEs sampled in the studies might be explained by the 
fact that wages of SOEs are low, their budget constraints are harder, and SOEs have 
been in a viable holding pattern, which depends on the expectation that privatisation
I
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4will eventually take place. Besides that, firms realised that there would be no 
bailout, and that managers’ future jobs are dependent on the viability of their 
enterprises. In other words, managers believed that good performance will be 
rewai'ded at the time of privatisation and their reputation, and hence compensation, 
will depend upon their performance today. Manager's awareness that competition in 
their products market comes mainly from imports, was an important additional 
factor. Many SOEs, which were included in the studies, had reorganised their 
management structures to make finance and marketing rather than production their 
most important priority.
The study found that the perfonnance of these enterprises deteriorated in the first two 
years of transition, 1990-1991, and improved after 1992. These results coincide with 
the general performance of the Polish economy, in Section Four. That is to mean, 
the rapid elimination of relative price distortions that flowed from “big bang” 
liberalisation of prices and foreign trade, the imposition of “hard budget constraints” 
on enterprises, and the implementation of macroeconomic stabilisation measures, 
were effective techniques in inducing enterprises to change their behaviour.
study Number Four analyses different paths of privatisation; covers a short period 
of time; focuses on a variety of different types of enterprises; and considers different 
regions of Poland and different economic activities. The findings of this study 
showed that privatised enterprises through the “capital” path showed the best
■performance compared to those commercialised, and privatised through other paths 
of privatisation, such as liquidation and bankruptcy. However, it is veiy difficult to 
generalise and argue that the change in the behaviour of the privatised enterprises
,was a result of privatisation alone, especially when one remembers that these
enterprises had a better initial position (i.e. some of them acquired monopolistic
. . .advantage and a better initial financial position). The findings of these studies 
concerning the performance of commercialised enterprises confirm those of Study 
Number One, that commercialisation alone is not sufficient to improve the 
performance of enterprises.
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The sample of Study Number Five is relatively small (75 large enterprises), covers 
only the manufacturing sector, represents different regions all over Poland (both in 
big industrial centres and in smaller cities). The sample contains sufficient product 
and geographical variance to draw some initial conclusions. The main findings of 
the study is that, in terms of profit relative to output and various other measures, 
SOEs performed much better than commercialised enterprises. This study raises the 
same question concerning the necessity of privatisation. The findings suggest that 
hard budgets and import competition- essential ingredients of Poland’s reform 
programme- can exert adjustment pressures even when changes in ownership and 
governance lag behind.
Study Number Six was carried out on a representative sample of Leveraged Lease- 
buy-out (LLBO) companies, covering four different sectors (manufacturing, 
construction and trade and services). The study confirms that LLBO companies 
made much better use of their means of production after privatisation. This result 
confirms the findings of study number two, four and five, that “insiders” now care 
more about their companies than in the past, when these companies were owned by 
the State. Therefore, one might conclude that among the advantages of leasing or 
selling SOEs to their employees are that, pressure from “insiders” on the 
government, is absorbed, and the performance of the enterprises has improved. This 
confirms the findings of Study Number One (see Page 313). I believe that the 
finding of this study is logical and can be generalised at least in the short run.
Wbicb method of privatisation led to better results?. Theoretically, as noted in 
Section Five, it is argued that the performance of privatised enterprises would be 
improved if the privatisation process was able to create an efficient corporate 
governance structure. More specifically, it is preferable to establish an “outsiders” 
control system, rather than “insiders” control structure. However, none of the above 
six studies directly tested this argument, i.e. compared the performance of privatised 
enterprises controlled by “outsiders”, i.e. foreign or domestic strategic investors, with 
privatised enterprises controlled by “insiders”, i.e. owned by the management and/or 
the workers. But, as shown in the first part of this section and section seven, most of
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most of the enterprises privatised tlirough the “capital” path are now owned by 
foreign or domestic strategic investors (i.e. “outsiders”), but most of the “liquidated” 
enterprises are now owned by the “insiders”. Therefore, one might argue that only 
studies number Two and Four compared the performance of enterprises privatised 
tlii'ough the “capital” path (i.e. owned by “outsiders”), with those privatised through 
other paths, including “liquidation” (i.e. enterprises owned by “insiders”). Both 
studies showed that the best performance was achieved by enterprises privatised 
tlirough the “capital” path. Although this result confirms the above discussed 
theoretical argument, one should not forget that those enterprises which were 
privatised tlirough the “capital” path, were initially in a better financial and economic 
situation, and some of them acquired a monopolistic advantage. So, one can hardly 
generalise and argue that the improvement in the performance of those privatised 
enterprises (i.e. those controlled by “outsiders”) was purely a result of privatisation. 
Because it is very difficult to divorce the impact of privatisation from that of other 
elements of the economic transformation programme, and it is very difficult to 
separate the impact of the initial situation of the enterprises (i.e. their monopolistic 
advantage, and better financial position), fiom the impact of privatisation, it would 
be very hard to relate the change in the behaviour of enterprises to privatisation 
alone. One should bear in mind that privatisation is one element in the whole 
transformation process, and therefore, should not be treated in purely functional 
terms, but must be included in the whole process of structural changes (see below).
To make a more complete assessment of the specific contribution of 
privatisation as opposed to other measures, these studies should have been done 
on a larger sample and longer period. Moreover, these studies should have covered 
all methods of privatisation, and included veiy detailed microeconomic data to 
enable researchers to run an econometric regression analysis, which would help 
separating the impact of privatisation from that of other factors. For example, in 
order to investigate the impact of privatisation on output of one privatised enterprise, 
an econometric regression could be run, to include all the variables that have some 
impact on output, like exchange rate, interest rate, investment, exports, and
317
privatisation (where revenues from privatisation would be taken as proxy). 
Therefore, the regression equation will approximately be as follows:
Change in Output = Constant Variable + (a) Exchange Rate + (b) Interest Rate
+ (c) Privatisation + (d) Exports + (e) Investment + (f) Others..............(1)
Where output is the dependent variable, while the variables on the right hand side of 
the equation are the independent variables. The letters in the parentheses are the 
coefficients of the independent variables. Assuming that the results of the regression 
analysis is the following:
£250 = 50 + 0.23 (Exchange Rate) + 0.44 (Interest Rate) + 0.12 (Privatisation) + 
0.15 (Exports) + ..........................................................................................................(2)
Then, it is very clear from equation (2) that a change in the exchange rate, for 
example, by one unit is responsible for the change in output by 0.23 of the unit, and a 
change in the privatisation revenues by one imit is responsible for the change in 
output by 0.12 of the unit, etc..'^
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The difficulty in the Polish case is the fact that even the performance of the SOEs
Î
has improved. Then, it is obvious that in this case privatisation was not responsible 
for the improvement of the performance of these enterprises which are still owned by 
the State (see page 315, for the possible explanation for the improvement of the 
performance of SOEs). In this case, one should compare the performance of 
privatised enterprises, with those owned by the State, on the basis of “like-for-like”. 
The question to be answered; “Is it possible to carry out such a study in practice?”. 
In the case of Poland, it very difficult to find two enterprises (one privatised and the 
other owned by the State), working in the same economic enviromnent (i.e. 
competitive market), having the same size, producing the same type of product, 
operating in the same industrial sector, etc.. Bearing in mind the difficulties of the 
different methods of analysis, therefore, one should take the findings of the various 
analytical studies as indicators, considering all the possible weaknesses of the these 
studies.
To conclude, one can argue that different types of ownership structure can be 
distinguished in Poland: public sector; SOEs, STCs, State legal persons, and mixed.
Private sector; domestic co-operatives, individual proprietorships, domestic 
partnership, and mixed. The type of control created as a result of “capital” path 
privatisation was the move from “State corporate control”, to “State Treasury 
corporate control” in the first step, and from “State Treasury corporate control” to 
either “outsiders” (domestic or foreign investors) control, or MEBO “insiders'” 
control, in the second step. The type of corporate control that was established as a 
result of adopting the “liquidation privatisation” path was mainly an “insiders” 
conti'ol structure.
It was found that the behaviour of both State owned and privatised enterprises 
changed after the implementation of the economic transformation programme of 
1989/90. It is difficult to generalise and argue that the improvement in the
■performance of those privatised enterprises (i.e. those controlled by “outsiders”) is 
purely a result of privatisation. Therefore, privatisation should be treated as an ;}
integral element in the whole transformation process. However, it can be concluded
.that, the main initial privatisation results are the following: more active 
adjustment strategies in firms after their privatisation (mostly in JVs with foreign 
capital); substantial strengthening of the ownership control in firms that were 
divested under the capital track; improvement of management efficiency brought 
about by a new ownership structure and a better corporate governance structure; and 
better financial management (mainly in companies privatised tlirough the “capital” 
path); and finally, an increase in work discipline and employees’ identification with 
their firms.
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Endnotes:
 ^ Ickes, Ryterman, 1994:83.
 ^ Lubinski, 1996:110-111.
 ^ Ibid: 110.
'* Lamer, 1966; Kamerschen, 1968; Herman, 1981; Peev and Hare, 1995.
Dabrowski (1996) talks a b o u t models o f ownership systems that can be created 
as a result of privatisation: closed scattered and concentrated, and opened scattered 
and concentrated. He calls the type of ownership that occurs in companies based on 
lease agreements (management/employee buyouts (MEBOs)), “closed ownership 
system”, where employees become the sole proprietors. He argues that “deterring 
the entry to such companies o f outside investors usually results from a conscious 
choice, strengthened with a statutory inscription and a specific distribution 
mechanism of property rights (only among employees). This trend stems from 
employees’ fear that they will lose control over the firm, their belief that this kind of 
capital investment is highly profitable, and from their reluctance to share benefits 
with outsiders. The concentration of ownership in lease companies reflects the 
power and financial capabilities o f the management. In smaller companies, 
endowed with a low initial equity, the managers’ stake tends to be strongly 
concentrated (about 30% or more), which allows them in practice to exert full 
control over the firm ”.
IIn general, the closed ownership structure results from good financial standing of the 
firm, its sound industrial relations and a strong position of transformation champions 
prior to privatisation. Experience shows that lease companies have performed quite 
well in their current operations (both before and after privatisation). In addition, in 
many MEBO companies the organisational structure has been improved, the majority 
of shallow reserves has been used for product and market adjustments, and the most 
needed and obvious changes in employment have been introduced. However, some 
of those quantitative changes were undertaken prior to ownership transformations, 
since they were forced, on the one hand, by a new systemic environment and on the 
other by stronger competition from the private sector.
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“The scattered system is usually established when the management and other 
influential groups in the firm (a part o f the middle-level management, leaders of the 
workers’ council) do not have the possibility to buy out the controlling stake in the 
company at the starting point Over time, however, a trend to concentrate property 
rights within the group of managers can be easily traced. Instead, cases of 
“opening” the ownership system are much less frequent. They occur most often 
when a firm starts to display a dramatically poor performance, and recovery 
prospects worsen. ”
In the case of open ownership structures, the scattered system is usually derived from 
SOEs sale through an IPO. This type of ownership tends to develop in companies 
showing good financial performance, and enjoying a stable position and a good 
product mix. In this type of ownership staicture, privatisation meant a total 
withdrawal State interference in the company’s operations, and an upgrading of its 
status- first, joining the prestigious group of public companies, and next, the firms 
listed on the Stock Exchange.
 ^ In 1995, some employee-controlled companies succeeded in finding such 
domestic or foreign {Lubinski, 1996:111).
 ^ Andreff, 1995:4.
 ^ Aoki, 1990; Harris & Raviv, 1988.
 ^ Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996:313; Perotti, 1994:54; Canning and Hare, 
1994:179-180; Frydman and Rapacznski, 1994.
 ^ MoP, 1995, personal communication.
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The Law on the financial restructuring of enterprises and banks, which took 
effect in March, 1993 is seen as a part of such new regulations.
Dabrowski, Federowicz and Szomburg, 1992, “Privatisation o f Polish SOEs”, 
Second Report. GIME:Warsaw, Poland.
Pinto et al, 1993, “Transferring State Enterprises in Poland: Evidence on
Adjustment by Manufacturing Firms, Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 2:213- 
270.
This study was carried out by The Institute of Political Science of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences in Warsaw; and the Gdansk Institute for Market Economy, in 
1993 and 1994.
For more details on the new methodological notes see. Central Statistical Office,
1991, ‘European Classification o f Activities’, Second Edition, Warsaw; and Central
Statistical Office, 1995, Statistical Bulletin, August, Vol.XXXIX:6~17.
The difficulty is the fact that privatisation might have a direct impact on the other
independent variables such as investment, and exports. In this case, problems of
econometric regression would complicate the situation. Besides the fact that the 
.period of transition is too short to run such an econometric regression, and it is very 
difficult to find enough microeconomic data needed for such this type of work.
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C o n c lu s io n s
1
1
The general puipose of the thesis is to examine the contribution of privatisation to 
economic transformation in Poland, during the period 1990-95, and to assess the 
relative merits of different privatisation methods. In order to accomplish these goals, 
the origins, development, and initial impact of privatisation were studied in some detail.
It is of importance to remember that it is hard to unequivocally assess the effects of the 
six year privatisation of the Polish economy, first of all due to the complexity of the 
process itself, and also because the period considered was too short to be able to draw a 
clear picture or “profit and loss account”. However, a preliminary evaluation is 
attempted.
According to the findings of the study, one can ai'gue that Poland is on the right track.
Poland was the first country in the region to break the recessionary forces accompanying 
the Eastern European transition. Since March, 1992 Poland has been one of Europe’s 
fastest growing economies. The restoration of growth occurred simultaneously with 
sustained declines in inflation rates, which in 1989 had reached hyperinflationary levels.
Poland has made progress in attaining external balance and increasing external 
creditworthiness. Poland’s foreign trade has been definitively reoriented away from the 
former members of the COMECON toward the developed capitalist countries of the 
OECD. Poland has established the region’s largest private sector, and the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange showed some progress in 1993, 1994, and 1995. The behaviour of State owned 
and privatised enterprises has changed. Unemployment appears to have peaked, and 
started declining in the third quarter of 1994. In addition, Poland has attracted EDI The 
whole purpose of the economic reform programme of 1989/90 is to transform the Polish 
economy from a Centrally Planned economy, to a market orientated one. What was the 
role of privatisation?.
%■I
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The study discussed the main features of the CSS to serve as a general framework for the
discussion of the Polish Socialist system during the period 1945-89. It was found that the 
.inefficiency of the CSS, in general, and the need to create an efficient corporate 
governance structure, to replace the State in monitoring the behaviour of the management 
of the enterprises, are the main reasons behind the urgent need for privatisation. The 
study, then, discussed the macroeconomic features of the Polish economy during the 
Socialist period, focusing on the development of the corporate control structure. Before 
1956, SOEs were controlled by the “industrial ministries”, which were responsible for 
the operation of large-and-medium-scale nationalised enterprises in their sector. In 1956, 
when Gomulka came to power. Workers’ Councils were established, and given a few 
unequivocal rights to monitor the behaviour of the managers of the enterprises. However, 
these measures were interrupted by strong pressure from the Soviet Union. In 1970/71, 
Gierek’s regime took another step toward decentralisation by setting up what is called 
“Large Economic Organisations”, or Wielka Organizacja Gospodarcza (WOG), as 
intermediate agencies between the individual plants and the economic ministries. The 
main purpose of those associates was to assist in planning investments and production 
and in allocating resources. In the eaily 1980s, Kania’s regime embarked on a new 
economic reform programme. The main achievement of this programme concerning 
corporate governance was that enterprises were to be self-managing, self-deteimining, 
and self-financing. According to these rules, enterprises were given certain powers to 
organise their daily business. However, the imposition of Martial Law on 13 December, 
1981, interrupted the self-government movement that had been gaining momentum in the 
second half of 1981, especially in big industrial plants. Therefore, the 1956/7, 1971, and 
1980/81, attempts at reform aimed at vaiiously conceived decentralisation and 
marketisation, and were concerned almost exclusively with improving the Decision- 
Making processes, but not at transforming the economy. Section two ended by discussing 
the legacy of the Socialist System in Poland in the late 1980s, and concluded that there 
was a need for a radical transformation programme. It was possible at that period of time 
due to four main reasons; the disappearance of the political factors that had constrained 
change in the past 45 years; the severe economic crisis that hit the Polish economy; the
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will among the ruling Party leaders to continue with the same Socialist system.
■ ?!
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support that Poland received from the international community; and the lack of political
' ■ I"I
Economic theories say little on how to transform an economy from a socialist to a 
market orientated one, though they offer some models for stabilisation. Most of the 
proposed models agreed that six broad elements of any comprehensive economic reform 
scenario must be in place for the reforms to be considered successful: (1) macroeconomic 
stabilisation; (2) microeconomic liberalisation; (3) enterprise restructuring and 
privatisation; (4) institutional reforms; (5) development of financial markets and 
institutions; and (6) a new system of social security. It is agreed that privatisation is one 
of the main elements for any economic reform scenario to be successful. In other words, 
successful transition to a market economy results from, and requires, the resolute and 
clear-sighted pursuit of a policy strategy having three essential and interdependent 
components: freeing the economy, decentralising decision making, and allowing
individuals to assume responsibility for their economic decision and actions. Stabilising 
the economy; to ensure, essentially through appropriately tight fiscal and monetary 
policies, that decisive progress is made toward low inflation, together with sustainable 
external and budgetary balances. Restructuring, and creation where necessary, the 
institutions and markets needed for a competitive market economy to function effectively 
and to serve the broader and higher objective- high quality growth. This includes 
adaptation of the Social Safety Net to help address the social costs of transition.
It was found that the sequencing of economic reform has only recently emerged as a 
topic of theoretical analysis. The fundamental reason for sequencing the reforms is that 
some changes are preconditions for others. For example, macroeconomic stabilisation is 
needed if price reform is to be successful. The systems and skill, which have to be in 
place for the markets to work, need to be developed. So, financial liberalisation is 
extremely risky, unless a sound system of accounting, auditing, prudential regulation and 
supervision is in place, and unless the economy is reasonably stable. The most important 
conclusion concerning the sequencing of the reforms is that a linear sequence of
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individual policy changes is not likely to succeed. In addition, no single reform sequence 
will fit all the transitional economies.
The Polish authorities formulated their ERP of 1989-90 after a very long political, 
social, and economic debate with the different conflict groups. Poland adopted a “big 
bang”, or “shock therapy” approach in 1989/90, to transform its economy into a market 
orientated one. The Polish ERP had two packages; (1) a macroeconomc stabilisation and 
microeconomic liberalisation package, aimed at bringing down inflation and restoring 
market equilibrium in the commodity market, and equilibrium of the cuuent account 
balance; and (2) an institutional (system) transformation package, aimed at creating a 
modern market economy. Privatisation is an element in the second package.
The stabilisation package can be defined as heterodox, with two nominal anchors, the 
nominal wage and the exchange rate, and fiscal and monetary tightening. Prices and 
trade were liberalised, the zloty became fully convertible, and the tax system was 
changed.
The study thoroughly analysed the meaning, the main issues, the main methods, and 
constraints to privatisation in Eastern Europe, to serve as a general framework to the 
Polish privatisation experience during the period 1989-95. In Eastern Europe 
privatisation can be seen as a process that takes the State out of the decision making over 
the allocation of the returns from SOEs; and a way to create a new ownership structure 
that would effectively oversee the management of the newly privatised enterprises.
The main issues of privatisation in Eastern Europe are the overall role of privatisation in 
the transition process, the compartmentalisation of privatisation policies; property rights 
and corporate governance, and the problem of privatising large enterprises. Theoretically, 
SOEs can either be directly sold, or freely distribute their shares, to the “insiders”, 
“outsiders”, or to the previous owners. More than 20 techniques of privatisation are 
available worldwide. Each technique has certain advantages and disadvantages. The
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On 13 July, 1990, the Law on Privatisation of SOEs won the approval of the Parliament.
Study found that the main constraints to privatisation in Eastern Europe in general are 
politics, identification of enterprises chosen for privatisation, valuation, low levels of 
demand for shares of the privatised companies, the lack of a capital market, and low 
levels of credits to the private sector.
Poland was the second country after Hungary, which adopted privatisation as an “official” 
economic policy in 1990. To be able to assess the contribution of privatisation in the 
transformation process, the study thoroughly analysed the development of Poland 
philosophy on privatisation, within the framework of the political, social, and economic 
environment prevailing at the time - as Polish privatisation does not operate in a vacuum. 
It has been found that the different conflict groups in Poland (the managers of SOEs, 
Workers’ Councils, Trade Unions, the Parliament, different governments, and the 
President) have an important impact on formulating Polish privatisation policy. The first 
technique of privatisation “officially” adopted in Poland, by the first Solidarity-led 
government was the “British-model”, which is based on the idea of offering shares to the 
public (IPO). Disappointment at the slowness of the privatisation process, in the second 
half of 1990, revived the idea of the free distribution of vouchers to all Poles, presented 
by Lewandowski and Szomburg in 1988. In addition, this alerted the government to the 
necessity of combating pressure from enterprises “insiders”.
The Law accepts the idea of a ''multi-track'' approach to privatisation. The main 
methods of privatisation provided by the Law on Privatisation of 1990 are “capital” 
privatisation and “privatisation via liquidation”. It is possible to implement mass 
privatisation based on vouchers through Article 25 of the Law, but mass privatisation was 
implemented in Poland through a special law; the Mass Privatisation Programme of 1993. 
Another type of liquidation is applied in Poland, based on Article 19 of the Law on SOEs 
of September, 1981. Each path of privatisation in Poland has slightly different economic 
and social goals, and usually also applies to different groups of SOEs, broken down by
I
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employees of enterprises; developing entrepreneurs and managers with initiative, drive 
and a keen sense of opportunity; and generating funds from the sale of enterprises, which 
can be used for enterprise restructuring.
Before collapsing in June, 1992, the third government managed, to scale back the SPP of 
the previous government. The most important achievement of the last Solidarity-led
iHÀ
size and financial standing. For example, the rationale behind privatising small trade and 
services establishments was to introduce an ownership management business. :
The Polish privatisation process is highly decenti’alised. For example, the MoP is 
responsible for privatising medium and large scale enterprises, while the MoF is 
responsible for privatising the banking and financial sector. The Agriculture State 
Agency is responsible for privatising State agricultural enterprises.
The Law on Privatisation of 1990 did not fix specific targets for privatisation to be 
achieved. Later, at the end of 1990, the first Solidarity-led government officially 
announced its main goals of privatisation. The goals published in January, 1991, are the 
following: privatising half the present SOEs within thi'ee years; achieving the same 
ownership stincture as Western Europe within five years; shifting the economy from a 
centrally planned system to an open mai'ket system to foster efficiency and competition; 
reducing the size of the public sector and the burden on the public budget and 
administration; promoting wider share ownership among the public at large, including
Apai't from the fact that these goals are broadly defined, it is very clear that not all these 
objectives can be achieved at once, and trade-off and compromise are inevitable. The 
first two objectives are over optimistic, therefore, the second Solidarity-led Government 
changed the ambitious plan for privatisation aiming at privatising half of the 8,441 SOEs 
from three to five years. Moreover, this Government introduced a new philosophy for 
privatisation. Another two privatisation programmes were formulated; the "Sectoral 
Privatisation Programme (SPP)", and the "Restructuring Privatisation Programme",
' 7'
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government (Suchocka’s Government) was the adoption of the Mass Privatisation 
Programme, which won the approval of the Parliament and the Senate in April, and May, 
1993, respectively. However, only in November, 1995, did the real implementation of the 
programme start. The conflict among the different Solidarity members brought a large 
victory to ex-communists in the Parliamentary elections of September, 1993. The study 
examined whether or not there was a change in the attitudes towards privatisation as an 
economic policy. It was found that the first two ex-Communist Governments announced 
their intention to begin a "mass commercialisation programme", which many analysts 
deem a substitute for, rather than a stepping-stone to, full-fledged privatisation. This 
programme came in the form of an amendment to the Law on Privatisation of SOEs of 
1990, and the long delayed MPP. Parliament did not pass the new amendments to the 
Law on Privatisation. Another privatisation programme was introduced by the first ex- 
communist Government; “the Stabilisation, Restructuring and Privatisation Programme 
(SRP)”, but was unsuccessful.
As the study shows, the only important issue in the privatisation debate was the form of 
ownership, not how to achieve that foim of ownership, that is to say, there was little 
discussion on the method of management of the SOEs before being privatised. The 
Polish political environment was always unstable. The whole privatisation process was 
progressing in an environment of strong pressure groups, frequent elections and a 
fragmented party system, apai't from other important external conditions, like the collapse 
of COMECON.
The progress of ownership transformation is very differentiated as it depends on the 
privatisation track adopted, firms’ size, their financial standing, and economic sector. It 
has been shown that the total number o f privatised enterprises in the past six years 
(1990-95) was less than one fifth of the 8,441 SOEs. The objective of the Polish 
Governments to privatise fifty percent of the 8,441 SOEs within five years, has not been 
realised. In total, only about 70% of the total number of 8,441 SOEs, has been included 
in the process of ownership changes. As for the method o f privatisation, small-scale
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privatisation was very fast, as Poland was able to privatise more than 95% of the small- 
scale retail wholesale, and construction enterprises, by the end of 1992. Regarding 
economic sectors, the study showed that the industrial sector accounts for more than 30% 
of the total number of privatised enterprises. The constmction sector ranks second.
Regarding the path o f privatisation, “privatisation through liquidation” comes first, and 
“bankruptcy liquidation” ranks second. As for the size o f enterprise, it has been found 
that small-scale enterprises were the fastest, followed by medium and large enterprises.
Contrasting the pace of privatisation by the financial standing of the enterprises, the 
study showed that enterprises with good financial standing were the fastest, but those 
which required restructuring (i.e. those commercialised before being privatised) needed 
more time. To sum up, one can argue that lack of capital markets, shortages of 
households savings, lack of domestic or foreign investors, strategic public opposition, and
political constraints, aie the main factors responsible for the slow pace of privatisation.
The study investigated whether the Polish privatisation process contributed to 
economic transformation. The goal of achieving a wider ownership among the 
public at large, including employees of enterprises can hardly be examined, because one 
cannot tell exactly how many people in Poland as a whole participated in the privatisation 
process, and have some shares in the privatised enterprises. This applies to employees of 
privatised enteiprises as well. However, one can argue that through the MPP, a wider 
share ownership would be achieved, but whether this would be to the benefit of privatised 
enterprises and the economy as a whole, it is difficult to assess.
The impact of privatisation on output was through its impact on exports and the 
development of the private sector. This was thanks mainly to the privatisation process in 
its broadest sense of the word, i.e. the “grass-root” or “bottom-up” privatisation, as well 
as “up-down” privatisation. In 1994, the private sector was responsible for more than 
50% of the total Polish exports, compared to 5% in 1990. This was mainly due to the 'vfavourable changes in foreign trade regulations, and the privatisation process. GDP 
growth rates declined sharply in the first two years of the transition process, and have
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Started to recover in 1992, reaching 6.8% by 1995. Privatisation cannot be sustained 
unless the political leadership is committed to it. And, for privatisation to be successful it 
must reflect a shift in the preferences of the public. The positively explosive growth of 
the private sector in Poland can be regarded as the most conclusive proof that Polish 
society is really in favour of a private economy. The findings of the studies on 
enterprises (Section Eight), confirm this fact. For example, the productivity, receivable 
to payable ratio, and sales of enterprises studied during the period 1990-1991, have 
declined (studies number one and four), while the same variables showed positive growth 
rates during the period 1992-93 (study number six).
The impact of privatisation on State budget, which mainly came from the divesture of 
SOEs rather than liquidation. The weight of privatisation receipts in overall budget 
revenues was only 0.8%, 1.5% and 1.7%, in 1991, 1992, and 1993, respectively, and rose 
to 2.5% in 1994, with an expected 2.9% in 1995. The percentage share of the total 
revenues from privatisation to GDP increased from 0,2% in 1991 to 0.5% in 1993, and to
0.7% in 1994. The income resulting from privatisation was disappointingly small in
,compaiison with the expectations of the politicians, who saw privatisation as a financial 
source which would aid in the consolidation of the State Budget. This was because the 
vast majority of enterprises were liquidated rather than sold. The impact of privatisation 
on expenditures came as a reduction in the government subsidies to the privatised 
enterprises. The main positive impact of reducing subsidies was the reduction of 
government deficits. This was also intended to ensure that the SOEs would be able to 
operate on the basis of a hard budget constraint. However, in effect this was mitigated by 
the fact that some enterprises continued to have access to credits from state owned banks, 
while others merely adjusted their investment strategies.
The impact of privatisation on creating a capital market came after reopening the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). The first five privatised enterprises had shares listed on 
the WSE, and by the end of November, 1995, there were only 50 companies quoted in the 
basic market of the WSE, and 12 companies were quoted in the parallel market. The
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reason the companies listed are growing slowly is because the process of privatising State 
owned assets through public offer of shares has proved to be more difficult than was 
expected. Most importantly, companies are not interested in being listed, since it is costly 
and requires the full disclosure of financial data on a regular basis. On November 22, 
1996, the National Investment Funds (NIFs) created as part of the Mass Privatisation 
Programme will be listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. As a result, one can expect a 
considerable increase in capital market activity. Three different types of securities will be 
available in the capital mai'ket; the shares of the privatised companies; shares Certificates; 
and shares of NIFs themselves.
There was no impact from privatisation on foreign debt although the regulations 
peiinit using the Debt-equity swap operation. The decline in the Polish external debt was 
a result of the agreements with Paris and London Clubs.
The impact of privatisation on FDI arose as a result of the participation of foreign 
investors in the various methods of privatisation; commercialisation; liquidation; the 
creation of joint-venture companies with companies owned by the State Treasury, or with 
an SOEs. In some cases, FDI arose as a result of foreign companies taking part in State 
designed rescue programmes. The study showed that the number of companies with 
foreign participation set up as a result of acquisition of shares of STCs increased from 7 
at the end of 1991, to 70 at the end of 1995. Likewise, the number of foreign companies ;
established as a result of contribution of assets of liquidated public enterprises, increased 
from 2 at the end of 1990, to 37 at the end of 1994. 80% of companies established 
through both the acquisition of shares of STCs and the contribution of assets of 
liquidated SOEs, operated in industry. The study showed that most companies 
established through the privatisation of State owned assets involved participation of 
foreign capital from the European Union countries (mainly from Germany) as well as the 
USA and Switzerland. The study argued that foreign investment, although increasing, 
has been less than expected or needed. The findings of Study Number One (in Section
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Eight) showed that foreign participation in the privatisation process of the sampled 
enterprises was low.
The impact of privatisation on the labour market was mainly on the levels of 
employment figures and nominal and real wages. The main negative impact of 
privatisation is the increase in the unemployment rate, due to layoffs, which were mainly 
a result of the insolvency of bankrupt enterprises. The study showed that the percentage 
share of mass-layoffs in the total number of unemployed people was 18.9% in the first 
quarter of 1991, decreasing to 16.5% in the second quarter of 1994. At the same time, the 
study showed that one of the main positive impacts of privatisation, in its broad sense, is 
the growth of the private sector, which helped to absorb mass lay-offs, which arose as a 
result of the bankruptcy liquidation of SOEs. The findings of Studies Number One and 
Three showed that there is a drop in the employment figures after privatisation, while 
Study Number Four showed that privatisation was not accompanied by a considerable 
reduction in employment as that had taken place before privatisation.
Real wages in Poland decreased during the first four years of transition, but have started 
increasing since 1994. The findings of Studies Number One, Two, Three, Four, and Six 
showed that wages in the surveyed enterprises were increasing. This confirms the 
argument that one of the main incentives to privatisation is the expectation that wages 
would increase.
The study found that one of the main consequences of the privatisation process on 
enterprises is the type of corporate governance, which was established after privatisation. 
As a result of privatisation, there was a move from a structure of "State corporate 
control", to either an "insiders'" or "outsiders" structure of corporate governance. More 
specifically, the type of control which was created as a result of adopting the "capital" 
privatisation path was the move from “State” control to “State Treasury” control in the 
first step, and from “State Treasury” control to either “outsiders” (domestic or foreign 
investors) control, or MEBO “insiders” control. The type of corporate control which was
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Bear in mind that the transition process is still ongoing, the relative merits of different
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established as a result of adopting the “liquidation privatisation” path was mainly 
“insiders” control structure. The study tried to evaluate (in Section eight) the impact of 
the new types of corporate control on the performance of privatised enterprises. The 
findings of the survey studies analysed in Section Eight, argue that the performance of the 
privatised enterprises as well as SOEs improved. But one can hardly argue that this was 
purely a result of privatisation, because even SOEs have changed their behaviour after 
implementing the stabilistion and liberalisation measures without ownership changes. To
.make a more complete assessment of the specific contribution of privatisation to 
economic transformation, in general, and the performance of privatised enteiprises, in 
particular, an econometric regression analysis, based on like-for-like analysis could be 
done (see Section Eight, page 318-319, for detail).
I.
privatisation methods can be summarised as follows; “Capital” privatisation created 
the most efficient corporate governance stincture, which is reflected in the performance 
of privatised enterprises via this path. The highest level of funds to the budget was 
generated via the “capital” path. Most of the enterprises listed on WSE were privatised 
through this path. All privatised enterprises through this track had to be restructured in 
the first step. This path attracted the highest share of FDI that came into Poland through 
privatisation.
The “liquidation privatisation” path was the fastest path of privatisation, accounting for
■more than two thirds of the total number of privatised and liquidated enterprises. This 
path helped to reduce pressure from enterprise “insiders” on the government, because 
most of the privatised enterprises via this track were leased to their personnel, and are 
now under “insiders” control. At the same time, this path helped to reduce the burden on 
the public budget and administration, and fostered the growth of entrepreneurs and 
managers with initiative, drive and a keen sense of opportunity. The study showed that 
this type of privatisation improved the performance of enterprises, because “insiders” 
who are the owners of the liquidated enterprises care more about improving the
1Î
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performance of their enterprises, than in the past when these enteiprises were owned by 
the State.
The Mass Privatisation Programme is the best in achieving wider share ownership 
among the public at large, including employees of enteiprises, however, one cannot 
assess, at this early stage, the relative merits of this programme concerning ownership and 
performance issues, as the programme only began in November, 1995.
Commercialisation ensures a more rapid programmes of restructuring, but cannot be 
considered a full method of privatisation. Finally, bankruptcy privatisation helped to
rid the Polish economy of a large number of poor enterprises. Is
f
Finally, the importance of this study comes from the fact that it analysed the Polish 
privatisation experience, which is the richest in Eastern Europe. Poland adopted a “multi­
track” approach to privatise its economy, avoiding the risk of adopting one single method.
.The study investigated the relative merits of the different methods of privatisation, and 
the initial contribution of privatisation to economic transformation. The study noted that 
it was veiy difficult to separate the impact of privatisation from that of other factors.
However, it is the first to analyse the origins, development, and initial results of 
privatisation in one work. The originality of the work appears mainly in sections three, 
six, seven, and eight. This study analysed in detail the development of Polish 
privatisation philosophy within the framework of the political, social, and economic 
environment. The impact of privatisation on corporate governance structure has never 
been analysed before in the case of Poland. Data and information used in the study were 
provided directly to the researcher, after some interviews with well informed experts in 
the Ministry of Privatisation (see bibliography). ■
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2. Mr. T. L. Krawczski, Research Assistant, PAIZ.
F. SBC Warburg
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